


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EDUCATION ISSUES AND PLANNING, 1953-1966

Interviews with:

Donald Doyle
Robert E. McKay
Keith Sexton
Alex C. Sherriffs

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Governmental History Documentation Project

Goodwin Knight/Edmund Brown, Sr., Era

EDUCATION ISSUES AND PLANNING, 1953-1966

Donald Doyle	An Assemblyman Views Education, Mental Health, and Legislative and Republican Politics
Robert E. McKay	Robert McKay and the California Teachers' Association
Keith Sexton	Legislating Higher Education: a Consultant's View of the Master Plan for Higher Education
Alex C. Sherriffs	The University of California and the Free Speech Movement: Perspectives from a Faculty Member and Administrator

Interviews Conducted by
James H. Rowland
in 1978, 1979

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PREFACE

Covering the years 1953 to 1966, the Goodwin Knight-Edmund G. "Pat" Brown, Sr., Oral History Series is the second phase of the Governmental History Documentation Project begun by the Regional Oral History Office in 1969. That year inaugurated the Earl Warren Era Oral History Project, which produced interviews with Earl Warren and other persons prominent in politics, criminal justice, government administration, and legislation during Warren's California era, 1925 to 1953.

The Knight-Brown series of interviews carries forward the earlier inquiry into the general topics of: the nature of the governor's office, its relationships with the legislature and with its own executive departments, biographical data about Governors Knight and Brown and other leaders of the period, and methods of coping with the rapid social and economic changes of the state. Key issues documented for 1953-1966 were: the rise and decline of the Democratic party, the impact of the California Water Plan, the upheaval of the Vietnam War escalation, the capital punishment controversy, election law changes, new political techniques forced by television and increased activism, reorganization of the executive branch, the growth of federal programs in California, and the rising awareness of minority groups. From a wider view across the twentieth century, the Knight-Brown period marks the final era of California's Progressive period, which was ushered in by Governor Hiram Johnson in 1910 and which provided for both parties the determining outlines of government organization and political strategy until 1966.

The Warren Era political files, which interviewers had developed cooperatively to provide a systematic background for questions, were updated by the staff to the year 1966 with only a handful of new topics added to the original ninety-one. An effort was made to record in greater detail those more significant events and trends by selecting key participants who represent diverse points of view. Most were queried on a limited number of topics with which they were personally connected; a few narrators who possessed unusual breadth of experience were asked to discuss a multiplicity of subjects. Although the time frame of the series ends at the November 1966 election, when possible the interviews trace events on through that date in order to provide a logical baseline for continuing study of succeeding administrations. Similarly, some narrators whose experience includes the Warren years were questioned on that earlier era as well as the Knight-Brown period.

The present series has been financed by grants from the California State Legislature through the California Heritage Preservation Commission and the office of the Secretary of State, and by some individual donations. Portions of several memoirs were funded partly by the California Women in Politics Project under a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, including a matching grant from the Rockefeller Foundation; the two projects were produced concurrently in this office, a joint effort made feasible by overlap of narrators, topics, and staff expertise.

The Regional Oral History Office was established to tape record autobiographical interviews with persons significant in the history of California and the West. The Office is under the administrative direction of James D. Hart, Director of The Bancroft Library, and Willa Baum, head of the Office.

Amelia R. Fry, Project Director
Gabrielle Morris, Project Coordinator

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Project Interviewers

Malca Chall
Amelia R. Fry
Gabrielle Morris
James Rowland
Sarah Sharp
Julie Shearer

Special Interviewers

Eleanor Glaser
Harriet Nathan
Suzanne Riess
Miriam Feingold Stein
Ruth Teiser

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GOODWIN KNIGHT-EDMUND BROWN, SR. ERA ORAL HISTORY PROJECT
(California, 1953-1966)

Interviews Completed, December 1980

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INTRODUCTION

In its Governmental History Documentation Project, the Regional Oral History Office designated the subject of education as a significant aspect of its study of the Goodwin J. Knight/Edmund G. (Pat) Brown era. Incorporated in this volume and dealing in whole or in part on education issues, are interviews with former Assemblyman Donald Doyle, chairman of the Assembly Education Committee from 1955 to 1958; Robert E. McKay, retired lobbyist for the California Teachers Association; Keith Sexton, former administrative assistant to Assemblywoman Dorothy Donohoe and consultant to the Master Plan for Higher Education survey team; and Dr. Alex C. Sherriffs, past Vice-Chancellor of Student Affairs at the University of California, Berkeley, during the Free Speech Movement protests of 1964.

Best studied within today's context of underenrolled schools and budgetary belt tightening, this volume should offer a valuable historical perspective on the structure and behavior of the educational establishment during a period of seemingly unlimited enrollment; public school personnel and higher education specialists should take special interest. Public school financing and other issues concerned with educational legislative relations is the main topic of the Donald Doyle and Robert E. McKay memoirs. For researchers on the Master Plan for Higher Education, the Sexton memoir analyses the key personalities involved in the master plan study and traces the complicated legislative maneuverings that led to its enactment. The inclusion of Dr. Sherriffs' account of the Free Speech Movement from one at the helm of the battle adds a special dimension to this volume. By probing the roots of student protest, he constructs a portrait of the University campus, the legislature, and the governor's office as they reacted to this phenomenon of the mid-1960s. He encloses extensive written documentation which is available in The Bancroft Library.

A careful review of the memoirs should reveal further questions on educational legislative relations. A sample of points raised: how are educational issues used in a political campaign? What are the ingredients of a successful educational lobbyist? What rivalries exist within the educational establishment? How are rivalries between educational institutions reflected in the legislature? To education specialists, these are questions that go beyond the 1953-1966 time frame of this study; in many cases, arguments revealed in the memoirs are just as relevant to present conditions in education as they were in their own historical setting.

This volume contains by no means the sum of testimonies on education recorded for the Governmental History Documentation Project. The reader is directed to the following interviews which supplement the enclosed memoirs: Governor Edmund G. (Pat) Brown, Senator Hugo Fisher, Senator Joseph Rattigan, and Superintendent of Public Instruction Roy Simpson.

By providing primary documentation on the structure and behavior of education and its relation to state government in the 1953-1966 period, the reader may gain insights on the mechanics of the state governmental process. In focusing on education, this volume provides a framework for conceptualizing the educational bureaucracy and a preliminary view of decision making in state politics.

James H. Rowland
Interviewer/Editor

14 August 1980
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University of California, Berkeley

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Berkeley, California

Governmental History Documentation Project

Goodwin Knight/Edmund Brown, Sr., Era

Donald Doyle

AN ASSEMBLYMAN VIEWS EDUCATION, MENTAL HEALTH,
AND LEGISLATIVE AND REPUBLICAN POLITICS

An Interview Conducted by
James H. Rowland
in 1979

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INTERVIEW HISTORY

Donald Doyle was interviewed by the Regional Oral History Office for the Goodwin J. Knight - Edmund G. Brown, Sr. era segment of its Governmental History Documentation Project. Assemblyman Doyle's vice-chairmanship of the Republican State Central Committee during the period of party turmoil and in-fighting, his trusted relationship with Governor Goodwin J. Knight, and his assembly career as an active supporter of education and mental health made him a valuable resource in our documentation of the Goodwin Knight era in state government.

Born to a large farm family, Donald Doyle was raised in the bucolic Central Valley setting of Dinuba, California. In the midst of the 1930s Depression, he joined the federal Civilian Conservation Corps which proved to be a valuable learning experience for a farm boy isolated from people of diverse backgrounds and races. He left the farm for good in the late 1930s and studied at Fresno State College where he had the opportunity to improve his public speaking skills. After serving in the Marine Corps during World War II, he married and moved to Contra Costa County and inaugurated an insurance partnership. Assuming the presidency of the Oakland Association of Insurance Agents, he took an active concern for insurance legislation as well as county education issues; coupled with his impressive speaking skills, he became an attractive candidate for public office. In 1952, he was selected by the county Republican Assembly as their nominee for the vacant tenth state assembly district seat. Winning the primary and general election on a determined, personable, grassroots campaign, he beat the odds that favored a Democrat in that strong labor district.

Once in office, he became involved in internal assembly and state-wide Republican politics that increased his prominence in the lower house and his association with Governor Goodwin Knight. As one of the key votes that won James Silliman the title of assembly Speaker in 1953, Doyle was rewarded with the position as vice-chairman of the Education Committee. He was promoted as chairman of the Education Committee with the election of Luther Lincoln as Speaker in 1955. As a key legislative advisor to Governor Knight, he defended, with the endorsement of the governor, conflict of interest charges directed at him by the press over his staff appointments to the Education Committee.

As a leading Republican politician and advisor to the governor, he succeeded Howard Ahmanson as vice-chairman of the Republican State Central Committee in the governor's attempt to stop the Nixon-Knowland forces from seizing control of the California Republican party. From his position in the party, he witnessed further party in-fighting against Knight, culminating in Knight's abandoned 1958 gubernatorial campaign due to William Knowland and conservative party pressure. Assemblyman Doyle is more widely known as the co-author of the

progressive Short-Doyle Community Mental Health Act of 1957. The signing of the act by Governor Knight in 1957 was achieved only by long months of closed-door negotiations, committee testimony, and legislative give and take. The final passage should stand as a tribute to Assemblyman Doyle's persistent advocacy and close relations with Governor Knight.

I arranged a one-session interview with Assemblyman Doyle at his insurance headquarters in San Francisco on June 20, 1979. Looking tanned and fit, he ushered me into his office and, after customary introductions, launched his narration with enthusiasm. In a single three-hour interview, we covered his personal history, his initial campaign for the assembly in 1952, various legislative personalities and episodes, the Knight-Knowland-Nixon struggle for party power, his actions as chairman of the Assembly Education Committee, and the development and enactment of the Short-Doyle Act of 1957.

After editing, the interview transcript was forwarded to Assemblyman Doyle for final review. Complications with a heavy work load and travel commitments prevented him from giving the transcript a meticulous review. After the transcript sat on his desk for several months, he resolved to give it a brief page-by-page review and personally return it to me in his office.

The Donald Doyle memoir represents the emotions, drama, and legislative maneuverings inherent in the state political system. In a highly charged testimony, he recalled the abandonment of Goodwin Knight's 1958 gubernatorial campaign due to conservative party pressures. In the same vein, he contributed a candid narration of the conflict of interest charges hurled at him by press sources for his chairmanship of the Education Committee. Through legislative brokering and his close association with Governor Knight, he recalled the give and take and final enactment of the Short-Doyle Community Mental Health Act. In all, the Doyle memoir should offer researchers a vivid documentary on the pitfalls and promises of politics.

James H. Rowland
Interviewer-Editor

5 August 1980
Regional Oral History Office
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University of California at Berkeley

I TRACING A PERSONAL HISTORY

[Date of Interview: June 20, 1979]##

Family Background

Rowland: You are aware of what our project is attempting to document?

Doyle: Yes.

Rowland: We have a certain format that we like to start off with each interviewee and that deals with family genealogy and childhood and education. This is mainly helpful for researchers to get a background on the interviewee. We mainly ask the interviewee to give us a little bit of background on the family's origin, where they came from, why they settled in California, et cetera.

Doyle: My father first came to the San Joaquin Valley from Tennessee in the late 1800s and settled in Tulare County, returned to Tennessee and married my mother; she was about sixteen at the time. They returned to California and moved back up to Dinuba in Tulare County where I was born in February of 1915. My family originally came from Ireland. Part of them settled in New York and part of them went on down into Tennessee. I am one of eleven children. My dad worked for various farmers in the area and then in the late twenties got into farming himself. In those days it was done on what we sometimes refer to as a sharecropping basis whereby the farmer would lease out the property to a family or a number of families to farm on a percentage basis.

##This symbol indicates that a tape or a segment of a tape has begun or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 72.

Doyle: We moved from the Dinuba area up to the Sanger area during the Depression in the early thirties. I went to a one-room school where I graduated from grammar school and then I went to Sanger High School and then from there into Fresno State College. I did not graduate. I attended there some two years, over two years, I guess.

Then I came to the San Francisco Bay Area with the idea of going to law school. But having no help from my parents or anyone else, I went to work for Fireman's Fund Insurance Company and I've been in that business since that time.

Rowland: What was your relationship with your brothers and sisters?

Doyle: I had a twin sister. We were close as youngsters. I had older brothers and younger brothers; older sisters, younger sisters.

Rowland: It was that large of a group?

Doyle: Yes, and being from a large family, everyone had a chore to do; everyone had something to do. I started milking cows when I was eight years old and milked cows until I was eighteen years old when I left home. I left home in '33 and I joined what was then the Civilian Conservation Corps, which in those days was for families that needed help or they felt that they needed help. For \$30 a month you were paid \$25 that went to your family and you kept \$5. My relationship with my family was close but not day-to-day because we were all busy. On weekends we were together. Sunday was a big day in the family because we always had friends and relatives drop around on the ranch where you would have chicken dinners and that type of thing.

Rowland: How did the Depression affect your family?

Doyle: Well, it didn't affect us very much because we never had very much in the beginning. So really we always had plenty to eat because we raised most of our food in those days. I can remember we had oak trees on our property and we would saw up oak trees and trade that for groceries. So we didn't really know that much difference. We wore each other's clothes in those days. In fact, I graduated from high school in a pair of trousers of my brother's. We had gowns in those days, not caps but just gowns that we wore, and so you couldn't tell what you had underneath them, I guess. But it really didn't affect us very much and no one had any ambitions of going beyond high school because we couldn't afford it. I went because I decided that I wanted to go and I worked at night and that's how that turned out.

Rowland: Can you describe your parents?

- Doyle: My parents were a typical Irish family. My part of the family were not Catholic. There are cousins that were and still are Catholic.
- Rowland: That seems a significant break.
- Doyle: The New York group stayed in the church. Those who went down South became Protestant actually.
- Rowland: Was that a big break in your family ties?
- Doyle: Not necessarily. Everybody was still very friendly. But it was just sort of a way of life in those days, I think, because you had a lot of Baptists in the South. The area where my family came from in Tennessee was strictly Protestant.
- Rowland: When in Rome, do as the Romans do?
- Doyle: Yes. Then when they came to California, my father was working for an Adventist family and my mother and we children started going to the Adventist church. So then we were baptized into the church and went the usual route of no meat, no pork. We went to church on Saturday instead of Sunday, while the other members--cousins--in the family--uncles and aunts--still remained Baptists and went to church on Sunday. So my family, I guess you could say, was very religious. My mother was most religious--a prayer every night and singing hymns and that type of thing and always an attitude that the Lord will provide and do unto others as you would have them do unto you.
- Rowland: How did your father feel about it?
- Doyle: Well, he went along with it; he went along with. He would go to church, but not that often. He really never was baptized an Adventist. He just didn't get that far into it. But all of the kids grew up in the church and then we sort of scattered later. Probably half of them are still in the church. [Some] left as they came along and went out to do other things.
- Rowland: Who was the dominant force in your family?
- Doyle: I would say my mother, yes, [she] seemed to be on pretty much all of us, and I see more of it as I grow older than I did perhaps when I was younger. But she was sort of the one that was always there in helping make the decisions, and she was not one that worried a lot about tomorrow. It was just going to be taken care of; things were going to be all right.

Rowland: You said you were in the Conservation Corps. I wonder if that was an affinity you had with Roosevelt and the Democratic party during the Depression?

Doyle: Well, we really weren't that political. My father was a deputy sheriff and my father was deputy constable in the area and when they needed him he would go out and work in law enforcement. I can recall back in the twenties when they would raid whiskey stills in the area and my father would bring all of the equipment back and they would tag it and stack it in our barn--sugar, big stacks of sugar, and raisins and prunes and that kind of thing they were using to make--

Rowland: There were quite a few stills out in the valley?

Doyle: Yes, there were a lot of them at that time.

But we really didn't have any positions. Politically I think my family probably were middle-of-the-road type Republicans where they would go either way. Yes, some of my relatives in the South were predominantly Democratic and registered and voted that way. But I think my father would sort of go with the tide, with the people, and if he liked someone like the sheriff and the sheriff said, "Well, Dave, I think we ought to support So-and-So," why, my father would usually go along. My mother would have her own feelings perhaps that were different from my father, but it wasn't a predominant factor at all and, of course, we were all pleased that someone--whether it had been Hoover, who maybe had some of the same ideas, or Mr. Roosevelt, tried to remedy the Depression. The Civilian Conservation Corps, for example, gave a lot of employment to a lot of young people. It wasn't just a weekend or just to have fun. It was a working operation.

I recall working on a tree-falling crew for six months up in Sequoia National Park. Then I drove a truck for about six months. I stayed in there fifteen months only and then got out and got a job.

Rowland: It must have been an interesting experience.

Doyle: Very much. [There were] people from all over the country. It was my first experience of living with black people.

Rowland: They didn't have segregated units?

Doyle: Well, they had them in separate barracks, but we ate together and we worked together and most of them were from the Los Angeles area. But it was my first experience because I had not been around

Doyle: black people. I had been around Japanese people who were neighbors in that area. I had been around Chinese people who did some work on the ranch off and on.

Rowland: Mexican-Americans?

Doyle: Mexican-Americans--but there weren't very many of those. The Mexican-Americans that we knew were our neighbors and our friends. But they worked on the ranch or they worked somewhere along the way. But you didn't see them out harvesting. You would see Chinese coming in to harvest, even Japanese, or to prune your vineyards, outside of what the family did. Of course, during the Depression we did all we could ourselves.

Rowland: Do you think that the Conservation Corps had an effect on you?

Doyle: Oh, very much so. From that day on I never returned to my home, and yet the day I left I didn't know how I was going to get along without my family and without my brothers and sisters. But once I saw I could do it on my own and get out on my own, that's when I got the idea that I was going to school and I was going to do something other than work on a ranch or be a farmer or drive a truck or whatever. That's the change it made in me, of course, and it worked out very well.

Rowland: I wonder what books you had in your house, what reading material you had in your house?

Doyle: Very little. We had the Bible, of course, and although it wasn't a requirement, we all read it. There might be a western book around now and then. I think I can remember one of the first books that I read and enjoyed was The Golden Fleece, about the farm in Montana and the people that would come out and the girls would come from a wealthy family on the East Coast and so forth. We just didn't have books. Well, we didn't have money for books, and number two, it was not a matter of books ever being handed down from family to family. So I really never created a reading habit at any time other than newspapers that we would take, of course, and that was about it.

Growing up in the Central Valley

Rowland: Did you have any significant or influential teachers in your life?

Doyle: Well, I think my grammar school teacher was a Pennsylvania Dutch lady, Mary B. Crawford. She was a teacher at the Oakhurst Grammar School in which she had all the children in one room. There were about forty of us. [gestures] The first grade here, the second grade here, and right on through. Several were members of my family, of course. She opened the school day with a prayer and a hymn, the church hymn, whether you were a--

Rowland: This wasn't an Adventist school?

Doyle: No, it was a public school. But whether you were Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish, that was her way of doing it, and she treated everybody the same. She always had a song or she made up a song or she wrote a song about all of our presidents. I recall when Hoover was elected she started out, "George Washington first of all by Adams was succeeded and then came Thomas Jefferson, who bought the land"--and then she'd go on and on. We'd all learn these songs and at the end, why, her big [ending] was, "Hurrah for Herbert Hoover, the first from California." But this was just her way of teaching and, yes, she would consult all of us. If you had an argument with someone--no fist fights. She just wouldn't put up with it. But if there was some kind of a disagreement or if you weren't doing well in your work, she had a little house built next door to the school-house, just a small, little cabin type thing. She would take you in there and talk to you, tell you why you should do this and why you shouldn't do that, and you should be nice to this person or the girls equally, and so forth and so on.

So I think she had an effect [on me] as a young man in grammar school. Then I would say in high school probably my mechanical drawing teacher was one that I could confide in and who would advise me on how to do things and how not to do things. The other was our coach, Huntly Dayton, who still lives in Carmel. He was very good about helping you. He understood, like those who could afford to do certain things--whether it was a snow trip or whatever, he understood that there were some that just couldn't afford to do things and others that could. In that area and in that part of the valley we were sort of all in it together. There were no real wealthy families in those days. Some hung on and, of course, became wealthy later on.

Rowland: What about your friendships? When you said you had gone into the Conservation Corps, did you break off from your friends in the valley?

Doyle: Pretty much, yes, because everyone sort of scattered and then, as I say, I just didn't get home that much. I made some friends in the Civilian Conservation Corps that I--well, one lives in

Doyle: Richmond today, a chap who runs the Richmond Blueprint Company. Mario Aquistapace, who is from Watsonville. We don't see each other that often, but we've kept in touch. But he was a good friend and if we would go to town or go to a movie (which we could do once a week) we did it together. In those days we didn't drink and we didn't smoke and we certainly didn't have money to go out with girls. So it was just sort of a matter of having someone that you felt you could be close to.

Rowland: What did you do for fun in your growing years?

Doyle: Well, ours was strictly outside. Of course, as I say, we had the small dairy and there was milking to be done night and morning. Of course, we worked in the vineyards and we hayed. We had a certain amount of land that we grew grain on. But we would play ball, just baseball--you'd call it baseball, I guess, today. In the summertime, of course, we would go swimming. Oh, we would have outings with the neighbors, girls and boys, and have a bonfire. Just general outdoor things.

There was never any thought of doing anything wrong or getting into mischief because it just wasn't done in those days. Like riding to [school on] the bus was a great treat for me because all of the other kids were on the bus and we'd sing songs. We had about fifteen miles to go by bus each way and our first bus was just a long-bodied pick-up truck with a canvas over the top. We didn't have regular buses in those days, particularly up in the area where we lived. It was all outdoors.

Rowland: It sounds like Steinbeck.

Doyle: Well, Steinbeck was around in those days, of course, We'd ride horses. We didn't have saddles in those days, but we did have horses. On picnics, as I say, I used to just--I couldn't wait to go to school because I saw friends there, I saw people there. It didn't matter to me if I had one pair of trousers and two shirts. [laughter] I can remember wearing my sister's shoes to school while mine were being fixed! That didn't bother me at all.

I sang in the choir and that type of thing because I couldn't do anything that was going to take me after school because I had to get home to work. I did run in track because I could do that during the days and then the track meets were on weekends and I could get away.

Rowland: In high school?

Doyle: Yes.

Rowland: What other sports were you involved in?

Doyle: Well, that's about all. I played basketball but not on a team because basically I just couldn't get away. I had to be home to milk the cows. But I ran the 440 in track and I ran in county meets and that type of thing.

Rowland: If you had some pictures it would be excellent.

Doyle: Well, I really don't have. We had very few pictures in those days because we just didn't have a camera, unless the school was taking them. It was just a childhood that we all enjoyed even though we had little or nothing as far as material things were concerned.

Rowland: Turning back to school, what were your favorite subjects?

Doyle: I liked history, geography, math, but not to where I wanted to be an expert in math. It was strictly just--I would say mostly history, and particularly American history, dealing with our presidents and elections. I was quite interested in the Al Smith--the first election--the first time he ran for president, because there was a lot of talk in the valley. It was almost a Protestant versus a Catholic, you see, in our area. Now, in other areas it didn't make any difference. My family was not that way. They always thought every man was whatever he wanted to be; whatever his religion was, was fine. The religious thing was an issue back at that time, as well as the matter of whether you were going to open the country up to prohibition was a big issue at that time.

Rowland: Your family was in favor of prohibition?

Doyle: My family was in favor of prohibition. They were not in favor of having it repealed, which Roosevelt did, as you know, in the early thirties. So that was about the way--and I liked mechanical drawing and that type of thing. Something that I could do and see some results--landscaping and that type of thing.

II CAMPAIGNING FOR THE ASSEMBLY

Beginnings of Political Involvement

Rowland: Were you politically active in high school or college?

Doyle: No, not myself. I was for other people. I managed the campaign for the chap who became president of the student body the year I left, in '33.

Rowland: This was in high school?

Doyle: Yes, in high school. A fellow by the name of William A. Savage, who went on to become a captain in the U.S. Navy. But I did not get involved myself. As a freshman in college, here again, working at night and enjoying being there during the day because I was among people and around people, I ran for president of the class (my freshman class) and I lost by twenty votes. I didn't know anyone, except I was an outlying chap--I was a country boy and out of the city of Fresno. Bob Smale won that year and the poor guy was killed in the war. But then I wasn't active at all in school politics because I just didn't have the time to do it. Once in a while I could go to a school dance, but I'd have to get someone to work for me and then that would cost me so I couldn't afford to have someone work for me!

Rowland: Were you active in any clubs or organizations?

Doyle: No, no, never joined a fraternity. I was pledged to a couple, invited up to Cal for a couple, but never became involved in any of them because I just didn't feel that I could have the time or the money to do it. I had many friends that were and we got along very well.

Rowland: Turning to your beginning with political campaigning, I wonder why you got involved in politics?

Doyle: Well, as I mentioned earlier, I had always been interested in what was going on. I had an office in Oakland at the time, a small insurance office, and I'd been involved with my professional association, the Oakland Association of Insurance Agents. I had been president of that association and I'd served on the insurance committee which manages some of the municipal business in the Bay Area, and generally I was primarily interested at that time with what was going on within the insurance profession--bills and laws that would affect them.

I had some interest in education because I had two boys coming along and I could see this big booming population growth after World War II. At that time, I could see that our continuing to build schools made of brick was costly. The school board would say to me, "Well, we made them with brick because it lasts; it's because they don't have to paint it," and so forth and so on. Well, we got away from brick-front schools later because we couldn't afford it. But I just became interested in two or three areas.

I learned that there was going to be a meeting at Acalanes High School in 1952 about April by an organization called the Republican Assembly, and any Republicans who wanted to come and say why they should run for the office, why, fine. I lived just a block or two from the high school in a small GI home that we had in Lafayette and I went down more or less out of curiosity, but I had made a couple of notes on schools, highways, taxes, the usual, which I didn't really know what I was--

Rowland: Did you have a basis of support too?

Doyle: None. I might have known three people in the audience and there were probably a hundred people there.

Rowland: You couldn't hardly plan any campaign, then.

Doyle: No. I knew two insurance men that were there because I had known them from my Oakland days as president of the association, and I knew a lawyer there that I had met, a very fine, older gentleman by the name of Brooks--Cliff Brooks, a delightful chap. He had a laugh that you could hear for half a mile! So the insurance fellow encouraged me to go down there. [I said,] "I don't want to go down!" So he came by my house and we went down together.

Doyle: Five Republicans got up before this body to tell them why they should run for the legislature. We had all agreed that if the Republican Assembly did not choose one of us, we would step out and support the one that was chosen. Among that group was John Nejedly, the present senator from Contra Costa County. Another one was King Parker, who is a realtor in Walnut Creek today. The other one was a member of the college board by the name of O.J. Wohlgemuth. He had been a baker in Walnut Creek and he was on the school board, the college board. These people had been well known in the county, had run for office before in the county, except for Parker, myself, and a young lawyer.

So we all got up and made our pitch and we all went home. The next day at noontime the [Oakland] Tribune had an article and some picture they had got of me somewhere, that I had been chosen by the Republican Assembly to run for Bob Condon's office. (Bob Condon was leaving the legislature to run for Congress at that time.) So there I was. I hadn't told my partner about the meeting.

Rowland: What were your connections with the Knowland family?

Doyle: The Knowland family?

Rowland: Yes.

Doyle: I knew who they were and that was all. I had no connection with them politically.

Rowland: No personal relationship?

Doyle: No, no. Until that time I had only met Bill Knowland once at some Red Cross affair in Oakland. I knew who the Senator was and I remember when Warren appointed him to the Senate when Hiram Johnson died and I had followed that, but I had no connection with him whatsoever. I had no connection with any newspaper, no connection with labor; I had no connection with the teachers.

Rowland: Just insurance?

Doyle: Just insurance, yes; a local, small-time agent trying to make a living. So there I was. So my partner at the time, Howard Cross, who incidentally lived to be eighty-seven and just passed away two years ago, said, "Well, if you're into it you might as well run." He didn't think it was a very good idea. I was young

Doyle: and had two children and was buying a house, buying a car, and trying to make a living, plus helping my younger brother through medical school.

Rowland: Had you been in the war?

Doyle: Yes, I came out of the Marine Corps in 1946 in August. Instead of going back to the insurance company, I decided to become a broker on my own. So I started from scratch in the East Bay with the use of an office and the use of a girl in a firm and that's how I got started in August of '46. I started the business with Mr. Cross, who was an older gentleman at the time. We were partners until he passed away, or rather until I made a move from another firm to this firm.

But he said, "Don, I don't think it's a good idea. I think you ought to stick to your insurance business and so forth." He made the remark, "You're trying to be another Abe Lincoln." [laughter] I said, "No, but they've chosen me." I just went down there to meet some people really, and I always like to talk anyway. I had some public speaking in school. So he said, "Why don't you go ahead."

Rowland: Was the Republican Assembly mostly a Warren group at that time?

Doyle: At that time. At that time, I would say that it was mostly a Warren operation. In our county it was Tony DeLap, a gentleman from Richmond under the old Tenning and DeLap law firm. They were pretty much on the Republican side and Tom Carlson was pretty much--although I think he was a Republican, he was on the Democratic side as much as he was on the Republican side. Now, here were two gentlemen I had not consulted about running and I was told later that was a mistake, that I should have consulted them before I even--

Rowland: Do you know why the Republican Assembly chose you?

##

Doyle: I was new in the area. I had only lived in the area about eighteen months. I was new in politics. I couldn't say I had been an attorney for the sanitary district or I had been a school board member or whatever. There were a lot of new people there in that county at that time that had moved into the area. Gregory Gardens was just getting started at that time, a small subdivision out in Pleasant Hill.

Rowland: It wasn't Pleasant Hill at that time.

Doyle: No, there wasn't a Pleasant Hill at that time.

So I assume, and it was by ballot vote, that the Republican Assembly voted that way. Of course, immediately following the announcement, all of the others decided they were going to run. So Wohlgemuth, Nejedly, Parker, Doyle--and I can't think of the young attorney's name--

Rowland: [Harold] Mutnick?

Doyle: No, that was the Democratic side, but there was a Republican. Mutnick was new in the county, too, and he was running against that old-line party Democrat from up county.

So then it was a matter of how do you do this, how do you go about it, and how do you campaign. So I just started getting a few friends together. Insurance people were very helpful to me. I rang doorbells, which I think was very helpful. My wife and her girlfriends rang doorbells. I had a couple of clients up in the Kensington area which was in my district (the tenth district) and Park Hills in Berkeley, and I would concentrate on seeing them and getting their neighbors together. I had written some insurance for some of the builders in the area, home builders, and they supported me strictly on a personal basis, I guess. So that's how we started and everybody ran. I beat Nejedly by about a thousand votes, I think it was, in that first primary.

Rowland: As I total it out here, I think Wohlgemuth was your principal opponent in that campaign.

Doyle: Yes.

Rowland: As a matter of fact, I think he came just a few votes short of you. You won by about thirty votes, I believe, over Wohlgemuth in the '52 campaign.

Doyle: Not by many, right, in the primary. Yes, he was the strongest. As I say, he was a businessman. He had maturity. He'd lived there a long time. He owned property in the area. He had been on the college board and helped organize it and so forth. So he was the--

Rowland: Did you enjoy campaigning?

Doyle: Oh, very much. It was meeting people again. I would go up to the steel mill at four o'clock in the morning and hand out my cards because that was all I could afford in those days. Of

Doyle: course, they'd want to know "what are you?" I'd say, "I'm a Republican." They'd just throw the card down usually and walk away. But that still didn't stop me. I remember the sugar mill over in Crockett which was in my district at that time--highly Democratic, highly CIO, the sugar workers. But I'd still go out in front of that sugar mill and stand there and hand out my cards to the shift leaving and the shift coming in and I'd enjoy it.

A Republican Candidate in a Democratic District

Rowland: What were the issues you were running on?

Doyle: Well, the issue was growth, of course--we need schools, we need classrooms. I didn't know how we were going to get them. I was not an expert in taxes or schools or anything else. We needed highways; we needed more funds for highways. If we were going to have subdivisions, we needed flood control. So it was sort of a collection of issues that I was hitting, and nobody knew any differently. Now, Nejedly could talk about the legal side of the sanitary district and how he had been their attorney and all that. Wohlgemuth could talk about the college and their budget and the taxes and how much of your tax dollar goes for education and so forth and so on.

Rowland: Mutnick's would be the labor--

Doyle: His was primarily labor, but he was a lawyer (although at that time he was not a practicing lawyer) and that he was a Roosevelt Democrat--a Roosevelt Democrat; he hit on that theme heavily. Of course, in the general I took him on a few times--"Mr. Roosevelt's gone and you're not going to Congress. If you're elected, you're going to Sacramento."

Rowland: That had been a persuasive argument in Roosevelt's years. But Mutnick was still trying to campaign on it in 1952?

Doyle: Oh, yes, he was riding on that. Both having been veterans--and that wasn't a big deal in those days. You listed it, but that was about all. In these general elections, all of the Republicans did come around and help me. And then the county central committee helped me. The county central committee took no position in the primary, of course.

Doyle: Then I had a lot of support--and, of course, to this day I probably wouldn't even know about--little ladies come up to me today when I see them and say, "I worked for you thirty years ago," or whatever the case may be. But they all got together and worked for me. But it was still a tight race.

Rowland: How did you persuade them, because it seems like that district was a strong Democratic district?

Doyle: It was Democratic, strongly Democratic.

Rowland: How did you manage to [get them] to switch votes?

Doyle: Well, as I say, I got a lot of the Republicans, I think, pretty well in line. Then I went up into the Pittsburg-Antioch area and just met everyone I could meet. They had different factions of people up there--even different Italian factions in Pittsburg--which I think they still have today. I went to a paper mill. I got Claude Stick, who is still alive, to help me. They would allow me to walk through the plant--not hand out [cards]--just walk through the plant, and then introduce me, who I was and so forth, to the union leaders. I had one union supporting me, the operating engineers, because I had known Al Clem, who was the head man at that time, when he was in Oakland. I had met him by soliciting his insurance for his building and he gave his endorsement to me and we became friends. They supported me the first time around.

Teamsters gave me support, a little bit, because I had met Earl Carter along the way. (Bill Carter had since passed on.) But they didn't support me openly. Oil workers, no; steel workers, no; sugar workers, no. So I just had to do it pretty much on my own. They all pretty well liked Earl Warren, so I got a pamphlet put together and I had a picture of Earl Warren on one side and myself on the other with the caption, "These two men think alike." I listed what Earl Warren's program at that point was, except socialized medicine. I didn't put that down. I wasn't supporting that item that he was talking about in those times.

Then he came to the county for me one time. He was running for vice-president--I mean he was supporting Eisenhower at that time and Nixon, although he and Nixon weren't that close. But he came to the county for me at a big meeting at Mt. Diablo High School in Concord. In fact, there must have been five hundred people there, the largest crowd I had seen anyway. But his position was "send this boy up here so I can work with him and we'll do things for you and Contra Costa County." It was a

Doyle: countywide meeting and that helped, although, you see, I had all of the county except Richmond, San Pablo, Rodeo, Pinole. I had all the rest of it.

So I had some of the large farmers, small farmers, farm bureau, and all of that type of people, and I'd just go to their meetings [laughter] whether I was invited or not because I felt I had to meet them, you see. A chap I went to high school with lived in Brentwood, by the name of Ben Peterson. He still lives there. He's a realtor. He was very helpful to me in east county--from Antioch east. Then I would get with these people and they would just take me from place to place.

I recall one fellow taking me out to a dairy farm. He was, I guess, a strong Catholic, but I never told him what I was. I had the name, of course, and he went in and we met this Portugese family and I can recall him saying to them, "Now, you support this young man. He used to be an altar boy. He's a good man. He's a Republican, but you vote for him." [laughter] But this was the type of thing that happened. If there was a picnic somewhere. I would manage to get there.

So I don't know what the final vote was the first time around between Hal Mutnick and myself--probably maybe ten or twelve thousand votes.

Rowland: You won by a significant margin.

Doyle: In the primary. Then later on, as I say, we became friends and I still see Hal.

Rowland: Did the Korean War or anti-communism at all enter your campaign?

Doyle: No, if there was issue--some said, "Doyle, you're sidestepping"--if there was an issue on the ballot--and there was an issue on the ballot in '52 having to do with the taxing of churches--and here was almost a battle between Catholics and Protestants on whether you believe in churches being taxed or not. I said, "How I vote in the voting booth is going to be my position. I was not in Sacramento when that was put on the ballot. It's been handed down to the people as a referendum for the people to vote on now and I'm going to leave it up to the people." They'd try to badger me, "Well, come on now, are you for Prop 4?" or something like that. That would be quite a heated thing.

If it was a federal issue that they'd try to get me into, I'd say, "Wait a minute. I'm not running for Congress. That's Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Kahn" [candidates for Congress]. I just wouldn't

Doyle: allow myself to be drawn into it and it seemed to work. If they demanded that I give them an answer, I wouldn't tell them how I was going to vote and I wouldn't today.

So anyway, that November, at the general election, I had some of my workers at the house. We just had a little evening together and the votes started coming in around eight o'clock. They started announcing over the local radio station out of Pittsburg. It started out with all of the names and so forth, and this one twenty-four, twenty-six; it got down to the bottom and it said, "Doyle, one." I thought, well, I had a good exercise! [laughter] Everybody was ahead of me at this point. But as it worked out and went along, why, we were able to win. Then, as I remember saying to my wife before we went to bed about five or six in the morning, [I said], "Honey, what do I now? Here I am an assemblyman!" [laughter]

III LEGISLATIVE PERSONALITIES AND EPISODES

The Battle for Assembly Speaker

Doyle: But it was a great experience, a new experience. I'd say I was naive. I certainly was naive because I had no idea what it was all about, where the bathrooms were or anything else. But what one did at that time, of course, right after the election I began hearing from Luther Lincoln, the assemblyman from Oakland, whom I had met. That's when Silliman was running for the Speakership--Silliman from Salinas--against Hollibaugh, I believe it was, from Los Angeles; and Randal Dickey, I know, from Alameda County was pushing Hollibaugh in his group; and Lincoln and Weinberger and Bruce Allen in San Jose and others were pushing for Silliman, who was more or less a new side of the old guard and so forth. But the L.A. people were pretty strong for Hollibaugh over Silliman and it got to be kind of a nasty campaign.

Rowland: How did Silliman manage to win the Speakership?

Doyle: I think, just as you said, the new ones, like Pauline Davis, went for him, and I went for him; Weinberger went for him; Bruce Allen went for him. These were all people that are in the area still, as you know, and there were others around the state.

But the leadership, as far as I was concerned at that time--if you looked at their districts, they were from northern California. You just didn't have it down south. The leaders were all coming from the north more or less. That, of course, I guess, has changed somewhat, but that was the view I had and, of course, knowing the Lincoln family--not well, but I knew them--and I'm sure that he had been involved in helping me get elected behind the scenes.

Rowland: Did he actually encourage you to run for that office?

Doyle: Yes, we had one luncheon, and after I had said I was going to go, he told me that he thought I should go and that I should run hard and they could probably help me win. He was a home builder; that's where I had some of the home builders that supported me at that time. There wasn't a lot of money involved in those days from the home builders. You might have gotten a few hundred dollars out of them, but that's about it. Then I met with Senator Miller and Masterson, who was the assemblyman-elect-- Judge Masterson; he was a judge before--

Memories of George Miller, Jr.

Rowland: What was your relationship with George Miller?

Doyle: Excellent. George and I were personal friends. George and I had met before because he had a little insurance business and he would be helpful to us on insurance bills if we needed to call him on something.

Rowland: That's a valuable source on the Knight-Brown years which is gone from us.

Doyle: Yes, this fellow, had he lived--I could have supported George Miller for governor. Number one, here was a man who had fiscal responsibility from the word go. Yes, we disagreed on issues. I happened to be a believer on capital punishment; he did not. That didn't bother him. I recall during my early legislative career there was a big fight on the Education Committee as to the night schools and square dancing and whatever. Well, he was for cutting back on some of this and let these pay for their own way. Well, it was a part of the recreation facility and so forth, so I was supporting the school side, [as] an example. It didn't faze him a bit because as far as our personal relationship goes--my oldest son, Don, Jr., and George Miller III are the same age. So we saw a lot of each other even though we were of different political parties.

In fact, after the first election when I was elected, the next time George ran, which was my second term, I believe, we would campaign together. We'd go to the steel mill together. We'd go to the paper mill together--management or labor, it didn't matter. We'd go together; there we were--"Here's your senator and here's your assemblyman. We're running for re-election."

Rowland: So it wasn't just that you were an incumbent that you were re-elected.

Doyle: No. George never to my knowledge, nor I to George--I remember when his opponents would run against him, I would say to them, "Look, I work with George in Sacramento. We do things together in Sacramento. I will not oppose him. I'm not going to go out and put my name on his sign-up campaign sheet, but I will not go out and oppose him." And that's the kind of relationship we had.

Rowland: Do you think that was influential in getting re-elected?

Doyle: Well, it was helpful. But, you see, George was that kind of individual. We wanted to get a new ferry boat over there because the old one had broken down between Martinez and Benicia. You had to go around the horn [east to the Delta region to return to Benicia]--we had no way--or you had to go around Antioch. George would say, "Don, I'm not running for re-election. I'm not up for a couple of years. You take this." So I'd take it and it became my bill and, of course, Goodie was governor. He signed the bill (the ferry boat was built in Alameda) and we had the ferry boat. This was before the bridges.

We worked together on most all legislation in that way, particularly where it affected the county. Flood control was some other legislation that I had.

Rowland: Constituent legislation?

Doyle: Oh, yes. I didn't get involved in the judges' bills. Masterson usually handled that because he was the lawyer and George would handle them in the senate. But we had a good working relationship in the legislature and we had a personal relationship. We used to play poker together and see each other socially.

IV THE KNIGHT-NIXON-KNOWLAND TRIANGLE

Impressions of Goodwin Knight

- Rowland: I have a group of questions here on Republican party politics and your involvement in the Republican State Central Committee. First off, we'd like for you to give us some profile on Goodie Knight, on how you first met and what were your impressions of him, because the first-person story of Goodwin Knight, of course, is lost to us and we're trying to piece it together. If you could start off with how you first met Goodwin Knight--
- Doyle: I had seen Goodwin Knight and met him just in passing when he ran for lieutenant governor. He was a superior court judge for the city and county of Los Angeles.
- Rowland: In 1946?
- Doyle: Yes. I was just getting started in business, but I still wanted to know what was going on, although I wasn't a member of the Young Republicans or that type of thing. I was here in San Francisco at some meeting. Of course, he ran and he won. He won, and after he won, perhaps, I looked at him as more on the conservative side than Earl Warren, the incumbent governor. I say that because some of the people that you would read that were supporting Goodie were conservatives from Los Angeles. Yes, he was probably going to be the one to succeed Earl Warren someday and perhaps even challenge him.
- Rowland: That was known at that time?
- Doyle: Oh, yes.
- Rowland: It was a widespread belief that he was going to--

Doyle: Yes, because, for example, the big farmers, the medical association, all of the health groups, were upset with Earl Warren because he was talking about--they called it socialized medicine. It might have been something else at that time. Goodie, of course, was taking the side of the professional people. Goodie was a very outgoing fellow. He could play the piano, he could tap dance, and he was kind of a show-off, really, to get attention. That takes nothing away from my friendship with him because we became very good friends. But he was just this kind of a person.

Rowland: I understand he was into astrology too.

Doyle: Yes, yes.

Rowland: He was deeply involved in that.

Doyle: I think more with Virginia Knight, with his second wife, than he was perhaps with his first wife. (I think his first wife was Arvilla Knight. Yes, it was Arvilla. I had met her just a couple of times at functions.)

The first time we actually had a meeting or talked was when he was lieutenant governor, when he had a meeting in Antioch, a big political meeting. Well, it wasn't a political meeting other than the fact I arranged for him to go down there and speak. This would have been in 1953, probably in the fall, and we sort of had a packed house because the lieutenant governor hadn't been there for a long time, particularly a Republican, in Contra Costa County. So we talked on the way down. I rode down with him in the limousine and we chatted about what was going on and why, and "what are your ambitions," and "what would you like to do," and so forth. Then we just became friends. During the first session, I would see Earl Warren frequently along with about six or seven others.

Rowland: From the assembly?

Doyle: From the assembly. Warren had Caldecott, Lincoln, Doyle, Weinberger, Bruce Allen, Glenn Coolidge--there might have been one in Sacramento, Gordon Fleury, who was a Republican there, a young attorney. Those were sort of his--

Rowland: These are all Republicans.

Doyle: Yes, these are all Republicans. These were sort of the people that Earl Warren would call in now and then and talk to about things, whether it was a Nike missile base or whatever, that he wanted to talk confidentially about; or his tax program, because

- Doyle: Tom Caldecott was on the Ways and Means Committee at that time; or the [revenue] reserve we had at that time. So we were with him; we were for him; we worked with him; we knew him; we liked him. I think even at that time Goodwin's supporters were pushing him to run against Earl Warren the next time around.
- Rowland: This is for a fourth term, do you mean, or in 1950 for the third term?
- Doyle: Well, in 1950, that was before. They talked about it but nothing-- it was before I was in--but that was when they talked about it. They held a meeting in San Diego. Earl Warren was in the hospital at the time with some minor surgery of some kind and Tony DeLap was the floor leader. Earl Warren got on the telephone--I remember that--and when he got off the telephone [laughter], Goodwin was out of it.
- Rowland: The San Diego meeting was in 1950?
- Doyle: This was at the state central committee meeting--it would be '50, wouldn't it, or '51. Then you recall when Earl Warren ran for vice-president under a New York governor.
- Rowland: Tom Dewey?
- Doyle: Yes, Tom Dewey, and Earl Warren ran for vice-president. Remember that?
- Rowland: Yes, that was in '48.
- Doyle: Yes. Now, that's when Goodwin thought he would become governor and, well, he would have become governor at that time had the Warren-Dewey ticket been successful. But I think the next time around had Warren--
- Rowland: So he was ambitious for higher office?
- Doyle: Oh, yes, yes, very much.
- Rowland: Was he also ambitious for national office too, for a federal office?
- Doyle: I think he was, but it just never happened. The lightning didn't strike. He was never in a position where he could know that he would have Ohio, New York, and some of the big states with him. Later on, there was talk about that. There was talk about his replacing Nixon on the ticket, as you recall. That was in-house talk, but it got to be a little bit hairy, which was another interesting part of his career.

- Doyle: But then when Earl Warren was picked by Brownell, the attorney general at the time, he came out and talked to Warren about going on the court, although we didn't realize at the time it was to become chief justice. But that was when Eisenhower appointed him chief justice of the Supreme Court and, of course, Goodwin became governor--immediately, almost within ten days. The conservative wing of our party felt, "Well, now we've got a guy, and we're going to do this, and we're going to do that, and we're going to show labor, and we're going to hold down taxes, and we're going to take over." For some reason--maybe it was just fate--Goodie was smart enough not to rush into it. So he too continued to talk to the Lincolns and the Doyles and the Weinbergers.
- Rowland: He continued these conversations?
- Doyle: Right, right. Paul Mason was the key to Goodwin Knight's political success once he landed in Sacramento.
- Rowland: How?
- Doyle: He just had an influence on the governor. Paul was a very smart individual. He was very intelligent, articulate. If Goodwin was going to sign a bill, he didn't sign that bill unless Paul Mason had his stamp on it. If Paul agreed to it, that bill was signed. I can go back to any bill or whatever other bill you wish to talk about. Paul Mason had a great influence on the governor. As you recall, Arvilla had died and he was single, I guess, when he became governor. He was widowed and not married at the time, and he wanted to succeed badly. Newt Stearns was another fellow who was influential with the governor. But he was more out front because he was his number-one secretary. But in my opinion, Paul Mason was the key.
- Rowland: When you met with Knight in these meetings, was Paul Mason there?
- Doyle: Often he would be there.
- Rowland: He would be the deciding voice, or he would be a kind of quiet moderator?
- Doyle: A quiet moderator; he listened. But when he and Governor Goodwin Knight were in there together, I'm sure that Goodwin--well, I know Goodwin listened to him because I remember legislation that we were anxious to have signed. Paul would say, "I'm having trouble"--he'd level with you, a very honest guy--"and maybe you ought to have So-and-So call him," and so forth. You see, at that time, when Goodwin first became governor, he had no real ties in the assembly.

Doyle: He couldn't say, "Well, Doyle is my guy" or "Lincoln is my guy" or "Randal Dickey from Alameda is my guy." He didn't have that tie, see, so he almost had to start from scratch with the leadership that was there. Earl Warren had appointed the--

Rowland: Why did he pick Paul Mason, or did Paul Mason just gravitate--

Doyle: Well, I really don't know that background. Paul Mason was always there when Goodie was there, and Paul Mason was a fellow that--after a session, when all the bills were down on the governor's desk, he was the architect that helped the governor make a decision of whether to sign it or not to sign it. I happen to know personally a couple of areas where that happened.

Rowland: Can you go into that?

Doyle: The Short-Doyle Act was one, although he had the governor pretty well softened-up by that time. Originally, Goodwin was not for community mental health legislation. We'll get into that when we get into the Short-Doyle Act, if you want.

But I recall a bill having to do with licensing insurance agents. It was down on the governor's desk. All the agents of California wanted it, and it was a good bill. It was elevating the stature of the insurance agents of the state. Paul was really not for it.

Rowland: Why?

Doyle: Well, we don't know. As I say, he just--well, he didn't know about it, and it could have been some legal item. I had to get on the phone to the governor [and] he would always talk to you. I'd say, "Look, there are this many thousand agents," et cetera. Well, to make a long story short, he finally signed it. But he was hesitating because of Paul.

Rowland: Paul was one of his closest confidants?

Doyle: One of his closest confidants. Newt Stearns was more of a confidant on the personal side, the family side, the day-to-day side, and he would treat the little ladies here and the little ones there, make sure you have the names of the people before you stop for dinner and that type of thing.

Rowland: There might not be too much of an analogy, but there might be an analogy there in my study between Senator Burns and--I don't know if you know Richard E. Combs, the counsel for that committee--Combs being the very quiet man, methodical worker; Senator Burns being affable, gracious, always a joke here and there. Is that

- Rowland: maybe the same kind of relationship--Mason and Knight, Goodie being gracious and affable, and Mason being very quiet and methodical?
- Doyle: Very quiet but very friendly and very honest; you always knew up front where you stood with Paul. He never played games with you and this was something that as a young man and new in the political field I appreciated, and I'm sure the others did too.
- Rowland: How did Mason work the legislature as a legislative secretary? How did he operate?
- Doyle: He would go to the Speaker; he would go to the Weinbergers, the Coolidges, the Allens, the Doyles, and a few others--I'm just mentioning those off the top of my head--and a couple in southern California. He knew pretty much where they were at all times. You'd see him in the back of the room or the front of the room. He'd walk in and out, just walk through. [He'd] never buttonhole you, unless it was in his office and he wanted to talk--
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- Doyle: Knight started then almost from scratch and he had some decisions to make in the first several months in office, not necessarily pending legislation but decisions affecting some of his Los Angeles supporters that evidently they didn't appreciate or didn't like. So the honeymoon didn't last very long between Goodwin Knight as governor and some of the supporters he had.
- Rowland: Who were the supporters?
- Doyle: Well, I look back at the Associated Farmers; that was a big farm group.
- Rowland: There was Johnson, who was executive secretary--
- Doyle: I go way back and I'm trying to think of the chap because he got very upset with me one time because I gave an interview and I said that I was an admirer of Earl Warren's after I went up there. This fellow came in and got all over me about it--"You're no friend of ours if you are that close to Earl Warren," and so forth and so on. He got very upset with me and then I learned later that they had contributed to my campaign. I don't know how much. I can't think of that fellow's name.
- Rowland: Johnson?

- Doyle: No. Oh, no, it was way back. But he never came to my office again because I told him I didn't want to see him again. If that was the way he was going to lobby for his organizations, I didn't have time for him. I was busy on other things.
- Rowland: Now, with Goodwin Knight would it be also the Chandler family and the Los Angeles Times?
- Doyle: They supported him, of course, as lieutenant governor, and they supported him as governor up until the time that he refused to accept right-to-work legislation for California. They began to get a little--
- Rowland: Who was the pivot person there in the--
- Doyle: Mrs. Chandler.
- Rowland: Dorothy Chandler?
- Doyle: Buff Chandler, as the governor called her. I only met her once. I didn't know her that well. I'd say Mrs. Chandler was.
- Rowland: How about Kyle Palmer?
- Doyle: Kyle Palmer was, I'd say, influential, yes, but not to the extent that the Chandler family was down south. At that time, prior to this time, he had the support of the Knowlands of the [Oakland] Tribune, of course. He had the support of most of the newspapers through the valley, the Hearst newspapers, the San Francisco Chronicle, and very friendly to all of them, and they [were] very friendly to him. Then, as you recall, the time he ran against Graves--
- Rowland: In '54?
- Doyle: Yes. He became very close to labor. Labor supported him, because I was at the convention where they endorsed him in Santa Barbara. That's when some of the business people got very upset, but they knew it was Knight or Graves. I think from that election on, they were looking for a way to get Goodie out of there. It was proven in '56 at the convention when they wanted to make Bill Knowland the titular head, the head of the convention, over the governor, who was automatically titular head, and that was a real nasty name-calling fight.

The Jostling for Vice-Chairman of the State Committee

- Rowland: Why don't we get to that in a second and go first to the battle for vice-chairman of the Republican State Central Committee. I believe I sent you a Knight-Brown chronology briefing on that.
- Doyle: The vice-chairmanship was offered to me after Howard Ahmanson had his heart attack and became ill. The governor called me one day about my interest in becoming vice-chairman of the party and I said that if he would like for me to, I would do it. Then, of course, we had some people who opposed my becoming vice-chairman because they felt that in representing a Democratic county I might be a little bit too liberal for them because I considered myself a middle-of-the-road type Republican.
- Rowland: That was in '54 I was asking about, the Ahmanson and Arbuthnot battle. Do you recall that?
- Doyle: Yes. I was not directly involved in that except that Goodwin, of course, wanted Ahmanson over Roy [Arbuthnot]. I think Goodwin and Howard Ahmanson had been close friends for years. Howard Ahmanson was considered one of the financial backers of people in those days, Knight in particular. I don't know how that particular campaign got started because I was not personally involved in it except that I knew when it happened and was at the meeting.
- Rowland: Will you tell us about the role of, perhaps, John Krehbiel?
- Doyle: I would say John was active. I don't know how active he was in putting this thing together. I think that Roy had Murray Chotiner and Pat Hillings and that group behind him. I don't know how involved Cotton here from northern California [San Mateo County] was in that with Roy. I know he was there.

John Krehbiel was involved in it, but not that heavily. I don't think he was in on the Nixon side. I don't think he was in on the in-fighting at all. The in-fighter of this whole group was Murray Chotiner, and any way you want to slice it, Murray was a rough fighter, a name-caller, a swearer; he thought nothing of calling his opponent an s.o.b. [laughter] That type. He was strictly an elbow guy. I always got along with him. He never personally opposed me for vice-chairman, but some of the people with him did. They asked me at the time--one of the things that bothered him was the fact that, would I go around the state and campaign for all Republicans against the Democrats? I said that I would as a party man. I certainly would as a member of the party. I would be glad to and I did. I can campaign for someone

Doyle: without getting personal by, at, or against the opponent. In fact, Harold Levering, who was the leader of the opposition, asked if I would write him a letter to that effect and I did. Of course, poor Harold took his life later on. But Harold was known at that time to be a very conservative individual.

Rowland: They were a little bit suspicious of you?

Doyle: Yes, yes.

Rowland: Because you had the support of labor?

Doyle: Well, I had the support of labor and my county was a labor county. I had a voting record in the book on labor of 50 percent. That meant I was with them half the time and against them half of the time. If I thought they were right, I went all the way for them. If I thought they were wrong, I would vote against them and forget about it. Harold Levering and some of the others knew that and that's the way it was. So when it came time for me to run for re-election, I had no qualms about going to labor and saying, "I need your support." After my first election I got their support, from Neil Haggerty on the statewide level to the local people.

Of course, I was able to bring Knight into some of these places that he had not been before when he ran for governor against Dick Graves. A couple of the unions stayed with Graves, of course, the leadership, mostly. But certainly the rank and file were for Knight as shown by the vote that he got during that particular campaign.

Rowland: Why did Nixon seek Arbuthnot as vice-chairman?

Doyle: I don't know what he was looking for unless he felt that he wanted to be able to have better control of the convention here. I was active in the '56 convention in San Francisco along with Alphonzo Bell and, you see, I was to move up that year, into that year, as chairman in place of Bell. But when I saw the Knight-Knowland fight coming, I wouldn't take the job. I talked to Bill Knowland about it.

Rowland: Backtracking a bit, why did you seek the vice-chairmanship to begin with?

Doyle: I was asked to take it.

Rowland: By whom?

Doyle: By Governor Knight, in place of Howard Ahmanson. In fact, I remember driving down to Newport Beach to see Howard Ahmanson and talk to him about it. He was still in bed from his heart attack and he asked me if I would take it also. I had known him in the past because he started out in the savings and loan business, so I knew who Howard was over the years but didn't know him that well. But between Ahmanson and Goodwin, I agreed to take it. Of course, the Speaker urged me to take it, Mr. Lincoln.

Rowland: They all wanted Knight to remain in control of the Republican State Central Committee?

Doyle: Oh, yes, sure, sure. I think even though Bell was from Los Angeles you would have to say at that time, Bell was a Knight supporter. I think it is shown, even in Congress, Bell was not a real conservative. Bell became a Republican after he married because his wife's father was a very active Republican, the baker man in Los Angeles who owned the Van Kamp bakeries. That was Al Bell's father-in-law and he convinced him to become a Republican. Al had been a Democrat. Al's sister was married at one time to Elliott Roosevelt, so there had been some ties there. But Al Bell, I feel, at the same time, was close to Goodwin.

Rowland: I feel that you must have been in a precarious position being such a Knight supporter, but also coming from Contra Costa County and having to give some type of endorsement or at least maintain some relationship with the Knowland family.

Doyle: Well, Bill never asked me to break or make the split. I don't think he asked Luther Lincoln. Luther Lincoln was right in his district. I don't think he asked--well, Tom Caldecott was gone at that time. I don't think he asked Walter Dahl, for example, who was an assemblyman from Piedmont at that time. I think he just knew that these people were going to stay with the governor because the governor had stayed with them. I mean, that was my position with him, and I went to Washington to talk to Bill Knowland about running against Goodwin a year before because I had heard rumors that he was going to do it.

Rowland: Rumors from where?

Doyle: Well, I had rumors from a friend of the family.

Rowland: Who was that?



Republican National Convention, 1956. Front row: Mrs. Donald Doyle, Governor and Mrs. Knight, Donald Doyle. Back row: Clem Whitaker, Jr., Newton Stearns

Doyle: Well, I don't want to divulge his name, but a friend of the family.

Rowland: You could seal it.

Doyle: A friend of the family actually called me and said, "Your boy is in trouble"--this was a year before--"Bill is going to run for governor against your boy, Goodwin." I said, "I just can't believe it." He claimed to have been at a meeting in the Tribune Tower with Knowland and others when that decision was made.

Rowland: Do you recall the others that were at the meeting?

Doyle: I would say Bill Reichel, I was told, was at the meeting, who is a friend who is since gone. Bill Reichel was always with the Knowlands from Junior Chamber of Commerce days. The father [Joseph Knowland] was there and he mentioned a couple of other people. I thought it was a joke. In fact, I went down to the governor's office the next day and told Knight about it and he, along with me--we both laughed. He was just talking to J.R. on some appointment, because he would always call J.R. if it was an appointment in Alameda County. Before he made it, he would talk to J.R. Knowland.

Rowland: No matter what the appointment was?

Doyle: Supervisor, hospital district, judges. He talked to other people; don't get me wrong. But J.R. always knew what good he was going to do. Goodie made him chairman of the Park Commission statewide. So they were friends.

Rowland: This is Joe Knowland?

Doyle: Joe Knowland, Sr., Bill's father.

So getting back to this vice-chairman, as I say, I was asked to serve and I served for two years. I worked both north and south. When I saw the Knowland fight coming, I decided not to seek--

The Right-to-Work Initiative and the Knight-Knowland Split

Rowland: You must have gotten a hint of this in 1956 when Knowland, you said, tried to become--

Doyle: Well, in 1956 when we had the convention here, yes, the big fight was over who was going to be head of the convention from California. The Knowland people wanted Knowland there. Well, there was a meeting in the Palace Hotel and, as I recall, Al Bell and I were there. Well, we were there. The press was not there. Kuchel was there. Knowland was there. Nixon was there. Knight was there. Nixon was vice-president at the time. A private hush-hush type meeting to work this thing out. There were a few people from Los Angeles, friends of both sides, maybe three or four. I don't remember who they were, business people, shall we say, money people, who had supported both in the past.

It got to be a name-calling situation. Of course, Goodwin stood his ground. He said, "As governor, I'm the titular head of the party and I'm going to be chairman of the convention," or whatever words they used at that time. I could see then that people were choosing up sides. I don't think Goodwin and Nixon had been that far apart before, but I don't think they had been that close before. I know Earl Warren and Nixon were very far apart and there was no secret about that, and I think maybe the Nixon people at first thought, "Well, we'll go along and sort of put up with Goodwin so long as we run the show." When Goodwin started using some of his own strengths and initiative, why, they didn't like it.

Goodwin told me that the Chandlers would have supported him for re-election had he accepted the right-to-work bill or initiative or whatever, if he would come out for right-to-work. He said, "Donny, I just can't do it." I said, "Well, Governor, I couldn't support you. I couldn't support that issue. You're my friend and I'd support you, but I wouldn't support you on that issue." I said, "I don't believe California is ready for a right-to-work bill or a right-to-work initiative or a right-to-work law." And, of course, they weren't.

My visiting with Bill Knowland was to try to save the party. I told him we would lose every constitutional officer if he ran on the right-to-work issue in California. Of course, Bill, in his booming voice, looking up at the ceiling (because he would rarely look at you), said, "Now, the last time I ran in California I carried the state by a million votes." I halfway jokingly said, "But Bill, I'm afraid you're going to lose by a million votes if you run on this issue." Well, no one could talk him out of it.

Rowland: Why did he get involved with right-to-work?

Doyle: Again, I think the conservative wing of the party wanted control and they wanted their guy and they thought, now is the time.

Rowland: Represented by his father?

Doyle: Represented not so much by his father as himself and some of the Los Angeles people that were involved in politics who just felt they wanted a right-to-work bill.

Rowland: Was this also the Los Angeles Finance Committee?

Doyle: They would have to have been involved, yes.

Rowland: Asa Call?

Doyle: Yes, Asa Call was one, for example.

Rowland: Frank Lanterman?

Doyle: No, Frank was not as conservative as one might have thought him to be once you got to talking with him. He represented a very conservative district out there, yes. John "Bud" Collier was much more conservative than Frank Lanterman. They represented nearby districts, as you know.

But that put Goodie in a position where he had to stand and fight, which he--he won the convention, he won the battle but not the war, because they didn't try to boot him out. But from then on, it was all downhill. The horse was out of the barn. Knowland had made up his mind and I think Nixon's position was this: (As I told you on the phone I'd be very frank with you on anything I say to you.) I think Nixon and his group welcomed the fight between Knight and Knowland because it would leave him as the big dog. I say that because of actions that I saw Chotiner doing at the state convention that year.

Of course, I choose to run and I was not going to run for re-election because I wanted to get back to my business, in spite of what some people may have thought as to why I didn't run. I think I could have won that seat as long as I wanted to run, but I voluntarily resigned and retired in '58 and retired from the state central committee [pause] because this just was not good.

I did support Goodie Knight for U.S. Senator. I was his northern California chairman, along with Cyril Magnin (Cyril Magnin being the Democrat). We were joint chairmen for Goodie Knight's campaign for the U.S. Senate. But by that time the people were unhappy about the musical chair bit. By that time, labor had decided that a governor could do more for them than a Senator and they spent most of their time on Pat Brown.

- Doyle: Now, in my opinion, Pat Brown would not have run for governor had Goodie just stood up and fought Bill Knowland. Clair Engle ran because, after all, the job was open and he was a congressman.
- Rowland: He was from northern California.
- Doyle: --up in Red Bluff, I believe it was.
- Rowland: Why did Knight back down?
- Doyle: Well, Knight got cold feet because of the money. We had \$120,000 to run for governor if he had gone. That's all we had. Now, we would have raised more, of course.
- Neil Haggerty and the labor leaders of this state begged Goodie to stay in the race and actually suggested that they would get Democrats to become Republicans to win the primary, that they would put people out getting signatures to re-register just to support Goodie.
- Rowland: What were the feelings about the Democrats among the Republicans? Who did they suspect would run for governor if it wasn't Brown?
- Doyle: There really wasn't anyone except Brown. It might have been our friend George Miller, Jr. But I don't think George was ready at that time. I think he was sort of waiting. He was smart enough to know. But it would probably have been just another candidate if it hadn't been Pat Brown, but he was a logical one to do it. Once he saw what was happening, he had no choice and I'm sure every morning he thanked Bill Knowland for what he had done for him after he became governor! [laughter] There was no way you could win that one, no. Had Goodwin stayed in it, he would have had the legislature with him. Bill didn't have that much support in the legislature. Bill was not that personal.
- Rowland: Where did Knowland get what support he had?
- Doyle: He went to women's groups and he went to the money people-- Republicans with money. He went to the conservative wing of the party, which was primarily Los Angeles.
- Rowland: Was this also Henry Salvatori?
- Doyle: Henry Salvatori would be involved; Justin Dart would have been involved, although Justin is a good friend of mine today and I think Justin wanted to be nice to the governor (to Goodwin). But I think those people down there just decided that was the move that they wished to make and the money wasn't there.

Doyle: So I remember talking to him at the Mansion where he had a few of us in--

Rowland: The governor?

Doyle: Yes, and he said he just didn't know what he was going to do; he was going to take a few days off. So he went down to Phoenix someplace, a ranch--he, Mrs. Knight, Newt Stearns. I don't know whether Paul Mason was there or not. There were probably four or five people with him. He called me at home one evening and said, "Donny, I've made my decision. I'm going to run for the U.S. Senate." I said, "Well, Governor, I'm disappointed. I don't like to see you make the change because I don't think you have to do it." He said, "Under the circumstances I don't think I have any choice." I said, "I would rather see you not run for anything and become a statesman, become a spokesman for the party, because we won't have much left when this is over."

But some of his friends, I guess, wanted him in office. Maybe he did. I really don't know. He never told me; he never said. But we could see that the handwriting was on the wall. As I say, our labor friends put all their time and effort and money into Pat Brown. Some were helping Engle, of course.

Then the Republican party--I guess some of the members of the Republican party who thought Knight should have just played dead to Bill Knowland didn't give him much support for the Senate. I could see even the women's groups--they just spent all their time on Knowland and forgot about Knight. Mrs. Knowland was very harsh on Goodie.

Rowland: Why?

Doyle: Just a personal feeling that she had. One remark she made at a meeting, which Joe Knowland personally apologized to me for, was she called Goodwin--she said he had a spaghetti spine. She got real nasty in the campaign, more so than Bill Knowland, and she had no reason to be because her husband was running for governor and she was running all over. Maybe she thought that Goodwin should have just bowed out and said, "Well, come on, Bill, I'm all for you and we'll elect you governor." But it was handled very badly.

Rowland: We have a note in our office that there was a meeting between Knowland and Knight and various other people. Do you recall that?

Doyle: No, unless it was the weekend that they were down there. But I thought Goodie was down there for a rest.

Rowland: I think the press reported that he had the flu or influenza or something of that sort.

Doyle: If he had talked to Bill at that time, he didn't talk to me about it. He didn't mention it to me, and I doubt that you saw them on the platform many times together during that campaign, senatorial and gubernatorial candidates. I just don't think it happened. It might have been at a dinner or somewhere along the way, but not at any of those that I attended, and we had a couple for Goodwin. But to me that was the unfortunate part of that era of the Republican party. But Republicans have never seen fit to--[they] always play the game by their own rules. They sometimes become cannibals.

My first campaign was back in 1936 in the Fresno city mayor's race. Then I worked for Frank Merriam, who was opposed by Hatfield, who was a lieutenant governor, both Republicans. Merriam won the primary. The Democrat candidate, Culbert Olson, then became governor in November. That was the first governor's race that I was involved in--why do we [Republicans] do this to each other?

The next one that I was involved in, of course, was when Goodwin and Knowland had their differences and we all know what happened there. The next one was when Max Rafferty decided he wanted to be U.S. Senator against Tommy Kuchel. Of course, I was on Tommy's side there and we lost again. Recently, of course, this history with five Republicans; they think they're the only ones who could be elected governor and the five lose after spending \$5 million.

Rowland: I'm wondering, would the battle between Nixon, Knowland, and Knight for various positions in the party--what can this tell us about Knight's personality and his way of dealing with these crisis situations?

Doyle: Well, I don't think they took Knight seriously. I don't think they looked upon Knight as a man with that much strength. In other words, "This fellow can't run the party; he can't run the state; he shouldn't be vice-president; he should never be president." He was more outgoing than both of them. He had more soul than both of them. And they may have resented this in a way--you know, "We'll put up with him as long as we have to and then perhaps we ought to find a way to get him out of the picture." They treated him very shabbily; both Nixon and Knowland treated Knight very shabbily.

Rowland: Including their lieutenants.

Doyle: Including their lieutenants--Chotiner was the greatest hatchet man in the history of this country, in my opinion--certainly in California--and he was just that.

I think that Knowland was the man that hurt him. Here was this sincere, honest, decent guy and when he saw his own party members--he had worked in the party as much as any of them, probably longer than any of them--

Rowland: Are you talking about Knowland now?

Doyle: Knight. When Knight saw his own political family biting him in the back it hurt him. He was a sensitive guy. He had feelings, he had passion, and this bothered some of the rest of us who were involved in politics at that time. Again, I certainly didn't believe this could happen and when I saw all these people in a room at the Palace Hotel calling each other names, including an s.o.b., I thought, "Wow, this is [laughter] a little different than I pictured my party or any other party." Yes, you see, because there really was no reason for it. There was no brass ring to be head of the convention here at that time and certainly historically the governor had been the head of the party, so it was just so much nonsense. But it happened and it wounded some people.

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Rowland: I'm curious about Newt Stearns's role because he left the governor's office and became a public relations person for Whitaker and Baxter and they worked for the Knowland family.

Doyle: Whitaker and Baxter handled our first campaign. [They] handled the Knight campaign during the Graves challenge [1954]. Whitaker and Baxter handled Goodwin Knight's primary campaign for the Senate, not the general--the primary campaign. Now, whether they felt they wanted to spend all of their time on Knowland, whether they felt Goodwin couldn't win or didn't have the money--because at that time Whitaker and Baxter were usually winners. They were on the winning side. I think they were still friendly with Goodie at that time and even after. I think Newt Stearns felt that it was a new position for him, a new job that he wanted to take and, of course, he stayed with them until he became ill. So I don't think he left because he was upset with Goodwin, any more than I was upset that he didn't stay in the gubernatorial race against Bill Knowland. So I never really felt that there was that

Doyle: much feeling because I know that up until the time Goodwin died, he and Newt were still seeing each other; they were still friends. If there was any other feeling there at that time, I don't know about it.

Rowland: I was wondering about the role of Butch Powers.

Doyle: Butch Powers was always the bridesmaid. A great man for the job of lieutenant governor--he handled the job and he handled it well. Butch never got involved in any behind-the-scenes politics. He felt (and I agree with him) he never had to, that he was the lieutenant governor, elected by the people. He ran the senate and ran it well, worked well with both Republicans and Democrats--"Why should I get involved in being anything other than acting governor now and then when Goodie's out of the state?" Now, that was my view of Butch and I was sorry to see him defeated by Mr. Anderson when Brown won, but there was no choice. When Brown won, everybody went out except Frank Jordan just because he had been there for forty years, and Frank had reason to win.

So I think Butch did a fine job as lieutenant governor. I think history will show that he was one of the better lieutenant governors because, like Lyndon Johnson, Butch Powers knew how to get the job done with that senate. [pause] And he did.

I had one unhappy experience with Butch Powers which I am almost apologetic for. After Jim Silliman's first term as Speaker in '53, he ran against Butch Powers for lieutenant governor because of a fight he had with the senate. Silliman's lieutenants, Silliman's "boys" as he called them--the Doyles, the Allens, the Lincolns, the Weinbergers, and some of the others--supported Silliman against Butch in the primary. It was sad; it was too bad. I think we all knew that Silliman wasn't going to beat Butch Powers. He had the party pretty well with him. He had the money people pretty well with him. Goodwin did not get involved in that fight, but it was one of the first times that I think I did something that I really didn't have my heart in doing because of my friendship to Silliman. He had appointed me in my first term as vice-chairman of the Education Committee, which I appreciated, getting that position, having that experience. In those days it was rarely done to a first-year man, to a new man. I felt a loyalty to Jim to support him.

Rowland: Was there a bit of arm-twisting too?

Doyle: No, not at all. No, none at all. But the team that Silliman had made chairmen of committees and all for the most part--Glenn Coolidge and others pretty well went along with Silliman knowing that, "Gee, this is statewide; this is tough." We had no money.

Doyle: But the assembly--the Republican side--pretty well went for Jim out of loyalty and, of course, he was defeated badly. But the next day we were all on Butch's bandwagon. Butch was way ahead of us. He knew why; he knew what the story was. I remember bringing him down to our county fair for a meeting after that.

So politically that's one of the things that I did that I was sorry I--I felt I was obligated to do. As it turned out, Butch held no grudge and I consider him still a good friend and, of course, next time around we supported him heavily.

Rowland: I'm also wondering about the role of Kyle Palmer in the shift between Knowland and Knight. We have a note in our office that Kyle Palmer played in influential role in that decision to dry up Knight's money sources in southern California.

Doyle: I don't know whether he did. I can't say he did directly. Certainly indirectly his influence had as much to do about it as anyone else. Those who lived in that area and those who were active at that time politically just went along with the Chandlers and others. I'm not saying the Chandlers were the only ones involved. There certainly had to be more, but certainly that was a very influential newspaper at the time and Goodwin needed that newspaper and he just couldn't win with maybe one paper here. We didn't know exactly at that time whether the [San Francisco] Chronicle and [San Francisco] Examiner would both have gone with us [Knight] or not, and the [San Francisco] Call, I think, was there at the time against Knowland. We knew the Knowland paper could not do it [support Knight] and we knew the Los Angeles Times would not do, they wouldn't be going for Knowland. This frightened Goodwin, it really did.

But I think, looking back in retrospect, he would have been better off, the party would have been better off, had he [Knight] just resigned.

Rowland: We also have a note in our office that there is a question of whether Tom Caldecott was the stalking horse for Knowland.

Doyle: No, Tom is a gentleman, first and always a gentleman, an honest, sincere guy--not an outgoing individual, but one you could sit down with in a room and say, "Tom, how do you size this? How do you see it?" He'd tell you how he saw it, and he might not agree or disagree with you, but he'd tell you the facts. To our knowledge, those of us involved in the Bay Area politics, Tom Caldecott took no position for or against Knowland or for or against Knight, being a superior court judge at the time.

A White House Visit

- Rowland: Turning to one of the last questions on the Republican party: a visit that Goodwin Knight had in Washington, D.C. in which he met with President Eisenhower and Vice-President Nixon. The press came out saying that Knight was trying to get an endorsement from Eisenhower for his U.S. Senate campaign. I remember you charged Christopher with needlessly trying to make political hay out of this meeting. What would your interpretation be on that trip to Washington?
- Doyle: I don't think there was any question that Knight went back for the help of Nixon and Eisenhower and I don't think he got it.
- Rowland: Why?
- Doyle: Well, I think Nixon, as I mentioned earlier, was going to be just as happy if both Knowland and Knight were defeated and Nixon was--
- Rowland: Do you think Nixon was able to persuade Eisenhower too?
- Doyle: Whether he was able to persuade Eisenhower or not, I don't know, but Eisenhower was not a politician. Eisenhower didn't know first base about politics. He was a great general. I think he did a reasonably good job as president, but as a public servant or politician, whichever you want to refer to it--as a politician he just didn't know. That's why he had some problems along the way--not serious problems, but little problems--because he didn't know how to handle them. He had never been in that kind of a ballgame before. I doubt that he took much from Nixon. I doubt that Nixon was able to give him an awful lot of advice that he would accept and run with it.

There again, the Christopher and Knight situation was a bad one. It was not a good one. George and I have become very good friends. We've traveled around the world together in the last few years. I didn't know George very well at that time. I was doing what I guess one would do for someone you were supporting and felt needed support (when he was running for the Senate.) Of course, we would meet and [discuss] "how do we slow down George?" or "how do we keep Christopher out of this thing?" In fact, originally we would hope that Christopher would not run at all because I felt certain that Los Angeles was going to elect Knight in that primary, although George is well known here [San Francisco] and well liked.

Doyle: George would have made a hell of a U.S. Senator, a good one. He would have made a fine governor, George Christopher would have, but the timing was wrong. In politics, like business, you've got to be in the right place at the right time. George Christopher, except for mayor of this city where he did an outstanding job, was never in the right place for statewide office. We saw it in the Knight case. We certainly saw it in the Reagan case. He just couldn't win for losing and it's unfortunate because he's a fine, honest guy--a "stand-up guy," as we say; a no-nonsense guy, a public servant. He would have made a great governor. He would have made a great U.S. Senator. But the time wasn't right for George. A term before, or a term after, George Christopher would have made it. Stop and think who was in line at that time. But it just wasn't in the cards for him and, unfortunately, we didn't know that until it happened to us.

It's hard to know when to quit, for example. It's hard to know when to run and when to not run. You ask your friends if you should run and they say, "Sure, great." A lot of them wind up holding your coat and that's about all--"You go fight them," see?--which is too bad. We've lost some good men, both Democrats and Republicans, on the same basis. If you watch the national scene and even the state scene, Pat Brown I don't think ever had any reason to believe he'd ever be attorney general when he ran for district attorney of this city.

But Pat Brown--and again, a personal friend of mine and still is--was always at the right place at the right time, no question about it. Unfortunately, George Christopher was not. But I think Washington could have done a lot to have not had this problem. I think that Eisenhower and/or Nixon should have talked to Bill Knowland and said, "Why don't you stay out of this. If you don't want to run for the Senate again, we'll give you a job here. There's lots of jobs around here you can have and do your international thing which you're good at, ambassador or whatever." They could have done that, but they didn't, and they didn't want to.

Rowland: Was that Nixon?

Doyle: Well, Nixon would have to be the one advising Eisenhower on whether to do it or not to do it because Eisenhower didn't know. Nixon being from California, Knowland being from California, as I say, they could have avoided the downfall of the Republican party in California, and I go back and say that, in my opinion, the reason they didn't wish to interfere at that time was that it didn't make that much difference to either one of them.

Rowland: How about the role of Earl Warren?

Doyle: Earl Warren, after he went to the Court, had no position--period. I probably saw him half a dozen times after when he would come back to Oakland because he and my partner were and continued to be good friends. Then, of course, he began making some decisions that some people in California thought were not the right decisions. They weren't lawyers [laughter], but they didn't like some of the interpretations. But he wasn't that active here anymore and he had a few personal friends and that was all. But I don't know of any political role that Earl Warren took after he left the state.

Rowland: When Warren came back to the state, would he visit with Goodwin Knight?

Doyle: No, never.

Rowland: Why?

Doyle: Because he had no reason to.

Rowland: We know he met with Pat Brown.

Doyle: Well, he and Pat Brown were duck hunting partners and they were more personal friends than Knight or Nixon. He and Knowland were friends as family and young people together, or Bill was much younger.

Rowland: Do you mean Warren and Knowland?

Doyle: Warren and Knowland, and Warren put Knowland where he is [appointed him to U.S. Senate], let's face it. So they were friends, there's no question about it. How much they saw of each other, I don't know. But certainly not Goodwin Knight or other party leaders in California. But Pat Brown was like Ben Swig. He'd go on vacations with Ben Swig and his family. They were personal friends. But Warren and Pat, I think, were just good buddies; that type of thing. I doubt that he would get involved even with Pat on any political issues. Oh, they might talk about something, but Warren wouldn't be trying to influence him.

V LEGISLATING FOR EDUCATION IN THE ASSEMBLY

Appointment to the Education Committee

Rowland: I have a whole group of questions here on legislation and your chairmanship on the Assembly Education Committee. I'm wondering why you got interested and involved in education legislation?

Doyle: I became vice-chairman of the Education Committee through Jim Silliman. I have to assume that I was one of his votes that helped him become Speaker, and they asked me my preference in committees, and the one I chose was Education, as I say, having sort of campaigned on education costs in the future. So, I was named vice-chairman and at that time worked with Bud Collier, who was chairman, and I introduced some legislation for the teachers, the CTA at the time, the California Teachers Association. I was not too heavily involved in the AFT, which was the teachers' union people at the time, because they didn't have that many members. [I was] not involved in any big tax issues legislatively as the vice-chairman of the committee. I more or less just assisted on the committee. If Bud wasn't there, I would handle the committee and that was about it.

Analyzing the Influence of the CTA

Rowland: I understand from doing some research that Bud Collier had not a very good amiable relationship with the CTA and Bob McKay.

Doyle: No, Bud was very much an independent, and I think he felt maybe the CTA was a little too strong for his liking; he might have. See, in that period in Sacramento, the CTA was probably the strongest legislative advocacy group in Sacramento. I think the CTA--

Rowland: Stronger than the liquor and the horse track?

Doyle: No. You may have had some going on behind the scene for horse track and liquor that I'm not familiar with because I wasn't involved with them.

Rowland: Right.

Doyle: But as far as the rank and file in that, particularly the assembly, CTA got pretty much what they wanted. CTA sort of took over where I thought Simpson should be operating in the field of education. But I might as well tell you now, as far as Roy Simpson was concerned, I think it was the poorest appointment Earl Warren ever made. He was not a good superintendent of public instruction. In the six years that I served there, he never once appeared before the Education Committee on any issue. He always sent his lieutenants, and I think, in my opinion, he did it sometimes in order that--he didn't want to have to take the heat on the issues because he was not a strong aggressive educator.

Rowland: Would it also be some feeling of the status of the office?

Doyle: It could be, but other heads of government and other officeholders came before committee meetings, but not Roy Simpson. Even when he was asked and I threatened to subpoena him, why, there was a big to-do over that.

But my point is, I think that the CTA handled themselves very well. They had a statewide network of people, unlike any other legislative advocacy group in Sacramento, lobby group. They did their homework from border to border on any issue. Now, if they needed to crank out ten thousand letters, they could do it.

Rowland: Was that primarily Bob McKay's achievement?

Doyle: I would say it was Bob McKay's achievement. Now, Dr. Arthur Corey was, of course, the head at that time, but Bob McKay was the man, the voice of the legislature, you see, and that was his show and he ran it. I would say Bob was responsible for that activity.

And, really, except for school funds that were needed, more buildings that were needed--the impoverished districts needed more through the allocations board and so forth--they really didn't get involved in any big issues during my six years there except one, when they wanted to raise taxes.



Assemblyman Donald Doyle visits elementary school children in Walnut Creek, Ca.
1956



Assemblyman Donald Doyle making awards to student leaders at Las Lomas High School, Walnut Creek, Ca.
1956

Rowland: Beer and cigarette tax.

Doyle: Beer and cigarette tax, yes. That was the one time that I think they may have stubbed their toe.

Rowland: On what?

Doyle: Politically. They suggested it, not the legislature. They suggested it, not the governor. They suggested it, not the chairman of the committee. They brought it in and said, "Here's our package."

Rowland: They didn't clear it through--

Doyle: No one but their own group.

Rowland: Except their own group.

Doyle: Oh, sure.

Rowland: They didn't talk to the governor about it? They didn't talk to you about it?

Doyle: To my knowledge, they didn't until it was ready to go, see. Now, I had to say that I couldn't support it, see. Now, they didn't get mad and jump up and down. They said, "Well, Don, here's why we need it." I'm not saying they didn't need it, but I just said that the philosophy, the policy, of having to tax beer and cigarettes to give our kids more money is just beyond me. I just can't comprehend that being done.

Rowland: Yes. Of course, they also ran head against those interest groups too, Dan Creedon and the malt beverage industry.

Doyle: Oh, yes. Oh, sure. Dan Creedon. Oh, yes. But, you see, had it been something that the committee or the governor and others could have gone for, or even [if] someone in the house [assembly] had brought it up, Collier or someone or myself, and said, "Well, look, this is what we want to do"--but there was some resentment on the part of some, not me particularly. I just was against it, period. Whether I'd have thought of it or not was beside the point. So, I told them right off that I wouldn't support it.

Rowland: There was a reference in the Sacramento Newsletter [March 8, 1957] to remarks by Assemblyman Coolidge and a few others that they were not tools of the beer and liquor interests. They were referring

Rowland: to some charges by the CTA that they were run by the--[laughter] that the whole assembly, as a matter of fact, was run by the beer and the cigarette and all sorts of other interests.

Doyle: Yes, yes. But I will--

Rowland: This sounds like a little bit of muscling by the CTA. [laughter]

Doyle: Oh, yes. I think they moved in pretty hard on some, but, all due respect, I thought they handled themselves like ladies and gentlemen. I'll say this to you: they generated over ten thousand pieces of correspondence to my office for that campaign.

Rowland: For the beer and cigarette--

Doyle: Yes, for the tax. I had delegations up from my district. I told them all the same thing. And there was really no heat; there was really no pressure, other than that they were trying to get the thing through. That was really the only big issue, I would say, that was before us at that time.

The AFT was just getting started about the time that I left, you know, and they were gaining momentum and getting members then.

Rowland: I understand that George Miller was a partisan of the AFT.

Doyle: He was, yes, and maybe for two reasons, one being his labor friends, the other being--I think he may have felt, "Well, the CTA's getting too big and we've got to have some competition." He didn't always agree with me on CTA legislation. He would not refuse to carry it if I asked him to, but I have seen George Miller handle legislation for me and make his presentation, get it on, and then withhold his vote or vote no. But that was the kind of a senator he was; that was the kind of a man that he was.

Rowland: I understand there were some personality conflicts between Bob McKay and George Miller. Do you recall?

Doyle: There could have been, but George never mentioned them to me and neither did Bob, of course. Bob never came to me and said, "Hey, would you talk to your senator about this?" or George never said to me, "Hey, that's McKay's bill. Forget it." George never did it in the six years that I worked with him. But I could see that--George being a finance man. He was a good figure man. He understood figures. He understood budgets. He understood finance, including the school finance, much better than I did. So, I would have to say that George was serious and sincere when he would take these positions that he took against, say, the CTA. I don't think he did it because of the AFT.

Doyle: But, I guess, after I left, and I don't know this to be a fact, but there sort of began some--I think Bob McKay left about the time I did.

Rowland: McKay left in '61.

Doyle: All right. See, I left in '59, January, and he left a session later. And, very frankly, not having been there but looking back, he just wasn't replaceable in the way he did the job. I don't know whether he even realized it or not. But he knew how to get the job done, and if you defeated him on something, he'd be right back the next day to talk to you on something else. He would not get upset. And, of course, I gave everybody an audience, maybe too much at times. [laughter] Sometimes you were there till two in the morning on that committee--including the AFT.

Rowland: Who supported you for the chairmanship of the--?

Doyle: Abe Lincoln became Speaker. After Silliman was defeated for lieutenant governor, he didn't run again and Lincoln was a candidate for Speaker. When he ran for Speaker, I supported him and, being vice-chairman of the committee, he asked me if I would like to take over the chairmanship and I told him that I would. So, that was the support. I mean, the Speaker at that time made those appointments. Dorothy Donohoe was named vice-chairman of the committee.

Rowland: I wondered if the CTA also put their stamp of approval on your--

Doyle: Oh, I would assume so. Now, they never came to me and said, "Look, we're pushing for you," or "We want you." I would assume that I was acceptable to them, but there was no big deal on it. Certainly Luther Lincoln never told me that the CTA wanted me or had been to him about me. The committee was pretty well set up and we kept pretty much the same committee after I became chairman, even to the point of having Bud Collier stay on the committee, which he chose to do. He could have left if he wanted, but I said to Lincoln that it didn't bother me; if Mr. Collier wanted to stay on, that's fine.

Rowland: You had some interesting people on your committee. One of the most interesting to me, in that he became later Speaker, was Jesse Unruh.

Doyle: Yes.

Rowland: In '55. We're still trying to get an interview with Jesse Unruh and he's unfortunately been very reluctant, so we're trying to dig up as many angles and profiles of Jesse Unruh as we can, particularly in those Knight years.

Doyle: Jesse was the quietest man on the committee. Jesse Unruh actually said very little. Yes, he was there, had a good attendance record. He voted. But you never heard him make speeches. You never heard him get involved or aroused about one issue or the other, the same as on the floor of the assembly. Jesse was there two years before you even knew he could make a speech--quiet, watchful, evidently absorbing everything that went on around him, with him. I'm sure [he] supported issues and things in his district.

Jesse and I were friendly and I would say we were friends, because education he supported pretty well, Short-Doyle he certainly supported, flood control projects in my district, highway projects in my district, and the bridges that we got the legislation through while I was there for both the Carquinez and the Benicia Bridge. Jesse always was helpful to me for things in my district. Labor--those that we were on or for--Jesse and I were pretty much the same. He showed no inclination of ever wanting to be a power in Sacramento, the time I was there with him.

Rowland: Do you have some insights on why he suddenly made those moves?

Doyle: Oh, I think Jesse had it planned long before anyone knew about it. I think Jesse probably had it planned when he was going to USC that, "When I leave here..." You know, he and Pat Hillings and all these boys were there together and Jesse, of course, was supposed to be the liberal of the crowd. But then he made his move to come to Sacramento and, as I say, handled himself very well and just didn't make a lot of noise, but he knew and saw and watched and listened. I think from the time he arrived he probably had plans of where he wanted to go and maybe he was thinking about governor at the time.

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Doyle: But Jesse was--I guess, once he made his move for the Speakership, at that time I think he probably got involved more statewide than just district-wise or Los Angeles County-wise. I think he watched how some of the Speakers might have handled situations with being able to help candidates in an area, and if you helped the right candidate in the area, why, naturally you would expect him to help you when you ran for Speaker. I think Jesse was a little

Doyle: more outspoken than others, although they all did it; let's face it. You know, even as vice-chairman we'd go around and try to support those that we thought were going to make it, and hoping they would support the people we were supporting for Speaker and other positions.

Frank Purcell and the Textbook Controversy

Rowland: I sent you an article there from the San Francisco Chronicle [November 21, 1956]. It seemed the Chronicle was really doing a big investigation of some insurance payoffs.

Doyle: Yes. [looking through papers]

Rowland: And also there is a story of your hiring a consultant for your Education Committee, a Thomas Meckling.

Doyle: Meckling, yes. That's another item than the--

Rowland: I was wondering what were your views of that episode. I can see that the Chronicle was really hot on that. [laughter]

Doyle: Well, the [San Francisco] Examiner--

Rowland: What did they have against you? [laughter]

Doyle: Well, the Chronicle wasn't nearly as hot as the Examiner.

[emphatically] Let me get in the insurance thing first. Prior to my going to Sacramento as a legislator, I received commissions as an agent and broker in Oakland on State of California business. So, receiving commissions after I arrived there, along with other agents and brokers who were in the assembly and out of the assembly, was nothing new. It was just that the Examiner had sort of "scooped" the Chronicle, I guess, on the so-called textbook scandal and I guess the Examiner was looking for something to do some headlining on, so they chose the insurance side as openers.

Rowland: You mean the other way around, don't you? The Examiner scooped on the textbook [scandal].

Doyle: On the textbooks, right.

Rowland: And the Chronicle wanted the insurance.

Doyle: The Chronicle wanted the insurance, yes. See? [fervently] So, there was nothing new as far as I was concerned. As I say, had I not gone to the legislature, I think I would have still been on the insurance list of the State of California, one of those in the Bay Area receiving commissions on state business. In those days, that's the way it was done.

Now, they had an insurance man in Sacramento, through the Department of Finance, that handled the coverages. Different companies came in and wrote the business, whether it was the Fireman's Fund or you name it--the large companies--and those companies paid commissions and these commissions were handed out to various brokers around the state--some in the legislature, some out.

Now, perhaps, looking back, one might say, "Well, now that I'm in the legislature, I better not take any more commissions from the state because there might be a conflict of interest." Again, in those days, making \$300 a month in the legislature, being away from your business, I felt I was contributing something to the state. I'm not saying I was under compensated; I knew what it paid before I went there. [emphatically] But I didn't see any big flap about allowing my office to continue to take state insurance business any more than I felt that a law firm could not accept funds from lawyers who were in the legislature, which in those days most did. See? This was just the way business was done in those days. I'm not saying it's right, but it was. I think that any lawyer that was there at that time whose firm was of a size so they could handle accounts, was given accounts from insurance companies, unions, whatever, to help support the guy while he was in Sacramento. I don't know about Washington, but I know it was done Sacramento-wise.

So, as far as that goes, that's the end of that as far as I'm concerned. Of course, after the big blowup, why, they decided to stop doing that, and they didn't stop doing it to people other than those in the assembly because the commissions had to be paid to someone, and they gave to both Democrats and Republicans who were agents and brokers. It wasn't a matter of just certain ones. But I received that under Earl Warren's time, you see; my office did. My partner, as I told you, [was] Howard Cross.

Rowland: Before you were in the--

Doyle: Before I was in the legislature. So, there was no big squabble as far as I was concerned. It was just a matter of--it made good headlines, and it sold some papers, and it tied in with the textbook thing that Mr. Purcell was trying to build up on, and so if

Doyle: it hadn't have been for the textbook [issue] this would not have appeared anywhere. See? I mean, everybody knew it; it wasn't that there were any secrets about it. But it was a chance to get at me, to get at John Peirce, and to get at the governor. And sometimes--

Rowland: This probably hints at some deeper feelings that the Chronicle and Examiner had against Knight and his supporters.

Doyle: Yes. Oh, yes. You see, really, I don't know whether it's the editor or the owners. I'm not saying it's owners or editors. But I will make this open statement to you: in my opinion, there are some newspaper reporters that would crucify their own grandmother to get a headline. End of quote. [heatedly] And I can show you in spades what I'm talking about.

So, yes, these things are bothersome, they're worrisome, they embarrass some people, but it certainly didn't embarrass me. It was a matter of public record. As I say, I didn't receive one letter saying, "Hey, you must be a crook, Doyle," and so forth and so on, even though there were those in Sacramento at that time who might have thought that I was going a little too rapidly politically and thought, "Well, this might slow the kid down some." And to some it might have. To me, it didn't. Had I wanted to run again, I would have run. I would have won. Had I wanted to run for a statewide office, I certainly would have done it, not because of this type of thing.

The Examiner had me on the front pages for seventeen days when they were sinking ships in the Suez Canal and you read about that on page four or beyond. [excitedly] It's business; it's business with them. But what I resent is a reporter being able to lie about an individual, be he a public servant or someone else, and get away with it, although I did get a retraction out of the Examiner on one of their headlines.

Quickly, and I've got volumes on this thing, I was always against the state printing textbooks because I'm for free enterprise, and I'm not one of those who think you can believe in free enterprise and still think that you can be a little bit pregnant. You're either one or the other. See? I don't want the state in the insurance business. I don't like the State Fund. I don't want them in the printing business or any other business that can be done by private enterprise.

This whole thing started when a young lady, married with three children in Walnut Creek, by the name of Doris Haslett came to me about the textbooks that they had in their district. I really

Doyle: hadn't been involved in it before. I went out and she showed me books that they weren't using and hadn't used, but they had to keep them on the shelf because the state had printed them and sent them down to them.

Rowland: She was a teacher?

Doyle: No. She was a PTA president. So, that's where I started out with it. I wasn't that involved in knowing exactly what they were doing, and so I talked to Dr. Francis Doyle, who was in the state Department of Education at that time; Dr. Connor, who turned out to be somewhat of a different individual; and just--

Rowland: Different?

Doyle: A different individual, as I say, different in that--well, I couldn't trust him after some of the remarks that he made because he too wasn't always telling the truth. There are two people I don't want anything to do with; one's a liar and the other one's a thief. And that's probably one of my downfalls because I'm very open to say that.

So, what happened was, I said, "Well, Doris, look, let me find out about it. Let's check into it." So, I went to Sacramento and I tried to find out something about this. Well, I found it was pretty much a closed session, that it's been asked about before, and you've got the unions in the printing plant. They don't want that disturbed. The guild is involved there. The guild is involved in all your newspapers, as workers, you see. In fact, the guilds run some of them. That's why management's uneasy about riding too hard on guild members as to what they do and why, I've found.

So, I really wasn't going to get that deeply into it until I saw some of these things that were happening. So, then I get a call six months or whatever later from this chap, who was very interested in education, very interested in education. He had written "The Bay Area Public School Emergency" [reading headline from the Examiner] for the Examiner, Frank J. Purcell. So he seemed to have a real interest in education, textbooks, whatever. Being naive, I had no reason not to talk to him. I noticed that he never had me at his office nor met in my office; we always met someplace else.

Rowland: And he was a writer for the Examiner, a reporter?

Doyle: Yes. [heatedly] He's the headliner. He's the headliner. And I've got volumes of it, which I can show you, and I don't want to get into a lot of--[reads headlines from the Examiner] "Text Dispute," "New Problems for the State." See? Frank Purcell.

Doyle: He was the headline writer. September, '56: "School Text Plan Scored." And he worked up to it, kept talking to me all the time. In fact, he asked me for a job, to work for the [Education] Committee. This was before Mr. Mechling or anyone else. And I couldn't quite put my finger on it.

Well, the state school board at that time were pretty much Simpson people. I mean by that--sure, the governor appointed them, but they went along pretty much with what Simpson wanted.

Well, I just want to get some of these headlines to show you. [resumes reading headlines] "Governor Knight Eyes Row on Textbooks." Well, the governor and I talked about it, but there was no big deal as far as the governor getting excited and going to fire me and get [me] off the committee and all that. [resumes reading headlines] "Link Disclosed Between Probers and Publishers." "U.S. Agents' Inner Probe in Textbook Scandal." And I'll make a statement to you a little bit later.

Rowland: This is all the Examiner?

Doyle: Yes, it's all Examiner. [continues reading headlines] "State Will Probe Doyle's Role in Textbook Scandal." Well, Pat Brown got into it because they pushed him into it, see.

Rowland: It looks like a real smear job. [laughter]

Doyle: Oh, yes! Can you imagine that?

[excitedly] As I say, here, November 17--I don't know how many ships they sunk that day in the canal, see. [continues reading headlines] "Doyle's Role, Inner Probe." "Attorney General Orders Probe of Textbooks." No, that's the same one. Let's see. "Secret Federal Probe in Textbook Row Revealed." "Doyle Profit on Textbooks." [heatedly] Oh! Now, that is the most dastardly thing to do to anyone ever. See? It had nothing to do with me. But the guy who wrote that, this fellow here [points to photo of Purcell], he'll never look at you straight. He's a felon! He was a felon! He spent three terms in San Quentin, been in prison in Maryland, been in prison in Utah, and here was the guy that was trying to make me look bad.

Now, I got over it. But my point is that when they want to talk about why people enter politics or leave politics--I didn't leave because of this guy at all. But this man was dishonest, he's a thief, and it's a matter of record that he's a thief. He had an alcoholic problem, of course. These are things that I'm not going to spend a lot of time on, but just to tell you

Doyle: that that's what this thing is all about, this guy right here [points again to photo of Purcell]. And everybody jumps on the bandwagon--"Gee, maybe we do have something here."

The people that were the nicest to me during this whole thing on the Democratic side were Pat Brown and George Miller. Pat Brown, see, came to me personally and said, "Don, I'm sorry, but I've got to look into it," and so forth and so on, "There's nothing wrong; don't worry about it." I said, "Pat, there's nothing wrong." And he came right into the meeting we had with [Clarence A.] Linn, who was trying to make a big thing out of it too. That was one of his deputies.

Rowland: Linn?

Doyle: Yes, Linn. His picture's in here somewhere. [looks through papers] See, here's a correction that the Examiner made after this one. [shows interviewer news clipping] See? Now, I have no quarrel with the Hearsts. I have no quarrel with a lot of people. But there are reasons why these things happen or don't happen, I guess. But this fellow here [indicating Purcell], to me, is just no good, and what I resented was the fact that the paper would have a man like that on their staff. He left later. I'm not going to say why he left, but he didn't hang around too long thereafter.

I guess, in short, what I can say is that I had two fellows that I trusted in trying to get in and find out about the textbook situation. One was Tom Mechling, who lied to me, and one was Frank Purcell, who lied to me. All our meetings were confidential. I would say to Purcell, "Gee, I can meet you in your office, Frank, or come by the house or we'll go to the office." Oh, no. We'd meet in some restaurant or some out-of-the-way place. Now, whether he had a reason to want to do that, I don't know.

Let's see. [looking through papers] This is Linn here. [indicating photograph of Linn] See? [reading photograph caption] "Assistant Attorney General Clarence A. Linn." Pat made him a judge afterwards, and I didn't think he was much of a judge on some of his decisions, but that's neither here nor there. I guess he felt he had a job to do.

But, you know, I'd give up records and all that; they'd call and ask me if I would--oh, yes, there's another thing. This fellow here [indicates photograph] handled my first campaign, a fellow by the name of Les Butler, and he'd been in San Quentin way back when he was a youth. So, the guy [Purcell] trying to make it look like I was tied in with this guy [laughter] had

Doyle: been in San Quentin three times to this guy's [Butler] one. So, this just shows you the irony of the whole thing. [reads another headline] "Doyle Campaign Funds and the Textbook Probe." It had nothing to do with it, absolutely nothing. See? My campaign treasurer had the thing [campaign financing] all laid out, monies all--see? But it made more headlines. So, just as long as they could do it--[reads another headline] "Doyle Revealed as Publishers' Dupe Since '55." It goes on and on and on.

But my point is that, I guess, when someone wants to give you a bad time, he can do it. [pointing to photograph] Now, here was Mechling with--Mechling ran for the Senate in Nevada. He was political-minded and a very sharp young guy. This was his attorney that he took with him. I didn't take any attorney with me. I took a whole bunch of files and, of course, then they would never give them back to me, which I thought was kind of crazy.

But the CTA, if you were going to ask, of course, were very quiet during all this, and the School Boards Association. Of course, the School Boards Association in those days didn't amount to very much, in my opinion. They weren't active at all legislatively or strong at all. But, here, Bert Levit--we're still good friends--and Elizabeth Hudson; I knew all of these people. But it goes on and on and on, as long as they [the Examiner] could do it.

All right. I got a phone call one night from a fellow. I don't know who it was, or is. This is getting toward the end. He said, "Doyle, you don't know me and I don't know you, but the guy who's been giving you all your trouble is a graduate of Stone College," and he hung up. Now, this was at night, quite late. So, what I did, I called the warden of San Quentin and asked him about this fellow, and he said, "Yes, it's true." [looking through papers] I was looking for a letter that he wrote to me and gave me all the information.

To make a long story short, as I say, they were really blowing the thing up. Most of my friends stayed with me, Republican friends. Some who didn't thought, "Well, maybe we're rid of Doyle. Now we don't have to worry about him any more." [looking through papers]

But anyway, as I say, the way this was stopped--in my opinion, the way it was stopped--I went down to see the governor and I said, "Goodwin--" I didn't call him "Goodwin." I said, "Governor, I'm real sick and tired of all of this. There are a lot of untruths in it and no facts. If there were, I'd be in jail. And

Doyle: I want you to tell your friends at the Examiner that if my name appears in their paper again on this issue, I'm going to get up before the assembly and with assembly state immunity I'm going to divulge the facts about Frank J. Purcell." That ended it.

So, as I say, I didn't mean to get this far involved in this particular issue. But this was in December, you see. I had a nice Christmas that year. [ironically] This was in December. I asked for the information and I received it. So, it makes you a little gun shy in talking to people like that who want to help you.

Rowland: So then Knight called up the Hearsts and said, "Stop it"?

Doyle: Well, I don't know exactly what happened except that it didn't appear again. So, that was in the beginning of the session, 1957. This fellow [Purcell] went on to the state Department of Education and had good jobs. [ironic laughter] This is the chap here [indicates Purcell] that, as far as I'm concerned, was a disgrace to his profession, and I think that it's people like him that give the press a bad name.

But the labor people called me in to talk to me about the issue. They said, "Gee, we don't want to get rid of the state printing plant." This was Neil Haggerty, who was a friend of mine.

Rowland: Labor didn't want to get rid of the state printing plant?

Doyle: They didn't. Yes, the printing plant. They wanted me to sort of get out of this thing.

One of Dr. Simpson's men came to me at a--

Rowland: George Hogan?

Doyle: No, no. Let's see. There were Hogan, Doyle, and Connor. And I think it was probably Hogan [who] came to me early in the game and said this was something [state printing of textbooks] he thought I shouldn't get involved with, that it had been here before and, you know, everything's all right, and I'm sure he was sent as an emissary of Dr. Simpson. So, I said, "Well, if there's nothing wrong, we don't have anything to worry about. If there is, why, we want to find out about it." I understand that since that conversation, they've made changes in how they allocate, distribute, and buy books. But, in the meantime, that was the beginning of a lot of hullabaloo.

Doyle: As I say, you know, if I hadn't have--I might have hired this fellow [Purcell], not knowing, to help me with the deal, but I hired Mechling instead. So, either one was bad news; they both proved to be bad news. But that's where, as I say, I lost a lot of respect for--

Rowland: Was this some motivation within the party?

Doyle: I don't think so. If it was, I couldn't--

Rowland: By a group opposed to Goodwin Knight's ambitions?

Doyle: If it was, I couldn't put my finger on it, you see. Now, today I see those same people. I left the legislature voluntarily to get back in business to where I could make a living and support my family. I've been quite successful businesswise. I had my own company at a time that I wanted to try and merge and then we sold out to another company. I serve on the boards of a couple of corporations. I've been president of the Chamber of Commerce, San Francisco. I'm now a lifetime member, one of three. I'm on the board of the California State Chamber of Commerce. I serve on hospital boards. And you name it, I've been involved in it.

Rowland: Yes. You also worked for Governor Reagan too, didn't you?

Doyle: Yes, sure, sure. And I was on the Cow Palace board under his appointment for four years. I'm involved in the Tort Commission study right now. I've kept my contacts in the legislature because I like to know and see what's going on. I'm still active in mental health, of course, through the Langley Porter Institute.

So, as far as I'm concerned, this was just one of those things that should not have happened. Nothing was gained by it happening, except for my family losing a lot of sleep and wondering what was going on and the boys wondering what was going on with their father, you see. But it only happened to me once, because I just would be very cautious as to the trust I put in people. It probably made a better person out of me because, as I told you, I was just, as someone said, a farm boy and a little naive, but I took people at their word, and I learned that you can't do that. I learned that you certainly can't do it in politics all the time any more than you can do it in business all the time, because you've got people who feel otherwise.

But after this, of course, I stayed on working with the party and, as I say, saw Bill Knowland and Knight and Nixon and all of them after they were in and out of office. I was state finance chairman under Put Livermore's regime during Nixon's last campaign for the Republican party.

Rowland: What was the first name again?

Doyle: Put Livermore. He was state chairman.

Rowland: [spells name] P-u-t?

Doyle: Yes. [spells whole name] P-u-t-n-a-m. Putnam Livermore, yes.

Rowland: Was he head of the state Resources Agency?

Doyle: That was his brother. That's quite a family. They're nice people.

VI SPONSORING A COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM

A Visit from Dr. Portia Bell Hume

Rowland: I've got a whole bunch of questions on the Short-Doyle Act.

Doyle: Yes. [tape off briefly]

Rowland: On the Short-Doyle Act--I hope you had a chance to read Dr. Hume's oral history. I xeroxed a portion of that relating to the Short-Doyle Act. That seemed to be quite a good summary from her perspective on the legislative maneuverings of community mental health. I have some questions here, first, on the Abshire Act, which she describes, in '53, and then going through the Short-Doyle Act attempt of '55, and then finally the achievements of '57. First, why did you get involved in the community mental health?

Doyle: Well, I had not been involved in mental health at all prior to a visit to my office by Dr. Hume and she first asked me if I could introduce a bill for her. I told her that I was quite busy as chairman of the Education Committee and, you know, couldn't someone else do it. She said, well, no, someone told her she should talk to me. So, she explained to me what she had in mind, that she wanted a bill which would take care of the mentally ill closer to home and not have them have to go to the institutions, and she could use my help.

I said, "Well, I'd be glad to introduce the bill for you, if you tell me what you want and how we can set it up." I had not been to any institutions or visited them or knew what it was all about really. So, I put the bill in for Dr. Hume originally and that was in 1955.

Rowland: Did she come representing the--she talked about the American Psychiatric Association. Was she representing herself or--?

Doyle: She came to me representing the University of California.

Rowland: The University of California?

Doyle: I mean, she was on the staff there, you know, Dr. Hume was. I mean, that was my tie: Well, if it's the University of California; she's with them, then I know that everything is okay. That was her original opening to me. [pauses] Oh, yes. When I asked her what the subject was she wanted the bill on, she said, "Mental health." That's when I told her I knew nothing about it and that I had my hands full with other things. But, as I told you, when she finished her meeting and conversation with me, I agreed to introduce the bill, so I introduced the bill.

Rowland: This was in '55, the first attempt?

Doyle: '55. The general session of '55. In my original bill, I was pretty much alone in my introduction of AB 1159. You can see I'm the only author.

Rowland: Yes.

First Failures in the Senate##

Doyle: I worked that bill through the two committees in the assembly side, worked it through the assembly floor, and I want to pause here and say through the help of Frank Lanterman, who I didn't know had any interest in mental health until I introduced this legislation, and he was one of my main supporters on the floor and in committee. So, here were two Republicans introducing legislation that some of our Republican friends thought was too, too liberal and said so in committee.

When the bill was to be heard in the senate, the chairman of the senate committee called me and asked me how long I would need for my bill, and I said, "Well, I have a couple of witnesses, two or three. It may take--"

Rowland: Who was the chairman of that committee? This was what committee?

- Doyle: This was the Governmental Efficiency Committee of the senate in 1955; I would say, in May of '55. He said, well, they didn't have a lot of time for it, but because of me they would listen to it. Then I had a call from the California Medical Association. Ben Read, who was their lobbyist at the time, said that they were going to have to oppose my bill, that his people hadn't had time to get into the details of it, but what they saw they didn't like because they thought it leaned too much toward the psychiatrists and not enough toward the practicing physicians or the MDs.
- Rowland: Why were they against psychiatrists?
- Doyle: Well, I think they probably wanted more to say about how the medical association would be involved in it rather than just the psychiatric association. I think it was possibly a political move on their part, because the man who opposed it most heavily was Dr. Murray from Napa, who was very active in medical circles in the association--in fact, past president of the American Medical Association. And Dr. Kilroy from Sacramento, who looked after the legislators there as a doctor for the legislators, came to me and told me that they were going to have to oppose the bill. I said, "Well, Doctor, that's nice of you to come and tell me. Fine. But will you listen to it?" "Well," he said, "yes, we'll listen, but we're going to oppose it." And we got over to the senate side and, of course, we didn't last--
- Rowland: It seems like they had more influence in the senate than in the assembly.
- Doyle: Yes, much more so.
- Rowland: Why was that?
- Doyle: Well, I think--and I don't mean it the way it sounds--I think, in deference to me, they were going to let it go through the assembly.
- Rowland: As an assembly bill?
- Doyle: Yes, as an assembly bill, because we were good friends. I handled other bills for them. You know.
- Rowland: With the medical association?
- Doyle: Yes. We were very friendly. They knew I'd taken this for Dr. Hume and I just have to feel that they were close enough to me or respected me enough that they didn't want to kill my bill in my own house. So they were nice about it. We didn't take thirty

- Doyle: minutes because we didn't get thirty minutes. But it was killed in the senate, with the proviso--and this is interesting--that it would be sent to an interim committee for study, with Alan Short being chairman of the interim committee.
- Rowland: Was this as a sop to you in the assembly that they would kill it, but they would throw it into the interim committee to keep your idea alive?
- Doyle: Well, it keeps your idea alive, plus the fact that I think the doctors were really interested in their own minds about what could be done in this area. They'd sort of touched on it before--the Abshire bill--and Lanterman had been involved before in a few others, but nothing with this depth, you see. And I think they may have truly felt that perhaps it should go to an interim study. [expressing attitude of the doctors] "Then we can have our say and then we'll support the bill." That's exactly what happened. The bill was in interim for two years. I attended meetings. Alan Short would invite me as the assemblyman for their meetings. The doctors attended. The psychiatrists attended. Dr. Hume attended.

A New Bill with Senator Alan Short

- Doyle: So then when we came back in January of '57, I introduced this bill [AB 630], but I had some support. [hands interviewer bill text]
- Rowland: I see. [reads through bill text]
- Doyle: Then Alan Short introduced a companion bill to that one.
- Rowland: SB 244.
- Doyle: But he also put in his bill what the name of it was going to be. So, we started back again and the medical profession supported the bill. In fact, there was just sketchy opposition to the bill anywhere in the assembly or the senate and even in our committee hearings. You didn't have a handful of people that would be opposing it. So, it went sailing through and passed. There was some scepticism on the part of some about Governor Knight as to whether he would sign it. They thought, "Well, gee, one of these conservatives might get to him." See? He was beginning to be concerned about costs at that time. It was a

Doyle: matter of costs and a matter of what the bill would do, who controlled it, and so forth and so on. But Mrs. Knight became interested in what was going on, and I have to feel that she was helpful to us in having the governor sign that bill.

After it was signed and, of course, became law, it was a matter of going and having it implemented in the different counties. So, Alan Short and I would go around the state--Los Angeles County, Contra Costa--to get the boards of supervisors to approve it. And, of course, it's a matter now of history as to how it has fared as far as the state's concerned and the people with mental problems.

Rowland: Dr. Hume described a meeting there on the '55 Short-Doyle bill in the Senate Governmental Efficiency Committee, which--

Doyle: What's the name of the committee chairman?

Rowland: It's Parkman.

Doyle: Oh, yes. Senator Parkman from San Mateo County. That's the meeting, yes.

Rowland: And Clarence Ward was vice-chairman of that committee.

Doyle: Yes. From Santa Barbara.

Rowland: I wondered how Parkman and Ward--they're the ones that pretty much killed the bill then, as you said.

Doyle: How they reacted?

Rowland: Yes.

Doyle: Oh, I think they just listened and then moved that the bill be tabled.

Rowland: Yes. Were Parkman and Ward particularly accessible to the CMA and--

Doyle: Oh, I would have to assume they were friendly, like I was. You know, I was very friendly to them also. And, you know, you had a headache or a sore throat, why, you saw Kilroy. [laughter] He was the guy that took care of you. But, no, they were very courteous about it. As I say, we didn't get a full-fledged meeting, which I know disappointed Dr. Hume and some of her people, but I was happy we got that far going into this thing.

- Rowland: Dr. Hume described that meeting as a vicious attack on Jews, Communists, and psychiatrists by the CMA and Dr. Murray. Do you recall that?
- Doyle: Well, Dr. Murray was a very conservative individual and he would get very exercised about things and people. Yes, I would say that they were some--well, one woman got up and said that she thought I was a very nice person but that I'd been duped by the Communists, that this was a Communist plot. So, that's the kind of testimony we had.
- Rowland: I don't quite understand the association of communism with this?
- Doyle: It was just out of the blue. It amazed us. We didn't know what they were hitting at or talking about at all. Then I had to go into the fact of my Protestant background and the fact that I belonged to the Masonic lodge and a few other things [laughter] to let her know that I wasn't a traitor to the cause! But the hearings got a little bit hairy. But the second time around, a different ballgame, a different group of people; it just went sailing through.
- Rowland: How was the CMA brought around to support the bill?
- Doyle: I think they just wanted to have something to say about the bill that went through. Now, I talked with them, but not in any details because, frankly, I didn't know the details of how it was going to work. I knew how it should work and what was going to happen to it. But whether they felt the psychiatrists were going to take a front seat to them on this issue, I don't know. But they didn't want it to happen. It didn't happen. But when they decided after these hearings, and they decided to support the bill, they went all out.
- Rowland: I have some other names here. Dr. Tallman is mentioned in her transcript.
- Doyle: Yes.
- Rowland: Do you recall working with him?
- Doyle: Well, only that he was around. Dr. Hume was the one I worked with more directly than anyone else.
- Rowland: Dr. Rapaport?
- Doyle: Oh, yes. Dr. Rapaport was and is a very good friend. I haven't seen him recently, but I've seen him in the last six months. He's on the left there. [indicating photograph]



Tenth Reunion of signing of Short-Doyle Act. Donald Doyle, Alan Short



Governor Goodwin Knight signing the Community Mental Health Services Act July 6, 1957.
Left to right: Walter Rapoport, M.D. (Dir. of Mental Hygiene), Portia Bell Hume, M.D. (Dep. Dir. for Community Services), Governor Knight, Assemblyman Donald Doyle and Senator Alan Short

Rowland: Yes. And that's Dr. Hume directly behind him.

Doyle: Dr. Hume directly behind, and myself, and Short, and Goodie. Dr. Rapaport was very active. In fact, he's active now. He does a lot of testimony work in psychiatry in courts. He lives in Oakland. But he'd run hospitals. He ran the department at this time, you see.

Rowland: Dr. Hepner, who organized an ad hoc committee in support of the Short-Doyle Act? He was a member of Governor Knight's advisory committee on mental health.

Doyle: Yes. He was working outside of the legislature. He was getting people interested. I'm sure he got some doctors interested, you see. And, as I say, once we knew we had Goodwin's support, that he was going to sign that bill if it got to his desk, I think that was a big plus.

Rowland: And that got it through the senate, which seems to be the toughest house to get through.

Doyle: I think that was a big plus, yes. But, you see, even with the senate, in their signing of the bill, are co-authors. [pointing to co-authors on bill] Here's Kraft from San Diego, a Republican; Coombs from Napa, rather conservative; Grunsky; Montgomery. So, you've got some people on here that, two years before that, wouldn't have touched it. As I say, it was new to them. It just hadn't been explored to this depth before.

Rowland: Why did Senator Short get involved in mental health?

Doyle: Senator Short was on the committee, and I think originally he probably felt, "If it's going to be studied, I want to study it," because the Stockton Hospital was in his district. He was very close to the Stockton Hospital, and I think that was one of the reasons why he wanted to do something that would affect and was within his own district, which was fine with me, because he was respected in the senate, he had support in the senate, and he could certainly help us.

I want to say too that between he and Lanterman, they've carried this legislation on since '59--amendments--and certainly bettered the program. I want to give credit to Ronald Reagan, who boosted the state participation up to ninety percent from--well, actually it went from fifty to seventy-five and then to ninety. So, both Brown and Reagan were active in supporting Short-Doyle, improving Short-Doyle.

Rowland: I'm wondering what the defeat of the '55 Short-Doyle Act in the senate could tell us about the role of lobbyists in the senate. I wonder if you might speak on lobbyists and legislation in general.

Doyle: I don't think there was any question that the bill was lobbied by the opposition and it was lobbied, as I say, on the senate side and not the assembly side at all. Yes, I would say, at one time much legislation, whether it was labor, medical, health, [or] education, was much more heavily lobbied than it is now. [Lobbyists] perhaps had more influence than they do now.

And I might say, in deference to the legislative advocates, that is where we got out information. You'd have several hundred bills. The Education Committee would have four hundred bills, one committee. One year I carried over a hundred bills just because I was chairman. I can't possibly know what's in all of those bills. Some I would know; some I wouldn't know. Some, I would have to depend on the activity of the advocates to tell me what was in the bill, and ninety-nine percent of them will tell you the truth. Maybe the one percent or a few of them won't, or may try to skirt around what the bill actually does. For the most part, they'll tell you what the bill does and why. Then you take it from there.

Now, had I not been the author of this bill, Short-Doyle mental health bill, I would have voted for it just because of my inner feelings toward people, coming from a large family, a relatively poor family, if you want to say. Of course, once I got into this, I visited all the hospitals in the state on my own, at my own expense, to see for myself, and I saw some horrible things in those days. The Modesto Hospital was full of old people because their kids didn't want them--actual truth--and then when they closed the Modesto [Hospital] down, everybody screamed that Reagan was trying to close down mental hospitals. Modesto should have been closed down ten years before it was.

So, a lot of good has come out of this. But I would say that when it didn't go the first time around, it was probably due to the activities of the CMA, and I say that respectfully. And, I would say, when it did pass the way it did, there was very little lobbying because it became a popular bill, as seen by the co-authors of the bill. Sure, our people were there and I was there, but we knew from day one that when we had that many authors we were going to get the bill through in this form.

Rowland: How did Ben Read operate as a--?

Doyle: Ben Read was a fine gentleman. In those days, you didn't have Prop 9* and there was a lot of money spent in Sacramento. I don't know of any money ever received by any legislator under the table, as they say, you know, or \$100 bills under the plates and all that. But they did contribute to your campaign--not \$10,000, not \$5,000, maybe \$250; maybe the most would be \$500. But it would come through your local medical society in your county, by your own doctor friends. The dentists did this. The doctors did it. Labor did it. The oil companies did it. So, it was done pretty much the same way by all.

Once you arrived in Sacramento, there was a lot of entertaining done. Ben Read had a luncheon every day for someone in his hotel suite. It was there. If you didn't have a place to go to lunch and you wanted to come have lunch, fine. The railroads did it. Danny Creedon--the beer people did it. Judge Garibaldi did it. It might be at one of the restaurants, or it might be a different restaurant. Some would do it in the hotels; some would do it in the restaurants. And, you know, you hear all kinds of stories of what happened and all the freewheeling and big spending. There was a lot of food. Sure, there were baseball tickets. There were theater tickets.

Rowland: Even Big Game tickets from Jim Corley. [laughter]

Doyle: Yes, sure. But there really wasn't, to my knowledge, any so-called tainted money passed around. Now, if someone didn't report what he was given, you can't prevent that. I reported everything. Some of these funds you would get in cash; some you would get in a check. Either way, it was up to you to report them at that time, [up to] the legislator to report them. And I doubt that the bottle of wine or the lunch or whatever really influenced that many people. Now, it helped, yes.

But I know, for example, the railroad people--very close to me and very good to me. But my county is served by trucks. I couldn't vote against the truckers for the railroads. And I remember them saying to me one time at a baseball game, "Doyle, I don't know why we take you to the baseball game. You haven't

*Proposition 9, called the Political Reform Act of 1974, was approved as an initiative by the voters in an effort to regulate lobbying.

Doyle: given us a vote in four years." And they were right. But I felt I was serving my county by--it was a big tight issue between the truckers and the railroads. I had to go with the truckers. And yet today some of my best friends are in the railroad business.

So, I think that advocates are necessary. Oh, you had a few bad apples like anyone else, I'm sure, and--

Rowland: Artie Samish, for instance?

Doyle: Yes, Artie Samish. Everybody knew that he was wrong and what he did shouldn't have been done. And it was taken care of. It doesn't happen anymore.

Prop 9 had some good points and some bad points. Now if you want to talk to a legislator three times, say, and take him to lunch and buy his lunch, you can't do it. You can do it once or twice a session; that's about it. Now, I think when they tightened the strings and pulled in the reins, they pulled them back too far. That's just my personal opinion, because I think advocates are necessary. If there was any money being thrown around and all these other things that you hear about, I certainly didn't know about it and many of my friends didn't know about it.

Rowland: Now political action committees have grown as a result of Prop 9.

Doyle: Yes, right, sure. And a candidate today--if someone wants to support him, they're going to find a way legitimately to support him, but what it's really cut back on is the entertaining--you know, the wives and yourselves and others up there. There was a dinner every night if you wanted to go to it. You walk into Frank Fat's, have a drink at the bar or go in to dinner; you'd probably never see a tag. Someone picked it up, naturally. In the old days, that's the way it was done. It's no secret. This is a matter of public knowledge and record, shall we say. And I'm sure the lobbyist would say, "Well, I took this one to lunch," or, "I entertained So-and-So and here's my bill," and some used to spent \$50,000 a session and could easily do that. That doesn't mean they're going to get a vote from 120 people because they spent that money. I'm sure, on the crucial votes, they can go to the fellow and sit down and say, "Hey, listen, I really need this one. I haven't bothered you this session at all, but here's one that I really need." And if the guy can do it at all, number one, in good conscience, and number two, for his district, I'm sure that he would do it.

- Doyle: So, unless something happened before I got there or happened since I left, I really thought that for the most part the legislative advocates handled themselves very well.
- Rowland: I have some final questions on the Short-Doyle Act. I wondered, were counties willing to physically support the Short-Doyle Act?
- Doyle: Their representative in Sacramento would up supporting it. [pauses] I'm trying to think of his name. But we still had to get the approval of the counties to put it into effect and, I guess, the worst time we had was with Los Angeles County because of what they thought the money was going to be, what it was going to cost, but they did vote it in and they did participate. Of course, it's been a godsend to them and other counties because it's not only saved money; it's perhaps saved a lot of lives.
- Rowland: Right. What contact did you have with state hospitals when you were pushing through the legislation?
- Doyle: Well, I had visited the state hospitals during the time after I put the legislation in, and that was the only contact I had with them because I wanted to be able to say to that committee or the people who asked me, "Yes, this is what I saw at Agnews. This is what I saw at Modesto. This is what I saw at Stockton Hospital." Down south, I visited three hospitals--you know, overcrowded, not enough help, people just put in there and warehoused; really. But that was the only contact that I actually had, and I got really no pressure. I got letters from those people thanking me, you know, or words like, "We support you," and so forth.
- Rowland: From the hospital personnel?
- Doyle: Yes, but no pressure otherwise. And even, I know, a couple of Catholic hospitals wrote to me thanking me for putting it in and so forth.
- Rowland: There must have been some real horrible conditions too in some of those hospitals.
- Doyle: Just unbelievable.

Alcoholism: A Special Concern

- Rowland: Were there any special concerns of the Short-Doyle Act, such as alcoholism?

- Doyle: Well, that was one. And at that time, as you know, Goodwin Knight formed an Alcohol Commission and it lasted maybe four years and then it sort of disbanded. They were to look into alcoholic problems. But alcohol was one issue that came up. Very little on drugs. They didn't talk much about a drug problem. We didn't know what the drug problem was in those days. And we didn't discuss the alcohol thing openly. This was one of the reasons we wanted Short-Doyle. It was for those who had a history of mental health--you know, just the stress and strain of housewife and business, which people don't think about, and that's where most of this comes from. Then either they slip into a depression or they slip into alcohol and now they slip into drugs or something else. And it was getting to those people before they had to go to the institutions, and taking them immediately upon their coming out and work them back into the community, and in theory that was the whole idea. Yes, alcohol was an issue, a problem, but not a big one, not one that caused this to happen.
- Rowland: In kind of retrospect, do you think the Short-Doyle Act has been a tremendous help to the mentally ill and to those who are confined to--?
- Doyle: Well, I think it has been a great success, not because I had something to do with it. But the fact that we've been able to reduce the personnel in our hospitals, I think, is one of the big things.
- Rowland: And did it make mental health cost efficient and effective?
- Doyle: Absolutely. And that was the whole idea of why we did that. In '59, the state hospital population grew to an all-time high; it exceeded 37,000 patients. Now, that's in-and-out type patients. But in 1965, that went down to 25,000 patients. Today, I would estimate that there are probably less than 5,000. Now, these are in and out, but that's one of the big items, plus the fact local hospitals, community hospitals, county hospitals, if they have the facilities, do participate in Short-Doyle funds. San Francisco participates heavily in Short-Doyle funds and I think they're doing a lot of good with those funds for the people that they're helping.
- Rowland: One question that I forgot about, and I just notice it when I see the list of amendments here--this might be too detailed a question, but I'm wondering if you might recall why [SB] 244 and your 1955 Short-Doyle bill were so heavily amended, amended in the assembly. It looks like this one, the 244, was mostly amended in the senate.

Doyle: That was mostly in the senate. It was amended in the assembly just one time before it went over, and I don't know the detail, although I can tell you there were no substantial changes that would change the bill as far as what we were trying to do with it in the first place.

Rowland: Were they mainly subsidy changes or--?

Doyle: An example here--one of the changes was that it would not be called the Community Mental Health Services; it would be called the Short-Doyle Act. That type of thing would be one. And I was looking to see--[looks through text of bill] They sometimes asterisk these changes, but this was the final bill, so it wouldn't have been--but I think, too, the--oh, the operation, or how it was going to be done, and whether you give the directors ten-day notice of a meeting, and that type of thing. They weren't big issues at all, because if they had been, why, we probably would not have been successful. But these were mostly senate amendments.

Rowland: Who drafted the bill?

Doyle: The bill was originally drafted through the legislative counsel with Dr. Portia Bell Hume's actual writing the idea, putting the idea together, and then they put it in legal form, and I'm sure that originally she had help from the psychiatric association.

Rowland: That ends our tape. I think we've completed a most successful interview and I really appreciate the time you've given to our project.

Transcribers: Michelle Stafford, Marilyn White

Final Typist: Marilyn White

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Governmental History Documentation Project
Goodwin Knight/Edmund Brown, Sr., Era

Robert E. McKay

ROBERT MCKAY AND THE CALIFORNIA TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION

An Interview Conducted by
James H. Rowland
in 1979

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INTERVIEW HISTORY

Robert E. McKay was interviewed by the Regional Oral History Office for the Goodwin J. Knight - Edmund G. Brown, Sr. era segment of its Governmental History Documentation Project. Mr. McKay's extensive background as lobbyist for the influential California Teachers Association (CTA), his advocacy of a wide range of public and higher education issues during the 1953-1961 era, and his trusted relationship with Governor Goodwin Knight made him a welcome contributor to our documentation of the 1953-1966 period in state government.

Mr. McKay was born in the province of Alberta, Canada and moved at an early age to California, settling in Compton near Los Angeles. Educated at local schools and Compton Junior College, his successful sports reporting for the Long Beach Sun while a junior college student won him a promotion as suburban reporter after graduation. Faced with several job offers in 1939, he chose a move to Sacramento to become confidential secretary to state Controller Harry Riley. After a stint in the Marines during World War II, he returned to California and worked as campaign manager for Proposition 3 on the 1946 ballot (a CTA-sponsored initiative to increase school teachers' pay) and to write radio speeches for lieutenant gubernatorial candidate Goodwin Knight. The success of Prop 3 inaugurated a new career for McKay. Asked by CTA head Arthur Corey to join CTA as a field representative to local chapters and to provide occasional legislative assistance for CTA lobbyist Roy Cloud, he eventually assumed full-time legislative duties.

Coming from a press background with excellent writing and interpersonal skills, McKay quickly built important connections with key legislators and created an influential education consultant role for the CTA in the legislature. His early association with Knight while Knight was a lieutenant gubernatorial candidate in 1946 increased over the ensuing years and, combined with his lobbying skills, proved to be a valuable asset when Knight became governor in 1953.

My first interview with Mr. McKay was held at his home in San Mateo. An extremely active retiree, McKay arranged our interview many months in advance. When the propitious date of May 25, 1979 arrived, I drove to his modest, comfortable home on a hilltop in San Mateo with a sweeping view of the south Bay and the coastal range. After the customary introductions, and the opportunity to meet the charming Mrs. McKay, we adjourned to the study. In that first session we touched on McKay's personal and family history, his press and early governmental career prior to joining the CTA, remarks on lobbyist-legislator relations, and observations of personalities in the legislature during the 1953-1961 era. Our second interview was again held at the McKay home, on June 1, 1979. This final two-hour session completed

his comments on personalities in the legislature, and moved to significant CTA legislation. The final chapter covered McKay's equally important federal lobbyist career and his comments on the decline in CTA influence after 1961.

After rough editing, the interview transcript was forwarded to McKay for review. Within a few months he returned the transcript to our office after sealing a sensitive passage and meticulously reviewing the entire text page-by-page.

In spite of a few selectively prepared responses, Mr. McKay has endeavored to be candid in his summary of the CTA legislative program and his own successful lobbying style. As a result, our documentation of state government has been qualitatively enriched by the inclusion of McKay's advocacy perspective on procedure and personalities in the California legislature.

James H. Rowland
Interviewer-Editor

2 June 1980
Regional Oral History Office
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I RETRACING A PERSONAL HISTORY

[Interview 1: May 25, 1979]##

Family Background

Rowland: Who was Goodwin Knight's education advisor, or did he have one?

McKay: I don't recall that he had one, as such. I think he was his own advisor, as was evidenced on one occasion when he apparently was looking for an issue to put into his record and decided that curriculum in the public schools was it. He said, "No, I didn't talk with anyone in education or anyone in the business [about curriculum], but I got a letter from a high school student asking me about taxes, and he spelled it t-a-c-k-e-s. So I decided something needed to be done." [laughter] So he dreamed up the bill that he had Don Doyle, who was chairman of the Education Committee in the assembly, put in, and it got clobbered because it wasn't very well documented.

Rowland: Did he use Dr. Simpson or George Hogan, the deputy state superintendent, as advisors?

McKay: I don't think particularly. As you know, Roy Simpson wasn't a particularly forceful leader in the field. He did what so many superintendents up to that time had done--gotten in office and then gotten re-elected as long as he wanted to.

Rowland: As an incumbent?

##This symbol indicates that a tape or a segment of a tape has begun or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 84.

- McKay: Yes, as an incumbent. George Hogan was a real source of strength in the state department in those days, a good friend of mine.
- Rowland: Well, we follow a certain format here, and maybe we should start off in that, and then we'll get to the issues.
- McKay: Okay.
- Rowland: We begin with a few minutes on family background, and then we'll get to those early years in the Olson and Warren administrations, which is a fascinating period. But beginning with your family, I'm wondering about your family history.
- McKay: I'm a Canadian, born in Alberta in a place that you probably still won't find on the map called Ghost Pine Creek, up towards Edmonton, in middle-northern Alberta. My father was a farmer at the time, later became a construction builder--built some of the early railroad bridges in Alberta.

In 1921, the McKay family moved to southern California. Interestingly enough, my sister, who is quite a devout church worker, had decided she wanted to become a missionary to China, and the place where she could get her training was the Bible Institute of Los Angeles. So that was the catalyst that brought us to California. We ended up in Compton, where I skipped a grade in school by telling them I was in fifth instead of the fourth grade--never did learn my mathematics as a result of that, but finished up elementary school and high school and spent three years in Compton Junior College. I had planned to go on to Stanford after I worked a year.

- Rowland: Could you tell us a little bit more about your parents, their personalities and--
- McKay: Yes. My parents were both deeply religious people. My mother was born in North Dakota. My father was a Canadian, born in New Brunswick--St. John, New Brunswick. They were struggling all their life, economically. I suspect my father was not a very good manager of money. He was always in need of loans and help. I had two brothers and one sister, and we survived somehow. They really made the big plunge in Compton. They bought two twenty-five-foot lots that cost \$100 apiece, payable in \$10 payments, plus interest.

But my father, in his later years, went into the ministry. He was ordained as a Baptist minister and worked in several small churches in Nevada and Oregon and later went to New Mexico and worked with the Indians down in the Window Rock area.

Rowland: Did you and the family travel with him?

McKay: No, that was in his later years. I was married by then, and aside from my kid brother, who is now the father of six and flies 747's for United, the family was all grown by then. So we didn't share his meanderings. He had a trailer that he used. He was never too successful as a minister. He had some deficiencies as an orator, but he was devoted to it, and deeply dedicated.

Rowland: How many children did your parents have? You mentioned you and your brother and your sister.

McKay: There were four of us. There were three boys and one girl.

Rowland: What were the ages?

McKay: My sister is the eldest, and she was three years and eight months older than my older brother, who was three years and eight months older than I.

Rowland: Evenly spaced. [laughter]

McKay: Yes. My brother Earl, the pilot, he came along many years later-- fifteen years or so.

Rowland: Who were you closest to in your family?

McKay: Oh, now, probably my younger brother. My older brother passed away about a year ago in Portland, Oregon. Of course, geographically, we're separated, so we don't see one another too frequently, but we correspond, of course.

Growing Up in Compton

Rowland: In your household, did you have certain books that you read or favorite books as a child that you remember back, or certain other literature or whatever you came across as a child that you--

McKay: I don't recall any particular line. I was an omnivorous reader in my younger days. I would come home on a Friday with a stack of books and read three or four of them before the weekend was over.

Rowland: What was your favorite subject area?

- McKay: Oh, I enjoyed fiction. I read history and some of the better things in literature that we were guided to in our early days, particularly in high school days. I remember such things as A Tale of Two Cities. One title pops into mind, The Ordeal of Richard Fernal. Does that ring a bell? That was one of the literary choices that our teacher made for us.
- Rowland: Did you have a particularly favorite teacher in school, a teacher you saw as a kind of a turning point in your life?
- McKay: Yes, I think we all do. In my work with the California Teachers Association, nationally we developed a program of honoring some outstanding citizen and his favorite teacher. So I've thought along those lines. I had one teacher who was the scourge of the school. Nobody liked her because she was demanding and ruthless in her insistence on excellence. Her name was Winterbottom. [laughter] Names like that stick in your mind, of course, but there were a few.
- Probably the most favorite in my experience and that of many was in my high school days. At Compton High School was a man who, in addition to being a teacher of art and metalcraft and related subjects, was the dean of boys. His name was Lueders [spells it out], "Pop" Lueders, who developed a rapport with his students that resulted in students writing to him as long as he lived--many, many years after they left school. He was sort of a second father to so many kids.
- I have preserved in my file two examples of what he did beautifully--envelopes that he would paint in watercolors. I have one when I was in a Boy Scout camp, of a mountain scene and a stream, and there is a post over on the right-hand side of the road. The stamp was the sign on the post, and another sign with an arrow on it, where my address was--priceless things that you can't replace. It was typical of him.
- Rowland: What did kids do for fun in your days, when you were outside of school, on weekends--
- McKay: Of course, there was no television--thank God for that--in those days. Oh, they had social events, dances, and, of course, the sports programs--football, basketball, track, tennis.
- Rowland: In Compton?
- McKay: In Compton, yes. Things of that sort. And the usual socializing that kids have. I guess not too different from today, except maybe there was more supervision of the kids in those days than there is today.

Rowland: Your family sounds church-oriented. Were you involved in church activities, too?

McKay: Only to a limited degree. I attended Sunday school because that's what I was expected to do. So I took on some of the organizational responsibilities--was secretary of the youth club and that type of thing. I was quite active as a Boy Scout, also, both as a member and later a leader in the Boy Scouts of America. No, I never got very deeply involved in the religious aspects of things.

II CREATING AN ADVOCATE CAREER: FROM JOURNALISM TO THE CTA

Reporting for the Long Beach Press-Telegram

Rowland: How did you get involved in the Olson and Warren administrations?

McKay: That comes many years later.

I have always enjoyed writing, and as a result of that, when I was in junior college in Compton, I started covering sports--football and other team sports--for the two Long Beach newspapers, the Long Beach Sun, which was the morning paper, and the Long Beach Press-Telegram, which was the afternoon paper, at the phenomenal rate of 10¢ an inch for anything that got published. I spent a third year in junior college largely because this was the beginning of the Depression. I had gotten out of high school in 1927 and spent two years in junior college.

Twenty-nine, you'll remember, was a tragic year economically. So I had an opportunity to continue at the junior college, and I had a job driving the school bus, at 50¢ an hour, and that was not bad income for a nineteen-year-old. So I stayed a third year and was editor of the school paper and active in other things on the campus. So when I finished school I had an opportunity to start covering general news in Compton, at the same rate of 10¢ an inch. Finally, they expanded my territory to include Lynwood and Southgate and what was then known as Hynes-Clearwater--now Paramount--Downey, Norwalk, and that area.

It finally got too expensive on the string that I would paste together of the things that were published, so they put me on salary at \$125 a month, which was quite attractive to me. I had fun running around sticking my nose in other people's business, asking impertinent questions and not getting slugged. [laughter] As part of that work, I covered city councils and city halls in incorporated cities in my area.

McKay: Later, the Sun was purchased by the Press-Telegram, or rather the other way around. The two morning newspapers were merged under one ownership. I was retained. I was one of two of the so-called "suburban staff" that was retained, and I was assigned to covering city hall in Long Beach.

Several years later, I had an opportunity to go to work in Washington, D.C. At the same time, I was offered a job in Sacramento. I was acting city editor because of the illness of the city editor, and the publisher had called me in and had advised me that if the city editor did not return--and it appeared unlikely he would--I was to be the new city editor. Well, for a young kid on a daily metropolitan of then fifty thousand circulation, this was sort of a goal.

As a Secretary to the State Controller

McKay: At the very same time, the mayor of Long Beach, Tom Eaton, who had run for Congress and had gotten elected, offered me a job on his staff. I had written his publicity during his campaign. At the same time, Harry Riley, who had been an assemblyman from Long Beach, whom I knew in my newspaper work, had become state controller, and he offered me a job as confidential secretary, one of two positions exempt from civil service.

Rowland: In Sacramento?

McKay: In Sacramento. Here I was with three directions to go, and I've always believed I had a guardian angel perched up here.

Rowland: This was still during the thirties?

McKay: Yes, this was '39.

Rowland: During FDR's administration?

McKay: Yes. I didn't know what to do, but I decided to go to Sacramento, which turned out to be the wise thing because the former mayor, the congressman, died within six months, and the city editor got well and came back [laughter] on his job. I went to Sacramento as a confidential secretary to Harry Riley.

Rowland: What were the functions of a confidential secretary?

- McKay: Oh, they covered a multitude of things, press relations among others, handling of some of his agenda. The controller was then--and, I guess, still is--a member of a wide variety of state boards and commissions like the Board of Control and a lot of others. The handling of the agendas and the preparation of the materials and the briefing of the controller--I was sort of a traveling companion, too, who dropped in on the newspapers and spread the good word about the great state controller we had.
- Rowland: Being that you're from Long Beach, or had worked for the Long Beach paper and later worked for the controller--the controller is an ex officio member of the State Lands Commission.
- McKay: Yes.
- Rowland: Did the question of tidelands oil and tidelands revenues and the trust fund come up in those years when you were working as a confidential secretary?
- McKay: No, it didn't. That developed later on--the drilling of the tidelands in Wilmington and Long Beach. Then the leasing of city lands for that purpose was under consideration by the city at the time, but the controversy over the state's right or the federal interest in that hadn't been precipitated at that point.
- Rowland: You were there in 1939. What can you tell us about the Olson years as you remember them, particularly about Governor Olson?
- McKay: First, maybe you can refresh my memory. When did Governor Warren come in, about '40?
- Rowland: Warren came in in '42, I believe. Right. Olson was there from '39 to '42. Governor Warren was elected in '42 and began in '43, if my memory is correct.
- McKay: Yes. Somehow, all of this blurs a little as you look back over [laughter] thirty or more years. I, of course, met and knew Culbert Olson and some of his staff but was not in any way close to them. My memory of those years is that they were a period of relative inactivity in development of the state. I have the impression--maybe I'm wrong--that the state was more or less marking time. I can't recall any great forward steps, although there were problems of welfare and, I guess, school need and many other things that were the hot issues of the day.
- Rowland: One hot issue was the State Relief Administration, which eventually became quite a controversy in Olson's administration. Do you recall that episode?

McKay: Yes, I'm trying to think--place for me where Roscoe Patterson, the lieutenant governor from the San Luis Obispo area--was he Olson's lieutenant governor?

Rowland: I believe he was Olson's lieutenant governor, yes.

McKay: I have no very clear recollection. I was not involved in it, except as a bystander, and I don't think I could shed much light on that.

Rowland: Do you recall the Yorty committee investigation of the State Relief Administration?

McKay: Oh, yes.

Rowland: And later the Tenney Un-American Activities Committee?

McKay: Yes, I knew Sam and his great proclivity for getting into the headlines. He later came back to Los Angeles, after he left the legislature, and became mayor.

Then Jack Tenney took over with a vengeance, particularly in the school area--"get rid of all the Communist teachers"--a lot of investigation. Later on, Nelson Dilworth inherited that role, although in a somewhat different way. He was more responsible.

Rowland: These are topics I'd like to come to later--Nelson Dilworth and the Tenney committee--but moving on to the Warren years, you said you were also active in the Warren administration. Is that true, or were you still working with Riley?

McKay: No, I was with Riley. I, perhaps, gave the wrong impression. No, I had no role whatsoever in the Warren administration, except I knew the governor then, and he was kind enough to give me a most flattering letter of recommendation when I applied for a commission in the Marine Corps--he and others.

Rowland: How long were you in the Marine Corps?

McKay: Three years.

Rowland: This is during the war?

McKay: Yes, '43-'46.

Working on the School Support Proposition, 1946

McKay: Then when I got out of the Marine Corps--if you want to pursue this chronology--I went to work on a campaign for increased school support, Proposition 3. It came about rather accidentally. I was still on duty at 100 Harrison in the city [San Francisco], and one of my fellow officers, a captain named Ned Berman, who was a radio announcer, was getting out of service and was going back to work for Clem Whitaker, the senior of Whitaker and Baxter. He had worked on a campaign for the California Medical Association and was going back to do that, sort of a public relations campaign.

One day in the Marine offices, he said, "Hey, Bob, ran into an old friend of yours--Harold Kingsley."

I said, "My God, what's King doing now?" He was my boss on the Long Beach Sun. He was managing editor.

He said, "Oh, he's running some kind of a campaign for the schools, for the teachers." So he told me about this proposition to increase state aid to the schools and set what at the time was a pretty high minimum salary.

Rowland: What was your previous activity with education, or involvement in education?

McKay: None. None whatsoever. And this was a ballot proposition to set a minimum salary of \$2,400 a year--it sounds ridiculous now--and to increase state aid to \$120 per unit of average daily attendance. So we kicked that around, and he said, "Hey, King's looking for somebody for his campaign staff." He said, "He wants to get somebody, a serviceman"--that seemed to be a mark of respectability at the time [laughter]--"somebody who can write and maybe make a speech and knows his way around government. Do you mind if I tell him where you are?"

"No." So I got a call from Harold Kingsley, asking me if I'd like to come to work on the staff of Proposition 3 for a few months.

Rowland: Was this the proposition in 1952, or was this earlier?

McKay: No, this was in '46.

Rowland: Oh, okay.

Joining the CTA

McKay: This was one of the early--not the first, but I think one of the first, probably the second--major initiative issues that were put on the ballot by the CTA.

So as a result of that, and not having anything to go back to--Harry Riley had died the year before, and my good friend, Erving Hass, who later was in charge of the legislative bill room, had taken my former job. He was a schoolmate at USC [University of Southern California] of Tommy Kuchel, who'd been appointed controller. So that job, being an exempt job with no civil service protection, was not available, and I really didn't know what I wanted to do. So I went to work on the campaign.

This was at the time when the long-time state executive secretary of CTA, Roy Cloud, was about to retire after twenty years, and Arthur Corey, who was executive secretary of the southern section of CTA, was the successor-designate. He was going to become the CTA's state executive secretary, and he asked me to stay on temporarily on the staff in L.A. after the campaign was over, then asked me if I would be interested in going to work for CTA. So I became one of the two first field representatives that CTA had, of staff going out and working with teachers and local teacher associations.

Rowland: Entering the CTA without any teaching experience, was there any kind of conflict with CTA classroom teachers who felt that you were outside the profession?

McKay: I wasn't aware of any feeling. At least, if there was, it was never apparent because there was a feeling at the time that there was a great need for improved relationships with the public.

Rowland: Why was that?

McKay: This, if you'll remember, was the "Johnny can't read" era when there were criticisms of all the alleged failures of public education.

Rowland: [laughter] Sounds contemporary.

McKay: Yes. But my employment was not related solely to that. They needed somebody to take on the legislative chores, which Roy Cloud had handled all these years. They had that in mind for me. So I went to Sacramento in the 1947 session and worked alongside Roy Cloud. That led to many years up there.

Rowland: What can you tell us about Roy Cloud and how he worked with the legislature?

McKay: He was a unique personality. He was a Scotchman, highly conservative. I think he would have been shocked to think that the association had squandered its money to buy the first typewriter for the office. He was a fiscal and political conservative who was born in Redwood City, who went to school in Redwood City, who became superintendent of schools in Redwood City, and died in Redwood City. I used to kid him--I was never sure if he appreciated it--I said, "You [laughter] never amounted to much, did you, Mr. Cloud? You never got out of the city where you were born."

But he was dedicated to education and its improvement, and he over the years had built up a reputation in Sacramento for veracity, for dependability, and for just honesty, generally.

Rowland: Did he favor a certain house to work with, and certain friends to work, either in the assembly or the senate?

McKay: I think he was closer to members and leadership in the senate. You know, the senate, in those days at least, was an older, more conservative body than it is now, dominated largely by the rural interests, including some millionaire farmers. So Roy Cloud, I think, was closer to them and had a fine working relationship with the senate leadership.

Rowland: People like Butch Powers, for instance.

McKay: Well, long before Butch Powers.

Rowland: Harry Parkman?

McKay: Harry Parkman was one of his close friends. He was the senator, as you know, from San Mateo County.

Roy Cloud was quite methodical, nothing spectacular. This may illustrate the type of person that he was: he wrote a legislative letter each week. He would go to Sacramento for the Tuesday and Wednesday night hearings of the senate and the assembly committees. Then he would come back to the office in San Francisco, and he would write an account of what happened, quite methodically and everything precisely in order. In the first session he would say, "The senate session was opened with the following prayer by Chaplain So-and-So," and he would quote the prayer, and then, chronologically, he would relate what had happened.

Rowland: It sounds like the journal of the senate. [laughter]

McKay: Yes. When I took over writing the legislative letter, I think he was a little bit shocked because I would take things out of order. I was quite sure that if an irate witness shot the chairman of the Education Committee at midnight, as the result of a long, bitter hearing, that's where it would be in his copy. [laughter] On page ten.

He had a reputation of being scrupulously honest. He was a source of dependable information. Members could come to him and say, "What are the facts here?" And he would give them the facts, even though they didn't necessarily support the position of his principals. He would say, "Here are the facts, and that's it."

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McKay: I felt a great sense of responsibility in trying to step into his shoes.

Rowland: Now, you were there during the heyday, you could say, of the Artie Samish years. Do you recall Artie Samish and how he worked the legislature as an advocate for the liquor industry?

McKay: Yes. Of course, I heard all of the stories there that had become legend. Some of the stories are even true about him. But he operated through his lieutenants. He had a suite in the Senator Hotel. He rarely came to the capitol building. He operated with campaign contributions and other monetary devices to make friends and influence senators and assemblymen.

My only personal contact with him--you might say I was, to this extent, lobbied by him--came late one night at the end of a long assembly committee hearing. He was standing around with some members of the committee. He suggested that we all go over to Hart's. I don't know if it's still there. It was a cafeteria on K Street, a twenty-four-hour type of thing. We were all invited, and I went over and was indebted to him for one cup of hot chocolate. [laughter] So that's the extent of my personal relationship with Samish.

Rowland: So he didn't have any personal relationship with other lobbyists?

McKay: Oh, I'm sure he did because his interests were not limited to the liquor industry, but he took on other accounts like trucking.

Rowland: He was a contract lobbyist, then?

- McKay: Yes. His main employment was with the liquor industry. But eventually they broke off in segments. Danny Creedon was the beer lobbyist in later years, and Lyn Peterson, the Pabst Brewing Company and so on; they were all up there. But Samish was the kingpin in that field.
- Rowland: I missed a question here on the Warren and Olson years, and I wondered if, as a confidential secretary for Harry Riley, did you have any communications with any of the staff of the governor's office in the Olson or Warren period?
- McKay: Yes.
- Rowland: What were your relationships with the staff?
- McKay: They were amicable. They were good. I'm trying to place different people in the different eras. Stan Mosk was on Olson's staff, was he not?
- Rowland: Yes, he was.
- McKay: And George Killian came along there someplace--director of Finance. We had good relationships. There were certain functions of the two offices where there was a relationship necessary.
- Rowland: What were the differences in philosophies between the Olson and Warren years? Of course, Olson was the first Democrat in the twentieth century in California.
- McKay: Yes, the first, I guess, in about forty years. He was, of course, liberal, more given to solution of social problems, that type of thing, and Warren was a moderate Republican who was quite conscious of the cost of everything and insisted on a balanced budget and fiscal responsibility generally. I think if you got into an examination of their programs and records and accomplishments, looked at the vetoes and the bills approved, you could get a clearer picture.
- Rowland: On education, what were their differences in philosophy?
- McKay: I was not too aware of Olson's attitude on education at the time because, as a member of the state controller's staff, that was not my primary concern. I was working for a state constitutional officer who had no direct responsibility for education. So, frankly, I'm kind of hazy on what Culbert Olson proposed. I haven't gone back to the books and looked at that.

Rowland: I'm wondering what led you to the role of advocate for the CTA. You were telling me how this position opened up. I'm wondering why did you actually eventually take an advocate position for the CTA. What was going through your mind at the time?

McKay: I don't know that there was any one impelling factor. Number one, it was what looked like an interesting and satisfying form of employment when I got out of the Marine Corps. I had always been interested in government, going back to my newspaper coverage of city halls and school boards and things related to that in Compton, Long Beach, and elsewhere. It sounded like something I might enjoy doing and might lead to something even better. So I just thought it was a good opportunity.

Rowland: In other words, just a door that opened at the right time.

McKay: Yes. Now, in those early days the Sacramento responsibilities were only a part of the total job. I was working in the field, and later I became director of field services, and we had a somewhat sizable staff, and later on became assistant state and executive secretary. They changed titles. Then I became director of governmental relations, with our staff in Sacramento. So more and more, as the volume of legislative activity and the amount of state government involvement in education increased, it became a greater, more time consuming responsibility than those earlier days.

III THE ADVOCATE IN STATE GOVERNMENT: ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS

The Former Legislator as Lobbyist: Contacts and Compatibility

Rowland: I have some general questions on advocacy and the third house, and maybe we could go through these to give us a background for the eventual issue questions we'll be dealing with later. I'm wondering if you could tell us, from your perspective, what is the role of a lobbyist or an advocate to the legislature.

McKay: I don't know how it is now in Sacramento because, fortunately, I've been away [laughter] from it long enough to regain my sanity, but I had always felt that the so-called third house, the legislative advocates or representatives or lobbyists, whatever term is used to describe them, is an essential part of the governmental process. I don't think it would be possible to operate without a group of individuals who serve that purpose--by whatever name you want to use. An individual senator, for example, conceivably could be well-informed and might even be an expert in one field, maybe two fields.

To take an example, let's assume that a senator came from a rural area and he was a big agricultural operator. Maybe he knew all the answers to farming and the handling of the dairy industry, and he could sit on the Agriculture Committee and make intelligent decisions, informed decisions on the issues that come before that committee. He might have a hobby in some other field, where he might be well-informed about something else. He might even be a lawyer and he could serve on the Judiciary Committee. I don't know how many committees there are now, but maybe he'd find himself on four or five committees. He might be on Education, and aside from having gone to school, and maybe even having served as a school board member, he would be hard pressed to independently know the facts and the issues, and yet he'd be expected, along with the other members of the committee, to make intelligent decisions on educational issues.

McKay: So the legislative representative, who by and large is an expert in his given field, whether it's oil or banking or fishing or whatever, is available, not only to present the position of his principals, his organization, or his association, but to provide facts. I doubt if this has changed at all. The legislative advocate has to be reliable. If he tries to kid or mislead a legislator, he won't last long. If he said, "Okay, if you pass this bill out in the assembly, we'll put amendments in when it gets to the senate," and he doesn't do it, the next time he makes a promise, he's through.

So the lobbyist, I think, is an indispensable part of the legislative process, and I think any experienced legislator would agree with that. I think he would tell you that they have to look to the people in this multitude of special interests and take their word.

Now, as was suggested in some of the material you sent me, this has changed somewhat. I smiled myself, because I had a hand in it, in the development of the legislative committee staffs and individual members' staffs, and the availability of research and other material. I served on a citizens commission studying the legislative process, and among other things, we decided and recommended to the legislature that there was a need for independent research.

Rowland: The legislative representatives?

McKay: Yes, that the legislator should have some source that he could turn to that was absolutely unbiased.

Rowland: Why did you come to that conclusion?

McKay: I'm not sure, except that there was a great burden on the third house. They would say, "Tomorrow morning I need to know everything there is to know about school finance."

I'd say, "Come back a year from tomorrow morning and I can have it for you." It's just impossible to produce everything. We did our best. We had a research department, which was well staffed and highly competent, and we were able to meet those needs, generally. Among other things, we felt--I'm speaking as a commission member--that the legislators should be better compensated, that they should have reasonable expenses allowances with automobiles for district offices.

Rowland: Was this similar to Unruh's argument, to make legislators less vulnerable to lobbyists?

McKay: I don't know what Jesse's rationale is, and I'm not too familiar with the details of what he may think on that, but generally believing that government is extremely important in every field--it affects all of us--that we should have the best qualified, the best equipped, in terms of information, members of the two houses that it's possible to provide.

I think maybe the development and expansion of this concept has gone too far; I don't know. I know it's resulted in less dependence on the third house over the years, and maybe that's good. They get a meld of the two.

Rowland: There's a phenomenon here of many legislators retiring and becoming advocates. There's a long list. I think Dan Creedon was a legislator, as well as Judge Garibaldi. What privileges did former legislators have in the houses as advocates that non-legislators didn't have?

McKay: I guess, legally and officially, none, but they had certain advantages in terms of their knowledge of the process, their contacts, their friendships with members and former members of the legislature. I suspect they had some undue privileges.

You mentioned Judge Garibaldi. He was a great pal of Hughie Burns and others in the senate, and they came back to a meeting--I think it was of Governmental Efficiency--one night somewhat delayed because they had lingered overly long at wherever they were being wined and dined, and Garibaldi was one of the hosts for the group that night. They came back in the senate committee, and they all sat down, with Garibaldi sitting up there with his pals on the committee. They heard a bill, and Garibaldi said, "I move that bill out, do pass."

Hugh said, "Mmmm--wait a minute! You're not a member of this committee. You're not even a member of the senate." [laughter] This illustrated the relationship, the extreme compatibility of some of the former members and other people who became lobbyists.

Rowland: They were still part of the club, even though they--

McKay: Yes, and they were accepted.

Rowland: Were they allowed on the floor? Did former legislators have the floor privilege that other lobbyists would not have?

McKay: They may have had in earlier days. There was a time when lobbyists were permitted to sit at the desk alongside the legislator when a bill was being heard. He would have his file

McKay: of papers and he'd shuffle them and prompt the assemblyman who was presenting a bill or arguing a point. But that was ruled out, and eventually they put the barrier at the back of the old assembly chamber, and the lobbyist had to be back there.

Rowland: Do you remember approximately when that was phased out? Was that during your years?

McKay: I don't remember that lobbyists were permitted on the floor when I first went there on the controller's office staff. But the third house got moved back, eventually, to the hallway with the big doors closed, and you'd send a note in to whoever you wanted to see, and they'd come out. Then they put a barrier out in the hallway so they were another fifty feet away. They're not using that building currently, but they ended up in the gallery, using smoke signals or hand signals. [laughter]

Registering and Regulating Lobbyists

Rowland: Now, we have in 1949 the Collier Act regarding the registration of lobbyists. Why was that enacted?

McKay: I think to formalize the procedure and set up some ground rules for the activities of lobbyists, to find out who was representing whom, to make sure that they were authorized to speak for whatever interest they purported to speak for. They had a form where an officer of the organization or firm or whatever says, "This indeed is the man who represents us in Sacramento," to get some idea of who was spending how much money.

There were all kinds of wild stories about votes being bought and virtually sold.

Rowland: Was this primarily Samish operations?

McKay: It was typified by the Samish tales, but I don't think it was limited to Samish at all. There were other interests who probably were very liberal in their entertainment and campaign help. In those earlier days, there was no record. There was no way of knowing who was beholden to whom. So I think the establishment of a lobbyist registration procedure was the result of a feeling that things were out of hand.

Rowland: Why was that supposedly being enforced and ruled on by the legislative analyst's office?

McKay: I really don't know how that decision was made. Back in the early days, the legislative analyst was known as the legislative auditor, and on this commission I mentioned earlier, I raised that question and made a suggestion: he isn't auditing; he's analyzing the budgets and the fiscal operations of the state. Why shouldn't he be called the legislative analyst? So as a result of that, the recommendation was made, and Alan Post became the legislative analyst. I really don't know why they chose that, except that he was an employee of the legislature, and if they looked at the available arms of the legislature, I guess this made sense. They wouldn't have the legislative counsel bureau or any of the other offsprings of government. I think they just wanted a reputable, knowledgeable agency to handle it.

Party Loyalty and Reapportionment: Effects on Advocacy

Rowland: Were there any changes in the CTA's governmental relations due to the termination of cross-filing in 1959?

McKay: No, I don't think so. You're probably as familiar as I am with eventual results of cross-filing. When it was possible for a person, particularly an incumbent, to file on both parties and get the nominations, he felt no great allegiance or responsibility to the party to which he was registered. He was independent in that respect. When cross-filing was eliminated, there developed a feeling that he'd better be part of the team--part of the Democratic or Republican team--and whatever the governor and the administration wanted, why, that was what he should do. More and more, I guess, that has become the pattern.

I don't know if it started with Jesse Unruh, but these pots of money that are accumulated by Speakers and others--I guess Leo McCarthy has these fund raisers and he has a kitty that he can disperse legally to either an incumbent or to somebody who's running for office. This has made being on the team more attractive. Sometimes I suspect that members will cast a vote more in allegiance to the party or the administration than they do to their constituents, or to their own personal convictions.

There's a great dichotomy there, and I think John [F.] Kennedy expressed it extremely well in one of his writings--it was Profiles in Courage, I believe--where an officeholder has to

McKay: weigh his allegiances. What he may feel very keenly as an individual, whether it's on a religious basis--he [Kennedy], being a Catholic, might be expected to follow the Catholic hierarchy on certain issues of school support or other things--and what allegiance is owed to the constituency (which may not be typical of the whole country, or in this case, the whole state), and what allegiance does he owe to, in his case, the National Democratic Committee and platform, and what the leadership in the House or the Senate wants. That applies, I think, in all areas of government.

More and more, as a result, or at least coincident with the abolition of cross-filing, this has become more and more the guiding rule: they're inclined to follow the administration.

Rowland: Reapportionment happens, of course, every ten years. In the assembly and the senate, reapportionment happened in 1965 and '66. I wonder what the position was of the CTA on reapportionment of the assembly and eventual reapportionment of the senate. Did they feel that would change their position in the legislature?

McKay: I don't think there was any conscious evaluation of that in terms of strategy or goals. I think what it meant primarily was that we were dealing with a different group of members who were more heavily oriented to the urban areas. In the early days, where you had one senator from each county, or a combination of small counties, you had the totally unjustifiable situation of Jack Tenney and his successor representing a multi-million constituency, and a senator from Inyo County, Charlie Brown--he lived in Death Valley--having equal voting status in the senate. Senator Brown was a nice, old guy who had just a handful of constituents, just a few thousand out there, and very comfortable. Nice to go to Sacramento every two years and see his old friends. Yet his vote counted just as much as [that of] the senator from Los Angeles County. So you were dealing in the senate primarily with people who were pretty well off, who were attuned to agricultural needs, who had to be convinced that the cities really needed much of anything.

Rowland: Was reapportionment of the senate favorable to the CTA's position?

McKay: I would think so because school needs--financial, primarily--and needs of teachers generally are heaviest in the more heavily populated areas. As was quoted in one of these newspaper clips that you'll read [see following page], about why CTA had a reasonable measure of success over the years, was that it had the means of transmitting our message forcefully to members of the legislature, because wherever there are people, there are

- McKay: children--human nature being what it is. In the large areas, there are more children and more schools and more teachers, and we had a ready-made network of communication, where we could reflect the needs as we saw them. So the heavier concentration of senators in Los Angeles County--what do they have, thirteen, sixteen, now?
- Rowland: Fourteen, and they share one with Orange County.
- McKay: In terms of financial need, you would have a greater percentage of the senate that was close to the problem, was more attuned to it, and in theory at least, more receptive to the needs of the schools.
- Rowland: Did this cause a split within the third house? We have information in our office that some of the larger interests who worked primarily with the senate were against reapportionment.
- McKay: I think they were, because they were quite comfortable with the arrangement they had. Members of the senate were inclined to stay longer. Of course, their terms are longer to start with. But their seniority, by and large, was greater than it was for members of the assembly, who come and go. Relatively few of them [assemblymen] would be there for twenty or thirty years.
- Rowland: That brings up an interesting point. I wonder what the CTA's relation was with other interests and other advocates in the legislature.
- McKay: We generally had no quarrel with other interests. We, of course, crossed swords when we had different positions. We were good friends. This is one of the things that people outside of a legislative operation may not understand, and that is you can differ on issues, but you don't necessarily become enemies as a result of that. You can still be good friends, and that's even true in dealing with members of the legislature.

We had differences of policy with some members of the senate, for example, on certain issues, and we would battle that out in committee or on the floor and do everything we could to sustain our position. At the same time, the senator we were--not attacking; we were on the other side of the issue with him--he'd be carrying some of our bills. The fact that we differed on something didn't mean that we were totally alienated as individuals. There are many, many examples of that over the years. But I don't know that reapportionment really made too much difference to us. It may have been helpful to education.

SATURDAY, JUNE 25, 1949
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE

WHAT IS A LOBBYIST?

Teachers Buy No Drinks, But They Wield a Big Club

(Chapter Three of an Exclusive Series) 1949.

By STANTON DELAPLANE, Chronicle Staff Writer

Sacramento

THE most vicious lobby in California is the teachers' lobby," say the other Sacramento lobbyists.

The teachers' lobby—The California State Teachers' Association—operates with none of the lavish expenditure of the business lobbies. It buys no dinners and it buys no drinks.

It is represented by Bob McKay, a former Southern California newspaperman and ex-Marine who gets \$8500 a year compared to the \$25,000 salaries of the oil, power, railroad and other business lobbyists.

But no lobby is more feared and none calls forth a more ringing denunciation. Say the lobbyists:

"They wave the flag in one hand and little Johnny in the other and God help the legislator who won't go along with their bills."

Schools take about 20 per cent of California's tax dollar—roughly a third if you count in the University of California and State colleges—and the teachers have a strong interest in the legislative session.

Money Wanted

At this session they asked for a \$400,000,000 bond issue to rehabilitate schools. They asked that the average retirement pay for teachers who have already retired be raised from \$103 to \$130. Of 450 bills of interest to educators, they took a position on 125—and they let their 53,000 members know about it. A McKay-written bulletin keeps members informed and urges them to let their legislators know how they feel.

But it is not the voting strength of the 53,000 that whitens the senatorial hair. It is the classroom effect.

"Just let a teacher tell the class 'Assemblyman So-and-So is going to vote to get us new classrooms' and bingo, that goes right home into the kitchen," said a Los Angeles Assemblyman.

From a dozen sources you can hear that a legislator put on the spot by the teachers' lobby is a dead duck in his district. However, examples are hard to find.

McKay, a quiet, highly ethical lobbyist, denies this flatly, too. He says the teachers' association is absolutely against pressure tactics.

This is in direct opposition to another lobby that works on voting strength—George H. McLain's old-age pension group which wrote itself into the State Constitution last year through Proposition 4.

McLain frankly admits they put the vote pressure on the legislator wherever he is weakest.

What It Has Done

The teachers' lobby bloomed out of the 85-year-old teachers' association under Roy Clodd of San Francisco, who lobbied teachers' bills for 20 years. The present McKay lobby keeps four people working out of headquarters at the Sacramento Hotel.

The lobby is credited with writing a \$2400-a-year minimum salary for teachers into the Constitution by a 1,330,000 vote of the people.

It is credited with the defeat of the Ham and Eggs proposition.

It has power and it is not un-

Continued on Page 8, Col. 1

WHAT IS A LOBBYIST?

Continued from Page 1

grateful to the Senator or Assemblyman who votes the teachers' way.

McKay explains the tactics: "At the end of each session and before election, we write a letter to each legislator who has helped the schools. He is free to use it in his campaign but the letter is not a formal endorsement."

The Sacramento lobbyists claim this is so much breeze.

"Endorsement?" they say. "Listen, they'll come in and murder your opposition if they like you."

The teachers not only get to the parents, the lobbyists say, they tie into the Parent-Teachers Association by natural association of interests and most teachers are naturals for membership in the California Federation of Business and Professional Women and the League of Women Voters.

Horse Racing, Too?

Lobbyists say these organizations are often swung into the teacher line through teacher members.

Because of prior rights to State income (schools get their mopey off the top of the State budget), lobbyists say that the teachers interest themselves in such income projects as horse-racing bills.

McKay says his lobby never touches such bills.

McKay is a blond-haired young man in his thirties who spent 10 years on the Long Beach papers. In the Marines he became a public relations officer and after the war tied into the teachers' lobby simply as a professional public relations job.

Before the war, he had a job as confidential secretary in the

State Controller's office for four and a half years. Sacramento's operation is not strange to him. Confidential secretaries usually lobby for their departments. Earl Warren and lobbyist Artie Samish started as secretaries.

As one of the young lobbyists and one of the most capable, McKay looks like a natural to take over one of the better paid business lobby jobs as the Old Guard retires.



By Chronicle Photographer Barney Peterson.

BOB MCKAY

His teachers' lobby is considered strongest in Sacramento

Rowland: What about Jesse Unruh's staff buildup in the assembly? When Jesse Unruh, as Speaker, began to build the staff of the assembly, creating--what he wanted was a professional legislature. How did that affect the CTA?

McKay: We were in accord, generally, with that trend, and we developed good working relationships with the staffs, the consultants to the education committees of the two houses primarily, but also with Rev and Tax, Ways and Means, Finance, and other committees to which school-related bills would be assigned. We would work on research materials, and try to, through the staff then, provide the information which we thought might be helpful in a given issue.

Rowland: So that was favorable to the CTA, the staff buildup and consultants on committees.

McKay: I don't think it was unfavorable.

IV PROMINENT PERSONALITIES IN THE KNIGHT-BROWN ERA

Reflections on Goodwin J. Knight##

McKay: When I got out of the Marine Corps and went to work on the campaign on Proposition 3, which was being handled by Whitaker and Baxter, the San Francisco campaign firm, I was asked by Clem Whitaker if I could find time to do a little writing for a candidate who was running for lieutenant governor, really on a shoestring. He didn't have much money. He was a superior court judge in Los Angeles by the name of Goodwin J. Knight. I said, "Yes, for a little money maybe I could find time." So I took on the job of writing a series--I think there were nine--fifteen-minute radio broadcasts for Goodie Knight, running for lieutenant governor.

When he was elected, along with Earl Warren that year, and went to Sacramento, and I went to work for CTA, I had, understandably, a good working relationship with the lieutenant governor. There were some overtures at the time as to whether I might be interested in working for him. I didn't pursue it. Later, when Earl Warren was appointed Chief Justice of the [U.S.] Supreme Court and Goodie Knight became governor, he called me and said he had a job and would I be interested in it. I thanked him profusely and told him I hoped he wouldn't take it as a personal rejection, but I thought my future didn't lie in that direction, that I would stay with CTA. I'd had some preliminary discussion with a member of his staff.

Rowland: Who was that?

McKay: That was Florenz True, who later became Mrs. Richard Dolwig.

Rowland: How do you spell that first name?

McKay: Florenz, F-l-o-r-e-n-z.

Rowland: T-r-u-e?

McKay: T-r-u-e, I believe it was spelled. She was his executive secretary when he was lieutenant governor, and she had worked on his campaign. That's when I knew her initially. She had talked to me, obviously, at the direction of Goodie, to see if I would be interested, and if so, would I be interested in press relations, or executive secretaryship or some other spot in the governor's office. Some time after that, Newt Stearns went into the governor's office. A very fine addition. He was a very able newspaperman, very loyal and dedicated to his boss there.

Rowland: What can you tell us about Goodie Knight and his ambitions for higher office?

McKay: I think the way it worked out, he became the victim of his own ambitions. You'll recall the shuffle that Bill Knowland and the L.A. Times--maneuvering of their chessmen around on the political board--and nobody got elected that they wanted. Goodie ran for United States Senate, and Knowland ran for governor. Was that when Pat Brown first ran?

Rowland: That's when Pat Brown came in, right.

McKay: So, I don't know. One little incident, which probably shouldn't be preserved for posterity [laughter], but I'll tell you anyway--when I was writing his speeches, I had a little difficulty in making sure what he stood for. You know, he's going to go on a twenty-one-station statewide network on radio and tell what he believes. Clem Whitaker and I had put together some ideas about "unity" and "pulling the state together" and "our future is tomorrow"--you know, this type of generalities. But I wanted to get a little better idea of what his views were on a series of subjects. There wasn't any time during the campaigning day or in the office to do it, so he said, "Why don't you come out to the house, and we'll talk about it?"

Rowland: This is with Knight?

McKay: With then-Judge Knight. So I said, "Okay." My wife, Lucy, and I drove out to North Las Palmas Drive in Los Angeles, where he then lived. That was with the first Mrs. Knight, before she passed away. They had a beautiful home, and we arrived one evening and went up to his study, and he said, "What's your birthday?"

I said, "It's August 21."

"Oh, you're a Leo. What about your wife?"

McKay: "She's August 19."

"Oh, she's a Leo, too? When were you married?"

I said, "August 20."

"Gee, that's fascinating. There must be some significance to that."

So he started pulling books off the shelf on astrology. We spent--I was going to say "wasted"--maybe the better part of an hour exploring all the astrological implications of such things, and I learned that he was quite a student of astrology--maybe just as a diversion; I don't know.

So we talked for a little while, and I said, "Okay, Judge, I'll put something together here." [laughter] So I went and wrote the next series of radio addresses. I still have a file of those speeches that I wrote for him. I guess what I'm saying here was that he, at that stage in his political development, didn't have too many strongly held positions on the public issues that you might expect a man running for office to have.

Rowland: We have, in notes from other interviewees, that he was a very ambitious politician and that he was really seeking a higher office, including the presidency.

McKay: He talked to me one day and said, "Bob, have you got any Mexican friends?"

I said, "Yes. Why?"

He said, "I think it'd be a good idea to put a Mexican on the State Board of Education. Can you come up with some names for me?"

I said, "I don't know whether I could or not. If I were to suggest names, I wouldn't do it on my own. The people I work for would be recommending someone, and it would not be on the basis of their racial background, but on the basis of their ability and their qualifications for the office."

Rowland: He would seek you out for consultation on appointments to the State Board of Education regularly?

McKay: No, not regularly. On that occasion. Then later, the CTA formally, after much searching and careful consideration, did submit some names. As I recall, he didn't appoint any of them.

- McKay: Of course, it's not unusual for a politician to seek advice and suggestions in various areas of the voting populace, and that's obviously what he was doing. He was sort of a happy-go-lucky sort of a guy.
- Rowland: We don't really have a feeling for how he ran the staff and how he selected the staff. It seems like there was quite a bit of turnover in the staff, and there was one particular controversial staff member. My research indicates that when Knight was lieutenant governor, one of his staff members tried to blackmail Knight. Can you explain this scenario or explain any of the problems with the staff that Knight had as governor or lieutenant governor?
- McKay: No, I wasn't aware of that. No, I really don't. I knew most of the staff rather well because we had need to deal with the governor on the introduction of legislation and the signing or vetoing of bills. Also, on some of his proposals, which we can get into later, he at one stage proposed what we call to "raid," unquote, the teachers' retirement reserve, and we had to tell him that wasn't a very good idea, in our judgment. He later changed his mind about that.
- Rowland: What about his relations with the legislature? We have a note that he was operating a laissez-faire philosophy with the legislature, letting them come up with their own suggestions for various problems, such as the solution to the Feather River problem, or the selection of a new advisory state board for water, and I wonder if that was true with education also.
- McKay: I think he was not a strong leader with a forceful program. I think he was more inclined to react to situations and developments.
- Rowland: Why did he function that way? Was it just his personality, his style?
- McKay: I would think it's just the way any of us react. Basically, we are what we are. He had some good people surrounding him, of course, but I suspect that Goodie Knight's era will not go down as the Golden Age of California Government. He was amiable, jovial--

Relations with Senate Leaders

- Rowland: I have a group of questions on the CTA's role and relationship with the legislature, the state Department of Education, the superintendent of education, and the State Board of Education.

Rowland: Breaking down each house and the senate leaders, I'm wondering what the CTA's relationships were, first of all, with the senate and senate leaders, maybe beginning with Hugh Burns, for instance. He was pro tem.

McKay: I think you'll find in one of the clippings that I have in that folder some very kind words about the teachers' lobby and me personally, from Hugh Burns, which I think reflects a generally good working relationship. Of course, as you know, Hugh Burns had commitments, shall we say, or allegiances to some of his old friends, and we have never been critical of any of those things with any of the members of the legislature.

I might illustrate with a little incident about Harry Parkman. He was the senator from this county (San Mateo) and a close personal friend of the late CTA executive secretary, Roy Cloud. Years later, near the end of Senator Parkman's tenure, we had a teacher by the name of Roy Archibald, a junior-college teacher, a close personal friend of mine who has for years now been on the staff of the National Education Association. We worked closely together on matters of federal legislation. He for several years was mayor of San Mateo. He decided to run against Harry Parkman, and being a teacher, he figuratively came and said, "Here I am, where's my endorsement?" We said in those days--it was true--"We don't endorse. What we do, we give an incumbent whose record is favorable to education a letter of thanks, which he's free to reproduce and publish as evidence of his record in education, but not as an endorsement. This we've done, or will do, for Senator Parkman."

He said, "You know he's no damn good. He represents the liquor interests, and he's a tool of the horse-racing crowd, and here I am, a teacher, and you're going to say that he's the guy that should be elected?"

I said, "No, Roy, we're not saying he's the one that should be elected. All we're saying is that his record on education is damn good. I can't cite an instance on a crucial issue or an important issue where Senator Parkman hasn't gone down the line for the schools and the teachers." We didn't pass judgment, let me say, on any other connections or how he voted on anything else. So that typified our relationship with leaders and members of both houses--Hugh Burns and others.

Rowland: When Burns became pro tem of the senate in 1957, there were two switch-over votes from the Republicans to the Democrats' vote tally. That was Randy Collier and Louis Sutton. I was wondering what the CTA's reaction was to that, or if they had sought consultation on the election of pro tem.

- McKay: I don't recall that we played any role other than just innocent bystanders on it. Of course, Randy Collier switching, I guess, typified his political awareness. He was a loyal Democrat for many, many years, and I think he read the registration figures and held his finger up to the wind and one day re-registered. He became a good conservative Republican.
- Rowland: Democrat?
- McKay: No, a Republican. I don't know when he was where, but [laughter] he switched back and forth in his registration, and he was quite successful at it.
- Rowland: Did the CTA expect any differences with Burns now as pro tem or Ben Hulse--
- McKay: I don't recall that we did.
- Rowland: What were your relationships with Clarence Ward and Ben Hulse when they were pro tem?
- McKay: Ben Hulse, over the years, was a powerful and important member of the senate, first as chairman of the Finance Committee, through which all spending bills must go, and later as pro tem. He was conservative, tight-fisted, scrupulously honest. He was a millionaire in his own right. He had a Caterpillar franchise in Imperial County--farm machinery, anyway, and he was a tough nut to crack, but you knew where you stood with him. He would be inclined to say "no" on things financial and then ask why you needed the money. You know, [he would say], "We have to keep the state solvent." But he was cooperative. He handled some bills for us, and I would say our relationships with him were good.
- Rowland: He came from Imperial County?
- McKay: Imperial County, yes.
- Rowland: The CTA wasn't very strong down there, was it? It was primarily agriculture.
- McKay: Yes, primarily agricultural, and the population of Imperial County is not large, or was not large at that time. Actually, his home was in Vista, over in San Diego County. He had his legal residence in Imperial County, but it's just too hot in Imperial County to live there year-round. [laughter] He was over on the coast.

Rowland: What about Clarence Ward? He was pro tem for a period--

McKay: We got along well with Ward. He was from Santa Barbara County, was a member of the club, so to speak, in the leadership there. I don't recall any difficulties that we had with him. He was inclined to be conservative. The reason I mention fiscal conservatism is that so many of the programs that the schools felt important involved money. So you had to be able to work with the forces that were inclined to block appropriations and money to meet the needs.

Rowland: A few other members of the senate--George Miller, Jr. What were your relations with--

McKay: George was a marvelous character.

Rowland: If you have stories about George Miller, Jr., just tell us. We'd love them all. [laughter] Unfortunately, George Miller is gone from us, and we really--

McKay: He, I guess until the day he died, was his own profane, obscene, four-letter-word self. I'm trying to think what it was--well, I shouldn't repeat it anyway.

Rowland: [laughter] Let's record it, then. [laughter]

McKay: It was a conference in connection--well, in the events leading up to the development of the higher education act [Master Plan for Higher Education] in the senate. I had arranged a meeting of some of the leaders of higher education, including Julio Bartolazzo, who at the time was president of College of San Mateo, and we were sitting in George's office, talking about some of the things, and Bartolazzo was being very nice about things and explaining in genteel fashion what the situation was. George said something like, "Aw shit. You ought to go fuck yourself." [laughter] This may not have been typical, but it's illustrative. [laughter] And poor Bartolazzo, in his position of eminence in education, wasn't used [laughter] to words of those dimensions.

Let me tell you a little story about George Miller, and it may be revealing. For years--I don't know what the situation is now, because I, fortunately, have not attempted to keep up with changes in the law, even though I drafted a good part of it during the years I was there, in bills that we proposed--there was a provision on the dismissal of tenured teachers in Los Angeles and San Francisco.

Rowland: That was Bert Levit's thing, wasn't it?

McKay: He was involved in that, yes. I forget what the definition--you know, you can't have special legislation that names certain districts, so you say, "In unified school districts of 450,000 or more average daily attendance, thus and so shall apply." Well, it was applicable only to Los Angeles and to San Francisco at the time. San Diego, by definition, grew into the coverage, and neither the administrators--the school district--nor the teachers in San Diego wanted this to apply. It was a dismissal for cause only, which would have imposed on their operation some procedures or hearings that at the time they didn't want. As a result of that, we had a bill developed through our legislative committees and processes which would have still limited that to the two districts.

The teachers' union, the American Federation of Teachers, took an opposite position, and in those days, as he usually did, George Miller listened to the teachers' union because of the rather heavy concentration of labor in his district in Contra Costa County; and I guess because of his own honest convictions and persuasions, he leaned in that direction, which was fine with us.

We were having a hearing in the Senate Education Committee one night, and I was at the microphone presenting our point of view, when George Miller came boiling into the meeting, tight as a tick, and loud--if you knew George or know the stories about him. He was just raucous. Without having heard the testimony, but knowing it was something that we were proposing and the union was against, he really took off. He really gave me a bad time, so bad that the talk in the halls the next morning was about what George Miller had done. Ben Hulse, who was pro tem at the time, came to me the next day and apologized on behalf of the senate for the senator's conduct.

I continued to do my work in the senate and deal with George. He was a member of the Education Committee, and we had a good working relationship, illustrated by my phone ringing one night in the hotel, and he said, "Hi, Bob! This is George."

"My God, George, what time is it?"

He says, "Oh, about three o'clock, why?"

I said, "What can I do for you?"

He said, "You got any scotch down there?"

I said, "No, I've got a bottle of bourbon you're welcome to come down and get."

McKay: "No, we'll find some scotch."

"Okay." And he hung up. So you see, [laughter] our relationships weren't entirely antagonistic.

Two years later, I was having dinner with a friend one night at Frank Fat's. I don't know if you're familiar with the place. They used to have an upstairs area called the Gallery, or the Balcony, and a bunch of the senators were being entertained by somebody, and they were rather loud. Their dinner finally broke up, and here came George Miller down the steps. He spotted me and came down, and he said, "Hey, move over. I want to talk to you."

"Okay, George, sit down."

He said, "You got your date book with you?"

I said, "No, I'm sorry. I don't."

He said, "Well, make a note then. On March 15, if there is a meeting of the Senate Education Committee or any committee of which George Miller is a member, you make a note not to be there."

"Oh?"

He said, "Well, I want to tell you something. Two years ago on that date, there was a meeting of the Education Committee, and Bob McKay was testifying on a bill. That happened to be George Miller's birthday, and Al Shults"--he represents the oil industry--"and George Miller were classmates at Cal. We were buddies in the army. And so Al said, 'George, we're going to have a nice dinner tonight to celebrate your birthday.'

'Fine.' So we went out to dinner, and we had a flock of martinis, and then we had a magnum of champagne. Finally, I said, 'Oh, I've got to go to a meeting.'

Al said, 'You're not going to any meeting, George, now sit down.'

'I have to go to a meeting.'

So he said, "I went to the meeting, and you were testifying, and I didn't know what the hell it was all about, but I knew I didn't like it. So every time you opened your mouth, I jumped down your throat." And he said, "Never in the days since then has Bob McKay said that he even remembered that incident." And

- McKay: he said, "Keep that date in mind. I don't want that to happen again," which was his way of apologizing, two years after the fact. But maybe it says something about both of us; I don't know. Because personally, I was offended. I thought it was outrageous, uncalled for, and shouldn't have happened. But I had to work with him. He was a power. Later on, he carried some of our bills. So you ask me about George Miller--a not important, but maybe a significant story.
- Rowland: Yes. Two more here, and one is Luther Gibson, from Vallejo, Solano County, who was chairman of the Governmental Organization Committee. I was wondering if you had any--
- McKay: Yes, we got along well with Luther Gibson.
- Rowland: The Governmental Organization Committee was commonly known as the graveyard for--
- McKay: Oh, yes. They would send some education bills that the leadership didn't like, or thought they didn't like, and we were able to work things out.
- Rowland: Did you have any consultation with certain people on the committee or the--
- McKay: Well, we, of course, would always consult with the chairman. I can't remember what bill it was--it was an important one to us--got sent there.
- Rowland: Finance bill?
- McKay: I think it may have been our survivorship benefit bill, part of the teachers' retirement. It was sent there, and they set up a sub-committee. I'm trying to remember who the chairman of it was. It was either Swift Berry or Louis Sutton or one of the rural senators who was chairman of it. Much to the surprise of people who thought it was dead, it came out with a unanimous recommendation and was adopted. No, our relationships with Senator Gibson were good.

Looking Back on Senate Education Committee Members

- Rowland: The last would be Hugh Donnelly, who was chairman of the Education Committee.
- McKay: Hugh was especially close to us. He was from Turlock. He was a very quiet, hardworking, usually even-tempered sort of a guy, who on some emotional issues could get up and really spellbind the senate. He didn't do it often.

McKay: But he was a member of the Senate Education Committee when Chris Jespersen of Atascadero died. We had worked very closely with Jespersen, and Hugh Donnelly was appointed chairman, and by that time they were getting some staff for the committees--major committees, at least.

Rowland: I was wondering if the CTA had sought consultation with the pro tem regarding the appointment of senators to chairman of the Education Committee. It seems like an important committee.

McKay: I don't recall that we did. I have no recollection of any consultation. There were many times in the assembly when the Speaker or the Speaker-elect would talk to us.

One of my long-time friends, who since passed away, was Ralph Brown, down in the Valley. He was Speaker. We had compared notes on proposed appointments to the Assembly Education Committee--not that he was duty-bound to listen to us or to follow our suggestions, but I had known him many years before in my work in Kiwanis. I had been president of two clubs, including the Sacramento Kiwanis Club, and Ralph had been active, so I knew him before either of us were on the Sacramento scene.

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Rowland: Just running through the members on the Education Committee, and this is 1959, would be--Donnelly is chairman; Al Rodda is vice-chairman. What were your relationships with--

McKay: Our relationships were most amicable.

Rowland: He's [Senator Rodda] a senior senator now. Very fine man.

McKay: Yes, he is. Well, he's a former teacher, you know. He's extremely sound. We worked very closely with him. He carried some of our bills.

He, as you may recall your history, was elected in a special election following the death of Earl Desmond, who was one of the old-time, inner-circle senators there. Rodda always was fair and wanted the facts. I don't think anyone ever led him around by the nose, or that he was beholden to any group at all. No, he was a fine one to work with.

Rowland: I don't have his first name; his name was Byrne, Senator Byrne.

McKay: Paul Byrne, B-y-r-n-e, from Chico. He was a Republican. He inclined to be a little on the conservative side, but quite knowledgeable and quite affable.

Rowland: Nathan Coombs, from Napa?

McKay: Nate Coombs, I think, was along in years before he arrived in the senate. I knew him years before that time as an inheritance tax appraiser, appointed by the state controller, back in my controller's days. He ended up on the Education Committee. I don't know that he was getting senile, although there were some indications that he was.

We had a dinner at Antonina's one night with some key members of the senate and the Senate Education Committee, including George Miller, and we were right in the midst of an important discussion, and Nate Coombs was leaning back--he said, "They don't make high ceilings like this any more." [laughter] He either didn't hear well or he wasn't concentrating.

His secretary used to make out a list of the bills coming up in committee and what he was supposed to do with them and put that in his hand and head him in the right direction. I don't say that in any disparagement at all, because he was a good friend, but he was not the young, alert senator that you might envision.

Nelson Dilworth and the Dilworth Act

Rowland: Now I come to Nelson Dilworth, of course. First of all, if you could just give us your perspective of Nelson Dilworth. Then I want to get into questions about the Dilworth Act.

McKay: Dilworth was a farmer, a product of a poor family. He lived in Hemet, reflected the basic--oh, what virtues would you call them?

Rowland: Pioneer?

McKay: Yes, pioneer. That's a good descriptive term for Dilworth. Virtues. He was scrupulously honest, leaned over backwards about that. He was a religious man.

Rowland: A prohibitionist, too, wasn't he?

McKay: Well, I know he didn't drink.

Rowland: I mean, not a Prohibition party member.

McKay: No. He had very strong feelings on that. I remember one night, in one of my first appearances before an assembly committee, Dilworth was sitting next to me in the front row. He leaned over to me, and he said, "You know, I think I smell liquor on the breath of two of the members of this committee."

I said [laughter], "Oh!" He was very strict about that.

Rowland: How did Dilworth get along with George Miller? They were opposite ends of the--

McKay: They tolerated each other and, I guess, in a way, respected each other. He would come to Sacramento by bus, because that was the least expensive way. He told me once he knew twelve eating places in Sacramento where you could get a good lunch for 35¢.

On occasion, I would go into his office--late in the afternoon, along towards five o'clock or so--and the lights would be off, but I'd know he was there, and he'd be sitting behind his desk, eating graham crackers and munching raisins. It was good wholesome food, and this is the type of person he was. If he believed in something, he would go all out to achieve the goal, and unlike some people in public office, while he was averse to getting credit for what he did, if the goal was achieved, he didn't object to somebody else taking the credit. Bills would start in both houses and would criss-cross, and maybe an assembly bill would be the one that would get through first. He'd say, "Okay, I'll drop mine"--this type of thing.

He was the father, to a large degree, of the state school building aid program. We were deeply involved in that. We proposed at the '49 session the first statewide bond issue--\$250 million, unheard of in amount. He was the author of that. Then the legislation that was necessary in setting up the machinery to distribute and run herd on this program, the State Allocations Board, this was all part of his work.

Rowland: Why did he institute the Dilworth Act? Maybe you could give us some background.

McKay: He inherited some of the Jack Tenney philosophy. I think he was a member of that committee. He may have been a member--

Rowland: He was a member of the Burns committee, too.

McKay: And of the Yorty committee when he was in the assembly. I've forgotten that. But he was a genuine patriot, and he saw Communists behind a lot of bushes. I'm convinced that he felt

McKay: there was a threat of Communists indoctrinating students, and, "We've got to be sure of their loyalty." This is what motivated him, I'm sure.

Rowland: What was the CTA position on the Dilworth Act?

McKay: Well, when he first introduced it, we were dead set against it, because there were so many unclear provisions and so many undesirable features that it was just a complete "no." But as a result of some discussions, we worked out amendments. We had a meeting one day in the meeting room of the Senator Hotel, and Hal Kennedy, who was county counsel in Los Angeles--I don't know if any of these names ring a bell with you--and a lot of other people who were involved were there. I played a rather major part in the discussions raising all of these questions, and I would, for example, say, "Now, what does 'knowing membership' mean?"

"Well, if you belong to it, you ought to know it."

I said, "Okay, how do you prove that?" If somebody says you're a member of the Communist party--

Rowland: So you were directly working with Senator Dilworth, asking questions of him?

McKay: Yes. A whole series of issues. He would say, "You know we don't mean that. That isn't what it means."

I said, "Okay, put it in the language here."

We got through--I don't know whether it was Hal Kennedy, or someone said, "Bob, I didn't know you were a lawyer."

I said, "I'm not a lawyer." [laughter]

"You sure as hell sounded like it in there."

But anyway, if you have occasion to go through the record, you'll find that the bill was amended radically to provide protections which we thought were essential.

Rowland: I think one provision of the act, however, stated that if a teacher pleaded the fifth amendment to any questions before a board, he was automatically fired.

McKay: I've forgotten the details. That was one of the points at issue.

Rowland: Was that an attack on those people in the [U.S.] House Un-American [Activities] Committee hearings that always pleaded the fifth whenever questions came up with their alleged involvement with the Communist party?

McKay: Yes. We did something in this general field. I don't know whether it was in connection with what became known as the Dilworth Act. There were a lot of loyalty oath bills and that type of thing. Given the climate that existed at the time, you could be very easily misunderstood if you said, "No, we're against it." [The opposition would counter with,] "You're for the Communists," this type of thing. So there were a few occasions where we didn't like legislation that was proposed. So I would stand before a committee and say, "This is perhaps something that should be done, and if it's a good idea, I think maybe it should apply to all public employees. I'm sure you don't want to single out the teachers as a target of this." So I'd get amendments in there which would make it apply to city, county, state employees, and then the opposition would really pour it on the bill, because these other people that didn't care--you know, "Let the teachers be subject to this"--said, "You mean, it's going to apply to us now?" [laughter] They'd start talking to their members of the legislature. I'm sure we didn't invent that approach to things, but it works.

Relations with Assembly Leaders

Rowland: That's an interesting tactic. [laughter] We'd better get on to the assembly here before we run out of tape. We have some changes in leadership in the assembly, first beginning in the Knight period with James Silliman, and then to Luther Lincoln and to Ralph Brown and to Jesse Unruh. What were your relationships with James Silliman? How did you work with him?

McKay: Silliman was sort of a volatile individual, given to explosive expressions of his opinion, sometimes when he was presiding and other times off the podium. We got along well with him, and I think, as far as I'm personally concerned, this will illustrate what I mean by that: I was sitting in his office one afternoon, chatting, and he said, "Bob, don't you get a little tired of this rat race up here?"

I said, "Who doesn't?"

McKay: He said, "Have you ever thought of picking off one of these good state jobs that come along?"

I said, "Oh, not particularly. Why? What did you have in mind?"

He said, "Well, we have a new controller, Bob Kirkwood, and there's an exempt position down in the controller's office. I think you'd be admirably fitted to that, and if you don't mind, I'd like to speak to Bob and suggest that he consider you for it." He said, "What are you smiling about?"

I said, "Jim, it was before your time up here, but that's the job that took me out of the newspaper game, back in 1939, and brought me to Sacramento in the first place. [laughter] I've been through that routine." Well, I tell you that simply to indicate that personal relationships with the then Speaker were pretty good.

Rowland: Weighing both houses, did you prefer to work with the assembly rather than the senate?

McKay: I think it may have been a little easier. I don't know that I preferred that, particularly. But there was an air of members of the senate being the elder statesmen. It didn't apply in all cases, but perhaps a little more aloof, not quite as approachable. That may have just been the reaction of the then relatively new and somewhat younger advocate, but the pattern of comings and goings in elections in the assembly caused a greater turnover and a little different attitude there.

Rowland: The assembly was a more accommodating body to the CTA's program?

McKay: No, I wouldn't say that either. I think that both houses, by and large, reacted to the need, the demonstrable need, that could be backed up with facts, and given the pressures for and against various pieces of legislation, they were comparable in that respect.

Rowland: Did the CTA seek any consultation with the changes in the assembly Speaker between, say, Silliman and Luther Lincoln?

McKay: We never involved ourselves in that in any way. This was something that my good friend, the late Monroe Butler, was a masterful operator in. He was independent oil, Superior Oil. A man named Martin was his boss, and Monroe Butler, a very quiet, efficient worker there, would make contributions for the oil company to

- McKay: candidates by checks. They'd make a complete report. It was available. He'd give \$500 to a candidate, and after the November election, then he would get signed commitments from members and members-elect on the Speakership race. I don't know whether it was in your materials or mine that my memory was refreshed about the occasion when Lincoln defeated Smith--what's his first name? Howard Smith?
- Rowland: Fenton Smith?
- McKay: No, from Glendale. He later went to Congress. Anyway, it's immaterial. This was the closest race in the history of the assembly up to that time, and maybe since, decided by three votes in the Speakership election. So there were a lot of changes in the appointment of chairmen and members, and the whole control was changed.
- Rowland: When Silliman lost the lieutenant governor's race to Butch Powers, and Luther Lincoln came in, how did you work with Luther Lincoln as assembly Speaker?
- McKay: Well, Abe started out, as he later said publicly, saying that he was not going to have anything to do with lobbyists, going to be completely independent and plow his own furrow. After a time there, he discovered that that was pretty difficult to do.
- Rowland: Why?
- McKay: You can't live in a vacuum. You have to be aware of the issues and the people who are interested in them. So he decided that lobbyists were not all ogres, that it wasn't a sin to talk with them, and in those days, to have breakfast or lunch or dinner with them, and that they could be quite helpful.
- He was on the Education Committee before he became Speaker. We worked very well with him. Because in most of these issues in education--not all of them, but most of them--have some application within a given legislator's home district.
- Rowland: Did he become a partisan of education as Speaker?
- McKay: Not particularly, as I recall. He certainly wasn't an enemy of education, but he was not like Bob Kirkwood, for example, or Francis Dunn in his days, Carlos Bee or Carly Porter, people who were in the forefront of trying to solve the educational problems. But more often than not, he could be counted on to support any sound educational legislation.

Rowland: I wonder if you could give us some perspective on maneuverings in the assembly during those years. In talking with Judge Caldecott on the phone, he was mentioning that [there] was a group of Young Turks--considered Young Turks in those years--including himself, Donald Doyle, Luther Lincoln, and Cap Weinberger and a few others, versus some senior members of the assembly--John Collier and Glenn Coolidge and others. What was your perspective on that? Was that a real bitter in-fighting in the Republican--or a bi-partisan battle?

McKay: These revolts or uprisings of new leadership or new rank and file, with leadership, occur periodically, as you know. All you need to do is change the names and the locale and the year. Tom Caldecott was in the assembly, as I recall, some time prior to Don Doyle and some of the others you have mentioned. I think they reflected maybe a justifiable feeling that new leadership was needed to change some of the ingrained practices and to get things moving a little more to their liking.

Rowland: What was the alignment of the CTA in this maneuvering?

McKay: We were not involved in it at all. We knew, and on most issues, worked with all of them. Glenn Coolidge was an old friend of mine from state controller days. In those days, the controller was administering the restitution part of the state's welfare program, and Glenn Coolidge was out of a job. Harry Riley put him to work on his staff. We laughed about that later. Glenn married a rich lady, a widow, and did very well. He didn't need a job later. [laughter]

Looking Back on Assembly Education Committee Members

Rowland: What about John Collier? He was the chairman of the Education Committee.

McKay: Yes, one year he was [chairman of the Assembly Education Committee]. Bud Collier will not go down in history as a close friend of the CTA. He and I tangled on occasions, and maybe we both had justification.

Rowland: Why was that?

McKay: Oh, a difference of opinion, a difference of position. He came from Eagle Rock in Los Angeles County. He was inclined initially, understandably, to take the position of the local teachers--at that

- McKay: time, the affiliated teacher organizations of Los Angeles, represented then by Ray Eberhart, whose daughter Millie is Mrs. Evelle Younger--and sometimes the broader statewide position on finance and other things wasn't, of necessity, to the best interest of a local area or a group. I really don't know why Bud was antagonistic. He was.
- Rowland: Was it a personality conflict?
- McKay: I think it was, partly, yes. I remember, when he was chairman, one night--I forget what the issue was--I was testifying, and he rapped me out of order. I appealed to the committee. I said, "If it's the will of the committee that the chairman be sustained in his ruling, okay. If not, I'd like to continue." The committee rose up and slapped him down. [laughter] I think there was a personality conflict there. I wouldn't be fully honest if I didn't say that, in retrospect.
- Rowland: A few other members here. We haven't really talked about Jesse Unruh in the Knight years, as a young assemblyman.
- McKay: Jesse Unruh was elected to a spot that had been held by one of the most delightful rogues in the assembly--Johnny Evans, of Los Angeles. He was openly receptive to any assistance he could get from third house members or anyone else. [laughter]
- Rowland: Evans was?
- McKay: Evans, yes. Jesse ran against him and beat him and came to Sacramento almost forlornly. He ended up on the Education Committee, and he complained to me once after he'd been there a few months that nobody talked to him. He was all alone, particularly in the education field, and in view of his history since then, it seems almost ludicrous.
- Rowland: Yes, that's true. That's interesting because if anyone ever does a psycho-history of Jesse Unruh, there's a little tidbit of information from the Ronnie and Jesse book, by Lou Cannon, that talks about Unruh's background as a poor migrant boy growing up in Texas.
- McKay: I haven't read that. He's no shrinking violet, of course. He didn't used to be. I don't know whether he's really sunk into oblivion in his present position.
- Rowland: He seems to be getting quite a bit of press lately. [laughter] He's freely giving his opinions. And rumors are that he's going to run again.

- McKay: After he became Speaker, there were some occasions when we had differences of position and handling of legislation, but by and large, we got along.
- Rowland: Gordon Winton?
- McKay: Gordon Winton, whose close friends called him "Don"--Gor-don--because his father was named Gordon also, and they wanted to make a distinction between Gordon and Gordon, Jr.--came from the Valley. He was a former school board member, had considerable knowledge about educational matters, and served on the Education Committee. He authored a few bills which we had to oppose, such as one, as I remember it, which would have done away with basic aid for the schools. We, having put that in the constitution, didn't think that was a very good idea. He authored a number of bills on our behalf over the years and, of course, the most notable one was what became known as the Winton Act--personnel matters--which later was repealed at the instance of CTA because experience indicated it wasn't working.

So the position of the profession changed. It reversed itself over the years, from being bitterly opposed to collective bargaining, as advocated by the teachers' union [American Federation of Teachers], to claiming the adoption of the collective bargaining bill as one of the great victories of the subsequent session.
[laughter]

- Rowland: Richard Hanna? He was chairman of the Education Committee.
- McKay: Yes, Dick Hanna. I see he was released from prison the other day. Dick Hanna was an ebullient, bubbly, enthusiastic young lawyer from Orange County. I don't know how many children he had, but he had a deep interest in education. He served on the Education Committee, became chairman, and was most cooperative, and we worked very well with him.
- Rowland: Charles Garrigus?
- McKay: Well, Gus was a teacher--
- Rowland: You remember that article.
- McKay: Yes, I do, and I have a little footnote I can give you on that. Gus was a junior-college teacher. He was a great poet. I think he had himself named as poet laureate of the state, as one of his contributions to the legislative accomplishments. His wife was a teacher. Gus was a great eater. Not a gourmet. On one occasion, in our previous home on the hillside in Millbrae Highlands--a

McKay: magnificent view--there were two assembly interim committees meeting on succeeding days, one in San Mateo and one in the city. So we had sort of an open house for them one evening--we had a large patio--and Gus was a large man. He ate everything in sight, and he was on a diet then. So he was telling me that he was on Metrecal. He said it was pretty good. He said you take a big glass and fill it about half with Metrecal, and then you take two scoops of ice cream and put [it in] and mix it up. He said, "It's great!" [laughter]

Rowland: I think it ruins the purpose. [laughter]

McKay: Of course it did. But anyway, this may typify him a little.

Well, I read with interest the clipping you sent me and refreshed my memory by reading some other records. You never know what motivates a person to do this. Here was a bill on where authority should rest in the selection of school sites. [Assemblyman] Bill Biddick of Stockton was the author of it. We thought it should be where it was, because--somewhere along the line, I should tell you our basic concept of what was our legitimate interest in legislation, beyond teacher welfare--but we thought was something that was important and that should stay where it was, and we had to oppose the bill. I was a little surprised when Gus came out with this blast at CTA, and inferentially at me. Then I recalled that there was a bill not long before that, which he had authored, which affected credentialing procedures. It provided that there would be a renewable credential for anyone who had a bachelor or baccalaureate degree--

Rowland: You might have to repeat this--

[Interview 2: June 1, 1979]##

Rowland: I sent you a clipping regarding Garrigus's criticism of the CTA lobby in the legislature, and you had a story about a Garrigus credential bill, which was involved in that criticism of CTA. Could we start that again?

McKay: Gus, as he was known in those days, was a teacher, as was his wife, who was serving down in the Valley, on a provisional credential. She was not fully credentialed. Gus put in a bill which in effect would have permitted his wife, who was not named in the bill, to continue to teach without completing the required academic courses that normally are specified for continuance of what was then a provisional credential. I don't know, because I

- McKay: never discussed the matter with him, but I felt at the time and still believe that the fact that CTA felt that was bad legislation, contrary to our attempts to improve the level of preparation of teachers, and our opposition and killing of the bill, may have motivated his blast at CTA.
- Rowland: How did the CTA go about killing a bill? Maybe you could tell us about the operation and how you, as the representative of the CTA in the legislature, went about it.
- McKay: The process, of course, is to prevent a bill from coming out of committee and reaching, in this case, the assembly floor. The decision of the majority of, in this case, the Education Committee determined whether the bill would stay in committee or come out, and we simply discussed the matter with the individual members of the committee in advance of the hearing and told them why we were convinced that it was not a good bill. Then when the bill came up for a hearing, I, as the CTA representative, merely appeared before the committee and stated those reasons publicly, and there were not enough votes in the committee to send the bill out. So it was dead.
- Rowland: The CTA, representing teachers, must have quite a few constituents who were able to write to senators. Did you use that as a wedge too?
- McKay: I don't remember that we considered it sufficiently crucial to do that on this bill. We had major bills on finance and retirement and tenure and other issues where we did present a strong front of opposition from the field, but I don't remember on this particular bill. My guess is that we didn't bother.
- Rowland: We have one other, and that's Ernest Geddes. I wondered what your relationship was with Ernest Geddes in the assembly and how you worked with him as a lobbyist.
- McKay: Ernie Geddes came from Pomona, was one of the hardest working, most dedicated members of the legislature, in the field of education. He all but killed himself. I don't know if he's still living now or not, but he worked so hard, such long hours, and with such great intensity, that he impaired his health. He had a heart condition, and in the final days of his incumbency, had to rest in his office. In the afternoon, he had a cot there to lie down on and catch his breath, so to speak. He was one of the most knowledgeable members of the assembly, in educational matters, was an expert in many of the major fields of education--finance, retirement, many other specialized fields. He was the author of

- McKay: many of the CTA-sponsored bills in education and was warmly regarded by all of us in education. His interests were not limited to the elementary and secondary field. He was equally interested in higher education and all aspects of education.
- Rowland: We have Carlos Bee as our next one. Of course, he'll come up in the Fisher Act, but maybe you could just give us a brief character sketch of Carlos Bee and how you worked with him.
- McKay: Carlos Bee was a former teacher who lived in Hayward. He succeeded one of the great folk heroes, I guess you might call him, in education, Francis Dunn, who represented the Thirteenth Assembly District for many years. Carlos was something of a protege of Frank Dunn. (He used the names "Frank" and "Francis" interchangeably.) We encouraged Bee to get into the race when Dunn left the legislature and later [Bee] became a member of the Alameda County Board of Supervisors.

Bee subsequently became Speaker pro tem of the assembly. He was highly respected by his colleagues; had a good grasp of the whole legislative process and was quite an expert in education, with his background in that field; was universally admired and respected; had a great sense of humor, and on those occasions when he would preside over the assembly, he frequently would turn an otherwise tense situation into one of laughter by an ad lib comment that would just break the tension and everyone would ease off a bit. He unfortunately died of a heart attack some years ago.

Donald Doyle and the Textbook Controversy

- Rowland: Donald Doyle is our next one, and we have quite a few questions about him, including some clippings here that I wasn't able to send you ahead of time [see following page]. What I am interested in is how Donald Doyle developed an interest in education, and how did he work with the CTA?*

* See interview with Donald Doyle in this volume: "The Politics of Education in the Knight/Brown Era," Regional Oral History Office, University of California, Berkeley, 1980.

McKay: I don't know how he developed an interest in education, but he was and is an intelligent individual who developed an understanding of educational problems and had considerable skill in working with groups and in presiding over the Education Committee during the time he was chairman. The CTA, of course, works with whoever is in charge of the committees through which legislation [in which] it's interested goes, and Don Doyle was no exception to that. We had most cordial relationships, and he, in general, was a good friend of education.

Rowland: The textbook controversy seems to have led to Doyle's downfall as a committee member. I was wondering, what was the CTA position regarding that textbook controversy? That was that the publishing companies were not printing plates to the state, if I'm correct--and correct me if I'm wrong--and this brought out a kind of a question of anti-trust violation, and I believe this was the reason for the Doyle committee's investigation of the textbook controversy. I wanted to know what the CTA position was on that.

McKay: The CTA has always attempted to see that students in the public schools had the best textbooks and other study materials that could be provided. The law has long served to prevent the use in the public schools of some of the available textbook material, because, as you know, the primary textbooks used have been printed by the state printing plant. Since the state does not write and prepare the textbook material, but through commissions and boards decides what shall be made available, it's dependent upon the cooperation of the textbook publishers, who prepare materials that are used generally throughout the country and are provided usually, or predominantly, through the sale of completed textbooks to the school agencies.

The question of textbooks has been one of the long, continuing, high-stakes controversies in education because organized labor in California has bitterly opposed any major reduction in the state publication of textbooks, for the obvious reasons that large numbers of their craft in the printing trade are employed in the printing of textbooks.

Rowland: In the state.

McKay: Yes, in the state printing plant.

Rowland: Why originally did the state get into publishing school textbooks?

McKay: I don't know. That was before my time. My recollection of what I knew about it is that the argument was put forth that it would be cheaper; it would be more economical for the state to produce

- McKay: its own books than to buy them as finished products. But that's a battle that's been fought over the years, and the CTA, to my knowledge, never got into the forefront of the battling on one side or the other. We were not involved in the fight between the publishers and the other interests at the time that Don Doyle was involved in this controversy.
- Rowland: I was wondering what the CTA position was on Don Doyle's hiring of the consultant Thomas Meckling, who was also a lobbyist for publishers. Was CTA aware of that, first?
- McKay: Only as it came out in the newspapers and was debated around Sacramento. We had no independent knowledge of that, nor did we get into the debate as to whether that was a proper thing for a chairman of a legislative committee to do. The newspapers, as you no doubt have found from the old clippings, editorialized on it, thought it was highly improper for an individual to be seeming to be on both sides of an issue, or at least one of the interested parties to have a representative in the employee of the group investigating the industry.
- Rowland: Now, I imagine your opponents in the legislature--that is, the American Federation of Teachers--must have capitalized on that. As you recall, did they make an issue out of Doyle's connection with--
- McKay: I don't recall that they were a factor at all. In my days in Sacramento, the California Federation of Teachers was more an irritant in the educational picture than a force. They were great at proposing highly desirable goals, which were impractical for financial or other reasons, and failing to get anywhere with them, would then try to capitalize on their proposals by saying, "Look what we proposed, as against what the CTA produced," because our programs were based on need and attainable goals.
- Rowland: Who in the senate and assembly were strong supporters of the AFT that you found hard to work with?
- McKay: I don't recall that they had any great number of adherents or proponents. George Miller, who was extremely liberal in his views and was, partly because of the nature of his constituency, which was heavily labor-oriented--Contra Costa County--was more receptive to the AFT's program than most members of the senate.
- Rowland: You mentioned Bud Collier last time. Was he affiliated with, or was he representing, the AFT?

- McKay: No. There may be some confusion between the two Colliers. One was Randy Collier, the senator, from Siskiyou County, and the other was John L.E. "Bud" Collier from Los Angeles County. Bud Collier was an extremely conservative Republican who was by no means a spokesman or a proponent of the AFT point of view.
- Rowland: I confused that on the tape. You've mentioned that there was a local teachers' group down at Eagle Rock.
- McKay: I mentioned the Affiliated Teacher Organizations of Los Angeles--ATOLA--which Bud Collier recognized as the voice of the Los Angeles teachers and he was quite attentive to their point of view. We worked with them. They were part of our group, too.
- Rowland: Getting back to the Doyle incident with the textbooks, I don't know if we actually got on tape the answer to the question of the CTA's reaction to the actual textbook printing controversy that came out in that Chronicle there--the hiring of Meckling, the Chronicle's attacks on Doyle for conflict of interest.
- McKay: The CTA didn't get into that controversy. We certainly were interested in it. Our policy-making arms were kept aware of what was going on, but chose not to get into it as a participant in the fight.
- Rowland: Now, that last clipping that you have in your hand [see following page]--I wonder why the CTA revealed to the press that Doyle was retiring from the committee and that Donahoe would be appointed the Assembly Education Committee chairman.
- McKay: That was the reporting in our weekly CTA legislative letter of what were pretty strongly supported rumors around the capitol that Doyle was going to step down, which he did, and that Dorothy Donahoe, who was the vice-chairman, would be named as chairman, which eventuated also. I was the editor, the producer of the CTA legislative letter, and when I thought the news was widely circulated and was well-founded, I wrote about a three-paragraph story saying that reports around the capitol were that Don Doyle would resign and that Dorothy would be the new chairman.

At the time, Doyle was not being quoted as to what his plans were, until the San Francisco Chronicle asked him about it, and he said yes, he had only considered stepping down for personal reasons--not the textbook publishing controversy--and that he

- McKay: had discussed it with the Speaker, Abe Lincoln, which was as far as he went. It served to confirm the story I had published.*
- Rowland: That last sentence by Lincoln there, on the very bottom there, says that regarding Donahoe's appointment to the Education Committee, he would cross that bridge when he came to it. Does that indicate some little tension there between the CTA and Lincoln, that he felt that he was being usurped in his--
- McKay: No, I don't think so. I think it would have been less than prudent for the Speaker to announce the appointment of a new Education Committee chairman in the same breath that he was saying that the chairman hadn't resigned. It would be a little premature. [laughter]
- Rowland: There's a whole long list here of Assembly Education Committee members, and I don't know if we really have the time to go through them. Some of them that pop out, we've already talked about--Hanna, Garrigus, Carlos Bee--Busterud. I don't think we actually talked about Busterud. Could you tell us about--
- McKay: John Busterud, an assemblyman from San Francisco, was a member of the Education Committee, but was not one of the leading members in terms of handling major school legislation. I would assume that, like so many appointments, he had to have a certain number, and he was assigned to that, and that was not his major field of interest.
- Rowland: One other question I have here in the corner, and that's jumping around a bit, but going back to the Doyle committee members there, we have two consultants which are interesting-- Jim Marshall, who was hired, I believe, by Donald Doyle, and Keith Sexton, who came on with Dorothy Donahoe.
- McKay: We worked with both of them. Marshall later became a member of the staff of a former congressman from Beverly Hills, Alphonso Bell, and later parted company with Congressman Bell. Our working relationship with both of them was cordial, without incident, I would say.

*Luther Lincoln at this point had not publicly announced that Doyle would resign.

San Francisco Chronicle, 27 June 1957

Doyle Plan to Quit School Group Told

Assemblyman Donald D. Doyle (Rep-Lafayette), center of last fall's textbook controversy, will resign soon as chairman of the Assembly education committee, the California Teachers Association said in Sacramento yesterday.

An investigation by the committee into the State's system of printing its own texts blew up last fall when it was revealed that the committee's aide, Thomas B. Mechling, was also on the payroll of major publishers who opposed the system.

Doyle acknowledged that he had "given some thought to stepping down from chairman to vice chairman" of the committee because of the pressure of his private insurance business and his duties as vice chairman of the Republican State Central Committee.

He said he had discussed the matter with Assembly Speaker Luther H. Lincoln (Rep-Oakland) and "any further announcement would have to come from his office."

Lincoln said he had discussed with Doyle "the possibility" of the latter's retirement as committee chairman "later this year" but as yet he had "received no resignation."

In a prepared statement Lincoln said he "joined with educational leaders through-

~~Assemblyman Doyle to continue the fine work he has been doing."~~

The announcement by the California Teachers Association said Doyle would be succeeded as head of the committee by Assemblywoman Dorothy Donohoe (Dem-Bakersfield), now the vice chairman.

Lincoln said he would "cross that bridge when it come to it."

Rowland: And Keith Sexton?

McKay: The same with him. I would include him in that. There was nothing in my memory to distinguish them from many other staff employees around there.

Rowland: Going down through the list of assembly committee members, the only ones that pop out in my mind--you might want to look at this and see if you could--see the names there on top. [hands over list] That's in 1959.

McKay: Hugh Flournoy, who succeeded Ernie Geddes, was a brilliant young member of the assembly on the committee, who later became state controller and is now on the staff of the University of Southern California, who was quite knowledgeable in education. He had been a professor at one of the Pomona College--I don't know if it was Laverne or one of them.

He was quite a pragmatist, and in the field of school finance, he decided it was not a good policy for all schools to get the same amount of what is called basic aid. There is an amount that is given to each school district on the basis of average daily attendance, regardless of their wealth. So he put in a constitutional amendment at one point which would have wiped that out. We, of course, had to oppose that. We had, at great effort, put that in the constitution and increased it.

Rowland: Who supported his movement for a constitutional amendment?

McKay: There was very little support for it. It was killed. It died in the Constitutional Amendments Committee.

Rowland: Was it, again, the AFT support?

McKay: Oh, no. I don't think they did. I don't think they were that foolish to deliberately cut off the support in the districts where they would be, at the time, more apt to prosper--San Francisco and Los Angeles, because they were primarily basic aid districts and didn't get much equalization aid. No, I don't think the AFT would have taken that position at all.

Rowland: Was this mainly an austerity move, or--

McKay: No, there [are] some, quote, unquote, "school finance experts" in institutions of higher learning who take an ivory-tower view of this and say, "Ideally, now, we should wipe all of this out,

McKay: and whatever the state contributes to the financing of school districts should be wholly on a need basis, on an equalization basis." Well, there are some arguments to support that, but it has never been a realistic position to take. So it's mainly the experts who don't have to run school districts who take that position.

V FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT EDUCATION LEGISLATION

Teacher Unions and the American Federation of Teachers

Rowland: I have a group of questions dealing with some of the more controversial legislation that CTA got involved with, and this by no means is an all-inclusive discussion here of all the legislation the CTA has supported, and anything that I'm missing here, please feel free to come out and say, "I think this is a little bit more important," or whatever.

Before we begin on that, I would like for you to talk about the AFT and the CTA problem, because that seemed to have come up in a lot of these legislative bills throughout both governmental periods. First of all, I wanted to know if you could give us a little bit of the history of the AFT. For instance, did some of the members of the CTA eventually leave the CTA and found the AFT, or what was the movement there?

McKay: I don't know how long the American Federation of Teachers [AFT] has been in existence in California. It goes back a considerable number of years. Through most of that history, in terms of total number of years, I would say that the AFT has been largely ineffective in the legislative field. As I indicated earlier, they were inclined, in the days I was in Sacramento, to propose highly desirable but impractical legislation, something that would presumably appeal to teachers, where if these proposals were enacted, the AFT as the sponsoring group could say, "Look what we did for you." But because they were not well-based, either in terms of practicality or need, they rarely were enacted. They could afford to make these wild proposals because they didn't have to live with the consequences.

Rowland: How do you mean by that--

McKay: An organization, such as the CTA, which over the years--and it goes back a long, long time--has more often than not been able to justify its legislative proposals and get them enacted into law. If they didn't work, if they had ill effects, or the implementation of the new law wasn't as portrayed by the CTA representatives, then the CTA would be held responsible. We could not afford to go up there with harebrained ideas and things which hadn't been thoroughly researched and documented and weren't designed to meet a provable need.

The AFT would make these wonderful-sounding proposals, but they wouldn't get enacted. Many of them just wouldn't work. For example, we would go up there and propose a \$4,000 minimum salary. At the time, it was \$3,000, and we would get it enacted. The effect of that was not just to raise the salary of the relatively small number of teachers who were beginning, but they, like a row of dominoes, would bump salaries all along the line and would have an impact on the financial ability of the district and the state. We would go up there and say, "This is going to cost 'X' millions of dollars."

The AFT could go up and say, "Here's our bill to have a minimum salary of \$10,000." Well, \$10,000 is much more attractive than \$4,000, but it couldn't be financed. This, by and large, was the reason that they would come up with these great-sounding proposals. We would come back and say, "We increased, through our sponsored legislation, salaries from \$3,000 to \$4,000."

They'd say, "Yes, but we proposed \$10,000."

Rowland: Now, one of the clippings I sent you was from a 1957 Sacramento Newsletter, and it describes an assembly bill regarding teachers' unions.

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Rowland: And I wondered, why was the CTA opposed to the teacher union bill that Masterson and Busterud co-authored in the '57 legislature?

McKay: I don't remember the nature of the discussion both in the tenure and legislative committees of the CTA's State Council of Education, but it was a continuation at that time of the position that teachers' benefits were so extensively provided for by legislation--minimum salary, tenure, retirement, dismissal, all of these other factors of teacher welfare and employment--that we should not have collective bargaining. The CTA subsequently changed its position after I had left up there and sponsored and obtained

McKay: the passage of a collective bargaining bill, which it thought met the objections. But the position, democratically arrived at in the councils of CTA, was that it was not to the benefit of the teachers.

Rowland: Was this a view that teachers were professionals and not workers, and that they should not unionize?

McKay: Yes. I think that was at the heart of it. There's been this distinction, real or not, that teachers are a profession, they're not a craft group, they don't fit into the trade union pattern, and that there are certain standards of professionalization that are not adhered to by trade unions, and, therefore, that distinction should be made.

The man under whom I worked for twenty years, Arthur Corey, the state executive secretary, was one of the great proponents of that point of view, which I in all honesty must say has been largely reversed, or at least changed in the last ten years or so.

Rowland: What categories of school personnel were members of the CTA?

McKay: All school district employees, except the so-called "classified employees," which would be the bus drivers and the clerks and the gardeners and people of that category. Generally, everyone whose employment required a credential, and that included school nurses, librarians, counselors. It included, of course, administrators as well, because the position was that they were basically teachers, and most of them had risen, or had progressed--I don't know if it's a rise or not--from the classroom to administrative positions.

Rowland: What categories of school personnel generally belong to the AFT?

McKay: Classroom teachers, I would say, because their great battle cry has been anti-administration. That's become, in recent years, more and more the position of CTA, that question of whether administrators should be members of CTA.

Rowland: How do you feel about that personally?

McKay: I'm sure there was a time when administrators completely dominated classroom teachers, both in the operation of the school district and possibly in the professional organizations, but those days are long since gone. In CTA organizational circles, it's virtually impossible now for an administrator, unless he's a rare bird, to be elected by classroom teachers to positions of responsibility,

McKay: which I think in many instances is too bad because in many fields administrators, because of their background and knowledge, are a great resource in the solution of school problems. Many administrators have been the strongest advocates of teachers' rights. I've seen them fall by the wayside, either by being defeated in elections or deciding that it wasn't worth the candle. It just was not worth it.

The Doyle Curriculum Bill

Rowland: The next major legislation that came up, at least in my research, was Donald Doyle's curriculum bill in 1958. I believe the curriculum bill was supported by Goodwin Knight and had the opposition of Roy Simpson, superintendent. I wanted to know what the CTA position was on that.

McKay: The so-called "Doyle curriculum bill" was Goodie Knight's brainstorm.

Rowland: Why wasn't it an administrative bill, then? Why didn't Knight actively push it as an administrative bill? Why did he--

McKay: Well, he did. He did. In our earlier discussions, I believe I mentioned the fact that the bill was a bill introduced by Don Doyle at the governor's request, and in discussions it became evident that this was just an idea of Goodie Knight's, and he said he decided that something needed to be done when he got a letter from a high school student, misspelling the word "taxes"--t-a-c-k-s. [laughter]

I don't know, because I wasn't privy to the governor's inner thoughts, but I had the impression that he, in surveying the available areas of possible legislative accomplishment, decided that here was one that would appeal to the public: "We've got to teach John to read and to spell, and we've got to help or direct the schools to do a better job." This would have great appeal to the voters. So he proposed this bill through Don Doyle without any consultation with the people who were involved in the educational process.

Rowland: He didn't ask your views on it, even though he was a good friend of yours?

- McKay: That's right. This, I think, was an inherent weakness in it because whether an industry or a profession or a group that's affected by legislation agrees with the proposal or not, it's almost essential that somebody talk with them and find out what the problems, if they exist, are. He didn't do this. The bill went down to defeat in the assembly.
- Rowland: Were you only opposed because he had not talked to you previously, or--
- McKay: Oh, no. No, the weakness, the undesirable nature of the bill.
- Rowland: Roy Simpson's position was that it interfered with local determination of curriculum, local district determination of curriculum. Was that the CTA position?
- McKay: Well, yes. We objected to the imposition of additional mandated courses. There are only so many hours and so many minutes in the day or the school year, and over the years CTA had taken the position that regardless of how desirable a goal may have been-- "We're going to teach patriotism," or "We're going to have to have more emphasis on reading. Therefore we're going to double the time that each school district has to devote to teaching of reading"--that this undesirably restricted the ability of a school district to put together a curriculum that was well balanced and would meet the total needs. So we, as a matter of principle, had opposed the establishment of additional mandatory courses. We had no objection to the legislature saying, by resolution, for example, "We think that greater emphasis should be placed in a given area of the curriculum."
- Rowland: What was the AFT position on this?
- McKay: Gee, I don't know.
- Rowland: They didn't support it?
- McKay: It's been a little while since I read that clipping.
- Rowland: Yes, right.
- McKay: I don't mean to sound that I'm denigrating the AFT, but in many of these issues at the time, we didn't consider their attitude to be of great importance.
- Rowland: There was another issue in the subject [of] teacher unions, a collective bargaining bill of George Brown. That was AB 351, in the '61 legislature, and I imagine again the CTA must have been opposed to that.

McKay: I think we were in the first instance, but I believe our staff worked out amendments with Mr. Brown to remove the objectionable features. You see, one of the things that outsiders--

Rowland: What were the objections of teachers to that bill?

McKay: I don't remember. I think many people who are not intimately familiar with the legislative process will get a misconception of a group's position when they hear or read that they opposed a certain bill, not, as it turns out, because of the broad objective, but to practical flaws and defects in the legislation which the author may not have been aware of. Frequently a bill which drew a flat "opposed" position from our legislative committees would end up being passed with amendments. That's true on many of the controversial issues, that we would say, "No, we can't go for that," and then we'd sit down--as was the case with the Dilworth bill. When safeguards were put into that bill, okay, but in its original form, no way.

So I don't remember--I'm sure you're aware of the tremendous volume of legislation that is tossed in and is battled in a given session, and in some of those sessions there would be as many as five hundred educational bills that we considered of sufficient importance that we followed them, and fortunately we didn't take a position on all of them.

Financing Public Education: The Battle over Beer and Cigarette Taxes

Rowland: One major controversy during the Knight years was request for a beer and cigarette tax. That came up in '57, and I think it later came up in '59, during the Brown years, too. Why did you request a beer and cigarette tax to increase revenue for schools?

McKay: Because we had been put in the position earlier, by Governor Warren and to a degree by Governor Knight, of having to provide the additional finance through legislation that would be required to finance the school finance program. Earl Warren had told us repeatedly, even when there was a surplus in the treasury, that "I don't dispute the need of the schools. I think unquestionably they need the money, but where is it coming from? You provide the money, and then we'll look at it." Our position at the time, through most of those years, was that we don't think it's our responsibility to design or propose a revenue program for the state of California. We think our responsibility is to document, if we

McKay: can, the legitimate needs of the school for money, and if the legislature agrees, then it's up to the legislature to provide a revenue program adequate to finance the total needs of the state, not just these isolated ones, large as they are.

We finally, during the Knight administration, said, "Okay, if we prove the need, if money is not there, or they say it's not there, then we'll propose a school revenue program." And traditionally, state revenues were being underestimated until after the legislature had gone home, and then with great surprise they'd discover they had many millions of dollars more than the January estimate would have indicated.

Rowland: Was the beer and cigarette tax bill a Knight proposal, or was it a CTA proposal?

McKay: No, it was a CTA proposal. We got the best available consultants we could in the field of not only school finance, but of revenue matters, and we had surveys made as to what the public thought, and we had no control over them, as to what the outcome would be, what would be most acceptable to the public: beer and cigarette taxes.

So in the Knight years--I'm trying to remember when we first proposed a cigarette tax--in '57, Governor Knight pledged his full cooperation on financing, having noted then that there had been no increase in state aid to the schools in four years, and we proposed a \$73 million increase.

Rowland: Had you talked to Knight personally, or had you talked to one of his staff members?

McKay: I, because of my earlier relationship, pretty much had Goodie Knight's ear, and had no difficulty.

Rowland: You could go right to his office instead of going to Paul Mason or Tom Bright or one of the others.

McKay: Well, of course, we'd go through the staff in setting up an appointment. We just wouldn't have knocked on the door and walked in while he was doing something else.

Rowland: Who would you work with on the staff? Just the appointment secretary?

McKay: Paul Mason was the one most closely identified with legislation in those days, and I knew Paul. Of course, Tom Bright was a former newspaperman whom I knew. So we worked with all of them. I don't know there was any one button to push that would open the door quicker than the others. But we had a good working relationship.

Rowland: Was Mason closest to Knight? Do you feel like he--

McKay: Not necessarily, but he was the one to whom the governor looked on legislative matters.

I don't know if you noticed that clipping of Jack McDowell's column one day [see following page], which told of me running into Pat Brown at a social affair when he was--

Rowland: Before and after he was attorney general.

McKay: Yes. He was attorney general then, and he thought this business of cigarettes and beer tax was horrible and expressed his opinion to me in the [committee] hearing. Then he became governor, and we talked again at his request. He wanted to know what we could do to help him get a beer and cigarette tax. [laughter]

Rowland: Now, it appeared that in proposing a beer and cigarette tax, you would be bringing up a real conflict with the other advocates in the legislature. What were your relations with Dan Creedon, for instance, of the Malt Beverage Association?

McKay: Danny Creedon, speaking on behalf of his employers, was violently opposed to the tax, as was almost everyone else. One clipping I don't think I showed you--I don't think I have it--from the L.A. Times told of the hearing. This was during the Brown administration, when the tax was approved. A front-page story told of the opposition of the beer industry, the state Chamber of Commerce, the AFL-CIO, the Farm Bureau Federation, right on down the line.

Rowland: The Farm Bureau Federation? Why would they get involved? [laughter]

McKay: Well, they're fiscally conservative. But anyway, it listed all of these strong, large, statewide organizations, and then the line that I loved said, "The only witness to support the tax proposal was Bob McKay, spokesman for the California Teachers Association"--period, paragraph--"The bill was approved." [laughter] And I smiled to myself. [laughter]

Rowland: That was during the Brown years, right?

McKay: Yes, that was when the bill passed. But in '57, during--that was still Knight administration--Goodie Knight was quite cooperative in that period.

Jack S. McDowell

CALIFORNIA FACT AND COMMENT



Governor
Brown
Changes
On Taxes

SACRAMENTO, Feb. 3. — Today's contributions to the "my-how-times-have-changed" department:

From this column in The Call-Bulletin of February 12, 1957—

"Bob McKay, the able Sacramento lobbyist for the teachers, is probably happy, indeed, that Attorney General Pat Brown isn't a legislator.

"They ran into each other at a social affair in the Sheraton-Palace the other night and Brown took off on McKay in loud and definite terms. He didn't complain about the prospects of more money for schools and teachers, But he certainly did about the cigaret and beer tax plan McKay is plugging!"

From a Page 1 headline in The Call-Bulletin of Wednesday, January 28, 1959—

"Brown asks 3-cent cigaret tax—oil, beer boosts."

TWO YEARS have passed and the attorney general now is governor. The cigaret and beer taxes Brown opposed he now demands. But lobbyist McKay and Governor Brown still aren't able to hold fiscal hands.

The California Teachers Association, which McKay represents, is preparing to fight hard for more school money than the governor recommended in his budget.

Brown demanded increased money for schools—but the CTA insists it isn't enough.

TROUBLE SIGNALS are flying from another big organization of public servants, too. Governor Brown called for a 5 per cent pay boost for all state employees—trimming a bit from the 7½ per cent recommended by the State Personnel Board.

But the California States Employees Association isn't buying it. CSEA officials are launching a fighting campaign for a 10 per cent pay boost—half of it retroactive to January 1 and the other half to become effective with the new fiscal year on July 1.

These situations, of course, are added to the previously declared opposition to Brown's tax program by labor (over cigarets and beer) the oil industry (over Brown's proposed severance tax) and the economy bloc legislators (over any and all tax increases).

McKay: As you probably know, under the constitution, no appropriation bill may be given final passage by the legislature unless it is given a letter of approval or consent by the governor, and in this instance the governor, Goodie Knight, gave a letter permitting the legislature to consider the school aid bill in advance of the passage of the budget. Then we had to go to bat on the revenue measures.

Rowland: Had he been approached by the opponents to the bill, or were you the first--

McKay: I don't know what opposition, if any, we had on the school finance bill, other than those who thought it would raise taxes. So we got a modified school bill through of \$37 million, which incidentally was the largest single increase in school aid in the history of the state. We had asked for \$73 million; we got thirty-seven. We increased the minimum salary to \$4,200, but there was no tax increase at that session. Then the tax bills that were enacted came in the 1959 session, under Governor Brown.

Incidentally, if I can revert to the discussion about the Doyle curriculum bill, the action of the Assembly Education Committee was to refer the bill to an interim committee for study. That's one of the classic ways of killing it without just saying "up" or "down." There was only one vote in the twenty-member committee against sending it to interim.

Rowland: Who was that?

McKay: I think it was the author. I think it was Mr. Doyle. I didn't indicate that here.

Rowland: That's interesting, because it seems like Doyle had a good working relationship with the CTA, and he didn't consult with the CTA at all on that curriculum bill.

McKay: Well, he was carrying a bill for the governor, and as I indicated in our earlier discussions, it's quite frequently the situation that someone with whom you have good working relationships in the broad program of education will have a bill that you have to oppose, and this doesn't mean he's an enemy or that you can't work together on other issues.

I think most members of the third house would tell you that they can deal in issues and not personalities. They get mixed up at times, of course, but in this case, this didn't destroy our relationship with Don Doyle in any way. He was doing a job, and we had to do our job, too.

Rowland: One other thing that came up--legislation that seems to be rather interesting in terms of relationships with legislators--was your support of the increase in legislative pay. You were a member of the Citizens Advisory Council, I believe, a commission which supported a pay increase for legislators. I'm wondering why you took the position in favor of a legislative pay increase.

McKay: Simply because the existing compensation was inadequate. We never believed that you could, quote, unquote, "buy" talent or integrity. But we believed that people shouldn't do it at a sacrifice.

We as citizens were asked to discharge what I think is one of the most important functions, that of deciding what shall be law and what isn't. Even in my time, I found that--particularly in the senate--there was a tendency to let only the wealthy go to the senate because they were the only ones who could afford it. Now, in, I think, the first session, or at least in my early recollection, they got \$100 a month when the legislature was not in session. Keep in mind, it was a biennial session, with the exception of special sessions. There was no budget session in those days. They were paid \$1,200 a year, paid at the rate of \$12 a day for the first hundred days of the year they were in session; they also had very minimal expense allowances. I guess they did get enough to travel to and from Sacramento, but even in later years, when the salaries were increased, they were not adequate at all, in simple justice. It's not that this was a trade-off, that "We'll scratch your back if--"

Rowland: That reminds me, can you comment on the Capitol News Service article I sent you [see following page] that was critical of your role in the legislative salary decision?

McKay: This clipping you've handed me from April, 1960 is by-lined by Henry MacArthur, who at the time was the owner of CNS--that's Capitol News Service. He had a service (I don't know whether it was one or two columns a week) that was sold to some of the smaller dailies in California that were not large enough to hire their own representatives. He would do special stories for them if they had something affecting their district. If there was an allocations board meeting and the local agency was awaiting the news, he would cover that.

I had reason to believe that some of his non-newspaper clients were paying a high fee for this service, and some of those clients, whom I could identify but won't, were opposed to some of the things the CTA was doing, like the cigarette tax and the finance programs and some of the other things. That may explain why he was critical of the CTA and myself.

Legislators Enlist Aid of Lobbyist In Quest for More Pay

By HENRY C. MacARTHUR

Capitol News Service

SACRAMENTO (CNS) — Almost every general election, it appears, state legislators dream up some new gimmick to wrangle themselves a salary raise. While the legislators do vote themselves all the expense money they think the traffic will bear, they must go to the people via the constitution to get a raise in salary.

Legislators at the present time draw \$500 per month, or \$6,000 per year. Thus, an assemblyman elected for a two-year term is good for a take of \$12,000, and a state senator elected for a four-year term receives \$24,000, in salary alone.

Considering most of the legislators give up considerable to come to Sacramento and represent their districts, this probably is not enough salary. The people will decide that in November when the vote on an amendment that raises the legislative pay to \$9,000 annually.

Thus, a two-year assembly term would be valued at \$18,000, and a four-year senate term at \$36,000.

Pro and Con

Every time salary increases for legislators are discussed, however, it brings up the age-old question of whether it is better for the state to keep salaries low, and attract men of substantial means to the job, these men to serve, of course, as a civic duty without regard to the financial rewards available.

On the other side of the coin, of course, is the contention that if such a practice were followed, guardianship of the state would fall into the hands of the rich for the creation of a wealthy oligarchy.

Back Scratching

Thus, there appear to be plenty of arguments on both sides of the coin. A majority of the state's legislators have created a Citizens Advisory Committee, which will try to help pass the legislative salary increase at the next election.

One member of the committee is the head of the state's most powerful lobbying organization, the California Teachers Association. This is Robert McKay, who introduces and gets resolutions passed by the committee favoring the salary increase for legislators. There is little reason why McKay should not be for salary increases, as one of the principal objectives of his organization is more salary for California teachers. Thus, his promotion of more money for legislators could win many friends for teacher salary increases, as reciprocal back-scratching is one of the finer points of lobbying.

(McKay spoke in Escondido Thursday night.)

More Mileage, Too

The committee met recently to discuss several problems which had nothing to do with salary raises or expense accounts. But the discussions never got beyond those two subjects, which were not even on the agenda.

Assemblyman Richard Hanna (D-Orange) came up with a new plan in accord with a previous suggestion of the committee to cut back mileage fees for legislators from 15 cents to 10 cents per mile. Hanna, chairman of the rules committee, suggested the cut be made, but that legislators be granted mileage for all driving done in their district, and be allowed one round trip home every month during the time the legislature is in session! Less money, but more miles, and bigger expense checks!

It is questionable, of course, just how strong the people are going to go for the proposed salary raise this year. The public may have forgotten the state income tax raise by November, but not quite.

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The CTA and the Master Plan for Higher Education##

Rowland: I wondered what the CTA position was towards the state college move from the Department of Education to establish an autonomous state university status under the Master Plan for Higher Education.

McKay: The CTA supported that, despite the opposition of the state superintendent, whose jurisdiction and functions were diminished. That had been part of the responsibility of the State Board of Education and the state Department of Education. And we thought with the tremendous current and future growth of the state college system that it should have its own administration and should be separated from the state Department of Education.

Rowland: Did the CTA have significant representation among the state college professors?

McKay: I don't know how you measure significant--

Rowland: As opposed to the AFT. I think the AFT was actively organizing.

McKay: At the state college level, there have traditionally been a number of organizations--the American Association of University Professors, later the State College Association, the CTA, the AFT, and others--and in the years since I've left the active scene, there's been a pulling together of many of the groups under CTA auspices. I think there's a big election coming up this year, maybe.

But the CTA had a basic interest in the college system, at the least the portion that dealt with the training of teachers, because the quality of education depends, we have always felt, on the skills and the ability of the people who teach. The people who teach come through these institutions, and the quality of teaching at the college is directly related to the net educational product in the public schools. So we have always had not only members of faculties in the schools of education, we've had student teacher organizations in the major institutions--primarily the state colleges and USC and Stanford and some of the smaller universities and smaller colleges. So we had what we considered a legitimate interest in the operation of higher education. Our concerns were not limited, and are not now limited, to the kindergarten through high school, or junior college rather, levels.

Rowland: So was the concern in the CTA over AFT organizing the state college professors?

- McKay: Not that I recall. People may try to read something into it, saying, "Oh boy, if the teachers that are turned out by the state colleges are oriented toward the trade union concept, eventually you'll get enough teachers out there that they'll all want to be union members. So if they can exert some control over the faculties and teacher training institutions, then we'll eventually get that result." I don't think that was a major concern of the CTA at the time.
- Rowland: In the legislature, the recommendations of the master plan liaison team of the Board of Regents and the State Board of Education were not put in as a constitutional amendment, but enacted as a statute. I wonder what was the CTA position on that change from enacting those recommendations as a constitutional amendment to a statute.
- McKay: Without consulting some of my old records here, I can't say. If you'd like to wait a moment, I'll refer to my notes. [tape interrupted]
- Rowland: How much do we have?
- McKay: I was just going to read the lead here.
- Rowland: Okay, fine.
- McKay: I think the CTA's position on the Master Plan for [Higher] Education is reflected in the lead paragraph of an article which was carried in the April 25, 1960 issue of the CTA legislative letter, entitled "Master Plan Written into Law."

It reads, "Portions of a Master Plan for Higher Education, unanimously recommended by the Board of Regents of the University of California and the State Board of Education, and vigorously supported by CTA, passed in statutory form, where it can be amended at will by the legislature. It becomes operative July 1, 1961." Then the story goes on to detail the major provisions of that plan, which includes the establishment of a new, sixteen-member board of trustees and a coordinating council, with a fiscal freedom similar, but not quite as free as the University of California. Authorization for acquisition by the legislature of sites for new institutions and so on--you raised the question of the decision to approach the problem by statutory means rather than constitutional amendment. The final paragraph of the story, which, incidentally, I wrote at the time: "Because the constitution prohibits establishing terms exceeding four years, the [senate] constitutional amendment (SCA) by Donald L. Grunsky of Wastonville authorizes an eight-year term for the new state college board of trustees [and] will be submitted to the voters at the November election."

- McKay: I don't remember if there were other phases of the master plan which had been proposed to be in a constitutional amendment or not.
- Rowland: I would imagine they would be able to change that through a constitutional amendment, too. The [legislators] could extend the terms of the state college trustees.
- McKay: Yes.
- Rowland: I wondered what the CTA position was on the demand by many in the state colleges that the newly created board of trustees be given autonomy, much the same autonomy that the Board of Regents has.
- McKay: We took the position that the state colleges should be on a par in terms of freedom of fiscal and administrative operation as the University of California. There were those on the scene who insisted that the university had too much freedom, particularly members of the legislature who don't control the university's detailed budget.
- Rowland: On the senate side, particularly?
- McKay: Yes.
- Rowland: Senator Burns, for instance, complained about the university's autonomy.
- McKay: Right. Here is something which may be pertinent to what we were talking about, about the constitutional amendment. This is a story in the April 4, 1960 issue of the CTA legislative letter, which reports the decision of the CTA to support a statutory version of the master plan. This was in Senator Miller's Senate Bill 33, which is described as the keystone of the plan.

It said, "CTA, which vigorously supported the original master plan survey team's recommendation that the program be embodied in a constitutional amendment, has re-examined its position in view of opposition to that approach and is now in full support of the statutory plan. Strong support for the Miller measure came from other quarters last week. Governor Brown spoke out in favor of SB 33 after discussions with leaders of higher education. Spokesmen for the University of California and the State Board of Education followed with a joint statement of support, which regretted the apparent unacceptability of a constitutional amendment, but concluded that the statutory approach is substantial progress towards our goals."

Rowland: We have a note in our office that Clark Kerr and Jim Corley were very much opposed to a constitutional amendment that would freeze in a Ph.D. program in the state college curriculum. They feared it reduced the image and prestige of the university.

McKay: Yes. I think that's inferred here. The next paragraph said, "The statement, which urged action at this session, was signed by UC President Clark Kerr, Chairman Donald H. McLaughlin of the Board of Regents, President Louis Heilbron of the State Board of Education, and State Superintendent of Public Instruction Roy Simpson. The intent of the legislature, to give the proposed new state college system 'a large degree of flexibility' in fiscal matters, is spelled out in a resolution, SCR 16, introduced last week by Senator Miller."

So that pretty much confirms my otherwise dim memory of the details.

Hugo Fisher and Credential Reform

Rowland: Okay. Why don't we go on to a whole series of questions I have here on the Fisher Act, the credentials reform act?

McKay: Yes.

Rowland: Starting off, I wondered why was there a credential reform?

McKay: Basically, in our view, because the jungle of a multitude of credentials and confusing and overlapping requirements was not desirable. The CTA had a department that worked on credential matters. It had two Ph.D.'s in charge of it, [laughter] for what that may be worth. Our committees had made studies and had hearings throughout the state on what the existing situation was and whether it was good or bad, and if it was not what it should be, how to improve it. As a result of that, and this process took several years as I remember it, the decision was made to propose legislation to overhaul and simplify the credential structure. There were (I don't remember how many) a very large number of credentials.

Rowland: I think there were over forty, as I recall.

McKay: Yes. The recommendation of CTA was to reduce that number materially, down to three or four or six, and to establish a credentials commission that would have jurisdiction over it,

- McKay: rather than let it remain in the hands of the State Board of Education, which had a tremendous load, having had the state colleges as one of its divisions.
- Rowland: Who would be the members of the new commission on credentialing?
- McKay: They would be appointed. Again, I would be well-advised to refer to my notes here, or my records.
- Rowland: We could put that as an appendix.*
- McKay: Yes. But CTA had been pressing for credential reform and came up with a proposal which they thought was warranted, and eventually, despite all of the controversy over Hugo Fisher's bill in the same session, the bill establishing the credentials commission was adopted. I don't remember what the vote was initially in both houses, but there were some differences between the versions which came out of the senate and the assembly, and it went to free conference. They reached agreement, and it went back to the two houses for concurrence, and the bill, SB 624, which was by Senator Don Grunsky, was approved by both houses unanimously. There wasn't a single vote--and then was vetoed by Governor Brown. There was no analysis of the provisions or their effects. The only reason he gave was that it was opposed by the state board and by Roy Simpson, and the PTA [Parent-Teachers Association].
- The opposition of the state board and the state superintendent, of having functions transferred to a new body, a new commission, is understandable. I don't know what motivated the state PTA.
- Rowland: I'm wondering what your relations were with Senator Fisher prior to the Brown administration's--
- McKay: My memory of the comings and goings in and out of the legislature of various individuals may be a little faulty, but as I recall it, Hugo Fisher went to the legislature--I believe his first term was 1960. He came up from San Diego.**

*For text of CTA Legislative Letter regarding the Fisher bill, see Appendices.

**Hugo Fisher (Democrat-San Diego) beat incumbent Fred H. Kraft for the state senate seat in the 1958 election. He lost as an incumbent in 1962 to Republican challenger Jack Schrade.

Rowland: Fifty-nine, I believe. He won the '58 election.

McKay: Hugo Fisher was and still is a highly competent attorney. I guess he's still serving on the superior court bench in San Diego. I think that was an admirable appointment by the governor after Fisher was defeated for re-election. No quarrel with his ability or his integrity or any of the aspects of his qualifications at all. He, I believe, was a member of the Education Committee during that first session. That would be '59. I don't recall anything but the most cordial relationships with Senator Fisher.

At the beginning, or just prior to the '61 session, the Brown administration decided it needed to do something about education. It wanted an education record--not a plank of something they were going to do, but they wanted to put something on record. At the governor's invitation, some of us--not just in CTA, but the state department and some of the administrator organizations--met at a restaurant in north Sacramento with the governor and some of his staff. I think Hale Champion was there.

Rowland: He was at that time press secretary.

McKay: Yes. I've forgotten, because he became state director of Finance later. But anyway, we met in a private dining room, and we talked about all of the problems of education, including our program on credentials.

Rowland: Fisher did not attend this meeting.

McKay: No, this was just the governor's staff. Well, at about this time, the legislature was preparing to meet--it may have been slightly before that--Senator Fisher obtained from the state department a copy of the measures they were working on. They were paralleling and working with us, and their proposals didn't include the credentials commission, obviously, but other reforms with which we were not in conflict. He obtained a copy of their bill, and very early in the 1961 session, introduced this as what became known as the Fisher bill. It was not refined at all. It had many serious deficiencies.

Rowland: Can you tell us why Senator Fisher, particularly, got the bill--

McKay: No, I can only speculate. He was one of the bright, promising, new members of the senate, who was a member of the team, of the Brown administration, and whoever made those decisions within the administration apparently decided that Senator Fisher was a good

McKay: one to author the proposal because, though he had no long record in the legislature, he had no bad record and was competent and this was something that he could handle. So he put the bill in. Unfortunately, there were many deficiencies in it.

Rowland: Why did Gordon Winton become a co-author in the assembly of the Fisher bill?

McKay: I don't know. Probably because Senator Fisher asked him to. Much of what is done is done on faith. People take bills and put them in without ever reading them, without knowing except in a general way. Somebody will come and say, "Here's a bill that's going to clear up the mess in credentials, something I think should be done, and if you're in accord with our objectives, I'd like to have you author it."

"Why, sure, Senator." You toss it across the desk and then read it later.

Rowland: We have a note in our office that Gordon Winton may have supported the bill in opposition to Jesse Unruh's control over the assembly.

McKay: I don't know.

Rowland: Can you amplify that in any way?

McKay: No, I would have no way of knowing what motivated Winton.

Rowland: That is, Winton supporting an administrative bill against the movements of Jesse Unruh. I believe the CTA was at first supportive of the Fisher bill, was it not?

McKay: No, initially we felt there were a lot of deficiencies in it, and we pointed them out. We had meetings with Senator Fisher and proposed amendments, which he put in. Let me see if I can find what some of those were. [looks through folder]

Rowland: Why did the AFT support the Fisher bill?

McKay: You'll have to ask them. I don't know.

Here's an item I overlooked when we were talking about the attitude of the State Board of Education on the commission bill. Here in the CTA Legislative Letter of March of 1961, [reads] "The State Board of Education has unanimously endorsed the proposal sponsored by the California Teachers Association to establish a ten-member commission on teacher licensure to discharge functions to be determined by the state board, relating to certification documents."

Rowland: That's from the CTA--

McKay: CTA Legislative Letter. Now, with respect to the deficiencies in the Fisher bill--let me check here to see what the CTA's position was initially. That was Senate Bill 57, wasn't it?

Rowland: I believe the initial opposition was to the vague definition of academic--

McKay: Yes, what is academic? [looks through papers] I don't find the initial opposition readily, but here's a story in the February 27, 1961 issue of the CTA Legislative Letter, headed, "Heavily amended Fisher bill awaits March 8 senate meeting."

"Extensive amendments, apparently intended to meet the widespread objection to the 'academic major and minor requirement' have been made to the Fisher credential bill. The author, Senator Hugo Fisher of San Diego, offered a bulky batch of seventy-eight changes to the bill last Wednesday. Many of them dealt with the sections of the original bill which have been objected to somewhat forcefully by members of the teaching profession. No public statement has as yet been made by Senator Fisher detailing the reasons for the amendments or indicating to what degree he believes the altered bill differs in effect from the first version."

As you indicated, the major controversy arose over the requirement that there be academic majors and minors, and there appeared to be a lack of a definition. As a result of that, many areas of teaching thought they [would be] adversely affected, not just the physical education people, but home economics and a whole range of other educational fields.

Rowland: What did this bill say about the Brown administrative policy in education? It seems to be a position in opposition to the CTA's support in the legislature.

McKay: There's nothing I could put my finger on that would answer that question.

I think it should be said, and maybe you're aware of this, that Senator Fisher appeared to take umbrage at a column I wrote in the CTA Legislative Letter on February 20, 1961, in which I attempted to describe what had developed and what was happening in the credentials area. While at the time I thought it was quite fair and accurate and was not slanted, I was told by others that Senator Fisher thought it was patronizing in tone, that I described him as San Diego's able young senator, Hugo Fisher, which I think is quite accurate. I started out by saying, "A

- McKay: sincere desire to be helpful has gotten San Diego's able young senator, Hugo Fisher, into a bit of academic hot water he didn't anticipate and from which he's now ruefully trying to extricate himself." Then I went down and told of the development and introduction of the bill and what the response, the reaction in the field, was. So it was not possible after that to work as closely with Senator Fisher as it had been before. In the meantime, of course, we had introduced our proposal for credential revision, the upgrading of credentials in both the senate and the house. Assemblyman Carlos Bee introduced our version.
- Rowland: You had a conflict with Senator Fisher over a lobbyist report. He was chairman of the Joint Legislative Representation Committee.
- McKay: Yes.
- Rowland: Is that related to the--
- McKay: I think it was related to the extent that when he was offended by what I had written in this column, he understandably lashed back in one of the ways in which a legislative representative could be punished, I guess, if that's the correct term--was to question his credential, his authority.
- Rowland: Why was Senator Fisher critical of you?
- McKay: The only issue that I recall, and I saw it referred to in one of the old clippings, was he wondered out loud, in the presence of a newspaperman, why my reported expenses were not larger. There were no charges filed; there was no hearing held; there was no action by this committee to revoke my lobbyist's credential at all. As I recall it, there was just a newspaper story. I don't know what he really proposed to do, if anything. He simply sounded off to the press.
- Most of the time that I worked in Sacramento in those days, I had a full-time job as director of field service of CTA. I had a staff of eight or ten men working with teacher groups throughout the state, and this legislative assignment was just an added responsibility. I would go to Sacramento, and the association itself paid for the office space. They had a hotel bedroom suite where we kept our typewriter and my clothes. CTA paid directly for any restaurant bills I would sign at dells, or elsewhere. So I simply reported my out-of-pocket expenses, and I guess he was accustomed to the spending of large business and other well-financed lobbyists--
- Rowland: The horsetrack and beer interests?

McKay: Yes. He may have been making a mental comparison between what they spent and what I reported on my report, which was accurate and was otherwise never challenged.

Rowland: What was the State Board of Education's position on the Fisher Act?

McKay: I think, like other organizations, they modified their position as the bill was changed.

Rowland: Had the state board changed in philosophy since the Brown administration?

McKay: I'm sure it had, although I have no direct way of knowing.

Rowland: We have two new members, Heilbron and Thomas Braden. Braden became president, and Heilbron went to the state college board of trustees.

##

McKay: We generally had a good working relationship with the state board. We determined, or realized, maybe somewhat belatedly somewhere along in these years, that while the legislature was still extremely important to the operation of the public schools and the welfare of teachers, the State Board of Education was maybe almost equally responsible for conditions and actions. So we began attending meetings of the state board and presenting our position on the key issues.

And we developed a good working relationship, particularly during the Brown administration, witnessed by the fact that we were supporting--I don't know what election it was, but it was when Max Rafferty was elected--we were supporting Ralph Richardson, and the records will show that the state board came out--I think, unanimously--endorsing Richardson, which was quite a departure for a state board, and which caused them understandably to be the subject of some criticism.

Rowland: Getting back to the Fisher Act, I wondered why was the Fisher Act eventually passed, with the CTA against it?

McKay: Let me check the records again, and what our final position on the Fisher bill was. You know, of course, that the credentials issue didn't cease to be an issue with the passage of the Fisher bill. In later administrations, you know what happened probably better than I.

McKay: The Fisher bill was passed, and you'll have to pardon my apparent attempt to be humorous here by oversimplifying it, because they had at least the required number of votes in the two houses and the approval of the governor. But I think basically it was passed because many of the objectionable features were removed from it before final passage.

We, in the CTA, went ahead with our bills. Witness the Grunsky bill, which was passed and then was vetoed. We didn't lessen our desire or our move to improve the credential system.

Rowland: One theory in our office holds that the Fisher bill was an attempt to reduce the dominance of the CTA in the legislature and in the state Department of Education.

McKay: I don't know. That could be. I don't know whose attempt that would be, whether it would be the governor's office or someone else. There may have been that. I would appear to be immodest, I guess, if I were to suggest that my presence or absence on the scene had anything to do with the outcome of that bill or the general effectiveness of the CTA, as opposed to other groups, in the sessions after that.

Rowland: Being that this is a very important legislative piece for the CTA, I imagine you must have used all your guns that you could against it. I was wondering exactly if you recollect how you were opposed to this, and if you used your constituency of teachers to write letters to the legislators, or--

McKay: On this particular bill, it really wasn't necessary to do that at all. The information concerning the proposal and what it would do and what the uncertainties were resulted in a spontaneous upsurge of questions and objections from all over the state. We didn't have to push a button and say, "Write to Senator Fisher and the other members of the senate."

I guess some people think that everything that happens in connection with legislation is programmed and masterminded by some genius sitting astride the capitol and saying, "This is good," and "This is bad," and "Do this," and "Do that." I suppose there's a certain amount of truth to the belief that all of the actions are not spontaneous.

Rowland: So you didn't operate like the gun lobby, then?

McKay: [laughter] No, Not on this. We've been known to on other things.

Rowland: What were those other things that you--

McKay: [laughter] I'll give you one illustration, which I don't think I've mentioned. When we proposed the cigarette and beer tax bill, we had a press conference, at which Dr. Paul Strayer, of Princeton, who was a fiscal expert who'd been retained by CTA, held forth on what the elements of a well-balanced revenue program for a state like California were.

The publicity came out, the announcement we were putting the bill in. There was an assemblyman who was a member of the Education Committee and was quite volatile. He just would blow off without great provocation, and after the press conference Arthur Corey and I were in the corridor of the second floor of the capitol, and this assemblyman came storming down to us and really told us off--this horrible thing we were doing. It was terrible, and he'd never support it, and I said, "Okay, if you feel that way, that's fine."

Well, not too long afterwards, he encountered us again and said, "Arthur, Bob--God, you don't know how I hate to have to be a co-author of that cigarette and beer tax bill."

I said, "What do you mean, co-author? You don't have to be co-author if you don't like it. Oppose the bill, vote against it."

He said, "Have you seen my mail lately?"

I said, "You know the answer to that. Of course we haven't seen your mail. What does your mail say?"

He said, "People down in my district want that bill. They've been saying I have to not only support it, but I have to be a co-author!"

I said, "Gee, that's good news. I'm sure glad you told us that."

What we didn't tell him, and he should have known, was that through our organization, after the first conversation, we talked to people in his district and said, "Gee, we'd hate to lose your man on this bill. See what you can do to convince him that it's a good bill."

We have legislative contacts in every assembly and senate district, people who know the assemblymen, hopefully, and apparently they reached them, and these people in the field got on the telephone and went to Western Union and wrote letters and

McKay: got local groups to express themselves on it, and that convinced the assemblyman that not only should he not oppose the bill, he ought to be a co-author. So he was. Well, there's an example of what we considered a legitimate effort. We made our case. We didn't on the Fisher bill. This just happened.

Rowland: Another holds that Senator Fisher was defeated for re-election by the CTA and by the position against the CTA's credential--

[Page 76 of the manuscript is under seal until March, 1990.]

[The following portion of the manuscript is under seal until March, 1990.]

McKay: Probably, probably. This is something which I probably will ask you to strike out of the text, but in my work on federal legislation, I went to Washington quite frequently, and the chairman of our federal legislation committee at the time was Peg Lemmer, a teacher in San Diego County, quite politically astute and quite active and quite effective. She later became state president of CTA.

She was on the same plane as I on a trip to Washington, and we got off the plane, and who did we run into but Hugo Fisher. We had someone meeting us, and Hugo had no transportation. I said, "Come on, Hugo. Are you going downtown? Join us." So he sat in the back between Peg Lemmer and me, and we had a most cordial trip. This was after he was defeated. We went out of our way and delivered him at his hotel, and after he got out, Peg said, "My God, do you suppose Hugo knows he rode into town with the chairman of the Committee to Defeat Hugo Fisher at the last election?" [laughter]

I said, "I don't know. He didn't appear to." He was very cordial and fine.

Yes, the teachers organized against him. I don't know whether it was simply because of this one bill and the encounter, but I suspect you could say accurately that the teachers not only did not support Hugo Fisher for re-election, but they supported his opponent.

Rowland: Jack Schrade.

McKay: I guess he got the Democratic nomination, didn't he?

Rowland: Let's see. This was after cross-filing, so he'd have to be a Republican. Schrade is a Republican, I know that.

McKay: Yes, of course. I think some of our leadership in San Diego County swallowed a little hard--some of our more liberal politically oriented leaders swallowed a little hard, having to accept a somewhat conservative Republican in place of a Democrat who ostensibly was more attuned to our needs. Yes, that's what happened.

- McKay: We started out on fine terms with Hugo Fisher. After his election [in 1958], I was attending a meeting of the senate interim committee in San Diego with Don Grunsky and others, and Hugo, who had been elected but hadn't taken office at the time, attended, at the occasion of my first meeting, and we all went to lunch. Everything was fine. I hope he's happy as a judge now. I carry no malice towards the gentleman at all.
- Rowland: It seems like that is characteristic of the problems you might have had with the senate and several of the relations with the assembly. Is that true, that Fisher and Miller and other senators, probably with the exception of Grunsky, had less of a good working relationship with you?
- McKay: No, I wouldn't say that's quite accurate. I would say we had good working relationships by and large with the senate. There are some exceptions to that because of predilections of individual senators and their views on legislation and other things.
- Rowland: The senate is more of a fiscally conservative body, too.
- McKay: Oh, yes. That's right.
- Rowland: At least it was in those years.
- McKay: That's right.

VI CHANGES IN CTA GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Moving to Federal Level Advocacy

- Rowland: I was wondering what happened to you after the 1961--and after that year, because you no longer remained lobbyist, were you, for--
- McKay: No. My assistant, Bill Barton--I don't know how long Bill had been on the staff at that time--took over. He lasted one full session before he ended up with a heart attack and eventually left the CTA employ. No, I was assistant executive secretary with other responsibilities, and I was assigned full responsibilities for the administrative, policy-making arms of CTA--number one, the state board of directors, the state council of education, which is the elected statewide [council] of about five hundred people that meets five times a year and determines policy. It's the ultimate source for all activities.
- Rowland: Why did this change occur?
- McKay: Oh, probably a combination of reasons--primarily my health. I had literally had it, in terms of pressures. You see, I was working on the federal level also and was a member of the NEA [National Education Association] legislative commission and became chairman of it and continued--in fact, stepped up--my activity on the federal level. I think after so long a time of pressure in a job like that, it's a good idea to take a breather, to get out of it.

Decline in CTA Influence

Rowland: I hoped you had read certain sections from the Collins thesis,* which describes the CTA and other educational associations. The main point of that thesis, I thought, was that there was a decline in CTA's influence in the legislature, after 1961, in 1963--that crucial year.

McKay: I read that with interest.

Rowland: Would you agree with that?

McKay: Probably. I think because of the fractioning of the solid front on educational legislative matters, there probably was some diminution of effectiveness.

In the early days, there may have been some justification for the assumption that CTA was dominated by administrators. In many years, an administrator was president, or a series of administrators. In those days, the CTA was the effective working edge for legislative action. There were half a dozen statewide organizations--the California Association of School Administrators, the California Association of Elementary Administrators, of secondary administrators, and so on. They all were part of the CTA operation, along with the state Department of Education.

Rowland: Along with the school boards, too?

McKay: Yes, the school boards were involved, although they were frequently dissenters from those proposals which had to do with teacher welfare--higher salaries, tenure, and that type of thing--anything which would appear to impinge upon their functions and their freedom to do as they pleased. But we would, before each session, have a sort of clearing-house meeting of all of these organizations' representatives, and we would go through all of the proposals that were pending. If possible, we'd agree on a common front, and in

*See: Paul Vaughn Collins, "Legislative Influence and the Changing Relationships of the California Education Associations, 1960-1969." (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1971.)

McKay: many of those instances, CTA would take the lead in sponsoring or having introduced the legislation. We would do that after the bill introduction period was concluded.

Rowland: Who were the particularly strong people in CTA who managed to keep this coalition together?

McKay: Originally, and this was mostly before my time, Roy Cloud, who was not a dominant figure, but was rather a quiet, deliberate Scotchman, was quite effective in keeping the County Superintendents Association--the fifty-eight counties [together within the coalition]. In the smaller counties, they were quite influential with the small districts. But after that, without question, Dr. Corey was the dominant figure, not only in CTA but in public education in California, and to a major degree in the United States, by his rather imposing figure--and I don't mean just the fact he's a big man physically, but by his professional stature and his persuasiveness he was able to hold the organization together as an effective unit.

Subsequently, as you know, the administrators pulled out, or maybe the other part is that they simply formed their own organization. There was some feeling before the formation of the statewide group of administrators, on the part of the executive secretaries of the individual organizations, there was some chafing at the bit. There was some desire for recognition by the individuals and the organizations. They wanted, for example, to set up their own insurance programs. CTA had one that was all-inclusive, whether it was automobile or health or whatnot. So they formed their own organization and they went their own separate way.

Well, the ability of CTA to have gotten favorable action most of the time was that they spoke generally with a united voice. I appeared up there many times, and without saying it in these words, spoke for education. These other groups were not popping up and saying, "No, we don't like that" or, "Here's our program." But after they were formed--and I think it was just coincidental with my departure from Sacramento.

Rowland: Are you sure it wasn't the fact that you left? [laughter]

McKay: Anyway, the timing was such that you could raise the question. But they developed their own legislative programs, and sometimes they're in keeping or in accord with CTA's programs, and I guess sometimes they're not.

McKay: The abolition of cross-filing, of course, created a party loyalty, which was translated largely to an administration loyalty--the Democratic party, the Brown administration, the Republican administration, or whatever the situation is or was, had to make a record that they could take to the voters, and this included the area of education. So more and more, as was evidenced in the Fisher bill, the administration had a bill, and this, in effect, becomes the party line. So the legislative loyalties, the commitments of legislative members, increasingly were divided: "Should I go for what the teachers in my district, or the constituents, want, or should I say, 'Yes, sir' to the high command in Sacramento?" So I think this had an effect on it.

Rowland: What about the AFT? Was that starting to be a thorn in the CTA's side?

McKay: They became louder; they grew some.

Rowland: Did you have a breaking-off, a leaving of CTA members to join the AFT?

McKay: There has always been a minority who would become dissatisfied with any organization, and depending upon the liberality of their views politically and economically, perhaps, would go from one to the other. I'm sure that over the years some teachers have become disillusioned with the CTA and have gone to the AFT, and I know that some AFT teachers have done the reverse. They've come to the CTA. But the significant thing over the years has been--and I don't know what the percentage is now, but in all the years I was active--somewhere between 80 and 90 percent of all those eligible chose to join the CTA.

We have attempted to make it easier for them. We've had a dues deduction program, wherein on a totally voluntary basis, if the teacher wants to do it, if the district is willing to do it, and if the organization approves, then they may sign up and have their dues deducted from their salary each month. So that has served to make continuing membership easier.

For many years, we have staged what we called a "membership drive" each fall to enroll teachers in CTA, but that hasn't been as necessary when teachers who are of that persuasion say, "Yes, I want to continue to stay in the CTA."

Rowland: In talking about the Brown administration, I'm wondering who on the Brown staff gave CTA an ear and who you had sought consultation with on the staff for CTA legislation.

- McKay: It varied. Keep in mind that the major state agency that deals with education is not an administration arm. That's the state Department of Education--independently elected state superintendent--and to the degree that the state superintendent is in harmony with the governor and the administration, we could work through that arm. But in the state administration itself, of course, we had to perforce work with the state director of Finance, and we did that regardless of who the director might be. There were some civil service staff like Jeff Mugford, who's retired--you know, the old professional, career public servant. We would work with them and consult with them and keep them advised as to what our plans were. We couldn't expect them to say, "Gee, that's great. Let's do that," if it involved spending \$100 million more.
- Rowland: What about Tom Braden? He wasn't a staff member. He was a board member.
- McKay: Yes, he was a board member and was chairman. Tom Braden was quite cooperative. I worked very closely with him--a former newspaper publisher and later a columnist in Washington, D.C. and quite an integral part of the Democratic administration nationally. Very high credentials in that regard. We worked with him on problems that were before the State Board of Education.
- Rowland: I'm trying to see if we have enough tape here to squeeze in some things about Max Rafferty. I'm wondering--you said you had opposed Rafferty's bid for the superintendent, so I was wondering how did you work with Rafferty as a superintendent?
- McKay: With great difficulty. He was a showboater, I guess you'd call him. He had his eye on publicity. His books were highly derogatory of public education even though he was a part of it. He was an opportunist. I haven't heard how he's doing with his conservative colleagues in the deep South now. Fortunately, we don't hear much about him any more.
- Rowland: There was a battle between Rafferty and Braden for authority in decision-making. That is, I think the question came up, "Can the superintendent supersede the decisions of the State Board of Education?" What was the position of the CTA on that?
- McKay: I don't recall any specific issue, but we were quite content to see the state board function in its legally authorized role, and the state superintendent to do likewise in his. We didn't think that either should usurp the function or the authority of the other.

Rowland: You were a little bit uneasy about giving Rafferty more power, or having him acquire more power than he already had?


McKay: Let's say, I don't think the record will show that we ever suggested Max having greater authority. No.

Rowland: I think that's about it. Thank you for a most pleasant and informative afternoon.

Transcriber: Bob McCargar
Final Typist: Marilyn White

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LEGISLATIVE LETTER

CALIFORNIA TEACHERS ASSOCIATION

Vol. 22, No. 7

SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA

February 20, 1961

Action Program

FEB 20 1961

CTA Backs Testing & Textbook Bills; Nixes Bargaining Plan

By ROBERT E. MCKAY

A TWO-FISTED 65-point program to bolster public education and protect hard-won professional gains was launched by the California Teachers Association today following a two-day meeting of its policy-making committees at which support for such things as state-wide testing of pupils and multiple adoption of textbooks and opposition to collective bargaining and harmful financial proposals were voted.

Heavy Volume

Under mandate of the State Council of Education, CTA's statewide delegate assembly, the 75-member Legislative Committee screened the more than 200 bills introduced up to that time directly affecting education and the teaching profession.

Acting upon the recommendations of the Finance and Retirement Committees and four subject-matter subcommittees which met simultaneously, the Legislative Committee voted favorably, to support or approve, 41 bills, and took negative action, oppose or disapprove, on 24 others. It set aside for subsequent action several others.

Support of the testing program and multiple adoption of textbooks highlighted a series of actions on bills affecting curriculum.

The pupil testing proposal, as contained in AB 340, introduced by Assemblyman Gordon H. Winton, Jr., of Merced, calls for the State Board of Education to establish a list of achievement and intelligence tests, one or more of which shall be used in the schools.

Local Choice

Each district would be required to institute a testing program, using tests selected from the list. In approving the bill CTA did so on condition that it would be amended to prevent the release of results on a pupil or school basis and to make certain that districts can continue to use in addition to the intelligence and achievement tests the

(Continued on Page Three)



ASSEMBLYMAN Carlos Bee is shown as he introduced the CTA-sponsored bill, AB 1772, to revise and improve the issuance of teaching credentials.

CREDENTIALS

Upgrading Sought

Tougher standards for teachers and administrators and a voice for the profession in keeping them high are called for in a major credential revision.

(Continued on Page Four)

Scene at Sacramento

A SINCERE desire to be helpful has gotten San Diego's able young senator, Hugh Fisher, into a bit of academic hot water he hadn't anticipated and from which he's now ruefully trying to extricate himself.

AS A RESULT, the mailman is daily lugging bulging bags of letters to members of both houses which take violent exception to "The Fisher Bill" dealing with teachers' credentials.

FOCAL POINT of the furor swirling around the author, who besides being one of the brighter new crop of legislators is a highly successful lawyer in Southern California, is a well-intentioned idea that now appears to have been more explosive and far-reaching than anyone ever guessed.

IT IS THE idea that there should be written into the law a requirement that an "academic major and minor" be required as a prerequisite for a teaching credential.

SENATOR FISHER, as a member of the upper house education committee and the father of two children attending public schools, is more than passingly familiar with educational issues and is dedicated to improving the profession and the schools.

FOR MONTHS last year, he listened to long testimony and pored over bulky reports on the credential problem submitted to the Senate Fact Finding Committee on Education on which he serves.

AWARE THAT Governor Brown was anxious to have in his record book of Administration achievements a bill to do what the profession has been carefully charting for nearly six years, to bring some order out of the present credential chaos, Senator Fisher decided early to author a bill with such a purpose.

MOVING QUICKLY in the opening days of the session, he obtained a copy of the proposal which had been pulled together by the boys in the State Department of Education and worked over by the State Board of Education in a way which even the department couldn't buy. He added a few ideas of his own and without delay tossed the bill into the hopper.

THAT WAS on January 9. The bill was SB 57, now widely referred to as "The Fisher Bill." It contained the "academic major and minor requirement" over which the State Board had had heated discussion only a few days before.

THE BOARD, over-ruling the protests of spokesmen for large statewide educational organizations, had decided

(Continued on Page Four)

Scene at Sacramento

(Continued from Page One)

the academic reference should go into a bill. It had admitted openly, though, that it wasn't quite sure what academic really meant. The board had tried its hand at defining the term at an earlier meeting, but had given up, temporarily at least, leaving to individual interpretation what meaning the word conveyed.

SENATOR FISHER, who, like responsible leaders of the profession, believes that standards must be raised and that a distinction must be made between those fully and those partially prepared for the profession, accepted the language in the state board version of the bill.

WHEN THE measure reached print and word got around the State about the requirement, things began to pop. It appeared to many that it was the intent to rule out people in the physical education code unless they met the academic major requirement. Statements of some state board members led them to that conclusion.

ALARM began to spread as people in the vocational and technical education fields began to realize that the bill, if passed, would likewise apply to them. Letters poured into Sacramento.

EDUCATORS in other fields became alarmed at the possible implication for them. What, they asked, would be the effect on people planning to teach domestic science or music or art, or other subjects of a like nature?

AN AVALANCHE of mail descended on the Capitol, not only to Senator Fisher but to all senators and assemblymen, voicing disapproval of

"The Fisher Bill." Secretaries struggling to answer the protests and trying to keep their bosses' constituents happy, say its unlike anything they've seen in a long time.

SENATOR FISHER, who really didn't intend to cause any furor at all, is now reported to be examining SB 57 to see what can be done to ease the situation. He is said to have extensive amendments in mind for the measure.

THE QUESTION being asked around the Capitol, however, is whether anything he does to the bill now will remove the stigma perhaps unfortunately attached to the original version and whether, even if drastically overhauled, it won't still be "The Fisher Bill" to thousands of concerned members of the profession all over the State. -R.E.M.

CREDENTIALS

(Continued from Page One)

sion bill introduced last Friday by Assembly Speaker pro Tempore Carlos Bee of Hayward.

The measure, AB 1772, sponsored by the California Teachers Association, provides for the establishment of three basic credentials, a teaching permit for persons engaged in internship programs, a specialized services certificate and a year-to-year credential for the so-called eminent scholar group of persons who serve briefly in the schools.

In addition, existing provisions are continued for the provisional and exchange teacher credentials. Equal in importance to the reduction

of the number of authorized credentials from the 41 now issued to the handful listed above is the new State Commission on Teacher Licensure which the bill creates.

Top-level advice to the State Board on establishing and maintaining standards would be given by the ten-member commission which would be named by the board.

It would consist of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, five certificated persons employed in the public schools, at least three of whom would be classroom teachers, an administrator and one member each from the University of California, the state colleges and private institutions of higher learning.

The commission would assume in addition whatever responsibilities the State Board chose to assign it relative to certification documents.

More Training

Higher standards are specified for each of the three major credentials. A fifth year of preparation is required by the bill for the elementary credential.

For an administration-supervision credential the Bee bill would require a master's instead of a bachelor's degree and five instead of two years of successful teaching experience.

Likewise a master's degree instead of a bachelor's would be required for the pupil personnel credential.

Assemblyman Bee, a high school teacher himself, said that although the bill as introduced does not provide for it he leans strongly towards accepting an amendment to provide for one additional credential to be issued to teachers of standard designated subjects. This would cover persons in the trade and industrial and related fields.

PUBLIC HEARINGS REQUIRED BEFORE DECISIONS ON CREDENTIAL PLEAS BY FELONS

No person convicted of a felony involving violence or deadly weapons will get a teaching credential in California in the future without a full public hearing and specific authorization by the State Board of Education.

That was decided on February 11 by the board after it was advised that the Commission of Credentials, a group of five staff members appointed by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, had on January 31 voted to grant a teaching credential to an applicant convicted of second degree murder as a youth.

The action by the State Board was recommended by the State Superintendent.

CTA LEGISLATIVE LETTER

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TEXTBOOKS

Burning Issue

Hottest question on the Sacramento scene today is how to dispose of a sizeable supply of brand-new but obsolete basic elementary textbooks printed in the State Printing Plant and now useless because of later adoptions.

The question arose when a San Francisco newspaper revealed last week that more than a million books have either been burned within the last few months or slated for early incineration.

The repercussions have shaken the State Legislature, involved the Governor and have reverberated all the way back to the White House where a Presidential aide voiced concern over the destruction.

Doesn't Approve

Dr. Rex Simpson, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, said he has never approved of the book burning, but is caught in a legalistic maze that ties his official hands.

The book surplus, caused by an inability to know exactly how many texts will be ordered by elementary school districts over a period of years, has troubled the State Department of Education for a long time, a spokesman said.

The unwanted volumes used to be sold for pulp, but there is, it is reported, no current market. Contracts with the publishers whose plates are used in the state plant forbid sale of the books for use or export out of state, Simpson's office said.


The San Francisco newspaper which broke the story last Tuesday with photographs of the burning said that 143,000 English texts and 31,000 music books had gone up in smoke in the last few months, that another 970,000 readers were ready for the torch and that 649,000 spanking new but useless books had been burned in the last four years.

Halt Called

The Assembly, by unanimous action, passed two resolutions, one calling for a halt to the practice and the other setting up an investigating committee to probe the problem.

Bills also went into the hopper to untangle any legal red tape which may now prevent useful disposition of the books through export to foreign lands as suggested by the White House, gift to the Navy or other noninflammable means.

A possible solution was suggested by Dr. Simpson in a three-way telephone conversation with Governor Brown of the White House. It was that laws be changed to permit gift or distribution of the books for use in underdeveloped nations or in other useful ways.



Heavily Amended Fisher Bill Awaits March 8 Senate Meet

EXTENSIVE AMENDMENTS, apparently intended to meet the widespread objections to the "academic major and minor requirement", have been made to the Fisher credential revision bill, SB 57, which has been scheduled for hearing before the Senate Education Committee at 10 a.m., Wednesday, March 8, in Room 4202 of the Capitol Annex Building, Sacramento.

The author, Senator Hugo Fisher of San Diego, offered a bulky batch of 78 changes to the bill last Wednesday. Many of them dealt with the sections of the original bill which have been objected to somewhat forcefully by members of the teaching profession.

No public statement has as yet been made by Senator Fisher detailing the reasons for the amendments or indicating to what degree he believes the altered bill differs in effect from the first version.

The major aspects in which the amended measure appears to soften the original inflexible requirement of both an academic major and minor for a teaching credential are as follows:

The new requirements for each of the three standard teaching credentials, with specializations in elementary, secondary and junior college teaching, would include a major and a minor in an academic subject matter area or specialized preparation area.

"Academic" Defined

The term, "academic subject matter area" is defined as referring "exclusively to the natural sciences, the social sciences other than education and educational methodology, the humanities and the fine arts."

The State Board of Education would have authority under the revised version to define the terms, "major and minor."

At week's end, with sharp words flying around the capital, it appeared most everyone had gotten into or was planning to get into the act, including potential candidates for the office of State Superintendent and book publishers who long have objected to the State printing of text books.

In the requirements for the elementary and secondary credentials is a mandate that:

"In promulgating any additional requirements the State Board of Education is hereby directed to emphasize academic preparation and student teaching and de-emphasize education and methodology courses."

Student Teaching Ban

The amended bill specifies more completely than the original version the junior college teaching requirements and stipulates that:

"The State Board of Education shall not require any method or education courses or program of student teaching as a condition for securing a standard teaching credential with a specialization in junior college teaching."

The Fisher bill would permit persons holding a secondary or junior college credential, if authorized by resolution of the governing board of the employing district, to teach in grades outside those specifically authorized by the credential.

The secondary credential holder could, by resolution, teach in kindergarten or grades seven to twelve, inclusive, any courses except courses in special education.

The junior college credential holder would be authorized to teach in grades eleven to fourteen, inclusive, any subject in which the holder has completed an academic subject matter major, or by board resolution, courses in which he has an academic subject matter minor.

An annual report of all "out of subject or level" teaching assignments authorized by resolutions must be made by the governing board to the

(Continued on Page Three)

NEW SENATE BILLS

SB 521 Grunsky. Adds Ch 31 (Sec 1-126 Div 22 Establishes subsistence grants for room and board, subject to certain qualifications, for award winners of state competitive scholarships and junior college reserve scholarships.

SB 542 Stiem. Amends and repeals various sects. Revises provisions prescribing classes of persons who may be members of the State Teachers' Retirement System.

SB 698 Shaw. Amends Sec 23052, adds Secs 23058-59. Requires board of regents to set resident tuition fee of \$100 per semester; that payment may be deferred upon determination that student may not otherwise be financially able to attend for the semester. Prescribes interest rates and limitations for such deferrals.

SB 702 Miller. Amends Sec 13407 Gov Code. Pertains to Department of Finance procedure with lowest responsible bidders on State purchases.

SB 706 Thompson. Amends Secs 16564-65. Repeals provisions prohibiting use of public school buildings by subversive organizations and requirement of affidavit that applicant is not a member of such an organization. Makes use of school buildings for such purposes if property will not be used for commission of any crime including criminal syndicalism act.

SB 722 Holmdahl. Adds Art 6 (Sec 31715) Ch 5 Div 22. Requires each school district, state college and University of California to provide life insurance of at least \$5,000 and insurance for medical, hospital, funeral and interment services of at least \$5,000 for each member of an athletic team while being transported by it to and from athletic events.

SJR 19 Farr. Memorializes Congress to continue in their present form the provisions of Public Laws 874 and 815 which provide financial assistance to school districts affected by federal activities.

FISHER BILL

(Continued from Page One)

State Department of Education. The report would include the number of such assignments, the names of all persons so assigned, the reasons for each such assignment and the percentage of certificated employees in the district so assigned.

In addition the State Board would be authorized to require districts to report such additional information as it deems pertinent.

One of the 78 amendments fixes the operative date of the proposed new credential law as of July 1, 1963.

In an apparent effort to meet the criticism of the bill from persons in special fields of education, Senator Fisher has inserted the following language:

The standard teaching credential... shall be issued to persons who have majored or minored in such areas as physical education, business education, industrial arts, agriculture, and home economics, if such persons have, to the satisfaction of the State Board of Education, met the specified minimum requirements for each level which, in the case of the above enumerated fields, calls for, among other things, an academic major and a minor which may be in an area of specialization preparation.

School Bond Vote Requirements And Assembly Term Proposals To Be Heard

HEARINGS in the Capitol during March will highlight consideration of three Constitutional Amendments dealing with the percentage of vote required for passage of school bonds and the length of terms for Assemblymen.

In three successive weeks, the Assembly Committee on Constitutional Amendments will take testimony on ACA 18 by Assemblyman Phillip Burton, reducing the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds vote to a simple majority; ACA 25 by Assemblyman John A. Buserud, cutting the margin from two-thirds to 60 percent; and ACA 32 by Assemblyman Charles B. Garrigus, giving four year terms to incumbent assemblymen who are re-elected.

The Burton and Buserud measures are supported by CTA under a general policy to seek a reduction of the present high two-thirds margin. Senator John F. McCarthy has also proposed SCA 5 to drop the voting requirement to 60 percent.

CTA will also back the Garrigus proposal to lengthen assembly terms for re-elected incumbents, as it supported a proposition for four year terms for assemblymen on the ballot last November. The proposition was rejected by the voters.

The following measures have been scheduled for early hearings:

ASSEMBLY

EDUCATION—Feb. 27, 3:45 p.m.

AB 337 Elliott: PROBATIONARY TEACHERS, dismissal for cause only extended to all districts.

AB 398 Waldie: REPAIRS to school property.

AB 429 Mills: DISTRICT BOARDS, appointed members not listed as incumbents.

AB 440 Bradley: DISTRICT OFFICERS, elimination of surety bond.

AB 463 Hegland: DISTRICT ORGANIZATION changes.

AB 483 Cusanovich: DISTRICT PROPERTY leases.

AB 575 Winton: STATE CURRICULUM COMMISSION, appointment by State Board of Education.

AB 577 Conrad: SCHOOL PROPERTY, newspaper notice two weeks prior to sale.

AB 630 Shell: JUNIOR COLLEGES, withdrawal of territory without board approval.

AB 635 Rees: TRANSPORTATION distances for pupils, determined by governing board.

CIVIL SERVICE—Feb. 27, 3:45 p.m.

AB 767 Z'berg: RETIREMENT, survivors benefits, school employees in SERs.

TRANSPORTATION & COMM.—

February 27, 1:30 p.m.

AB 67 Carroll: SPEED LIMITS in school zones.

EDUCATION—March 1, 3:45 p.m.

AB 656 Sedgwick: HANDICAPPED CHILDREN, Coordinating Council.

AB 820 Carroll: ELECTIONS, contracts between school board and county clerks.

AB 821 Munnell: DISTRICT BOARDS, contracts for electronic data processing.

AB 825 Hegland: UNIFIED DISTRICTS, formation, numerous changes.

AB 761 Walfrum: DISTRICT BOARDS, delegation of power for contracts.

AB 762 Walfrum: DISTRICT BOARDS, purchase or lease of textbooks.

APPORTIONMENT—March 1, 1:30 p.m.

AB 400 Hegland: VOTING time-off.

PUBLIC UTILITIES AND CORPORATIONS—March 1, 3:45 p.m.

AB 77 Hegland: IN LIEU PAYMENTS, public utilities to school districts.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS—March 2, 3:45 p.m.

ACA 18 Buserud: BUILDING AID BONDS, majority vote required for passage.

GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION—March 7, 1:30 p.m.

AB 1072 Mills: BUILDING AID, financial eligibility for second loan.

JUDICIARY—March 8, 2:30 p.m.

AB 1186 Sumner: CODE REVISION, student loans.

AB 1187 Sumner: CODE REVISION, National Defense Act of 1958.

AB 1199 Sumner: CODE REVISION, technical changes.

RULES—March 2, 9:00 a.m.

SCR 26 Raddo: UNIVERSITY OF CALIF., establishes medical school in Sacramento.

PUBLIC HEALTH—March 8, 1:30 p.m.

AB 529 Dills: DENTAL HYGIENIST, employment by districts.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS—March 9, 3:45 p.m.

ACA 12 Buserud: BONDS, statutory in lieu of Constitutional proposals.

ACA 25 Buserud: BONDS, 60% rather than 2/3 approval by electors.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS—March 16, 3:45 p.m.

ACA 32 Garrigus: FOUR YEAR TERMS for incumbent legislators.

ACA 16 Winton: TEXTBOOKS, uniform list by State Board selection by district.

MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY GOVERNMENT—March 16, 1:30 p.m.

AB 510 Hegland: VEHICLE CODE FINES on state college premises.

GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

AB 883 Winton: RETIREMENT administration to Retirement Board.

SENATE

EDUCATION—March 1, 10 a.m.

SB 385 Murdy: CROSSING GUARDS, provides funds.

SCA 8 McCarthy: STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, election of members, by district.

SB 295 McCarthy: ELECTIONS, consolidation, if within 90 days of state-wide.

SB 323 O'Sullivan: CREDENTIALS, renewable.

SB 345 Grunsky: APPORTIONMENT, divisor for 175 days.

SB 346 Grunsky: APPORTIONMENT, divisor for summer school.

SJR 19 Farr: Memorializes Congress to continue federal financial assistance under provisions of Public Laws 874 and 815.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT—March 2, 1:15 p.m.

SB 236 Shaw: DISTRICTS, stock transfer, mutual water company.

AB 161 Hegland: LEGAL COUNSEL, contracts with school districts.

AB 291 Hegland: LIABILITY INSURANCE, board officers and employees.

JUDICIARY—March 2, 10 a.m.

SB 123 O'Sullivan: DRIVER TRAINING, repeal of 5% fine for supoon.

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Regional Oral History Office
The Bancroft Library

University of California
Berkeley, California

Governmental History Documentation Project
Goodwin Knight/Edmund Brown, Sr., Era

Keith Sexton

LEGISLATING HIGHER EDUCATION: A CONSULTANT'S VIEW
OF THE MASTER PLAN FOR HIGHER EDUCATION

An Interview Conducted by
James H. Rowland
in 1978

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INTERVIEW HISTORY

Keith Sexton was interviewed by the Regional Oral History Office of The Bancroft Library for the Goodwin J. Knight-Edmund G. Brown, Sr., segment of its Governmental History Documentation Project. Mr. Sexton's experience as a consultant to the Assembly Education Committee, his close working relationship with Education Committee Chairwoman Dorothy Donahoe, and his role in the designing of the Master Plan for Higher Education, made his contributions a keystone in our documentation of higher education issues in the Knight-Brown period.

Born in Kansas and raised in Barstow, California, Sexton went through numerous turning points before his involvement in historic higher education coordinating legislation. After high school in Barstow, his early work at Chaffey Junior College was mainly in journalism. Coming to the University of California, Berkeley, to finish his undergraduate studies, he switched his focus to political science and international relations. After graduating, he visited Pakistan, India, and Ceylon through Project PIC--a forerunner of the Peace Corps--where he developed an interest in South Asian studies. Returning to the Berkeley campus in 1954, he took an M.A. in political science and South Asian studies, with international government work his career goal. After his studies and a stint in the Army for two years, he joined the Asia Foundation in San Francisco. Renewing an old fascination with state government, he applied and was accepted as a legislative intern in Sacramento, with the strong backing of Berkeley political science professor, Eugene Burdick. By chance, he was selected as an aide to the Assembly Education Committee during the last days of Republican domination in state politics. In 1959, with a new governor and a Democratic majority in the assembly, Dorothy Donahoe won her bid to chair the Assembly Education Committee. Under new leadership, Sexton's prominence on the committee increased. He eventually became spokesman for Donahoe's attempt to coordinate functions and growth in the three California higher education units: the community colleges, the state college system, and the University of California. Sexton played an important liaison advising role to concerned legislators on the progress and developments of the master plan survey team, a master plan decision and recommending body made up of distinguished higher education leaders. After the master plan recommendations were enacted, he was appointed by Governor Pat Brown as assistant director to the Coordinating Council on Higher Education. He is presently University of California Systemwide Dean of Extension Programs.

As I approached the subject of the Master Plan for Higher Education, I decided to gather interviewee suggestions. The consensus of those associated with development of the master plan pointed to Keith Sexton as a prime interviewee. Unable to gather substantial research material on the master plan, I arranged a review session with Mr. Sexton on the master plan, as preparation for a full recorded interview at a later date. We met on August 23, 1978, at his basement office in University Hall, across the street from the Berkeley

campus. What was planned as a review became a full blown recorded interview session as Mr. Sexton launched a detailed narration of Dorothy Donahoe and the master plan maneuverings with enthusiasm and precise recall. On October 4, 1978, we held the final interview in his office. In this interview he provided a personal biography and a description of lobbyist-legislator relations during his consulting tenure.

After editing, the interview transcript was forwarded to Mr. Sexton for review. After considerable deliberation and a careful page-by-page examination, he returned the transcript. However, before final typing, I rearranged the table of contents by moving Mr. Sexton's biography to the beginning of the manuscript. This change has been noted in the manuscript tape guide.

Apart from modest tendencies to downplay his influence on the master plan development, Mr. Sexton has provided readers with a rich collection of reminiscences that should breathe life into the development of the Donahoe Act as well as other education issues during his years in state government. The Keith Sexton memoir has provided further evidence of the importance of oral history to record undocumented insights into the process and procedures of state government.

James H. Rowland
Interviewer-Editor

14 July 1980
486 The Bancroft Library
University of California, Berkeley

I RETRACING A PERSONAL HISTORY

[Interview 1: August 23, 1978]##

Family History

Rowland: We have a procedure that we follow whenever we interview: we ask an interviewee to give us at least ten minutes of family background--family history--geneology--and things of that sort. This is important for the cycle of the story and for researchers who study the backgrounds of our narrators. How would you like to reminisce about your family?

Sexton: What do you want to know about?

Rowland: Where your family is from?

Sexton: I was born in Abilene, Kansas. We moved to California in 1940--southern California. I was an only child--what else do you want to know about that?

We moved around in southern California and my father was in the Marine Corp in the second World War, and so we lived in one place. And then after that when I was in the seventh grade we moved to Barstow--garden spot of America--in the Mojave Desert--I graduated from high school there.

Rowland: You're an only child? [laughing]

Sexton: Yes. And then after I graduated from high school, I went to Chaffey Junior College in Ontario for two years and then in '52 came to Berkeley and graduated in '54 and got a master's degree in '55. Then I went off for two wonderful years in the army--mostly spent in the middle of Texas--another garden spot of America.

##This symbol indicates that a tape or a segment of a tape has begun or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 53.

School Years in California

Rowland: Do you recall turning points in your life that directed you to studying higher education?

Sexton: No. I never thought about higher education. That never occurred to me.

Let's see, I graduated from high school and I was going to be a journalist, because I worked for the local Barstow paper-- I mean that's really big stuff-- And so in junior college I really worked mostly at journalism and writing and wanted to do that, but by the time that I finished the two years I think I disliked the journalism teacher so much and I couldn't get into UCLA. UCLA only had a graduate school of journalism, so I couldn't do that, and Berkeley did, so I decided to go there. By the time I got to Berkeley I changed to political science, which seemed more interesting, and did that.

And in the summer of '54 when I graduated, I went to India and Pakistan and Ceylon with a student group that existed for about five years on the Berkeley campus--you raised your own money and then you went for goodwill--this was even before Peace Corps time--to India, Pakistan and Ceylon. And you were there for three months during the summer--talking and meeting the students.

Rowland: Were you actually involved in high school or campus politics?

Sexton: You mean like running for student body things? Yes. I was in high school and in junior college. Not at Berkeley--it was too big. And I came to Berkeley as a junior, but this other thing did appeal.

So you went through this process and got selected--it was competitive--then you raised money and then we went.

Rowland: What was the organization called?

Sexton: Well, it's called Project PIC, because it was Pakistan, India and Ceylon. And it started one year and I was in the second year's group--I was chairman.

So we did the three months in the subcontinent, speaking all over, came back and then we spent about four or five months speaking to groups in California--mainly Bay Area, but some other places. It was an idea of goodwill--we'd exchange information.

Sexton: I don't want to sound cynical about it now--I really believed in the thing, at the time, but as time passes--but it was a very emotional experience and that was the kind of thing that rarely ever happens. We got to do it and it really was a stunning experience in all ways--in fact that you had to learn how to speak and you had to handle difficult situations as well as doing good and being on show constantly to people. I think that told me at that point that I didn't want to be in the state department or something or other, where you were stared at all the time.

So, I thought it was going to be some kind of international government in my future. When I came back--instead of going to law school, which I was going to do, I decided to get the M.A. in political science.

Rowland: Your decision to go to law school was your father's?

Sexton: No. I'm the only college graduate.

Rowland: What was your father's trade?

Sexton: Dad was a cook and finally he owned a small restaurant in Barstow. Both of my parents graduated from high school. And one set of grandparents had graduated from high school and the other had not. Of all my relatives I was the only one who had gone to college. I had one aunt who had also gone and who worked at the University of Chicago, but that was it.

No, law school seemed like a good thing, but at that time, I couldn't be assured of getting through the three years because of the draft and I didn't want to start and have to drop out. I also realized how little I knew about south Asia, so I stayed on and took an M.A. in Berkeley in a year.

Rowland: What year was that--do you recall?

Sexton: It was 1954-55.

Rowland: This was the height of the McCarthy period. Did that affect you in some way?

Sexton: No. I don't think so. On our Asian trip we had to answer questions about him and William Knowland all the time.

As I say, I did the M.A. on south Asia, which was interesting. But it was in south Asian studies, or something. I had a really good professor, who was here [Berkeley] and has since gone to Michigan.

Sexton: Then I worked for a little while on a project in the Institute of South Asian Studies. And then I went to the army and I did my wonderful two years and then I came back and went to Boalt for a semester in which I decided that that was not what I wanted to do. I didn't like law school and I just wasn't happy about that at all.

Rowland: What didn't you like about law school?

Sexton: Part of it was coming back immediately from the army--I just walked back from the army into law school, which was another regime--you know from one to the other. I did not like being brow-beaten by law school professors after I had been brow-beaten sufficiently by all kinds of other people in the army.

I worked during the Christmas vacation, when everybody else was working on law homework. It was at that point that I realized that I financially wasn't going to make it over any period of time--and I didn't like it, so I quit!

Becoming an Education Consultant

Sexton: I went to work for the Asia Foundation in San Francisco in some kind of an administrative assistant position out of the library. And that was okay and it provided money and the opportunity to live in the city--play around and have a good time.

But after a while I got tired of that and I got tired of the job and that was when I heard about this internship in Sacramento. I heard about this and I began to inquire. I was a little late in getting into it. It was designed primarily for people who were either in journalism, law or political science--graduate level--and for people in school. And so I didn't qualify on that last count and was a bit late.

Professor Gene Burdick was one of the people that really went to bat for me in the political science department--that I ought to be interviewed and all the rest of this even though I wasn't enrolled in school and all that kind of thing and I didn't indicate that my goal wasn't a higher degree. The committee proceeded to give into that and interviewed me. And by a fluke I got it! So, then I went to Sacramento--well, I quit the Asia Foundation immediately and went to Mexico--[laughing] for a month and a half and then--

Rowland: Just as kind of a recuperation!

Sexton: Then knowing that I had the job in Sacramento, I came back into Sacramento broke, but ready to work and I was an intern for the year. And then as I say, I think I told you before, that it was just a fluke that education was a third choice of mine. I forget--Speaker's office was one choice, I forget the other one.

So, it was the third choice and that's what I was assigned to. I was the consultant under lame duck chairman Doyle of the education committee--very unpleasant. It wasn't unpleasant, it's just that I didn't do much and I got all the dumb stuff you have to do because the consultant who was there was very concerned about his job.

I got to go over to the state library, the law library in the state library, and I got to look up every state law on tenure, and come up with a report, which really wasn't wanted by anybody except the consultant. And it was a way of making me do something and keeping me out of the office and keeping me away. And I was never taken to any committee interim hearings or anything at all.

Rowland: He just kept sending you to the state law library! [laughing]

Sexton: And doing little dummy kinds of jobs, but several of the interns were in the same boat; consultants were then only hired for interim periods--they didn't work during session. Well, they saw us as a threat and ultimately, of course, they were right.

The guy [the other consultant] had been appointed because of his work in the Republican party and he knew next to nothing about education. Anyway some of us went on, so we were a threat and we were young.

In January of '59, Brown was elected and the Democrats came in the legislature in strength. Doyle was, of course, by that time, already a lame duck, so he was through. Then it was, who was going to be Speaker and the Speaker was Ralph Brown. That meant that Donahoe, who had supported Brown, wanted education and that's what she got. So then I stayed on just during the internship, which was to the end of June. She and I got along quite well. We [consultants] did bill analysis and that sort of thing.

II PROFILE OF DOROTHY DONAHOE

Background in Bakersfield Public Schools##

Rowland: Well, the master plan for higher education is one aspect of Pat Brown's legislative program. I personally got involved in the study of higher education through my thesis on the Burns Committee on Un-American Activities and its attack on UC Berkeley during Clark Kerr's administration. I also worked for the state college system, in what was called a 'steady state' study. I have been following up my interest on higher education. The master plan seems like an interesting, rich topic to explore, especially the legislative aspect of it. The first thing that we should jump into is the question of a conflict between the state college and university system.

Sexton: Yes. I'll tell you: I came into this—I was a legislative intern in '58, '59. It was the second year of that session in the assembly. I was assigned to the Assembly Education Committee, my third choice. For '58, I just rode out a lame duck assemblyman who was chairman of education, a guy named Doyle.

Rowland: Donald Doyle?

Sexton: Yes. He had a consultant who was there and I don't know all the animosities between all the people before that.

But in '69, when the Democrats won, Doyle was gone, and Donahoe became chairman of the education committee. One of the first things she did was to fire the consultant and ask him to leave immediately. (Ralph Brown was the Speaker.) She knew beforehand that she was going to get this. I mean that's what she really wanted was the education committee.

Rowland: How did she get involved in education?

Sexton: She came from the public schools. She had worked at the Kern County Unified School District--I think it was Kern, yes, Bakersfield High School, I'm not sure which--as a classified employee. She had graduated from high school, and I don't think she'd gone past that. And then she had worked as a classified employee for a number of years, had been active in some women's organizations. And one of the women's organization that year was trying to sponsor several women. I don't remember the name of the women's group. It's the most common one. It's not AAUW [American Association of University Women], but at any rate, they asked her if she would be one of the three that they were going to back.

Rowland: Was the date approximately the late forties, early fifties?

Sexton: Let's see. It had to be like--not fifty. It must have been about '52. I know she asked the school district for a leave of absence to run, and they refused to give it to her. And after all those years, she just quit and ran for the assembly anyway, and won. Probably by the time I met her she had been in the assembly for three terms.

Joining the State Assembly

Sexton: And at least at the time in '60, she was only one of two women. The other one was Pauline Davis. They were the only two women in the legislature.

And so, education had been an interest of hers--not particularly higher education, though. She had polio, as a child, and so she was handicapped with a limp, and other ailments: she had asthma and so on. So she was very interested in the handicapped, all of that area and particularly as it related to education, and mental health, and so on. Those are sort of the areas.

III LEGISLATING THE MASTER PLAN FOR HIGHER EDUCATION


University and State College Friction

Sexton: So then there was '59, and then Ralph Brown became the Speaker, and she became the chairman of education. And Unruh became the chairman of Ways and Means, Carley Porter became the chairman of Water, and we all had offices next to each other. It was during the '60 session that she introduced this resolution; is it ACR68 or 9?

Rowland: Oh, ACR88?

Sexton: Yes, to call on the state Board of Education and the regents to produce some kind of a master plan. In the previous session, which had to be '57, I guess--two bills had been introduced. There had always been an arrangement between the regents and the board in a joint committee--they'd come up with what they felt was the need for new institutions, and they would list them. And usually, I guess the legislature had pretty much gone along with those recommendations. But in '57, two state colleges that were way down in the bottom of the list of the needs for either system got passed by bills through the legislature. One was Stanislaus, and the other was Sonoma.

And both of these were from two powerful senators: Rattigan was one. I'm sorry, instead of a second senator it was a strong assemblyman. Is that right? Some assemblyman, as I recall. The assembly had--well, for Turlock it was Assemblyman Brown and the Senator was Donnelly, who was chairman of education. And so, both of these bills had gone through, and that had at least bothered, alerted a number of people, I'm sure, in the educational area. It bothered these people because if this game started in California the most powerful legislators could get colleges, and so on, in their districts, what would that mean?



Meeting of the Master Plan for Higher Education survey team at Occidental College, 1959. Left to right, front row: Keith Sexton, Howard Campion, Arthur Coons, Glenn Dumke, Tom Holy; back row: Dean McHenry, Arthur Browne, Henry Tyler, Robert Wert

Photo by Joe Frieser

Sexton: I'm sure the university was also hearing the same kinds of concerned comments that the more of those state colleges that were developed by law, the harder that was going to be for the university. And the university at that point had on its books, you know, Santa Cruz, and Irvine, and--where's the other one?

Rowland: Riverside?

Sexton: No. Riverside was there and Santa Barbara was there. San Diego, I guess. And so, the argument was that there needed to be some orderly planning. The state colleges, you know, at that time were under the state Department of Education and under the Superintendent of Public Instruction. And there was champing at the bit even then from faculty and others. One of those spokesmen was Lyman [A.] Glenny, who was at that time a professor at Sac [Sacramento] State, that they needed their own board or their own autonomy, or they ought to be like the university. There were arguments, then, about how the state colleges ought to be giving the Ph.D.

I can't tell you who gave Assemblywoman Donahoe the resolution to introduce. Somebody that she was friendly with and listened to very closely at that time was the university lobbyist, Jim Corley. And I certainly know he was there in that picture. But I have been asked before and I've tried to go back and recollect, and I can't do that. I don't know. I think it is unlikely that she would have thought up such a resolution on her own. Somebody suggested it to her.

Rowland: So, from Corley then--at Corley's suggestion?

Sexton: Could be. It certainly wasn't from Simpson's. The university at that stage was more eager to see the study done, probably, than the state colleges. She had a--

Rowland: The state colleges also wanted to offer a Ph.D.

Sexton: Some of them did. Some of them were making arguments about--you heard this Ph.D. argument from San Francisco State; Glenn Dumke was then the president of San Francisco State.

Rowland: From President Wahlquist of San Jose State.

Sexton: Yes, Wahlquist, and Malcolm Love at San Diego. And so there were these kinds of, you know, statements. Educators and legislators were faced with huge increases in the number of students. How were they going to accommodate these? The cost that would be attendant when that happened was really worrying them. The times called for some kind of orderly planning.

Sexton: Dorothy, over the years, had evoked out a, well, workable, I guess, would be a fair statement, arrangement with Roy Simpson, the Superintendent of Public Instruction. But there wasn't a high regard on Donahoe's part for Simpson or the state Department of Education. I mean, it wasn't as bad as many others, but--. And so, my hunch is that somewhere along the line, the university people were eager to have such a study happen, and that she accepted that and so did some of the people in the state Department of Education. Somebody who might be useful to you at that particular era who now is on the Berkeley campus is Dick Hafner. Hafner is the public information officer for the Berkeley campus and has been for a few years. But during this period of time, he was Simpson's special assistant.

Rowland: He wasn't on the campus then.

Sexton: No, no. He had come from newspapers. And he was Simpson's special assistant. He was the most aggressive and independent kind of assistant that Simpson had had. He and I knew each other from before, and so we were able to talk and work together, and he was talking to Simpson and some others. So he would know better what was happening in the state department, probably, during that early period of time than many people.

Legislators and the Subject of Higher Education

Rowland: One theory holds that the master plan might have been an effort by some legislators to control the university, that is, the university autonomy. Legislators wanted to tell the university what it could and could not do, in the field of its administrative affairs.

Sexton: Yes. That came in, and it was stronger on the senate side than it was on the assembly side.

Rowland: Do you recall any particular senators? Such as Hugh Burns?

Sexton: No. To my knowledge, Hugh Burns was never really in this picture particularly. I'm sure he was informed of things, and he showed up at a couple of ceremonies. George Miller: he unfortunately is no longer around.

Rowland: Grunsky?

Sexton: Grunsky was there, and he was informed all the time. Sure, he would certainly be a knowledgeable person. But he wasn't intimately involved, to my knowledge, during this period of time. He was

Sexton: on the Senate Education Committee. He was also on Senate Finance. And he was sort of considered as a more--I won't say reasonable, but--yes, maybe a more reasonable Republican member on these matters than some others. As a matter of fact, more reasonable than some Democrats like Donnelly. Hugo Fisher was another senator. He was then a kind of Miller protege. He's a judge in San Diego. He was a strong figure on that side. Rodda had just come into the picture as a senator. Since he was in education, he was kind of brought along. Sure, Hugh Burns would have been there in that sense, I suppose, to talk to Miller.

Rowland: As a senate leader?

Sexton: Yes. To say, "The university means to get theirs," and things like that. I didn't hear a lot of that. I just didn't hear it. It may have been--that's what they may have been talking about. But as an intern at that point with the [assembly education] committee and the resolution, I didn't hear that argument among the stated reasons.

Rowland: That is, you didn't hear the argument that the legislature was trying to invade university autonomy by proposing this master plan.

Sexton: That's right, I didn't. And that's why I think the university was somewhat behind all of this in wanting to see the state colleges suppressed. I think the university viewed the state colleges as much more of a threat to them. There were more state colleges than university campuses, and you know, if they could get the ear of a legislator and get new colleges and so on--I think there was a concern on the university's part about that.

Rowland: The university also wanted to expand its campuses, too.

Sexton: Oh, yes. This was going to be the big decentralization which was going to take money. And yes, I guess it was at that period of time, certainly at that period of time, the university was under great pressure from people like [Senator] Burns and others for a university campus in Fresno; the state colleges and the university didn't really want to go with that. So any other kind of process the Fresno people could use so they wouldn't just be the ones saying--

Rowland: There was money also involved, too.

Sexton: Yes. And gifts of land, and you know, all of that. So the resolution--

- Rowland: Harry Wellman recalled the meeting with George Miller, Jr. and Glenn Dumke, in I think it was '62. The reason Miller supported the master plan was that he didn't want a duplication of efforts between the state college and university system, and he didn't want to force the legislature to spend more money to build both systems. So he turned to Wellman and told him that the university was not going to get any more money for the expansion of campuses. Then he turned to Dumke and said, "You're not going to get a Ph.D." There was that kind of mood among the senators.
- Sexton: Yes. Yes, I think so. Yes. In the assembly, at this point, Williamson was involved because he was from the adjacent district to Donahoe. And Walter Stiern, Senator Stiern, was also involved in the same way because his district encompassed Donahoe's and Williamson's. They worked as a team, all of them. But again, Williamson was new, and Carlos Bee was there. Bee's main interest was to look out for the CTA's interests.
- Rowland: What about third house involvement?
- Sexton: The CTA didn't seem interested.
- Rowland: Other than Corley, who was in a sense a third house representative?
- Sexton: Yes. Yes. Well, then obviously the state department's representative for the state board had to be at committee meetings to respond. And also, the Association of State College Professors, or whatever they were called.
- Rowland: The American Association of University Professors?
- Sexton: No. This was a state college association of professors of some kind. They made some statements, but they weren't strong. But they were part of that same rumbling about, you know, wanting to get out from the secondary school system. And you had Love, and you had Wahlquist, and you had Dumke making these other statements about being converted to universities. The AFT [American Federation of Teachers] was somewhat more interested, because they had a few members in the state colleges, and they hoped to get more. So everybody sort of saw, I suppose, in this resolution and this study, that they could get out of it whatever they hoped for.

Groundwork for the Master Plan Study

Rowland: And Governor Brown?

Sexton: I'm trying to think--there was an appearance--Donahoe and I drove down to Berkeley one day to a meeting of a Board of Regents and the state Board of Education. It was the first time they had met together in a joint board meeting. I don't know how that was arranged, because it was an unusual meeting, and it was the first time in years and years that they had done it. And I can't tell you who really set that one up. But one of the items on the agenda was this ACR [Assembly Concurrent Resolution], and the need for it, and Donahoe was asked to tell them why she thought it was necessary, and Pat Brown urged their support for this kind of a study, which they did. You know, someplace in this process there was another meeting in Los Angeles, and why was that necessary?

Rowland: This was again another joint meeting between the Board of Regents and the state Board of Education?

Sexton: Yes. I can't remember exactly why this was; I suppose if I went back and looked it up I might. But at this meeting in Berkeley, I think they sort of said, Yes, they needed to meet more often and they would look at this sort of thing, the possibility of this study. Then, Simpson began to balk, and at that time, I don't remember who the president of the state Board of Education was, but it was somebody who was rather weak and did whatever Simpson and the department wanted.

And about this period of time, Brown appointed Louis Heilbron and Tom Braden to the state Board of Education. Those were his first appointees on that board, and they really immediately began to change the nature of the board. It was those people, obviously, who were eager to have this resolution come about, and I know that Donahoe, Miller, others could work more with them than they had with anybody so far on the board.

And at that time, well, let's see, Brown had, I guess, Ralph Richardson on his staff, who was the educational liaison, the guy who--I guess he's probably still at UCLA as a professor of speech. He ran for state Superintendent of Public Instruction. He had been on the L.A. city Board of Education. But at this time, he was there as educational aide--Bill Coblentz was also there. I remember him coming to us about labor matters. Another person involved but not on the staff full time was Warren Christopher. Anyway, Richardson was the one who had been trying to get the governor's support. Don Leiffer, who was in the state colleges, was also there. The governor had brought in these two people

Sexton: [Richardson and Leiffer], to be education advisers. Leiffer went later back into the administration of the state colleges, and he was kind of acting head chancellor while they set up the new board of trustees. Isn't that amazing; I've never thought about him again. Is that what this thing does, oral history?

Somehow or other, there was a problem about whether there was going to be this study and whether it was going to be given the degree of prestige it needed. And my impression is that Simpson was balking at doing this.

Rowland: Why?

Sexton: Oh, probably because they would lose the state colleges, that this could only be advantageous to the university and not to them. You know, he himself was much more a public school person than he was--

Rowland: So Simpson was still thinking in terms of the state college under the state Board of Education.

Sexton: Yes. And the department and the division. There was a fairly small division in the department that handled the state colleges, which was a constant bone of contention, as you can imagine, with everybody in the state colleges.

So a second meeting was planned in Los Angeles for the meeting of the two boards. And that's the one that the governor attended. It was a 'fancy do' affair, even by my standards now and even though I was an intern at the time. Ed Pauley used his place. We met at UCLA. Cars picked everybody up. They had planes fly us down from Sacramento, the contingent of legislators. And so, they piled everybody on the plane, [Assembly Speaker] Ralph Brown and his wife--I can't remember Hugh Burns being there--Grunsky was there. Carl Britschgi was an assemblyman. We were all trundled down--we were all taken by these cars down to Ed Pauley's house for a sit down dinner, huge. I was impressed.

Rowland: Now this wasn't with the full Board of Regents?

Sexton: Yes. All the regents. All the Board of Education, and all the legislators--

Rowland: Including Kerr.

Sexton: Including Kerr, and Glenn Anderson was there, and so on.

Sexton: As I recall the governor made a statement. People were urging statements about the necessity for this study, and that it be given high value and high prestige. It was all that kind of aura. The governor then indicated that if this group could come up with a reasonable plan to submit to him--even though as I recall the resolution called for it to come to the legislature--but he said if it came to him, he would open the 1960 budget session for a special session on this type of master plan, and then he would--

Rowland: Excuse me here, but didn't Pat Brown cut the budget for the university in his first term?

Sexton: Well, I know, among other things, he began to reduce funds for university extension.

Rowland: Right, without prior notice to Kerr and other people who were--

Sexton: Yes. I don't know whether other things were being cut or not.

Rowland: Right. But it was the university extension that was cut? Was that some kind of tension that existed between the university and Brown, do you recall?

Sexton: I don't recall that. I don't recall that. I remember that happening--

Rowland: --teach the university a lesson, or--

Sexton: No, I don't. I don't know why, but I remember it happening, and my feeling has been really that I don't think Pat Brown personally knew about it one way or another.

The Department of Finance had wanted to use for--had been using for several years the argument that the state colleges extension was self supporting: why shouldn't the university's extension be self supporting? In that particular year, that's what happened.

So they did it over a period of time of seven years or eight years; it kept going down in support until it ended. I can't remember it being a big issue. Perhaps it was and I--that was all done in the Ways and Means Committee. So I wasn't there. And I don't recall there being a lot of animosity between any of these people at this point, although the university had always been less successful in the assembly than in the senate. And Corley was extremely close to the senate leadership: Miller and Burns and everybody else.

Sexton: I think that this dinner at Pauley's was an attempt to really put on a big show to make this a very important study; to push Roy Simpson and the Department of Education to go along with it. And this was to really make this a big study and really involve everybody.

Selecting the Survey Team Members and Staff

Sexton: And obviously by this time, Brown had been convinced, perhaps by Kerr, that this was a major issue which his administration needed to face, at some point, and that this might be the way to do it.

So we were all flown home, and then the resolution was passed, and at that point then they had to appoint the survey team. Everybody put up their nominees. And I know there was a good deal of scurrying over the chairman of that group and feelings about whether it should be a strong person or not a strong person, in or out of state, and all that. And I know that Kerr made phone calls to Simpson. At one point, they had some talk on the side at a joint committee meeting, over appointing Arthur Coons. All I can glean from that is that the university had checked Coons out and thought that he would probably be supportive of the university. He'd be fair, but probably supportive. But the state college people weren't at all sure of that.

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Sexton: Before that, Dumke had been at Occidental under Coons. He was an associate dean, and so other people thought, well, maybe that wouldn't be too bad. I know Malcolm Love wanted to be the representative on the survey team for the state colleges, and, you know, they were saying, "This guy is unworkable, and Dumke's better," and so finally, after all those machinations, they wound up with the survey team that they did.

And at that point, the legislature decided to appoint a kind of--what did they call it? Well, it was a watchdog committee, but that isn't what it was called. It was some kind of advisory committee. And it had had four assemblymen and three senators.

Rowland: Now this was Grunsky--

Sexton: This was Grunsky, Miller, and Fisher. There was one more--Donnelly, even though he never participated. He was still there.

Rowland: You don't recall the name of that advisory--

Sexton: It was a very informal kind of group. I don't ever think it got recognized, particularly. And in the assembly it was Donahoe, and it must have been Bee, Sedgwick--the other one was either Geddes--it must not--I couldn't think--it must have been Britschgi. It could have been somebody else; I don't recall who that fourth one was. I should know.

Rowland: Throughout this time, you were an administrative assistant?

Sexton: At the end of that session, when my time was up as an intern, Donahoe asked if I'd stay on as consultant. Only a few of the larger committees had consultants at the time. Ways and Means did and a couple of others, you know, full time.

I had no background in education and I said that. I said, "You know, I really don't have any education background." And that was exactly what they wanted at the time. It was the period of time when in education it was "the fight of the educationists," in quotes.

So, I stayed on as consultant. We had four subcommittees that operated during that two year interim period. One was on higher education, and it really got into looking more at the community colleges than anything else. Then there was this other sort of funny overlap group of those we just talked about.

Rowland: Yes. Kind of a joint committee?

Sexton: Yes. The survey team was going to meet all the time on a crash basis. And they were really going to try to get this thing finished in a short period of time, which would add to the drama and urgency of it all. Then there was the liaison committee of the two boards. Gerald Hagar, McLaughlin and Heilbron got on that liaison committee. The liaison committee met monthly. So the survey team was reporting to them. It was decided that it would be appropriate to have one or more of the legislators at every one of those meetings.

Rowland: This was a decision between Donahoe and Miller?

Sexton: Between Donahoe and Miller, I think, yes. One legislator would show up each time.

I think that this scheme may have been pushed by Jim Corley as well. And at the same time it was suggested: Wouldn't it be a good idea if Sexton sat in with the survey team so that he would know what was going on and he could keep the legislators briefed as well as advising the survey team. And I was then supposed to play this role to go back and be able to brief this group of

Sexton: senators and assemblymen on whether things were happening. And I was supposed to be able to tell the survey team, when they came up with ideas on any of this, did I think this would go or not with the legislature? It was a nifty role.

And so I went to the first meeting of the survey team, in which I got an assignment. I was really being tested, and that was reasonable on their part: "Who is this punk who is coming in here?"

Lyman Glenny--do you know him? He is with the school of education here at Berkeley. At that time, he was a professor of education at Sac State, and one of the leaders for getting [the state colleges] out of the state department of education. And he had a book, which was in galley proofs at that point, that was coming out, called The Autonomy of Higher Education. It was one of the first books on coordination in higher education. Roy Simpson despised Lyman Glenny for doing all these things and showing up at legislative hearings which they had had--I should have added that.

They had had some hearings before the '59 session of a legislative subcommittee, where Glenny and some others had appeared for the state colleges, and said, "Hey, we need a Ph.D." So, having appeared at those hearings, Simpson disliked him. Simpson forbade the survey team members to talk to Lyman Glenny. And so, Arthur Coons said to me, "Here are the proofs of Lyman's book." They had the proofs: Would I read it, would I brief it, and would I go talk to Glenny and come back to them? Because I could talk to Glenny, but they couldn't. Which I thought was really marvelous suspense. So I did all that, and I came back and reported and everything else. And somehow or other I managed to get along and was accepted by the team from then on. So I sat in on all of the meetings of the survey team, which for me was really an incredible experience. I mean I'm new; I'm young; I don't know about all this, and suddenly here I am. It was the right time and the right place.

And toward the end, I kind of played a funny, different role. Coons and I got to be very good friends. We got to be very close, and I kind of played a hearing role, you know; he could talk to me because he couldn't, at times, talk to one of the other segmental representatives. If he wanted to think something out, and people were taking a break, we'd walk someplace so he could just talk, you know. And then in turn, I kept going back and telling the legislators what the liaison committee was doing. We had a legislator, I think, at most of those liaison committee meetings. The legislator showed up and kind of listened.

Rowland: This was [Senator] Miller, on the whole?

Sexton: Miller didn't attend any of this, it seems to me, until toward the end. [Assemblyman] Sedgwick came once, and [Assemblyman] Brown came once, [Senator] Grunsky came once.

Rowland: The background to all this is that it appears that Grunsky is probably one of the main people who we might try to interview.

Sexton: Yes. Certainly interview. He was always in my opinion on the periphery. I mean, I would talk to him, and I would brief him about what he was getting into. But education was really not a main interest of his at all. The judicial committee was much more of interest. Working his practice and making money, and home was of interest. I never got any kind of an interest or commitment in education from him.

He wasn't a malicious person, and when it came around to the--in the introduction of the legislation, he introduced it first. He really jumped the gun on everybody. And again, in my opinion, I don't think he was malicious about it. I think he saw it as a good way to enhance himself, or something.

So he would come in at those stages, you know, when all the regents were there. But then, toward the end, as they got to the end of the survey team, then there was the pulling together, more of the legislators tended to appear. Only one time, it seems to me, did I call several of the legislators and say: I think that this meeting is going to be important, because they're bogging down on something or another and it would be helpful if you are there. And then about that time, the legislators began to use the argument much more than they had in the resolution: If you don't do it, we will. That became the threat. If we don't get a plan from you, if you can't get together and do it yourself, the legislature will do it for you.

Rowland: So that then became--

Sexton: --and that had been said earlier. But we really, at that point, didn't apply that threat until that stage. Then there was all this constant arguing that was--I don't want to bore you with that.

Rowland: Was Governor Brown just observing this, or did he have reports from Coblentz or Christopher?

Involving the Governor's Office

Sexton: Yes, I kept reporting to Richardson and to Leiffer about what was going on. Leiffer was getting his own reports from Dumke. Richardson was not getting any other reports from the university people particularly. The difference was, Richardson didn't conceive his role in the governor's office to be a university representative. And I think Leiffer did think of himself as much more a state college advocate in that office. Beyond that, I can't remember that the governor was involved. I know that Donahoe occasionally would see him at things, and so on--

Rowland: Would see Governor Brown?

Sexton: Yes. And it would come up about having this, and how are they doing. And I'm sure then Brown was attending regents' meetings, at that time. And so he was obviously hearing from that source.

The survey team finally did reach agreement, God, in the kind of--it appeared they had an agreement, then it appeared it would fall apart, and then finally at the last minute it would come back together. They had a meeting here [in University Hall] upstairs, in the regents' conference room, of the two boards again. [Governor] Brown was there, and Kerr. At that point, all the legislators showed up again. Coons presented the survey team's plan. It was a kind of crowning touch for him.

Rowland: This was in 1960?

Sexton: No, this had to be in early December of '59. And he presented this and it was a very impressive show. The liaison members, you know, urged the support of the two boards for this plan, and Kerr did, and Simpson did.

Rowland: Simpson by this time had been won over?

Sexton: He went along with it. It seems to me that by that time, but I could be off; it may be in like another year that Heilbron became chairman of the state Board of Education.* And that was really the end. The board began to take over more and more away from the superintendent in many things. This was one area, and the other was, you know, get all those people from the state Department of Education who are educationists, out. Braden was much more interested in that fight than he was in higher education. Heilbron was much more interested in the master plan, and played an absolutely key and essential role throughout this whole time and when it went to the session, and so on.

Rowland: Heilbron was--

*Heilbron was president of the state Board of Education in 1960-61.

Sexton: He was an attorney in San Francisco. He went with the state colleges, and he was chairman of the board of trustees--oh, gosh, I don't know--a number of years.

And then his term expired. Everybody I know urged Reagan to reappoint him--Republicans, Democrats, everyone--to the board of trustees for the state colleges.

So then when--[pause] I guess everybody had talked with Governor Brown before hand. I talked to him again--you know, Richardson, Leiffer and I, and other people had talked to the governor about this meeting. So at the end of the meeting, when the plan was adopted unanimously by the boards to transfer the master plan to the legislature, and to urge that Brown call a special session in '60, he said, yes, he would do that. You know, [Brown said] that this was one of the great issues of our time, and he would call a special session. And everybody left happily. [laughs] And round two was about to begin! But that really ended that portion of, as far as I know, Brown's connection. And Brown was clearly always hearing more from regents. Yes, from regents. Hale Champion was not that high in that process yet. Later he became that way in his administration. He came to be very powerful.

Rowland: Did Champion support the university?

Sexton: No. No, he became more kind of very questioning: 'a plague on all your houses, and wanted the governor to be more independent of the university. But at that point, he was press something or another.

Rowland: Press secretary?

Sexton: Probably, yes. He really did not come into his own. It was later, then, when he was director of Finance that he became really influential. But he wasn't then, and my impression is that the governor was not close to Simpson. No one really was. The Board of Education members were not his appointees until Heilbron and Braden came on. Heilbron--

Rowland: The Board of Education was elected?

Sexton: No. Appointed. The governor appoints. Simpson's elected. The superintendent's elected, and the board's appointed, which is a contradiction to start out with.

And then Heilbron and Braden obviously--they were close to the governor in terms, I suppose, of getting to him.

Sexton: But this fellow Warren Christopher is now the U.S. Undersecretary of State, attorney in L.A., a really behind the scenes figure, for years throughout the Brown period of time. And I got to know him because the governor appointed him to the Coordinating Council for Higher Education when he set it up. And then he became the president [of the same organization] for a couple of years. He was the U.S. Deputy Attorney General under President Johnson. An incredible faceless person for having had all these connections. But he was close to Heilbron and Braden; so was Coblenz.

That whole little group of people who were involved as the kind of junior members of the Brown administration in a role with lots of those people. And so I'm sure that's how the governor was hearing a lot of what was going on, from them. So, it went to the legislature.

Rowland: Now, backtracking quite a bit here. It appeared that Donahoe and Williamson introduced ACR89, which was a move to create a state college or university at Bakersfield on the same day that the master plan proposal was introduced. Was there a connection there?

Sexton: Yes. She said that she was doing that proposal for constituent reasons, but that she agreed to put that aside until this master plan was completed. And that, she wouldn't push it. On the other hand, it was her way of indicating, is this going to be one more Stanislaus State College and more of that? (which was always referred to as Turkey U).

Rowland: Turkey Tech, right.

Sexton: Yes. Yes, it was her way of saying: Sure, we all have these. Frankly every legislator could put in a resolution if they wanted to. And she had indicated that when she had put it in, (I think Williamson too) that they were not going to move ACR89. They were not going to push this thing. Until this plan—

Rowland: They had a fear of a charge of pork barrelling.

Sexton: Yes. Until this plan's completed, and that they would, you know, push for what they wanted. But it was one more of those little things that they could say at home, you know: We've introduced a resolution to see about it. On the other hand, she was able to say to master plan participants: Hurry up about it; otherwise we're all going to start doing this and the most powerful will get institutions in their areas.

Text of Kerr's Letter

(EDITOR'S NOTE: This is the text of President Clark Kerr's open letter to Representatives-at-Large Ken Cluke and Roger Hollander concerning the Kerr Directives.)

open letter to:

Ken Cluke:

Roger Hollander:

In the Daily Californian for Monday, November 13, 1961, you write in part as follows:

"We broach the question of what forces are behind the decisions to eliminate, without precedence (sic), student rights which previously existed."

The claim that "students rights which previously existed" have been eliminated has been part of the Slate "line" for two years. It is also a good example of the "Big Myth" technique at work.

I make this offer to the two of you: If you present your request to Executive Committee for the return of "rights" effective prior to my participation in their formulation or any part of them (i.e. the Rule 17 as of 1956, the Sproul statement of 1940 and the associated rulings), and Executive Committee concurs and forwards this request to me, you can have them back for the Berkeley campus effective the day following receipt of this request. There is only one proviso and that is that the "old

directives" will remain in force and effect for the Berkeley campus until such time as a vote of the student body asks for the "Kerr directives" back again and this vote shall only take place after the "old directives" have had a fair trial.

If you believe in what you set forth as your convictions, you will ask for the "old directives" back again. If the students at large come to share your belief, they will never ask for the "Kerr directives" to be returned. I await your request.

May I add that I regret the circumstances which lead me to this letter but, after two years of silence, I have come to the conclusion that this is the best way to introduce a sense of reality into the continuing discussion.

I have great confidence in the good judgment of our students and because of this confidence I am particularly desirous that they have available to them the true facts rather than distortions of the facts.

—Clark Kerr

One Man's Opinion

In a press conference reported in The Daily Californian of Oct. 26 we expressed our opinions on the Kerr directives and their relation to student apathy. We stated that the general lack of concern with policies directly concerning students was an indication of apathy and further that the philosophy of the directives itself contributes to the discouragement of meaningful participation by students.

We now feel compelled to present our criticisms of the directives and a justification for them.

First, we question the so-called "open forum" policy, which allows for "a wide range of speakers" whose views must not be "incompatible with the educational objectives of the University" as determined by the Chancellor, and requires certain procedures such as a full week's notice before a rally can be held. A policy with such limitations cannot be rightfully called "open;" wide range or liberal, perhaps, but not truly open.

We, however, object to the restriction or limitation of speech at the University for any other reason than to maintain proper peace and order. We do not believe that a free and open interchange of ideas can be "planned" by a paternalistic administration. True free discussion is a spontaneous phenomenon and the only way to insure its existence is to preserve the availability of all channels through which it is liable to erupt. Seemingly innocent restrictions subtly, perhaps even unintentionally, oppress spontaneity.

Second, we feel that relegating social and political action to an off-campus status is detrimental to the educational process and further that it undermines a basic purpose of the University. Such a restriction unavoidably carries with it the all too prevalent notion that taking actions upon one's beliefs should be completely divorced from objective and nonpassioned consideration of those beliefs, and that engaging in the former is somehow less reputable than in the latter. This is not so. Participation in a free and democratic society requires more than the ability to reach intelligent decisions; it demands know-how and often courage to act upon such decisions. The University, whose purpose it is to prepare students for participation in society, must therefore provide for the development of the ability to put ideas into action as well for the objective consideration of ideas.

Third, we are critical of the rationale given for the expulsion of political and social action from the University campus. This entire argument is derived from Article IX, Section 9, of the California Constitution which states that the University shall be "entirely independent of all political or sectarian influence and kept free therefrom in the appointment of its Regents and in the administration of its affairs."

It seems to us that the intent of this statement is to protect the autonomy and integrity of the University from outside forces, such as a state legislature or religious group, which might attempt to influence its policies and standards for political or sectarian reasons (How could an on-campus action group such as SLATE was, possibly influence the appointment of the Regents?). The philosophy behind such a safeguard asserts that the University, in order to continue its quest for truth, must be the most liberal institution in society, it must be left free to explore whichever paths it finds fruitful, it must be a sanctuary for those of the most radical persuasion, it must be free to consider the most un-orthodox of ideas—for truth is often found in the most unlikely places.

Fourth, we broach the question of what forces are behind the decisions to eliminate, without precedence, student rights which previously existed. It appears that the element of controversy is the factor which has influenced such decisions. For example, when ASUC Executive Committee encouraged social and political action in its motion with regards to the Activities Fair, nothing was said; but when a motion was presented to endorse the peace vigil, it was ruled to be social and political action by the Chancellor's representative.

Proponents of this doctrine argue that such rulings are necessary to keep controversial issues and groups off campus because, if allowed on campus, they become associated with the University and thus give a bad image of it to the public which elects legislators who in turn control University funds. This argument is essentially a plea for expediency, and as such we denounce it. We believe that it is time for both students and university administrations to stand up for student rights which are being seriously threatened by outside pressures which may or may not hold purse strings. We believe that it is time to stand by our ideals knowing it may mean sacrifice, an act which is rapidly declining in the highly pragmatic and bureaucratic society within which we live.

Finally, we protest the indiscriminate manner in which the directives have been applied. It has been considered political action to endorse a vigil and suggest participation, but not so to campaign for Berkeley School Bonds. Such arbitrariness is both dangerous and unfair.

We do not doubt the good intentions of President Kerr nor his desire to promote the welfare of the University. However, we believe that in his efforts to protect the name and independence of the University as an institution, he has imposed upon it a sterility which undermines its most basic of principles and induces the loss of that dynamic quality and spirit which makes the University the last outpost for truly free soul-searching and truth seeking in a proud society which is becoming more and more intolerant of criticisms of its cherished ways and institutions.

Ken Cloke
Roger Hollander
Representatives-at-large

- Sexton: Grunsky was obviously interested because the Monterey-Santa Cruz area had indicated an interest in a university campus. Oh, there were a raft of them. So, what more do you want to know?
- Rowland: One theory holds that the founding of Cal State Bakersfield is tied in with the Kern County Land Company and the governor's office. Do you know any further on that?
- Sexton: Well, that's much later on. Yes.
- Rowland: Right. The school was founded in '65, so this was maybe in '64, was the year--
- Sexton: There was an authorization for Kern and for--
- Rowland: The Tejon ranch?
- Sexton: No, it was from some other interest--for two state college sites.
- Rowland: Oh, two state colleges.
- Sexton: No, two sites. I don't remember what the other one was. The [state college] board of trustees had to select, and they had several different offers of land. I think there were virtually free offers of land in Kern County; that was a surprise--it was different say from Contra Costa County. They did take the Kern County Land Company land; you're right.
- Rowland: Other offers came from partisans of Brown, supporters of Brown, in the Democratic party. And these partisan Brown offers may have played a role in the selection of the Kern County Land Company offer for Cal State Bakersfield, which was odd in the sense that Kern County Land Company is Republican.
- Sexton: Yes. I just don't know about that.
- Rowland: Had some give and take occurred there?
- Sexton: Could be. I really was not involved on that myself. Somebody else that is still around by the way, though, in terms of the legislative part of this, when the governor did call a special session: Hugo Fisher was really very influential, and so was Alan Post.

Enacting the Recommendations

Sexton: And there was a jumping of the guns, as I say, and Grunsky introduced the constitutional amendments in the legislature, which would in effect accomplish most of the things in the master plan. There had been meetings between Donahoe and Miller and Post and Fisher, Sedgwick, I think, myself I know, in which none of them were terribly enamored about some of the recommendations of the master plan and freezing all the stuff into the [California] constitution. I had kept the legislators informed of that as we went along in the process, too.

Rowland: Yes. One other recommendation, I think, was to establish a board of trustees for the state college system.

Sexton: Most everybody, I think, was in favor of that. To get it out of the Board of Education, get it out of the superintendent's office.

The recommendation was to make it a constitutional body. The master plan survey between the two boards [Board of Education and Board of Regents] went with the constitutional business, so that you would have set up the regents then you would have set up the trustees, and you would have set up the coordinating council, all in the constitution. And in the process you would have put in some functions which were frozen functions, so that everybody got their payoff in this game.

Rowland: But the board of trustees does not enjoy the autonomy that the regents have.

Sexton: It's not unintentional. That never went through. And so, if you're reading the survey, you know, the master plan and such, you read the recommendations, those were not what were enacted in the law. And that proved to be a really big fight, because as I say, most legislators were not in favor of this constitutional autonomy routine.

Rowland: For the state colleges.

Sexton: Yes. And for the coordinating council. Legislators had had enough of that with the university, and they did not want to have to go through that with anybody else. They felt that it would be impossible to get the university out of the constitution. (And some were not really in favor of doing that.) But they sure as hell were not going to do this other [follow the master plan] of putting all these in the constitution. And their experience with the university up to that point certainly justified this kind of--

Rowland: The beginning of the turbulent '60s, when legislators were quite critical of the university.

Sexton: Yes.

Rowland: When it was getting quite heated on the university campuses.

Sexton: And there was some other legitimate concern on their part, about recommendations.

I remember we met several times in Miller's office; we met once in Hugo's office on this same kind of thing. And during this period of time, Donahoe was getting ill--asthma trouble and so on. As you know, she died the day before the session ended, or about two days before it ended. And so, I guess I went to more of those kinds of things at that point, on behalf of her. Miller, Hugo, and I could talk more easily than they could talk to Dorothy. I suppose that was male chauvinism more on their part.

And Post came into it, very strongly at that point, because Miller was very close to Alan Post, and he chaired the committee, you know, that Post staffed--the Joint Budget Committee, and the audit committee and all this and so on. Post became a really key advisor at that stage of the game. He had not appeared much before although we had always kept him advised, though, on what was going on.

So Grunsky had introduced this constitutional amendment and was putting in all these things that the joint boards wanted. And here were all these other legislators who were furious with this, because they didn't want to go for it anyway. I think the other legislators had planned to have some sort of meeting and see what they would introduce as a package rather than have Grunsky just jump the gun.

And so there were a long series of hearings that went on in the Senate Education Committee that Donnelly chaired and Miller and Fisher were both on it, and so was Stiern. And then Grunsky was presenting all these recommendations.

And rather than ever face it directly, they just kept chopping him [Grunsky] away by amendments: Don't you think this ought to be there, and don't you think that ought to be there? And then finally, he knew he couldn't get the bill out. In fact, I can still remember--it was just really one of those marvelous legislative scenes.

Rowland: Now, one of the master plan recommendations was the right of the university and the state college to expand the--

Sexton: New institutions?

Rowland: New institutions, right.

Sexton: That was apart--those were recommendations that came out about certain areas that needed to be looked at. Those [recommendations] came through the survey team, and they came through the two boards and would have gone to the legislature; the legislature was asking--well, as a matter of fact, one of the things that the legislature added to the responsibilities for the coordinating council, was to advise them on a need for new facilities. Those would come through this new agency that was going to be created. And what they hoped for was some kind of an impartial agency that would hear the requests and then advise the legislature on what was needed and what wasn't.

Rowland: Another problem was that there seemed to be a raging argument between the state college and university over the Ph.D.

Sexton: Yes.

Rowland: Was it Kerr who finally worked out a solution to this, in working with Simpson? Do you recall?

Sexton: Of the joint doctorate proposal?

Rowland: A note in our office suggested that the joint doctorate was Kerr's idea.

Sexton: Yes. I think that Kerr was probably holding out in the survey team, during the period of time, adamantly, that the Ph.D. was not going to be in the state colleges. And he strongly wanted functions, a statement written in. I think that was the key part of the university--they wanted that definition--delineation of function they called it--they wanted it in the constitution. And that would be the end of further issues over the state colleges growing to be universities and the Ph.D. and so on.

Eventually the compromise from that was the--which Dumke had to sell to his people--was this joint doctorate, which was the most that they [state colleges] would get.

I'm sure that Kerr--I know in the legislative session Kerr had a really tough time when the idea of master plan constitutionality was dropped and substituted with the statute proposal. This allowed joint Ph.D. functions to be changed by statute any time. Kerr then saw this as a terrible nose under the tent, and he at one point was ready to throw the whole thing out. He and Corley were having it out, because Corley was saying, "We'd better take this now" and, "How's it going to look if you accepted it this way and not do it?" So Kerr bought it--

Rowland: Yes. Kerr's problems with Corley are legend.

Sexton: But everybody kept balking and for different reasons along the way, as you would expect. Eventually Kerr accepted this in statute, but he was very unhappy about it, that it wasn't constitutional. Because he saw that [constitutionality] as the final resolution--

Rowland: Now the coordinating council--that's gone through a major change, now, too.

Sexton: Oh, yes.

Rowland: Now it's called the Post Secondary Education Commission. And from reading, just by trying to pick up some references here and there, I went through some of their documents, and they even mention right on the back of it that they've had big problems trying to handle particular grievances with the master plan, like the joint doctoral argument which was carried on in the meetings of the coordinating council.

Sexton: Not particularly.

Rowland: Arguments over campuses' financing.

Sexton: The doctoral question really was never to my mind--I don't think it's ever popped up seriously again. I worked for the Coordinating Council for Higher Education, and I don't really remember that as being an issue.

Rowland: What about research?

Sexton: Research funds?

Rowland: The '62 legislature--didn't they cut out research funds for the state college system?

Sexton: '62? They may have.

Rowland: They cut it out completely on that.

Sexton: The council's dilemmas were more with what were the proper role for them?

Rowland: Defining their existence. [laughs]

Sexton: Yes. Defining their role and advisory to everybody, you know. Advisory to all the boards. And a council that was probably more heavily made up of people who were higher education, than they

Sexton: were of, you know, public appointees, and they were appointees from the regents and so on. The whole question of new institutions was a key one for them.

Rowland: This was the year of expansion of population.

Sexton: Yes. And trying to advise properly about that.

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Sexton: When the council was adopted by the legislature, you know, when that part of it was put in, there was a hope on a lot of the legislators' part that they would create a body that would be sort of knowledgeable but semi-independent, that really could advise them.

And I know people like Miller and Donahoe (well, before her death), but--certainly people like Miller and--oh, let's see--Hanna, the famous now Congressman Hanna, who was to become the chairman of the Assembly Education Committee after that. These people were really serious that they wanted an independent body that could make those tough decisions about new campuses and get that issue off the legislators' back. And if this independent body could also come up with reasonable recommendations about growth, about financing and so on, that, too. And that, I think, was what they sort of hoped for.

They should have known in looking at the kind of membership that they were putting on the thing, that that really wasn't going to work very well. We made a mistake at that time. We added three public members; the original recommendation from the survey team and boards did not include any public members on the council. It consisted of the segmental representatives. And it was kind of a little bit of glorification of this joint liaison. The whole question of new institutions, and the three public members got added by the legislature. So they hoped for it, but it was a part of those euphoric days when you really thought all kinds of things might happen. And then, October of '60, the council people were all appointed, and in the governor's council chambers the governor was there. And his appointees and everybody else--

Rowland: This was the coordinating council.

Sexton: The new members, yes. And the governor gave a little talk about how he hoped for great things, and then they were to advise him as well, and so on. And so again, this was another place in which--

Rowland: --the research issue was not a raging battle to be excited about?

Sexton: I wouldn't have said so. Admissions was certainly another one. That was a whole big area.

Rowland: Admissions?

Sexton: Admissions. They raised the admission standards in the state colleges and diverted 50,000 students to the community colleges.

Rowland: Right. And lowering the undergraduate lower division admissions for the colleges?

Sexton: Yes. All this kind of thing. Because all they saw were fantastic numbers of students coming--where were they all going to go? And they would bankrupt the state if they came into the university and the state colleges--on and on. And that consistently was a big issue, I think. I was trying to remember--the governor did appear then, and the governor appeared later at another coordinating council meeting.

Rowland: So he generally backed the--you would say, he generally backed the master plan recommendations.

Sexton: Oh, sort of, yes. He did at the time of the passing of the plan, and so on. I mean, again, I can remember Richardson and I can remember Leiffer being there and being informed about the kind of things going on, and they didn't take any active part of my knowledge at all, in the hearings, and so on, that went on.

And I don't remember the governor doing it either. I think he sat and waited to see what would come to him [from the legislature] and then be advised as to whether to sign those things [master plan bill recommendations] or not. When it came time to--signing the master plan bill, I don't think he had any strong negative advice telling him not to sign. Certainly most of the legislators were saying, "Sign," and I think his own people were probably saying the same thing, "this was the best you could get."

And it all ended on--that whole thing ended on Donahoe's death, which was really a stunner. She got pneumonia over a weekend and died, and so it was kind of saying--

Rowland: "We ought to do this for her"--

Sexton: Sort of thing, yes. And that's why at the end, it seems to me it was Miller or somebody on the senate side, who amended the master plan bill so that, you know, it would become the Donahoe Act, and all that sort of business. And it was really in that kind of sad sort of feeling that the thing was ending, and did end, and the governor signed it. You know, I can't remember, although,

Sexton: I know at that point we were also running to Bakersfield and everything else for memorial services, but I can't remember any flourish with the governor signing this thing. Now there must have been; there must have been press releases and all that kind of show that he was doing this, and so on. I just don't remember that part.

Rowland: Now how long did you remain in your legislative role as a consultant?

Sexton: I stayed until January of '61.

Rowland: And then you came to the university system.

Sexton: No. No. I was at this meeting in October of the coordinating council. I mean, I went down to see it open and everything else. And the governor in talking about this, then said: Well, we've got to have somebody here who can take minutes and do all this kind of thing--the council's going to need some kind of help. And the governor said, "Yes, Keith. Keith. Come on up here." Now I did not--

Rowland: Brown didn't know you that well, did he?

Sexton: Yes, and I didn't know the governor that well. I had seen him in and out of these occasions. It was all rigged--I learned later it was rigged by Leiffer and Richardson and Corley and all that crew, that Brown would do this. So then I ended up in this, and I started working for the coordinating council; he had appointed his people. I said: Well, I'll help staff, you know, until they could get started.

And then in January, then, I left the Education Committee; Hanna became the chairman, and I was going to go full time with the council. I was acceptable as a non partisan type; I knew about education, but I hadn't worked for any of them [the council members]. And I guess I was acceptable to most all of those people. They were going to begin the search for a director, and so on. So I was the council's first living employee.

And then, in the '61 session, Hanna called after he'd been appointed chairman, and said, "You've got to come back. I don't have anybody here for this." So I did both jobs. They called it half time; it was full time, you know, for the council. And then I left the Education Committee at the end of the session, which was the end of June. And was replaced by the now controller, Cory. Ken Cory came in as the consultant.

Rowland: Was that an ex.officio position?

Sexton: No.

Rowland: Before he was controller.

Sexton: No. Hanna appointed him as the consultant to the Education Committee, and from that he went on to meteoric heights. And then I went full time with the coordinating council. I stayed with the council until 1970, which was about like what, eight years or so in that, of the council, and then left that year and then came here.

[Interview 2: October 4, 1978]##

Rowland: Now, in talking about the legislature we would like your recollections of Jesse Unruh. What can you tell us about Unruh while you were a consultant?

Sexton: Unruh was just different. [pause] He later became the good guy-- I mean pleasant and that sort of stuff; then he wasn't as much fun; you couldn't call him "big daddy" and all that.

Rowland: Well, Unruh certainly had a bitter battle with Pat Brown too for a long time.

Sexton: Yes. That I don't know much about..

Rowland: That, more than anything else, we'd like to document and get down for the project for research. That will be a very valuable thing to go back and review in the Pat Brown administration.

Sexton: That would be true. I don't know how much there was a real split or how much--you read about a lot of what was really happening. But Unruh certainly was ambitious.

After a little while he controlled the assembly and the rest of it--I know, there was at the end of one of the sessions: He went over and he was working the senate floor on some bill or other that he wanted and God, the senators were absolutely furious. They had never, ever had the Speaker of the assembly come on the senate floor.

Rowland: This is prior to reapportionment, right?

Sexton: Yes. Jess was over there and was working the floor and muscling these people and, boy, they [the senators] didn't like it, but it was in the session--that's what he was doing. And he also had an entourage of people who went around and who were also equally fat. [laughing]

Rowland: Some of his administrative assistants?

Sexton: Yes, his A.A. was a man named Larry Margolis and he was big. Well, he didn't look quite like Jess, but he was big and jolly and so on. I guess that was it. The other person that I can think of that was around him was not. But you always had this impression of this entourage when they came. [laughing] You know, walls--

Rowland: I don't think that [senate pro tem] Hugh Burns had such a problem with Unruh. There were times when there was a friction between Burns and Unruh, but not too much. But there were certainly quite a few senators that disliked him.

Sexton: Oh yes.

Rowland: And that whole reapportionment thing when the senators feared that Unruh was going to try to gain control of the senate by having his lieutenants in the assembly run for the senate and then take it over. That was just a real bitter battle over reapportionment.

Sexton: Yes, that was Crown, wasn't it? Wasn't Crown chairman?

Rowland: Well, this is the senate reapportionment of '65, when the court ordered the one man-one vote decision. The court ordered the senate to be reapportioned like the assembly by population rather than counties.

Sexton: That's when lots of them quit.

Rowland: Right and some of them went into judgeships.

IV PORTRAIT OF THE THIRD HOUSE

Consultants and Lobbyists##

Rowland: With the experience you've had under Donahoe and under the education committee, you've probably come in contact with legislative advocates and special interests. We're trying to piece together a picture of how the legislature operated during the Knight-Brown years, and how lobbyists and legislators related. Can you amplify in some way the consultant role--that's interesting.

Through my research I uncovered that it was frequent for a consultant to become a lobbyist and go back to becoming a consultant--it was kind of this fluid avenue between lobbyists and consultants--did you find that true too?

Sexton: No. I have to start in '59 (I think that may have been true before). People were hired as consultants to serve during the interim period and the interim period ran from July 1 of a year (however many months that is--like 18). They would go through the budget sessions--

Rowland: These are consultants in both the senate and the assembly. You primarily--

Sexton: Yes, I worked in the assembly, so I guess I'm generalizing about that.

Rowland: Did that change?

Sexton: No, I think that was pretty much true, with maybe the exception of one or so committees that I can think of in the senate. They did the same thing--you tended to have people who came on July 1 of a year and they would go through the entire year and then the next six months and then they did not work for committees during the general session.

Rowland: Consultants?

Sexton: Consultants. Committees didn't have consultants then, with one or two exceptions and certainly George Miller, Jr.'s committee was an exception, but then about the time I came--now that has to be '59, there were interns--there may have been some consultants, although I don't really remember them particularly.

Rowland: Did that change when Jesse Unruh--

Sexton: Well, they changed in '59--at the end of the general session in '59. Yes, I got asked to stay on with the education committee as consultant and that was not just at the interim--that was set up then that we would be full time. And a number of other interns were asked--one or two from the previous year who had been working on the desk. And a lot of times that was what did happen to some people. They were consultants and then they'd go to work on the assembly desk during the general session and then they would become consultants.

Rowland: Who worked on the assembly desk? What does that mean?

Sexton: Oh, whatever you do up there--read bills and all of that--you work for the chief clerk--

Unruh had a consultant--well, no, I guess everybody had consultants and a lot of them had been interns and then when it came up on the--1960 was the general budget, so we went through that.

So in '61, came really the first question about whether you were going to have consultants then to the committee during the general session. They did and they had a number of consultants.

Jess, I guess, would he have been Speaker by '61?

Rowland: I think, yes.

Sexton: If that was the case then, he was very favorable to that kind of thing anyway.

So at that point, I know, that's the time that Hanna took over as chairman and I came back--

Rowland: Chairman of the--

Sexton: Education Committee. I came back half time through the 1961 session as consultant to the Education Committee. But other people had consultants. I can remember the Water Committee was

- Sexton: next door to us and so they had Ron Robie who was the full time consultant, and a number of the large committees had consultants during the session. That sort of started that whole process.
- Rowland: But there were transitions between consultants and lobbyists.
- Sexton: No, I didn't see that on the assembly side. People could--
- Rowland: Presume an expertise in a certain subject area, as a consultant and then would be hired on as a lobbyist?
- Sexton: They might eventually become lobbyists, but they wouldn't come back again as consultants--that's what I mean. I didn't see that kind of shifting. I'm sure people who were consultants became lobbyists. Legislators who didn't get re-elected became lobbyists. [laughing] But, I didn't see them coming back as consultants and legislators. Once you became a lobbyist you stayed a lobbyist or you did something completely different.

There was one other event, not right about that time, but shortly after that time, that a lot of consultants to committees came from the [legislative] analyst's office. Jerry Evans, who worked for Jess, who was consultant when Jess did his review of the master plan, had been in the analyst's office. And that's been true of the consultants of the assembly, even today. Murdock has been there for some time, from the analyst's office. There was a number of that kind of thing.

And I don't know on how many kinds of subjects, but I do know they moved to whatever that's called--the Republican consultants--isn't that the group--Republican consultants?

- Rowland: I didn't know they were called that.
- Sexton: But that was another source of people. And up until that time, at least until I was there, I know of the people in the 1959 session that we relied on, I relied on heavily, were the people who were in the analyst's office, because they had been there longer and they certainly knew more about all kinds of legislation; they were very discreet. You had to ask them for materials because they didn't really work for policy committees, but once you went into the interim, they were at every interim hearing, usually with some testimony.
- Rowland: Why did they not come in during the general sessions?
- Sexton: They tended to work the budget committees and they were not working with subject committees. They were staff for Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees and that really kept them busy.

- Sexton: And unless they were really specifically asked to come in on a subject matter, they did not--although you could use them as resource people if you wanted to do an analysis.
- Rowland: Again, was there no precedent for having consultants and people from the budget office during the general session?
- Sexton: That's right--also in '59 in several committees someone was assigned from Legislative Counsel's office and that again was another change.

We had a man who was assigned to sit at every hearing of the Education Committee. He was there to answer legal questions. That hadn't been done before either. And he and I used to sit on the tier directly below the chairman. Now consultants sit next to the chairman, but not then--that was too much--you couldn't do that.

The secretary sat next to the chairman and then the committee consultants sat below as long so we could be reached. Seating arrangements were very important--was very touchy to these people at the time. And very touchy with the secretaries.

- Rowland: Why were the consultants elevated in the sense of seating--was that because of their importance?
- Sexton: Eventually they became important and eventually the old system broke down.
- Rowland: Why did the system break down?
- Sexton: The old system didn't have consultants--other than the chairman. (I can say that, can't I?)
- Rowland: Well, I suppose it will pass [laughter].
- Sexton: (No, because we didn't say chairperson.) Anyway, the chairman of the committee--the only other staff persons being as consultants there during general session that worked for them was the secretary. They tended to have a committee secretary and then they would have a personal secretary.

The secretaries of most of these committees had been there for a very long time and they were very powerful women. It was in '59: it [the relationship of secretaries to consultants] began to come apart somewhat and I think by, at least during my time of being there, by '61 and '62, that had really fallen apart. It isn't to say that secretaries to committees were not very important and influential--

Secretaries and Lobbyists##

Sexton: There was a group of say like, ten or twelve of these secretaries and they had lunch together once a week and they were their own little group.

Rowland: This is assembly secretaries.

Sexton: Yes, not senate, just assembly. And they were a very close knit group and they had a tremendous amount to say about anything. The woman who was secretary to the Education Committee when I was there had been, I don't know, seven, eight years, maybe nine years as secretary to the committee. She and Donahoe did not get along and at the end of the '59 session, Donahoe fired her and wanted her own former personal secretary to become the committee secretary. And oh, my God, you never saw such wailing. And Ralph Brown, the Speaker, came down to talk to her about it and asked her, did she really have to do this? Because these secretaries had lots of influence and I suppose on the other hand they knew a great deal about what had gone on with every assemblyman and everybody else, because they partied with the assemblymen as well as among themselves.

And if anything, I know a number of them were more than just the keepers of the gate--I mean, you know, who could get in to see whoever [if you knew them well]. They also were, and the one in Education is the easiest one for me to use, they were very influential--that's where the lobbyists became influential a lot. You never saw such "buttering up."

Rowland: With the secretaries?

Sexton: Oh, my God yes!

Rowland: This is prior to '59.

Sexton: It was going on in '59--it was going on in '60, although it was beginning to fall apart, but before that, in that period of time it was really very important.

And the woman who was the secretary to the Education Committee was quite close to the CTA lobbyists, and so there was never any problem if the CTA lobbyists wanted to make sure that they were heard before committee or what time they were heard before the committee or if they wanted some kind of special note that might get to Donahoe, before or after the meeting and so on. She didn't like the person for the AFT at all and probably wasn't catered to as much.

Rowland: Because he was representing a more radical union?

Sexton: Or she didn't like him or he didn't give her "goodies." And the "goodies" were there. I mean they never went to lunch without it being picked up--the tab--by lobbyists. In fact we had several interim hearings and one of the first shocks for me was when the secretary indicated--we were having some hearing someplace--well, what we had to do was to work it out though because it had to be all right with [a particular] lobbyist. And her job was really mainly to make sure that a lobbyist would be there to pick up the tab of the assemblyman.

Rowland: Who was CTA lobbyist at that time?

Sexton: Bob [E.] McKay. And the fellow who was his assistant. He left and went with the school boards association as I recall, later: Bill Barton. The school boards association is another one--

Anyway, her job was really: who was going to pick up the tab for lunch. And if you had to be there the night before for the hearing, what lobbyist was going to be there to pay for dinner--all this kind of thing.

I thought that was really wild, but I discovered that that was the role that the assemblymen had come to expect. Notes would be passed during the morning hearing about who's the pigeon? And the secretary would determine which lobbyist would be the pigeon for lunch. That was a very big part of it, so the lobbyists had a good deal of influence in that way.

Analyzing the Effective Lobbyist

Rowland: How would you personally judge the effectiveness of a lobbyist. What would be your criteria for assessing a successful lobbyist?

Sexton: [chuckling] The easy answer I suppose is if you get the bills passed you want and you get those bills killed that you don't want--

Rowland: Well, what are the ingredients, then, of a successful lobbyist?

Sexton: I think that's difficult to tell. It depends on what you're representing, I think, and therefore who you deal with. An education lobbyist will be very different than somebody who was with the--

Rowland: Lobbying for oil, for instance.

Sexton: Or the race tracks and so on, because they tend to deal with different committees and different people.

Rowland: Oh, that's another interesting question. Who are the most important, the powerful lobbyists or representing more powerful interests at that time?

Sexton: In my time? I'm not sure that I'm terribly aware of the number of the powerful or the big money people.

Rowland: James Garibaldi, for instance?

Sexton: Garibaldi, yes. There was another man--what's his name--white haired--Monroe Butler--Superior Oil and a number of others. And I'm more familiar with him [Butler] because he happened to be an Occidental College graduate and he always had a dinner for the Occidental alumni.

Now, here's a case: for instance, when I was dealing with the Education Committee--I knew who the lobbyist was. He would upon rare occasions see Donahoe, for instance, on anything, and if he did, it probably was something because she was on Ways and Means and he had some bill or something or other that he wanted to get passed. But in terms of any kind of working sorts of things--

Rowland: In your time, what was the traditional role that a lobbyist played, in other words how did he get in contact?

Sexton: Let me use McKay as an example, because he was the most powerful lobbyist of the group that I saw. He was at every hearing--he testified on bills they wanted or didn't want. He arranged for people to carry the bills that they wanted. He had a couple of assemblymen who were on the committee, who were CTA people and they would do whatever they could for him.

Carlos Bee was one, and a man named Ernest Geddes was another. So a lot of times he would pass notes to them and they would do things which did not require him to have to get up and appeal.

He [McKay] was also there as a resource and he knew a lot about education and the code and all this and they did call--everybody called him. He was a resource person. That was a very valuable thing for him to be, because it let him be something more, I guess.

But, if you wanted to know something factual I think he did tell you factually how things were. They called him out of the audience and said, "Hey, Bob do you know--?" and he would come up and tell them what the answer was and make the people of the state Department of Education look dumb. That was a role.

- Sexton: He also could turn on letters to legislators through the CTA apparatus. They [CTA] gave money and they gave assistance during campaigns.
- Rowland: Tell us more about that.
- Sexton: One of the things they [CTA] had was a letter of endorsement at the end of a session or before the election. And if you didn't get the letter of endorsement from them--a letter commending--it wasn't an endorsement--it was a clever little arrangement of somehow a letter commending you on your great help--if you didn't get one of those that meant that the locals [local CTA chapters] would do nothing for you--no money, no work, no advertising in their journals, nothing else. At that time it was a very important letter to get.
- Rowland: Was the CTA, in relationship to other interests, a very strong group?
- Sexton: Yes, oh yes. They had at least a good sized staff; McKay had been there for a long period of time and knew people and so on. He wasn't as "in" on the senate side as he was on the assembly.
- Rowland: That's a good point. One of our interviewees said that there were basically, before senate reapportionment, two types of lobbyists: those who worked in the assembly to initiate legislation and those that worked with the senate to block legislation. For instance, Jim Corley [lobbyist for University of California] was a senate-oriented lobbyist who made good friends with Burns and McCarthy.
- Sexton: I think most of those others--Butler would have been one and Garibaldi another, who focused on senate relations.
- Rowland: It must have been a very exceptional person who could work both houses successfully?
- Sexton: Yes. And most of the big money and big lobbyists as I think of it, were in the senate, because it was easier to be able to get something there than in the assembly.
- Rowland: Did McKay work with the senate too, or did he have someone working with the senate?
- Sexton: You mean did he go? Yes, he went, but he wasn't as effective. He became a kind of focal point eventually. Hugo Fisher and Miller and others later on in '61, decided to get the CTA to reduce their power, [by way of] a new credential bill. McKay became a focal point for that controversy and as I recall he dropped out

- Sexton: of the '61 session towards the end. I think they pulled him out and he wound up working in Washington--whatever that equivalent is in Washington for a while.* And this guy Bill Barton took over, because he hadn't become the symbol or the image quite as much as McKay. And he hadn't probably caused resentments over in the senate. He was more liked in the senate even though Senator Miller was very close to the AFT.
- Rowland: So you're saying that you felt that McKay was dropped because he did not have a good relationship in the senate and the CTA put Barton in who was his assistant who had a style that senators could work with.
- Sexton: McKay had a heart attack, and it was something to lower the visibility. And as you know they passed the new Fisher credential law in '61 anyway and that was all aimed at the CTA as much as anything. CTA and the Department of Education.
- Rowland: Do you know much about that credential?
- Sexton: They had a deal with them sure, because when the '61 session was going on--
- Rowland: Was that Fisher's own personal attack on the CTA and the state Board of Education?
- Sexton: No, they wanted the credential changed and it was in that period of time that Sputnik had happened and the educational system wasn't living up to expectations, and it was the fight between the educationists and those people who were for reform and for "back to basics," I suppose, was the claim. The real examples would have been, that there was a committee--the committee on the public schools that must have been appointed in '60? It was after Sputnik and it was a result of this and there was this big committee appointed to study the public schools.

And the two extremes were a guy named [I.J.] Quillen, who was the dean of education at Stanford and Joel Hildebrand, and he was the absolutely "back to the basics" person. Those were the two extremes.

*See interview with Robert McKay in this volume: "Robert McKay and the California Teachers' Association," Regional Oral History Office, University of California, Berkeley, 1980.

Sexton: Now Fisher was not as far as Hildebrand, but they wanted something more than they were getting from what they called the educationists and the schools of education. And the Department of Education, headed by Simpson at that time, was absolutely full of people who had that kind of background. I mean what else could you expect--that's what schools of education had been turning out for years. So the department was full of that and was full of petty, bureaucratic types. And I suppose, given the head of the thing, that's the way it was, so the CTA was very powerful, because you had a weak state superintendent and the CTA supported him all the time by the way. And you had a weak state Department of Education, which the CTA wanted to see maintained because that meant that they became more important.

So, I may have mentioned this to you before: when the master plan was going through in its last days, we had a run-in with the California State Employees Association [CSEA], and they had decided to go to bat for the people who were in the state Department of Education in the division of state colleges.

There were like thirty or thirty-five, I think, employees in the Department of Education in that division. So, the question had come up, what would happen to them when you created the new board of trustees of the state colleges--would they be transferred, and would this be under civil service and so on. There was a clause that specifically excluded them from being transferred, because people were saying--that's one of the problems: miserable types have been there and you're going to saddle a new group and they [CSEA] don't want to do that.

For some reason the CSEA decided to take that on, right toward the end, after it [master plan for higher education] had passed out of the senate and came to the assembly. They were going to fight that on behalf of these employees. They were urged not to do that, but they decided to do that anyway. They were the only source of opposition when it came down to the last round. In the hearings in the Assembly Education Committee, they were there to oppose--others raised questions. But at any rate, they did this and they did it on the floor while the assembly bill was going through.

Well, they were very powerful people--a very powerful lobby at the time. The easy thing would have been to make a deal with them, because the whole thing hung in the balance, and Miller wasn't going to do that--Miller and Fisher--and they won. They beat them.

At some point, I remember talking with Hugo and the other senators. Well, they were so pleased, by God, that they had finally beaten one of these big outfits who always brow-beat them.

Sexton: They decided to use the same technique on the CTA. And he [Fisher] said something to the effect that: Well, we've gotten one and the CTA is the next one.

When the '61 session came, the Fisher bill did just that. And it did become a fight, because the CTA had introduced a separate bill.

Rowland: Now this was under Barton, or still McKay?

Sexton: No, McKay. '61 the session began--Fisher may have had a hearing--I'm not sure if they had a hearing in the interim about credentials.

Rowland: This was one of Pat Brown's legislative recommendations, was it not?

Sexton: Yes, and so Fisher and company were saying that--

Rowland: The governor's mandate--

Sexton: Yes, so they came up and they introduced a bill. I think the AFT [American Federation of Teachers] people were probably involved in helping them draft the bill, but it was drafted in the legislative analyst's office.

Rowland: So, it began as a battle between the AFT and CTA.

Sexton: Yes, and the CTA got Assemblyman Carlos Bee to introduce a bill which would revise the credentials. He introduced that on the assembly side. And the Carlos Bee bill was a change of credentials, but minor, and that was going to be their offset. The Fisher bill eventually came over to the assembly and then it was in assembly that Bee decided strategically that he would move his bill first and that led to, as I remember, a long and difficult struggle and a very long evening, in which finally he couldn't get his--

Rowland: Carlos Bee could not get his bill?

Sexton: He did not have the sufficient votes in the Assembly Education Committee to get the bill out.

Somebody who would know, he was an intern at the time--who was the legislative intern at the time--he's a lawyer here in Berkeley named Doug Hill and he was an intern during that general session and he did lots of staff work on this credential bill. Then at the end of that session we all went away and Ken Cory came in as the consultant.

Sexton: There were other lobbyists, by the way, other ones who really weren't in that category, at least in education, who were from very small kinds of groups, who hired half time paid lobbyists.

Rowland: Like citizens' interests?

Sexton: Yes, one that I can remember, it was the California Council for the Mentally Retarded, I think is what it's called. And Clair Burgener, who later became assemblyman, later became congressman, or maybe still is congressman for all I know--he was from San Diego, and he was kind of the head of this group and he would come and appear occasionally at legislative hearings, particularly in interim times, and so on. So you had that kind of citizen-volunteer. And if they happened to strike the right note with the legislator, why they could be very influential.

Rowland: Did they operate the same ways as the CTA were trying to do through the secretaries?

Sexton: Some. Everybody worked with the secretaries.

Rowland: You mean currying favor with the secretaries--take them out to lunch.

Sexton: Everybody curried favor with the secretaries. Maybe not quite as much, but some--just everybody.

Rowland: That was just their regular role of working the halls.

Sexton: And the secretaries handled it beautifully. And that group [secretaries] began to be broken up, as you had a new chairman coming through. For instance, Unruh came in when he was chairman of Ways and Means--he brought his own secretary. Then at the end of that session--she didn't go for this kind of thing either and she went. So, it began to break up.

It's almost like the way University Hall [administrative building for the system-wide University of California] operates. [laughing] You know, there are women who have been here for twenty years.

Rowland: When I used to substitute teach I always knew that if I got on the good side of the secretary--of the principal's secretary--I'd be called to substitute and if I didn't I wouldn't be called--that's it. She's the one who made the calls--it was not the principal.

Sexton: This is what was happening in a lot of the committees--the secretaries saw all the mail--they saw absolutely everything. In fact, in some cases, before, I know this is true in '58, letters of complaint, that were sent to legislators, often were given to lobbyists to prepare a response for them.

If it's your bill that they're complaining about, the lobbyist gets to write the letter of response to the constituents or somebody else.

Legislator and Lobbyist Relations

Rowland: Was there a slightly more impersonal relationship between lobbyists and legislators in the assembly than you had in the senate?

Sexton: Well, yes, I think that was true--there was more of the lobbyist in the assembly who would be the expert kind or expert-appearing.

Rowland: The bureaucrat's bureaucrat.

Sexton: But so much of that, in my opinion, was being done through the Speaker's office.

Rowland: Through Unruh himself then?

Sexton: Oh yes, the Speaker's office was very important then. I know that Corley, for example, didn't get along too well with Jess, at least for a period of time--the period of time that I can tell you about is like '61, '62--in there.

Rowland: What was the nature of that friction? Do you recall?

Sexton: I don't know. I mean I can make guesses for you, but it may have been partly the view of the university--it probably was Corley had been and was good friends with senators--probably helped to kill off some of Jess' legislation--I don't know what all, but all of that I'm sure was there. He just didn't get along well with Jess and I know he used to talk about it and complain about it, because if there were particular kinds of bills or something that he wanted--bills were assigned to the committee by the Speaker--and so if your bill went to a committee in which the Speaker controlled the chairman completely--you made your deals

- Sexton: with the Speaker's office. You didn't make it with the chairman of the committee. Government Economy and Efficiency was the dumping ground--I forget at this point who the chairman was, but it was Jess' person. I don't know who it was--the other committee was Government Organization that had equally been the dumping ground, but Gordon Winton was there and Jess immediately downgraded that to a "B" committee rather than an "A" committee--cut the membership and assigned very few bills to it, because of the fight with Winton.
- Rowland: Winton didn't try to challenge that decision?
- Sexton: Yes, he finally did. Anyway, it was that kind of thing, and so the lobbyists dealt with the Speaker's office a lot more than they dealt with the committees. And Ways and Means committee particularly--that was [Robert W.] Crown's and Jess' absolute league and some lobbyists just didn't get legislation through. So, for a period of time, if you didn't have the okay in the Speaker's office for yourself, you just didn't get it.
- Rowland: This was with not just the CTA lobbyists--it was with all?
- Sexton: Yes, that was with everybody. That was when Jess was really amalgamating that power and all those famous statements about "money is the mother's milk of politics" and that's where he was getting it, or a lot of it at the time--from lobbyists to run campaigns for people and so on.
- Rowland: Getting back to Corley. You said in the last tape that Corley backed your selection for the survey team in 1959. Why did Corley back you? Why do you feel he wanted you on that survey team?
- Sexton: Well, I guess when the question came up about whether I was going to be there or not, of whether they wanted me. I know the question was raised with him, by Donahoe--whether it was a good idea--and he supported it. And I think probably he went back and said something to McHenry and/or Kerr that this would be a good idea. I never asked him--I don't know. I have two guesses--well, one of them I think is that he felt that it would be good to have some kind of legislative influence into that survey team--
- Rowland: Rather than have educationists who were trying to tower--
- Sexton: --who he never trusted at all. He and McHenry didn't get along anyway, which didn't help, because their political philosophies and experiences were so different, so Corley was happy to have somebody else in there.

I'm sure that Corley could talk to me and find out things that he wanted in the survey team.

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Sexton: Corley once in a while would ask me to get some information to Donahoe about an item that was coming up in Ways and Means committee that was important, but not very often. Most of the time, I think he'd stop by the office and we'd chat. So, I think, probably, sure he found out things that were happening in the survey team, from me having been on there and I think he did want the influence. I think he had some sense of trust in me--I guess that was partly it.

Rowland: He came from Berkeley?

Sexton: I'd never known him before. I don't know.

I was a very trustworthy type. I'm going to cut that part out of the transcript when that comes around--[laughing]

I think he was happy to deal with somebody in the education committee who was a consultant and it was me--not as it had been in the past--not the secretary and so on. And I don't doubt that he had every intention that he could probably influence me--I mean more easily than others.

I mean it's at that point that I got free tickets to the Cal football games--I mean, my God!

[break in tape]

Rowland: You started getting the Cal football tickets--

Sexton: Not at first--[laughing] First I got Donahoe's tickets, because they gave tickets to every legislator from the university. If you were in the southern part you got UCLA tickets, and if you were in the north you got Berkeley. Two tickets each--well, Donahoe didn't--

Rowland: Was this kind of a standing rule that the university had?

Sexton: Oh, yes. Not only did you just get the tickets, but--

Rowland: You got good seats from it.

Sexton: Well, yes, you did get good seats--he had an absolutely marvelous woman as his secretary who was with him for a very long period of time. One of her jobs was to handle the football ticket seating, because you--

Rowland: Do you recall the woman's name?

Sexton: Oh yes, Dorothy Gibson--she later married--she lives in Sacramento. She works for a lobbyist part time--she was a really neat type.

Sexton: Anyway, one of her tasks was to handle all these football tickets and it was an enormous job, because she had to arrange the seating, and you couldn't put certain people next to certain people, and all that, because senator so and so, would not want to sit with senator so and so.

If it was a good season everybody wanted extra tickets and they were always calling her--they wanted these tickets. And if it was a Rose Bowl--I was never there during a Rose Bowl--I mean apparently it was just incredible, the pressure for wanting tickets--

Well, anyway, Donahoe didn't want hers, so she had them changed to Berkeley and gave them to me. That was the first year. By the second year I was on the mailing list--myself, so I got my own tickets and she got hers back at UCLA which she could give to somebody in Bakersfield. [laughing]

And that lasted for quite a while, until they shifted all the football ticket assignments from Corley to University Hall and somebody went through the list and cut off everybody--we all lost out. Now I sit in the end zone, with my dollar off from San Francisco Savings and Loan. [laughing]

Rowland: When you were talking about Donahoe, another thing as I was going through the transcript that you were mentioning how Donahoe had a less than amiable relationship with Simpson--Roy Simpson. What was the background to that? Was there hostility between them?

Sexton: No, and if I said that before, I didn't mean that it was a hostile one. In many ways--she was always cordial to him. Often times she would tend to try and defend somebody from the Department of Education when they were being berated in front of the committee. She didn't permit that thing to happen if she could avoid it.

Simpson never appeared at legislative hearings at all. He did finally at one occasion. And then it must have been in either '59 or '61 or whatever that was, there was the business of burning textbooks--they were surplus--but burning them--tons of these and millions of dollars. And Simpson had to appear in front of a grand inquisition lead by Unruh in Ways and Means. That was one of the few times that I can remember--he never appeared and he always had people who did appear. His main legislative person--he had two of them--one of them was the guy--I thought I'd never forget his name. He left the Department of Education and went to Senate Research and for years was their expert on school finance: Ronald Cox.

Sexton: The other one was a guy named Wallace Hall. Hall was the head of the division of higher education. Those were the two people who appeared all the time. There were very few people who were experts in the state on school finance, who understood this whole thing. Hall was one. The CTA had one, a guy named Oscar Anderson, who was out of the San Francisco schools.

And when it got into complicated things about school finance, I mean nobody knew anything except these people.

At any rate, it was kind of a distant relationship. It wasn't hostile, but she didn't have much respect for Simpson, either as an administrator or anybody with an idea.

Rowland: It was kind of a personal and professional--

Sexton: Standoff. She would at times berate this guy Hall to go back and tell Roy something or other.

Rowland: Why was Simpson against the master plan?

Sexton: I would have to guess. I don't think he wanted us to lose the state colleges.

Rowland: He wanted to keep that under his domain?

Sexton: I think he wanted that under the Department of Education and under the board.

Rowland: It wasn't anything against Donahoe, or overlap into any Donahoe versus Simpson friction?

Sexton: No, I don't think so. As a side note, one of the things that I suggested to Donahoe, when we were getting ready to go to the interim study period--I thought that one of the functions that a committee ought to do, if it had a Department of Education subject matter--one of the jobs of the interim committee was to look at the department. I mean you would have said the same thing for Transportation and so on. I thought that as a watchdog committee that that was one of the things you had to do.

She didn't want to do that at all. That, as far as she was concerned, would have turned into some kind of witchhunt against the people in the department and that was not what she wanted to do. We would stick to some kind of subject matter and so we did.

Other committees didn't do that entirely, like the fish and game with Pauline Davis as chairman--she had the Department of Fish and Game, in more interim hearings, on the hook all the time than

Sexton: you could imagine. But Donahoe didn't do that. There was something else that I was going to tell you that you mentioned--something about Simpson.

Oh, before the hearing--somewhere in '57, '58, in that interim period, they were looking at the need for new state colleges and the need for trustees and so on. So the interim [education] committee of the assembly was doing something. I don't think they did too much, but they did have a couple of hearings and there was a report from that subcommittee and I think that subcommittee recommended a separate board.

At those hearings, they had one while I was an intern, so it had to happen in that fall of '58--I wasn't permitted to go, I'm trying to remember--I think the chairman of that subcommittee was Britschgi, but I'm not positive of that. But, anyway, that's where Lyman [A.] Glenny appeared and he was then at Sacramento State and he made these statements about--

Rowland: Did Lyman Glenny make this climb from Sacramento State College to the university as a result of his book on--

Sexton: He wrote on the autonomy of public institutions or something--coordinating.

Rowland: Economics, isn't it, or financing?

Sexton: No, it was something about coordination--it was the very first book around and there wasn't really a lot out about that. His was the worst damn thing to read in the world, because he had it all chopped up. [laughing] But at any rate it was the thing that gave him prominence in the field of coordination, so suddenly he became the expert in coordination.

During the '60 hearings, Glenny went to most all the hearings and sat in the audience and listened, especially in the senate. And since he had been somebody who had testified, before they knew who he was, and he was opposed to the master plan, because it didn't go far enough. And for whatever reasons he had, it wasn't enacted into the state constitution.

So, he was really opposed to it and he let it be known to some people. And I know that some people like Donahoe and Bee and others were really disgusted and saying things like, "How's this guy getting in here? Isn't he teaching classes?"

I'm not sure whether as a matter of fact, she may not have called the president of Sacramento State College at one point to find out what the hell he was doing there all the time.

Sexton: He would go to Assemblyman Bruce Allen (now Judge Allen), who was one of the few people who was doing any kind of opposition to the master plan and he would issue press releases written by Glenny.

Anyway, back to those hearings--in that period of time, when Glenny, and I guess probably the AFT was the only other one, who would appear, urging a separate board [for the state colleges] to eliminate the present inefficient system.

I think that caused Simpson to react. "No, it isn't that bad, and these are just a few little mavericks" and all that kind of thing. I don't think Simpson was eager at all to get into any kind of survey or anything, because he thought it would lead to exactly to what it did--to take the state colleges out from the Department of Education. I'm sure he foresaw that. And he had some clue that this might happen anyway, because of the people who were recommending it. And at that period of time, Simpson had been in, gosh, I don't know, sixteen years, as superintendent. He had appointed every president of the state colleges. And of course, I hadn't thought of that, he really had greater control over the state colleges than he had over anything else in the public school system.

Rowland: Here's a question that I'm curious about. When we were talking about why the board of trustees is not as constitutionally autonomous as the Board of Regents, which legislators were in favor of autonomy for the board of trustees; that is, constitutional autonomy for the board of trustees.

Sexton: Well, Grunsky had to be one, because he was carrying the legislation that would have done that. The original legislation that he introduced would have just taken what had been recommended and put it into a bill so that they would then have been constitutional. He argued that side, because that's what these people had recommended.

Rowland: It would be my perspective that it would be mostly senators who would be opposed to constitutional autonomy--mostly the senate leadership who had been battling out with the university.

Sexton: I can't really tell you that. I think there was no one else who was in favor of the autonomy. I can't come up with somebody.

Rowland: What about third house support?

Sexton: Well, the university--as we talked before, Kerr felt terribly strongly about that issue, that he wanted them in the constitution.

Rowland: He wanted the board of trustees?

Sexton: Oh, yes, but he wanted the functions to go with it. It was all part of a package. The one that they would have dropped out most easily was the coordinating council, because that was originally also recommended for the constitution.

No, my impression was that Kerr wanted the trustees in the constitution. He wanted them to have autonomy--the four year term and all that kind of thing--the governor appointing. But the only reason he was willing to do that was because he wanted the functions frozen in the constitution the same way.

Rowland: What was the CTA position?

Sexton: I don't remember the CTA being terribly involved in this one way or the other. They really didn't take a strong stand. They were in favor of doing something that would help the problem kind of thing. And the AFT was much the same boat--they didn't really get into this.

There was the association of state college professors--that was Glenny. Of course, they didn't like it. They opposed the function part of it, because they did not want to be restricted to only the possibility of a joint doctorate--that was the one that they opposed.

Now, other than Grunsky, I really can't think of anybody who was terribly strong one way or another about that kind of autonomy.

I think some legislators would have gone along with it, because it was a part of a package. But the minute that it was jerked down from a constitutional amendment by Miller--you know his bill--nobody else was interested in creating more constitutional amendments.

Rowland: Or challenge George Miller too.

Sexton: Yes, but nobody really wanted to have any more constitutional agencies--as you indicate--they had their trouble with the university and to create that third kind of branch of government--I don't think anybody was interested.

Rowland: With senate leadership against it.

Sexton: This was being discussed in the survey team. I got asked my opinion and I said I didn't think it would go.

Rowland: Thanks again for a most informative narrative. We'll keep in touch with you for further background on Governor Brown's education program.

Transcriber: Alison Nichols

Final Typist: Keiko Sugimoto

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Alex Sherriffs while a student at Stanford in 1939

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Governmental History Documentation Project
Goodwin Knight/Edmund Brown, Sr., Era

Alex C. Sherriffs

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AND THE FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT:
PERSPECTIVES FROM A FACULTY MEMBER AND ADMINISTRATOR

An Interview Conducted by
James H. Rowland
in 1978

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INTERVIEW HISTORY

Dr. Alex Sherriffs was interviewed by the Regional Oral History Office for the Goodwin Knight-Edmund G. Brown, Sr. segment of its Governmental History Documentation Project. Dr. Sherriffs' years as Vice-Chancellor, Student Affairs at the Berkeley campus of the University of California and his role and perspective as an administrator during the Free Speech Movement in 1964 made him a prime interviewee in our documentation of this singularly important event during the Brown administrative era.

Dr. Sherriffs' appointment to the administration of the Berkeley campus can be traced to his deep commitment and sensitivity to students as a professor of psychology at Berkeley. Born and raised in San Jose, California and nurtured in an academic family, he set his sights originally on the study of law after finishing an undergraduate degree in economics at Stanford. It was in his freshman year at Stanford Law School that his career goals shifted upon encountering Lewis Terman and Maud Merrill James, both distinguished professors of psychology. While completing his doctoral studies at Stanford, he was appointed as an instructor to the Psychology Department and the Institute of Child Welfare (now the Institute of Human Development) at the University of California, Berkeley. It was here that he launched the successful teaching career that endeared him to Berkeley students lost in the maze of the "multiversity." He was later appointed to head the newly created office of Vice-Chancellor, Student Affairs, a post he accepted with enthusiasm. It was in this role in 1964 that he found himself caught in the middle between student activists on the one hand and the University of California president and the governor on the other. In 1968 he left the Berkeley campus to become education advisor to Governor Ronald Reagan. He is now Vice-Chancellor of Academic Affairs for the California State Universities and Colleges system-wide administration in Long Beach, California.

My first interview with Dr. Sherriffs was held at the San Jose State University campus in late August, 1978. The fall term had just begun and the campus was buzzing with students. We met at midday away from the hot summer sun in the office of Dr. Sherriffs' administrative colleague at San Jose State, Dr. Bert Burns. Dr. Burns found us a cozy, air-conditioned room where we settled down to a two-hour interview. In that first session, Dr. Sherriffs spoke of his family and personal history, his teaching career at Berkeley, various social and political episodes on the Berkeley campus in the 1950s, and his view of the origins of the Free Speech Movement.

In the interim before our second encounter, Dr. Sherriffs called me to confirm our next interview date and to relay his thoughts on the flight back to Los Angeles after our first session. He had rummaged through his notes on the Free Speech Movement (that we touched on briefly in our first

session) and he felt compelled to stick to a chronology consistent to his personal memoranda and documentation he had kept since that event of 1964.

Our second interview was in the same setting as the first, in September, 1978. Dr. Sherriffs continued his discussion of events and personalities of the mid-1960s on the Berkeley campus. Touching his narrative with wit, he relived those tense months of give and take between the faculty, students, and state and university officials. In a moving sequence, he captured the personalities and problems surrounding the negotiations with student demonstrators and offered his psychological theory for the emergence of student rebellions in the 1960s, a theory that won him selected popularity and a position as education advisor to Governor Reagan.

After rough-editing, the interview transcript was forwarded to Dr. Sherriffs for final review. A few questions over wording of the legal agreement and sensitive references in the transcript were resolved in a thorough page-by-page review with Dr. Sherriffs and his wife in the Regional Oral History Office. The completed transcript retains the bulk of the original wording intact, although several passages have been placed under seal until August, 1989.

Scholars of the new left as well as university alumni should benefit from Dr. Sherriffs' examination of events and episodes described in the following memoir. He has provided us with a balanced view of academic freedom pitted against the rising student rebellion and a university community in transition.

James H. Rowland
Interviewer/Editor

8 November 1979
Regional Oral History Office
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University of California at Berkeley

I FAMILY AND PERSONAL HISTORY

[Interview 1: August 31, 1978]##

Boyhood in the Bay Area

Sherriffs: My father was Superintendent of Schools of Santa Clara County from about 1910-1921 and later became a lawyer. I lived in San Jose for four years and then we moved to San Francisco. I went to a private school of which my aunt was principal in San Francisco; I was one of the first Gentiles in the school. It was a school established by the Jewish community, so I learned what it was to be a minority when I reached puberty. I'm not sure if it would be the same these days, but in hindsight it was a valuable experience. I went to Lowell High School, and continued my education at Stanford for three degrees. I taught at UC, Berkeley, first at the institute of child welfare. After two years, I secured a position in the psychology department at Berkeley.

I became involved in some committees of Clark Kerr's, studying admissions and advising. Kerr attended one on advising. He then asked me if I would work part-time in the chancellor's office (he was chancellor). The title would be chairman of the committee on student affairs. The job later became vice chancellor, student affairs. The formal title and position were given to me when [Glenn T.] Seaborg became chancellor. I'm fairly certain the idea was Kerr's, not Seaborg's, but I don't mean by that that Seaborg didn't like it. It was just that Kerr felt that something had to be done in the

##This symbol indicates that a tape or tape segment has begun or ended. For a guide to the tapes see page 92.

Sherriffs: teaching area at Berkeley, and I think he saw many decades ahead at the time. Something had to be done to get faculty a little more interested in the students if we were going to continue to have a lower division. I was a psychologist--developmental psychology by training, social psychology in research. So I was interested in Kerr's offer, accepted it, and learned on the job.

I became formally a vice-chancellor on the Berkeley campus in 1958. I came to the Berkeley campus in 1944. When I left, I had had twenty-three years at Berkeley as a faculty member and administrator.

From the Study of Law to Psychology

Rowland: Going back to your very early years in primary and secondary school, do you recall any particular turning points within those early years in which you became very interested in psychology?

Sherriffs: No, I don't. As a matter of fact, I'm embarrassed to tell you that I didn't know what psychology was when I was a freshman at Stanford. I was an economics major. I took some psychology courses--was going to be a lawyer, I thought.

Rowland: Was the study of law a tendency in your family?

Sherriffs: My father was a lawyer and I was an unthinking "I'm going to be what my father was when I grow up" type. I had a fairly non-intellectual approach to career goals at that time.

Rowland: Were your parents native Californians?

Sherriffs: My father was born in Canada, his father in Scotland.

Rowland: Nova Scotia?

Sherriffs: Ontario.

Rowland: Your mother's side?

Sherriffs: My mother's from Michigan. She was a kindergarten teacher in San Jose and my father met her when he was superintendent of schools. She was a music master's at Washington State, and had gone to Oberlin College. If I were to look back as a psychologist on my own life of how I got into the field, it was really kind of flukey. I did have an interest in it, or I wouldn't have

Sherriffs: taken the number of units I did at Stanford. I had forty-four units of psychology and sixty-three of economics when I graduated from Stanford.

I graduated from Stanford in 1939 and bought my law books to read during the summer. There is no bigger mistake than to take law books to read during the summer if you haven't had any contact with law. It's the dullest, most discouraging experience I'd had in a long time. I was hired as a graduate student advisor in Encina Hall, a freshman dormitory. The first day of the fall term, already enrolled in law school, I got a phone call from Lewis Terman, chairman of the department of psychology and founder of the Stanford-Binet intelligence test. He was a leading psychologist of the day. He asked me to come see him and offered me a fellowship if I would do a followup study of juvenile delinquents in Santa Clara County as the research assistant for Maud Merrill James who was on the psychology faculty there. I explained I was going to law school. He said that this would be an important experience for law, that it would make me better in testimony. So I took it.

Rowland: You were going to be a criminal lawyer?

Sherriffs: No, but I am embarrassed at how little I looked ahead into law as a career. If my students were as thoughtless as that, I would ask them what the hell they were doing. [chuckles] It was kind of an unthinking, it-runs-in-the-family kind of thing. I think I was too busy trying to grow up socially. I got good grades, but I didn't have driving intellectual ambition as an undergraduate.

Rowland: Turning back to your family, did you have any brothers or sisters?

Sherriffs: One sister. I still do.

Rowland: Older?

Sherriffs: Five years younger. She lives in Michigan.

II TENURE AT UC, BERKELEY: EMERGING ISSUES AND PERSONALITIES

University Loyalty Oath Controversy

Rowland: Turning to Berkeley, you came in 1944 as an instructor?

Sherriffs: As a lecturer, the first two years.

Rowland: In the psychology department?

Sherriffs: No, I first went to the institute of child welfare on the Berkeley campus. Then that was developed into a joint appointment at the institute of child welfare (now known as the institute of human development), and as an instructor in the department of psychology. In those days you could start as an instructor. (Ten years later you would start as an assistant professor.) I went up the ranks and increased my percentage time in the psychology department. I'd have to look but I think in about four years I was full time in the psychology department but with an appointment as a research associate at the institute. That was true for about ten years.

Rowland: Then certain things happened at the Berkeley campus and nationwide during the turn of the decade. One thing was the loyalty oath controversy of 1949-1952. Did you get dragged into that as a faculty member?

Sherriffs: I wasn't "dragged into that." I was very much concerned. A person has some people he thinks a great deal of. In my early academic career if I had a "hero" it was Edward Tolman, who probably was one of the two or three greatest human beings. My wife and I rented a little house from him and lived next door to him. He was the leader of the loyalty oath fight for the faculty. So I was up to my eyebrows with knowledge, emotion, and feeling on the loyalty oath. I was subject to the

Sherriffs: admonition by Tolman and others that those without tenure were albatrosses around the necks of the tenured faculty.

The tenured faculty were testing both the loyalty oath and tenure, and it wasn't the same test if those of us that could be readily dismissed were involved, or so many of the tenured faculty argued. There were debates as people tried to figure out the best strategies in the Faculty Club and elsewhere for weeks and months.

But in the end I was one of those who signed the oath with a statement of disapproval. Some people would say that was cowardly, and others would say that was acting according to the leadership at the time. But I was very much against the second oath.

Rowland: Which Tolman finally forced the regents to abandon through a legal suit.

Sherriffs: Yes.

Rowland: Did you feel as though the faculty gained quite a bit of power at the Berkeley campus since the loyalty oath incident in opposition to the administration?

Sherriffs: Well, this may sound strange to you, but I didn't think of it in terms of power. Perhaps, I wasn't really sufficiently cognizant of the motive of power in the academy, which turns out to be very strong indeed; I learned a lot about it in the sixties. From that experience I wrote articles and gave speeches on my view of the university as a very fragile and precious institution of a free society.

Rowland: This is in the early fifties?

Sherriffs: No, these articles were written in the sixties. They are consistent with what I believed earlier which kept me in the university rather than in law.

I came to understand the fragility of the university more deeply and with more nuances as I gained experience and grew. I see it as an institution of a free society which must be free and that academic freedom isn't just a slogan for power for faculty. The university is an institution that society provides to teach each new generation a little more than the last generation and, within the fallibility of humankind, get a little closer to what we call truth--the facts and the probabilities so far as we can see them.

- Sherriffs: I once truly believed that the faculty were the people whose lives were devoted not only to their discipline, but to preserving the university as a rare institution. I truly believed that the university was the first value, the discipline the second, and one's salary was third. I'm including students very much in those first two categories. So it wasn't natural for me to be thinking too much about the power aspect of teaching. As a matter of fact, most of the administrators that I knew had been faculty members. Many of them were planning to return to the faculty, and many of them did. But while they carried an administrative responsibility they didn't change their values.
- Rowland: In talking about the university administration, what could you add to our knowledge about James Corley?
- Sherriffs: I didn't know Corley very well until I was in Governor Ronald Reagan's administration, incidentally. I had known him as a pain in that he would always carry messages from the legislature protesting our students doing something legislators didn't like, ranging from having beer on a front lawn to making noises too late at night.
- Rowland: Jim Corley himself probably did those same things when he was a student. [laughs]
- Sherriffs: Well, the lobbyist has a difficult role. I didn't know how difficult Corley's role was in the fifties and sixties, but I knew him only as a lobbyist. Later, I knew him as a spokesman for the University of California when I was in Reagan's office; a very eloquent one and a very loyal "old blue" who, though not trained in the academy itself, understood its values better than did many faculty members. He was loyal to a fault. [chuckles]

Race for Berkeley Board of Education

- Rowland: When was your first political involvement? Didn't you run for the Berkeley Board of Education in the early fifties?
- Sherriffs: If you mean my first political involvement as a candidate for anything, then it would have been in 1953 when I did run for the school board against the incumbents, the merchants and the political establishment of Berkeley.
- Rowland: This was your first step into the political arena?

Sherriffs: Yes, and it was a step I was very much surprised to have taken. I had given a speech at Berkeley High School auditorium based on my experiences at the UC Berkeley Institute of Child Welfare. The speech was on the harm that was done both to people in the social clubs at Berkeley High and the people outside the social clubs.

In the area where the students had lunch, Berkeley High School had permanent benches that were tied to the concrete. The high school fraternities and sororities, by an unwritten code, were allowed to eat on those benches and nobody else was. The school administration really furthered this unwritten rule rather than being concerned about it and, in my interviews with a random sample of two hundred Berkeley youngsters who had gone through that high school, it was pretty divisive.

At the meeting there was a discussion about social clubs and whether they should be fostered or not at Berkeley High. I was called on as one of several speakers; Thomas [W.] Caldecott was another.

I took a strong position against the social clubs for the sake of the people in them as much as for the sake of those out of them.

Rowland: Did you make the decision to run as a candidate for the Board of Education?

Sherriffs: No, I didn't make the decision to run. I was asked the next day whether I would run. I don't remember exactly how long it took me to decide.

Rowland: Did your candidacy have Democratic-Republican bipartisan support?

Sherriffs: Well, yes and no. In my mind, a school board is a nonpartisan enterprise and I would not represent a party. I don't see how you can represent a political party as a member of the school board or, for that matter, as a regent or a trustee. Everybody's children go to public schools and universities and everybody pays taxes to support the schools; they shouldn't be stacked for any party's pupose. Besides, the institution won't be free very long if it gets that closely involved with politics. I have never put a bumper sticker on my car when I've been associated with the university, advocating yes or no on anything or for anybody. I realize the law doesn't require that, but I see no reason why I should influence a student by the accident of my title.

Sherriffs: So I ran as a candidate for the Berkeley school board as a nonpartisan. As I think about the committee that worked for my election, there were more Democrats on it than there were Republicans, though there were co-chairmen, one of which was a Republican and one a Democrat. It was an interesting experience, to say the least.

It was a time of Senator Joseph [R.] McCarthy [U.S. Senator from Wisconsin]. Life Magazine had decided to study the effect of McCarthyism on a normal election process where people were using the "red" smear tactic and it was sticking. After a very few days into the campaign, I was visited by the West Coast editor of Life Magazine. (His name was Richard Pollard.) He asked me if I would mind if Life covered my campaign. I said I didn't see how it could other than influence the campaign if they did. So I asked what was their motive. He explained the motive, which was hopefully to have an article written which would show the effects of McCarthyism on a local political campaign. That isn't what they eventually did, but that's what he wanted to do.

Rowland: Did you agree to the Life Magazine offer?

Sherriffs: Yes, I certainly did. I thought McCarthy was the biggest menace at that time that I'd ever known. But Pollard made it clear that there was a publication board and publisher and that the story could be handled in a lot of ways when it finally got put to bed back East. But Pollard's thrust was going to be that running for office was different for John Q. Amateur Politician compared to earlier times.

Well, during that campaign there were people from Life Magazine that followed me and took pictures of the League of Women Voters meeting and many other meetings at which the candidates spoke. People in military uniform would come up and harrass me at a number of these meetings, and always these cameras were flashing. There was just one Life reporter at each meeting and he wasn't noticed; but there was always a cameraman, too. The guy with the camera would never say who he was because that was part of our agreement.

So the word was gotten out that it was the People's World [official organ of the United States Communist party]. The people I was running against, who were pretty far on the right hand side of the fence, had to explain to themselves just who would think I was important enough to be taking all those pictures of me. Well, the first thing that entered my opponents' minds was not Life Magazine covering this silly assistant

Sherriffs: professor from Berkeley. It wouldn't be my first thought either! [laughs] I'm not sure that my second thought would have been People's World, but it was my opponents' first thought. So, the rumors were out. It even once got in to the gossip column of the Berkeley Gazette. It was kind of interesting, but I was relieved when it finally all came out in Life.

Rowland: Were you labeled at all as a liberal Democrat?

Sherriffs: I would say "left"--by my direct opponent and his group. The meeting with the Republican Women of Berkeley was one of the most uncomfortable meetings in my life, partly because I wasn't used to that kind of emotion about having different points of view on a subject; they essentially hissed every time I would say even "and" or "the." It was a very educational experience. I was sensitive, unpracticed, untutored, and without perspective enough so that I didn't contemplate for one minute doing it again, even though I only lost by 178 votes out of 16,000.

Rowland: What was your reaction to the defeat?

Sherriffs: I didn't change my views about political parties or politics much except to become a little more knowing.

Rowland: Did your defeat tarnish your liberalism in the sense that--

Sherriffs: Not that one. Neither end of the spectrum wanted me. I've never been loved by either end of the spectrum. I am to this day not loved by either end of the spectrum. The only people that tried to get me out of the governor's office under Ronald Reagan were two groups: the right wing and the left wing. The very far left in Berkeley tried to get me out of the school board race, as did the far right.

To both ends of the political spectrum somebody who is in the middle of the road is a nuisance; they're very hard to stereotype. Stereotypes are simplistic, and describe rigid and predictable personalities. The person in the middle is less predictable, can appear more rational, and instead of being "black or white" represents shades of grey. People who are their own people are hard to control and hard to label.

I think, looking back, that it was remarkable that I got within 200 votes (I think it was 178) of being elected to that school board. I'm not sure I was mature enough politically to make a very good school board member had I made it. I've several times thought that it was a good thing that I lost. Nonetheless, since, I've always been associated one way or another with what goes on in the community.

Rowland: Did you get involved with the Adlai Stevenson presidential campaign in 1952?

Sherriffs: I think I was rabidly pro-Stevenson. I was one of the people who established California Democratic Council [CDC] in this state.

Rowland: The Berkeley chapter of the CDC?

Sherriffs: No, the Berkeley Grassroots Democrats. But I spent time in Fresno at the preliminary CDC meetings. I was at the first meetings of CDC: the famous battle with Samuel Yorty. I attended other meetings, too.

Rowland: This was in the beginning of 1952 with the Stevenson campaign. Did you have a position representing the Berkeley chapter?

Sherriffs: No, I was just one who went to the Fresno meeting. Actually, my best friend (who's now dead) was a psychiatrist named James Whitney. Jim was the one who would have the posts and the titles in the Berkeley chapter. I'd be with him at all the meetings, and we'd work up precinct organizations. We started the Grassroots Democrats of Berkeley which was a pretty healthy Democratic club, which never slipped too far over in any political direction, at least during the time that we were in it.

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Rowland: Did you ever get involved in state politics?

Sherriffs: I never was really tempted to become a political leader or, more crudely, a politician. But I did believe in a two-party system very strongly. The more I worked politically, the more I believed that both parties had to survive or we were in deep trouble; anybody who's got it all his own way becomes careless about other people's rights pretty fast.

I was troubled by colleagues who would have liked to wipe out the other party. I've been troubled by that in both parties. I want you to know it's an experience everybody should have to be in both political parties; you can't take party hatred seriously ever again, but you can still see the value of the party in removing chaos and certain kinds of candidates. Certain parties haven't done too well lately in that regard.

Rowland: Were you ever asked to run for state office?

Sherriffs: I don't recall ever being asked to run for state office.

Rowland: But you worked closely with Cranston, Richards--

Sherriffs: Well, I knew them all.

Rowland: Snyder.

Sherriffs: I worked more closely with Jeffrey Cohelan rather than Cranston, Richards, or Snyder. I don't know if Cranston would even remember me, but I was around when he was active. But I was just getting my feet wet and learning.

I don't know why some people don't learn this: A person who votes the party line, regardless of the situation, election after election, has either to be blind, naive, immature, or stupid. If a person lives a life, forty or fifty years at least, there's going to be a time when (if he's got any values that are worked out and are clear to himself or herself) his party's candidate stinks. If he's going to vote for him because he's a Democrat or Republican anyway I have a mild contempt or sadness for him. Many of the people around me in the CDC and Reagan administration were that way in their party loyalties.

Rowland: Did this come out from working with certain CDC'ers?

Sherriffs: No, it came out of my whole experience. Even at Stanford I was involved with migratory workers.

Rowland: This was in the war years?

Sherriffs: Pre-war years, 1935 to 1939.

Rowland: With the State Relief Administration?

Sherriffs: No, it was connected with student committees. I went out and spent the afternoon with John Steinbeck (I thought he was a pretty remarkable guy) to try to get him to come onto the campus, become our advisor and give an opening speech to the Steinbeck Committee as we were calling it. He hated Stanford so much he wouldn't come within a mile of the place; they'd kicked him out. He was an earthy man. Nowadays the four-letter word is "in" for everybody, but let me tell you, then it was "in" for him. Most of the rest didn't use four-letter words very often. Four-letter words or not, Steinbeck was a truly great guy.

While you're on the other, biographical, part of this interview, I might say that one of the quotes, near quotes or paraphrases, that I feel very close to was one that was made by Steinbeck when he received the Nobel prize for literature.

Sherriffs: It was given in Chicago at a news conference. A New York Times Magazine feature writer, a young man whom Steinbeck didn't know, said, "John, you've received [pauses to recall] this award as a statement of gratitude, respect, appreciation, empathy, and sensitivity to the tragedies of the human condition, to the injustices that happen in our society. You achieved this reward because of Mice and Men and Cannery Row. Why in hell did you write Travels with Charlie?" (That's pretty close to the actual question.)

Steinbeck didn't like to be called by his first name by someone he didn't know--and he didn't like the question either, quite obviously. He said in as cold a tone as was possible, "Young man, I'll tell you why I wrote Travels with Charlie and not another Of Mice and Men or another Cannery Row. I can't figure out who the underdog is anymore."

There were many times in my life when I couldn't either. Is big labor the same as little labor? Is the Mom and Pop business the same as ITT [International Telephone and Telegraph]? Is our life nowadays such that upon reading the headline about a strike a conservative knows he's on the side of the employer and the liberal knows he's backing the employee? Bull, absolute bull! As a matter of fact, it's very unlikely you can get enough in an average newspaper story to know which side you should be on empathically, depending on who you are. But still people usually respond by reflex. Originally I thought Kerr was the kind of person Steinbeck was.

As Vice Chancellor of Student Affairs

Rowland: Turning to that subject, you moved from the position of faculty member to a faculty liaison with the chancellor who from 1952 to 1958 was Clark Kerr--

Sherriffs: Incidentally, since I took my present job as vice chancellor of academic affairs at the California State Universities and Colleges, it has been the first time since 1944 that I have not taught a class. Even when I was in the governor's office I taught at UC Davis. When I was vice chancellor of student affairs at Berkeley I taught my normal teaching load in what was called "half time;" (It was a very light load so it wasn't hard to do!)

Rowland: What was your relationship with Chancellor Kerr?

Sherriffs: Up until my present job, I've always thought of myself as a member of the faculty and functioned as one.

Rowland: You were a very popular professor in those years at Berkeley according to your former secretary at UC, Janice Starkey.

Sherriffs: I taught a course of psychology for nonmajors which was scheduled almost everytime in Room 2000 LSB, the Life Sciences Building. The room had 557 seats and I think there were very few years that it wasn't full. There was a sign-up sheet because not everybody could get in. I loved teaching. I found teaching a very interesting challenge, a process to deal with a large group and yet to make sure that most feel they are a part of it. (I'm sure it can be done.) I think once you get over forty students it's not a seminar anymore. Instead of just lecturing at people, if you think about a variety of other things you can do to involve them, a lot can be done. Not only did I enjoy a faculty's relation to students, but I also enjoyed trying to learn about the process of teaching.

Rowland: How did you work with Chancellor Kerr?

Sherriffs: Kerr appointed me to the advising committee; I didn't ask, "Why did you put me on the committee?" I suppose it was because it was believed that I had some understanding, empathy, and respect for students and I could deal with the problem (and it was a problem) of advising.

Prior to my appointment, the faculty didn't want to spend time advising undergraduate students on courses and programs. Some senior women students did the student advising. Professor Gerald [E.] Marsh was also summer sessions--whatever the title was--director, for a number of years. He would get women students to do advising in a big bullpen setting over several days. Marsh had a little stamp which was kind of a joke among students. The students interacted with a fellow student who, as an advisor, knew how to get through the system, and then the students got the official seal of Gerry Marsh; that's how much the faculty gave a damn as to how the education of undergraduate Berkeley students went.

The question remained, was there a viable way to involve faculty in the advising process? Our committee on advising rattled this problem around quite a bit and Kerr must have liked what he heard. He asked me if I would come in his office half time and try to pull together in some coherent way the Cowell

Sherriffs: Hospital (which had 400 employees and quite a remarkable potential for psychiatric service), the placement center, the counseling center, the dean of students office, student government, the student union and foreign students.

Rowland: The student union at that time was in Stephens Hall, was it not?

Sherriffs: But Kerr had a dream very early on of a new [student union] building and he got it.

Sketch of Clark Kerr

Rowland: What kind of working and personal relationship did you have with Chancellor Kerr?

Sherriffs: I thought he was a remarkable human being. He was one of two people I've worked with closely who were able, in a hot situation, to know quickly whether to say yes or no. I explained it to myself that he had his values conscious enough, and his philosophy of life worked out well enough, so that each new decision wasn't an independent event, it fit into a scheme of things. He had a remarkable memory, but partly that memory was aided by, I think, the structure that was his own set of values, attitudes, and beliefs.

We had close to a civil war with the City of Berkeley at one point. The City of Berkeley thought we were taking away property on which they should be getting taxes as we were building new buildings further and further into their community.

Rowland: This was when you were taking over Telegraph Avenue for the administration building?

Sherriffs: Oh, it was lots of things, but particularly, the residence halls. I think the residence halls really started the battle with the city.

One thing we always did was research everything in depth for Kerr. He wouldn't have had it otherwise. When he'd walk into a meeting he would know with documentation what probable dollars were that students would bring to local laundries and restaurants, as well as the dollars that would be lost in the tax rolls. He didn't go in blind to meetings with the city; he went in loaded. But the fantastic thing was that, as administrators, we'd get all this material together for him and

Sherriffs: he'd go into his office to review it and nobody but nobody knocked on that door or bothered him for about forty minutes. Then Kerr and I and other university officials would go to the meeting with the city and Kerr wouldn't take a note. We'd go and I'd just watch him perform and sit there in pride and gloat. He was a remarkable person. There are many things to say about Clark Kerr that are very positive.

I know you're asking the question in part because you're going to ask why at another date I take a position one hundred eighty degrees against Kerr and his policies. I don't think there's anything very hard to explain about disillusionment. When you have high expectations, human frailties may hit you harder than they do if you didn't have the expectations in the first place.

Fighting Student Apathy in the 1950's

Rowland: Getting back to the years when you were working under Chancellor Kerr, did you have some philosophy about students, particularly about student awareness? Just from my research of the Daily Cal in the mid-1950's faculty members were decrying the fact that students were apathetic and politically unaware of the issues.

Sherriffs: That was my personal position. As a matter of fact, I worked with Roger Samuelson and Colette Morgan (she is now alumni head at Berkeley) in their campaigns to awaken students politically. Imagine a vice chancellor getting mixed up in who was going to become student body president! But I did because they were excited about trying to bust student apathy.

Samuelson and Morgan were two individuals who, as juniors, running for student body president and student body vice-president, had been on committees with me, trying to do something about what we called the "silent majority." They developed a campaign around what they called the "new spirit." I think Brown, Carter, or somebody else swiped those words sometime later. Samuelson and Morgan participated with me in some little lively on-the-spot demonstrations in my own classroom of how potentially dangerous apathy could be. (I defined apathy as not saying what you believed, if you're not sure of what the others believed, and looking to find out what the others believed before you joined them, even if you didn't believe it.)

Sherriffs: As an example, the rooting section became ugly and violent one Saturday afternoon. It was a football rooting section but it didn't have much to do with the football game, actually. The UC Berkeley students had what was called "suds at sunrise" ("beer busts") for breakfast. This was largely a fraternity phenomenon. At the same time there was an attempt to integrate the rooting section by having women as well as men sit on the fifty yard line. In the past it had been the men on the fifty and the women on the thirty to forty yard line. The move to integrate the sexes threatened the hell out of some of the males. (Women are two to four years physiologically and socially ahead of males for a long, long time, if not forever, and there's nothing like a sophomore to be truly threatened.) The males did some very dangerous and ugly things.

Rowland: This was the period when you were still working under Chancellor Kerr?

Sherriffs: Yes. The point of the story, however, is not that there was a rooting section that did ugly things. The point of the story is that later I asked my class of 557 students, by show of hands, to indicate whether they thought the rooting section had been great, behaved well, so-so, poorly, or bad. I had my teaching assistants at the sides of my classroom to count hands (and I knew what would happen; I had seen it so many times). A few hands would go up instantly from those who thought it was great. Everybody looked around to see how to vote. Hands went up and especially hands would go up around clusters of hands that were already up. Pretty soon 83 percent of the hands were in the air.

I made a point of just accepting the results. I said, "Okay, now you've told me that the rooting section is great." I said, "I want you to write a paper. I'm a psychologist; one of my main interests is social psychology. For my information, for teaching me, I want you to tell me how it was great, how it might have been greater, and all the things you think I should understand from the standpoint of your age group about the rooting section." I tried to be as neutral as I could possibly be, not disgusted, pleased, or anything else.

In the privacy of my students' papers, where the other people in the class couldn't see, 86 percent said the rooting section was absolutely disgusting, and 30 percent of them said that it should be abolished. So, we took all the data from the students' papers, worked all weekend, and got out a mimeographed report of approximately sixteen pages. Along with the data and the statistics, we gave excerpts of their comments

Sherriffs: and then distributed them. Then I said, "Now, let's talk about this. Eighty-three percent of you say it's great in front of one another because you want to be 'in.' 86 percent of you say in private, it's terrible, one at a time, without your name on it, so you're not saying it to get brownie points from me. What does this mean about the values in this society and the defense of such values by you people? It means you can't be counted on for a God damn thing. It depends on the accident of who says something first, and how loud. If somebody tells you beforehand that 60 percent of the people believe 'X', are you still free to make a public decision? No."

I became an arch bad guy for SLATE.* SLATE profited much by pluralistic ignorance. The last thing SLATE wanted was an alive student body.

Rowland: Dr. Kerr in his oral history transcript (and this is turning to when you became vice chancellor, student affairs under Chancellor Seaborg) said that when you became an administrator, you suddenly turned against the students or saw the students in a different light now as an administrator rather than as a faculty member who had more rapport with the student body.

Sherriffs: Well, Kerr would like to believe that, I think. I think I can probably even prove it's not true.

Rowland: Why were you selected for the position of vice chancellor, student affairs?

Sherriffs: Because Kerr wanted a friend of his on the campus, that's why.

Rowland: So it was Kerr; it wasn't Chancellor Glenn Seaborg.

Sherriffs: I'm sure, yes. He told me I was going to stay as vice chancellor. Kerr always--and I was party to it for a while--had his hidden government which were his friends on all the UC campuses. He kept in touch with them and got a feel for how things were, where he needed to spend his time, and so forth. Formal consultation wasn't Kerr's cup of tea. He didn't even go to the crucial December 8th [1964] Berkeley faculty senate meeting. He prevented me from going, also.

*SLATE was a UC Berkeley student political party. The word SLATE designated a slate of candidates.

Non-compulsory ROTC: A New Policy of Clark Kerr

Rowland: From my research on the period of the sixties, there seems to have been some major policy changes that President Kerr initiated for the state-wide system. The first policy change I noticed, which was particularly disturbing to alumni and regents, was making ROTC [Reserve Officer Training Corps] non-compulsory. What was your reaction to that?

Sherriffs: I'm not sure which side Kerr was really on in that decision. I didn't have much emotional involvement one way or the other.

I took ROTC at Stanford (I guess it was called ROTC) so I could learn to ride a horse. Stanford's ROTC was a cavalry unit. [chuckles]

But the position that Kerr took, the position that Seaborg took, and the position that other administrators and I took, was that we had a contract with the federal government. The federal government was the one that knew whether they needed ROTC or not at Berkeley--the federal government said, for the security of this country, we needed to have a non-military backup. The federal government knew more about the necessity of ROTC than we did. We were an educational institution. Some of us would just as soon not have had it, but we got a lot of our funds from the federal government. And the federal government had a contract with the Berkeley campus and if they wanted to release us from the contract, that would have been because it was safe to do so. But as far as pro or con of continuing ROTC in its own right, I didn't have a position on that.

Rowland: In other words, you saw it for the good of the university, if it was good or bad for the university to do this.

Sherriffs: I thought two things. One, you've made a contract with the government in which you'll say you'll have Naval ROTC. The decision on whether there should be a civilian reserve corps is from my point of view that of the federal government of the United States of America, not that of the University of California at Berkeley, especially after it makes the decision to enter into the contract. If we enter into the contract, until the contract is over, we can't break it; we may try to get out of that contract or to get a different contract, whatever. Also, many students wanted ROTC for a lot of reasons. For a number of students, it was a way to avoid the Selective Service.

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Sherriffs: I can't remember exactly where the sentence left off when we left that tape, but I personally don't have much intensity of feeling on the subject. As a matter of fact, I haven't thought of it since, until you brought it up--until I noticed it in the interview schedule. It's hard for me--it wasn't that profound a thing in my life--for me to go back and dig it out. I do believe in civilian leadership of the military in a free society.

Amending the Regents' Speaker's Policy

Rowland: There was another major decision and that was amending the regents' speaker's policy to allow Communist speakers on campus.

Sherriffs: I remember that one well. I don't know of anybody that wasn't for getting rid of the old speaker's policy.

Rowland: You saw that within the context of academic freedom or the open forum?

Sherriffs: The open forum policy was as much mine as anybody else's. I agreed with Kerr completely in that you make students safe for ideas by giving them all of the ideas in the world, and letting them chew the pros and cons of everything. As a matter of fact, I was chairman of and served on committees (that I didn't have to serve on) with the student government that helped students get quality speakers on both sides of the issues of the day. We would meet every Tuesday noon to discuss what was of current interest to students, which speakers were currently in the area who had something to say, and how to get a balanced program on a variety of subjects. The subjects ranged from the morals of the time to China.

The idiocy of having a speaker, whether his name was Stevenson or Nixon, standing outside the campus on a curb or a car while students stood hungrily inside the campus to listen--it was bizarre. It was not the restrictions of the speaker's policy that got people excited in September of 1964, by any means. Those rules were long gone.

Rowland: Pat Brown was particularly upset about the speaker's policy during his campaign in 1958. Harry [R.] Wellman's transcript recalled that Pat Brown spoke on each state college campus but was not allowed to speak at any university campus in the state. Brown was so upset about these restrictions on speakers that he cut the university budget in his first term.

Sherriffs: You're not going to ask me to admire that, I hope. If I knew that Pat Brown was against it on principle and not because he wanted to get elected I would rejoice. But nothing that you said made me think that I necessarily knew that. You don't cut people's budgets because they have not yet learned to let the speaker inside the campus instead of out. You cut the university's budget when you personally are madder than hell that you didn't get to politicize a few people of your own. So Brown and I would be on the same side, but I would hope for quite different reasons.

III ORIGINS OF THE FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT

SLATE and the Kerr Directives

Rowland: Well, let's get right into the meat of FSM. It appeared from researching Katherine Towle's transcript that the beginnings of the administrative concern surrounding student political groups began in the spring of '64 with the primary campaign of the Republican party of Scranton versus Goldwater. Students were organizing for Scranton and Goldwater at the junction of Telegraph and Bancroft entrance of the campus.

Sherriffs: The concern about whether there was going to be a misuse of the university's name and misuse of its facilities, which might involve political intervention by the legislature and others, didn't begin even in 1964. It began in about 1959. I would say that there was about as much concern in 1960, '61, '62 as there was in the spring of 1964.

I do have my own records of a few things that I would like to share [goes through papers]. In 1960 we had a chance to give to the city the parcel of land which symbolically became the main event in 1964. In 1960 there was a meeting of the joint committee of the City of Berkeley with the Berkeley campus. Louis DeMonte who was the university architect, and buildings and grounds boss, stated, [quotes] "At least at the time being the proposal to convey a small parcel of land from the university to the city for public purposes at Bancroft Way and Telegraph has been suspended. " The reason was, and reading again, "It was agreed that the free speech island should be abandoned for the time being since the Kerr directive seemed to have solved the problem."* Seaborg pointed out that the Regents probably

*In 1960, University of California President Clark Kerr issued a directive forbidding the public discussion of off-campus issues by students on the university campuses. The directive was thrice amended and thus became known as the Kerr Directives.

Sherriffs: would not have voted to give the property back to the City of Berkeley anyway. One reason was that it was embarrassing to ask the city to be more liberal in a speaker's policy than the university had been. The university was supposed to be the place where all things could be heard. [chuckles]

In 1961 President Kerr wrote an open letter to the Daily Californian. [see following page]* It was addressed in response to the two SLATE leaders, Ken Cloke and Roger Hollender, and dated Monday, November 15, 1961. The Daily Californian said it wasn't newsworthy and didn't want to put it in, and Kerr took me with him to the Daily Californian office to see that it damn well went in. In the Daily Californian [see following page] for Monday, November 13, 1961 [Sherriffs quotes] Cloke and Hollender said: "We broached the question of what forces are behind the decisions to eliminate, without precedents, students' rights which previously existed." Kerr replied on November 15, 1961: "To claim that students' rights which previously existed have been eliminated has been a part of the SLATE line for two years. It's also a good example of the big myth technique at work. I make this offer to you"--then he made the offer to take back his Kerr Directives and to put the campus back to what went on before. He said, "If you choose to do that, you're going to have to live with it for a full year and the students are going to have to vote back the Kerr Directives."

Now, there are two reasons that I put this in. One is the issue of the use of university facilities and the university's name; whether you could mount political activity and so forth was hot in 1961, hot enough for Kerr to take me, as the vice chancellor, with him to the campus newspaper and insist that this be printed. It also refers to two years of battle between Kerr and SLATE, not Sherriffs and SLATE. It had gotten to the point that Kerr had lost his patience.

Rowland: He banned SLATE from campus did he not?

Sherriffs: I don't think we ever kept it off very long by any device.

Rowland: A University of Illinois professor had been expelled from that university because of his criticisms about the state of Illinois loyalty oath--an off-campus issue in violation of the Kerr Directives.

Sherriffs: SLATE lost certain privileges, but they didn't lose their effectiveness and SLATE was very much a part of the student scene

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*ERRATA: For the text of Clark Kerr's letter, see pp. 22abc in the Keith Sexton interview.

- Sherriffs: in the spring of 1964.* While Kerr was in Tokyo, the Berkeley campus administration got a call from the university president's office in early summer 1964 reminding us that there were some political events coming along this fall and we better be sure that the administration was tidy in the enforcement of its rules.
- Rowland: What were those political events? Were they specified?
- Sherriffs: There was a political convention for one thing, the Republican party national convention in San Francisco.
- Rowland: Which was in July of '64. Mainly the Scranton student supporters?
- Sherriffs: Right. It was correct and appropriate for the president's office to inquire whether the campus administration was consistently enforcing the university's rules and whether we were enforcing them appropriately. As campus administrators, we had a meeting and at the meeting was the dean of women and the dean of men, the campus police chief, the public relations officer, and Alex Sherriffs (myself). Our first meeting was July 22, 1964. The first item on the agenda was "bicycles." People were shooting down from the Campanile at about ninety miles an hour, and life and limb weren't worth much as you left the Life Sciences Building [see following page]. We agreed and the minutes state, "We will apply the city bicycle ordinance. . ."
- The second item on the agenda was the problem of bongo drums and other noise making in the area of Ludwig's Fountain. We agreed that we already had rules, that when enforced, would resolve the problem. On Item three, which came very close to the end of the first meeting, we noted that, "the area outside the posts at Bancroft and Telegraph were being misused according to university policy and that we could no longer turn our heads. We will continue to discuss this item on our Wednesday, July 29th meeting." That was how vague an item it was at that time.
- Rowland : Did you say you were informed that the areas outside the posts were being misused?
- Sherriffs: I'll read it: "We noted that the area outside the posts at Bancroft and Telegraph were being misused"--that is in relation to university policy--"and that we could no longer turn our heads. We will continue to discuss this item at our next meeting, Wednesday, July 29th."

*For an example of SLATE political activity in Fall of 1964, see supplementary materials in The Bancroft Library.

C O P Y

July 22, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO RECORDS:

Re: Meeting in Dean of Students Office re bicycles, bongo drums, etc.

People present were: Betty Neely, Arleigh Williams, Captain Woodward, Lieutenant Chandler, Dick Hafner, and me.

Item 1: Bicycles -- After reviewing the bicycle dilemma, we agreed that

- 1) We will apply the City of Berkeley bicycle ordinance, including licencing, to the campus;
- 2) Bikes will be allowed only on roads provided for regular vehicular traffic;
- 3) There will be parking only in designated areas;
- 4) The police will impound guilty bikes (mis-parked, unlicensed, etc.)

Item 2: Noise-Bongo drums -- The problem of bongo drums and other noise making in the area of Ludwig's Fountain was discussed. We agreed that we already had rules, when so enforced, would resolve the problem.

Item 3: Area by Bancroft and Telegraph -- We noted that the area outside the posts at Bancroft and Telegraph was being mis-used according to University policy and that we could not turn our heads. We will continue to discuss this item on our Wednesday, July 29, meeting.

ACS:jh

Sherriffs: The informants were in the dean of students office. They said that they'd go down and tell them (the offenders) to move their tables back onto city property. According to the Kerr Directives at that time, they were proselytizing for political purposes in a way that was not acceptable.

Kerr's story is quite different today than then. It's very hard for somebody who's going to write a history to get themselves in a frame of reference in the context of the time. What stunned me was to learn that this student political activity had been going on for several months. The dean of students office had never mentioned it to me. (The dean of students was accountable to me as vice chancellor, student affairs.)

Rowland: That there were these student groups?

Sherriffs: Well, that they were unable to stop unacceptable behavior on campus property. They'd send down, because they wanted to be loved, a secretary to enforce the rules. There were some people on the dean of students staff who felt you couldn't be an authority and loved at the same time.

Rowland: You were talking about Katherine [A.] Towle's office?

Sherriffs: I'm responsible as much as anybody for her appointment by the way, and I'm very fond of Katherine, despite her disillusionment.

Rowland: She's very fond of you.

Sherriffs: I really am fond of her. But Towle's office would send down Miss Skein who was essentially a secretary or an administrative assistant. The students would move their organization tables back, and by the time she got back upstairs again, and on looking out the window--(the dean of students office looks right down on that area) the students would have moved into the restricted area again; it was just harrassment on the students' part.

The dean of students office finally decided to ignore it, but they didn't do so on a policy basis, or come up with some statement that the Berkeley administration could then live with. Instead they just enforced it inconsistently, sometimes yes, sometimes no. Then we had our second meeting.

Rowland: Let me back track a little bit here. I have this document that I got out of Katherine Towle's appendix and it describes a meeting that you attended--the chancellor's special committee on the administration and regulation of student government,

Rowland: student organizations, and use of university facilities. This is a memorandum, July 28, 1960 [see following page]. It's a very liberal interpretation of university regulations regarding student organizing on campus. It says [reading document] that Vice Chancellor Sherriffs and Dean Shepherd participated in the committee's deliberations. It doesn't go any further in clarification of your deliberation. Do you have this in your documents?

Sherriffs: The big issue that any historian has to take account of is: that on the one hand the university should not move out and act on the basis of a student's private life. What student does on his summer vacation or in his hometown is none of the university's business. If he gets drunk every night, it is none of the university's business. If he works for the Communist party it's none of the university's business.

The other side of the coin is the fact that the university itself must not get involved in politics, and so you can't do political organizing in the university's name. You cannot say "Acting for the University of California I ask you to vote for Republicans or for Democrats." Kerr's original position, that he explained in his speech in May 1964, which was an idealistic speech, was a position I subscribed to a hundred per cent and I believed he did too. It stated that not only must the university be kept free of politics, and therefore the people must not use its name and facilities for their own selfish ends (whether they're good or bad ends is irrelevant), and there would be no stress, no duress, no harrassment that would make the university yield. Kerr said those exact words in May. If you want a copy of it I'll send it to you. It was a public speech he gave at Davis; I was proud of it. I'd love to have given that speech.

The only way a university could be free of politics was not to tempt the legislature into controlling you because you've become too political. In Kerr's words, "first and foremost, the university is full and unalterably committed to the principles of democratic government upon which this nation was founded, among which is the rule of law. Only under a rule of law can all citizens be insured full rights and liberties or redress when those rights or liberties are denied. Respect for the law of the land is imperative to the survival of democratic institutions." Then Kerr went on to state that if you violated the law, you did it on your own terms and you paid your own price. The university, however, should pay no attention if you're off-campus because that was your private business. But, again, you could not involve the university if you're on campus. That was in May 1964 and that was exactly the principles on which the Berkeley administration was operating in September--to the letter.

July 28, 1960

Chancellor Glenn T. Seaborg
Office of the Chancellor
3335 Dwinelle Hall
Campus

Dear Chancellor Seaborg:

Your Special Committee on the Administration of the Regulations on Student Government, Student Organizations, and Use of University Facilities held its initial meeting on March 22 and then met regularly during April, May, and June. Vice Chancellor Sherriffs and Dean Shepard participated in the Committee's deliberations.

Our major assignment involved the booklet entitled "Information for Student Organizations," which has been prepared in the Office of the Dean of Students as a revision of similar booklets that have been distributed in past years. We spent many hours reviewing the wording of the booklet and the various Dean's Office forms that supplement it, and the final draft -- attached hereto -- is ready for your approval we believe.

We decided there would be little value for you in a detailed summary of our discussions. In these discussions, however, it was necessary for us not only to consider problems of interpretation that have arisen as to the President's directives, but also to concretize the variant policies that seem to inhere therein. Our discussions have led us to unanimous agreement that the following modifications of the directives and related rules would be desirable, and we list them so that you may advise the President if that seems appropriate:

1. Petitions. Paragraph 3 of the Presidential Memorandum of September 9, 1949 should be amended by deleting these bracketed and underlined words:

A petition addressed to non-University authorities must not (identify the petition as coming from the University of California or identify the signators with the University of California, or) in any way imply the endorsement of the University of California.

2. Political Activity. Paragraph IIIA of the Regulation on Use of University Facilities restricts the soliciting of political party membership and the supporting or opposing of particular candidates to meetings where candidates or their representatives speak. We believe that restriction is unjustified. We see no reason why audiences limited to the campus community should be denied the full range of political discussion -- whether or not there are accompanying speeches by "candidates for public office (or their designated representatives)."

3. Funds Raising. Paragraph IVA of the Regulation on Use of University Facilities also seems too restrictive. We believe that fund-raising rules are required only to preclude exploitation of captive audiences and University personnel. Why should political and other groups be denied the privilege of a "collection?"

4. Literature. Paragraph IVB of the Regulation on Use of University Facilities implies censorship of literature. Entirely apart from questions of free speech, we believe that the administrative burden is not justified and that the University's only legitimate concern relates to littering and other custodial matters.*

5. The ASUC Executive Committee. We believe that Rule 4 of the Regulation on Student Government should be modified in accordance with the October 12th recommendation of the Senate Committee on Academic Freedom. (See VI Ac. Sen. Record, November 23, 1959, pp. iv and v) The attached booklet entitled "Information for Student Organizations" contains this rule (p. 3):

(w)hen a recognized student organization wishes to take a position on an off-campus issue, it must preface its statement with "we the members of (name of organization) ..." or any similar phraseology indicating that the organization is not representing the University or the student body.

Our recommendation is that the Administration accept that approach generally. Because of the uniqueness of the ASUC Constitution, however, we suggest that the Executive Committee be held to a prescribed formula such as "we the members of the ASUC Executive Committee" or "we the majority of the ASUC Executive Committee."

Sincerely yours,

R. G. Bressler, Jr.
F. L. Kidner
F. C. Newman
R. N. Walpole

E. C. Bellquist, Chairman

*In general we believe that the campus community should have at least the privileges regarding University facilities that the Civic Center secures to citizens and others regarding public school facilities. (See Education Code, § 16536 et seq.).

Rowland: During the summer of 1964 there were some very important meetings at Berkeley on unifying the university's voice. [see following page]

Sherriffs: Within the university administration state-wide or on each campus, there wasn't more than one voice; the one voice was Kerr's voice and we all subscribed to his authority, not because we were employed by him, but because we believed in his leadership.

There wasn't a difference in policy; it was a difference of enforcement of the policy. It was the people who could see the violation of policy that complained; one of those complaints was to the president's office. The people on campus could see out their windows that student groups were doing just what Kerr in May said student groups couldn't do, which was to advance political or religious causes, with the name of university behind it by using its facilities.

Now, there were other positions one could have taken. One could have said every student group could advance political and religious causes, so that there wasn't anybody who benefited unfairly. We never were able to use the chapel on campus when I was there (I don't know if you can now or not). Students could go in there. Meditation in the chapel was all that was allowed on the Berkeley campus. The atheists and those of specific religions didn't want a campus chapel used for religious purposes--if you had one denomination on campus the others would blow the university out of the water! There were other ways of going at it. You could have, at Charter Days and at graduation, different clergy representing different religions. The policy that was chosen was chosen by those who were going after funds from donors, and those that had to cope with the legalities of it.

The problems that the Berkeley administration observed in the summer were not differences of opinion about the use of facilities or the university's name. There was a difference of opinion about how consistent you had to be in enforcing the policy. There was the dean of students' opinion which was, "We don't want to keep running down the stairs and moving things that get moved right back anyway. It makes us look silly."

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL

September 21, 1964

Copy

VICE CHANCELLOR ALEX C. SHERRIFFS:

Re: University Regulations -- Use
of University Facilities

In your memorandum of September 18, 1964, you asked certain questions concerning various documents relating to the Bancroft-Telegraph speaker area. You enclosed a copy of Dean Towle's statement on the matter as well as a response thereto by student groups. Subsequently some modifications were made in the previous policy. It is my understanding, however, that the Berkeley administration, while it will permit the distribution of literature in the Bancroft-Telegraph area, will insist on a distinction between literature which is for or against a proposition or a candidate and literature which urges a specific vote or action for or against a particular proposition or candidate or seeks to recruit individuals in connection therewith. In view of the problems which have arisen in connection with this distinction between types of literature, I believe it would be useful to review briefly this aspect of the matter. While I have indicated to both you and Dean Towle orally my legal view of the matter, I think you should have this in writing as background in view of your memorandum and questions to me.

You may recall that in February, 1961, Paragraph IV, D of the Regulation on Use of University Facilities was amended to permit the distribution of literature, circulars, etc., at University of California campuses and facilities pursuant to regulations of the Chief Campus Officer seeking to preserve orderly administration of University affairs and the free flow of traffic. Subsequently, each campus adopted regulations relating to the distribution of literature. That which was approved by the Berkeley campus in my memorandum of March 29, 1961, permitted the distribution of all forms of non-commercial literature at various places on campus. The Bancroft-Telegraph area was not specified. The Sather Bridge was one of those included. The Bancroft-Telegraph area, you may recall, had been the object of some discussion in 1959 at which time this location had been proposed as a "free speech" area. No further action apparently was taken with respect thereto.

VICE CHANCELLOR ALEX C. SHERIFFS
September 21, 1964

2.

It would appear that subsequent to the issuance of the Berkeley literature regulation, students began using the Bancroft-Telegraph area for distribution purposes even though the area had not been included in the regulation. Thus, Dean Towle's initial action in seeking to curtail all distribution in the Bancroft-Telegraph area was in literal conformity with the existing regulations even though the Berkeley campus administration appeared to have acceded over a period of time to this departure from the strict letter of the Regulation.

The modification to which the Berkeley administration subsequently agreed was based, as I understand it, on an offer by various student groups to "self-police" the area with respect to the number and location of tables and the curbing of activities adversely affecting administration of campus affairs and traffic flow. The students, however, appear to believe that that portion of the modified directive which continues to make a distinction between various forms of literature is inconsistent with the basic concept of free distribution and hence is unacceptable. I have reviewed this distinction and am unable to find any basis for it either in law or university regulation. The particular matter under discussion in large part was the subject of my memorandum of May 3, 1961, in response to your earlier request for advice. I noted that because of the "wall of separation" doctrine relating to religious activities by public bodies distribution of literature on University facilities which attempted directly to advocate religious conversion or practice should be discouraged. Religious literature of an "informative" nature which merely informed of such campus religious meetings seemed acceptable. I noted, however, with respect to political material, the following:

"In connection with posting of political material, however, a different situation exists. There is no Federal constitutional prohibition of such activities, and the State Constitution and University Regulations require only that the University, as such, may not become involved in political activities. Our Regulations, for some time, have permitted political speakers on campus under certain circumstances. The new

VICE CHANCELLOR ALEX C. SHERRIFFS
September 21, 1964

3.

Regulation on posting and distribution of literature would seem similarly to permit the posting and distribution of partisan political literature. It is my understanding that such a situation was in mind when the new paragraph IV, D was drafted."

As the foregoing would indicate, there would appear to be no legal reason why partisan political literature not only specifically supporting or opposing a candidate or a proposition but also (if indeed a meaningful distinction can be made) urging the victory or defeat through appropriate votes of a proposition or candidate and suggesting action (within constitutional limitations as to free speech) and recruiting individuals therefor may not be permitted. Similarly, assuming that the Bancroft-Telegraph area is designated as a permissible literature distribution area, neither University-wide rules nor the Berkeley campus Regulation in point make any distinction as to the forms of non-commercial literature which may be so distributed. In other words, the limitation suggested with respect to the type of non-commercial literature which may be distributed in the Bancroft-Telegraph area is not consistent with the existing Berkeley campus Regulation and that Regulation would have to be amended accordingly.

I would appreciate a copy of the statement as it is finally issued.

Thomas J. Cunningham
Vice President and
General Counsel

cc: President Kerr
Dean Towle

- Sherriffs: Well, at the end of the meeting on September 4th with Towle present, Arleigh [T.] Williams present, Betty [N.] Neely present, police chief present, Dick [Richard] Hafner* present, and me, we noted--(I can read it here), "Our alternatives as we saw them were: One, ignore the misuse." We agreed that we would never be able to get through the semester if we did that! Both conservative and radical student groups would either pick up delegates at the Republican convention or picket the Republican convention, or whatever. That's what we meant.
- Rowland: This would be an interesting footnote to get on tape. It wasn't really leftist organizing groups that were doing organizing in front of the entrance. It was--
- Sherriffs: It was a range, a whole range.
- Rowland: Predominantly Republican student groups, though.
- Sherriffs: No. The thing that was predominant in people's minds was that the Republican convention was going to be near by. Both sides could use university property. One side could go over and give support to the Republicans. The other would go over and mess it up. Either one would be embarrassing. Either one would be involving the university in a way that the other political party might get teed off at, and use Sacramento controls to remove some of our freedoms.
- Rowland: There is also another incident here. I hope this isn't too confusing, but there was a reporter from the Oakland Tribune who had seen the Scranton group organizing at the entrance to the campus on Telegraph-Bancroft juncture and he reported this to Dick Hafner and wanted the university to clarify its policy regarding student organizing on university property. Several people have theorized that William Knowland, manager of the Goldwater for President campaign did not want Scrantonites--
- Sherriffs: That's not sure; that was believed. At least I never was able to find the truth.
- Rowland: Then you're aware of that story in the Oakland Tribune.
- Sherriffs: Oh, sure, and I suppose it's true.

*Arleigh Williams was Associate Dean of Students--Dean of Men; Betty Neely was Associate Dean of Students--Dean of Women; Richard Hafner was Public Affairs Officer.

Rowland: Carl Irving I think was the reporter's name.

Sherriffs: Oh, I know Carl. You could ask him. He will tell you fast enough if you have any concern about it; but it doesn't make any difference. There were some lady extremists in the community that noticed student political tables and kept phoning all the time, that the university was being used to advance one set of values. Now, the people that phoned were always the ones who thought that it was the other guy's set of values that were being advanced.

The university is supposed to pursue the truth wherever it may lead, not somebody's biased position. The reason you have academic freedom and tenure to support academic freedom is to be able to pursue the truth wherever it may lead. If you get the Republicans so mad they will only allow certain kinds of things to be pursued or the Democrats so mad they will cause certain kinds of things to be pursued, the main point is the university is being threatened.

Rowland: Was there any regent involvement in this?

Sherriffs: There was lots of regent involvement later on.

Rowland: But not at this--

Sherriffs: Not to my knowledge, I don't recall any.

Rowland: Or the governor's office, legislative--

Sherriffs: I was aware of none at this stage. Not even Corley comes to mind at that stage. But one possible decision was to ignore the misuse which we decided we couldn't do. The second (was) "to renegotiate with Berkeley about taking over the area as previously--"

Rowland: You're now reading from the transcript?

Sherriffs: Exactly, thank you. The tape can't see that.

"As previously proposed." We rejected this--all of us did--for two reasons. But I'll read what it says here first. "That it couldn't be done in time. The semester was about to start. The third was to make the area a poster area. There were certain areas on campus which could be used for posters." We decided that that couldn't be done either because of traffic, so the only alternative was to treat the area like any other area and enforce the Kerr Directives as you would anywhere else. Ed Strong wrote

Sherriffs: a note on the bottom of that saying, "If this has to be done, the reasons should be made clear in advance." Then he wanted to know if there was any way to mark the area off so people knew for sure where they were because a lot of people inadvertently used university property.

But there wasn't an ominous feeling during these meetings that we were going to have--

Rowland: A major confrontation?

The Russian Exchange Student Incident

Sherriffs: We'd been in so many major confrontations--really major--and I guess the fact we'd survived them made us a little careless in that we assumed we'd survive again.

Earlier the United States worked out a foreign student exchange with Russia and we had our first Russian students on the Berkeley campus. They had been on the campus just a couple of days.

Rowland: What is the date of this? The early sixties?

Sherriffs: Yes, somewhere in the early sixties.

Rowland: Before FSM.

Sherriffs: Oh, yes. FSM doesn't exist in September of 1964 either. That became a new label for something old.

After a basketball game one evening at Arleigh Williams' home (the coaches were there and a number of student affairs people were there). The phone rang and it was a newspaper man that wanted to speak to me. As I recall, it was the San Francisco Examiner and he said, "I just wanted you to know that we've all been phoned; all the newspapers, Supreme Court Justice Earl Warren, the governor of the state, and a number of people. We've all been told that the University of California is against freedom of speech, that the University of California is against people of different nations working out their problems together, and the University of California is suppressing (I can't remember) a certain number of things and therefore we're having a news conference with the Russian exchange students tomorrow morning to hear what they have to say about the United States and the

Sherriffs: University of California and freedom." The reporter said, "Look, I'm not going to print this story. I want you to know we wouldn't touch this story with a ten-foot pole. We know that the Russians want out of the exchange more than the U.S. does."

##

I want to finish this story on the Russian exchange students because I think it was at the beginning much more serious than Sather Gate, though what developed at Sather Gate turned out to be much more serious. But, we were on an alert basis all the time and Kerr knew it and was informed of all these things (and so was whoever the chancellor was at the time).

I want to finish this story about the phone call. The reporter said, "We're not going to touch this story. We're not going to print it because we're responsible--but note, in the story are the names of the Hallinans (Patrick and [Terence] Kayo Hallinan) who were part of SLATE. In the story are the Russian students, and in the story is the statement the University of California is against free speech." He said, "I can tell you another newspaper in this town that will print it and I think you better find out a way to see that it doesn't happen." (This was a reporter friend speaking to me.)

Well, I didn't know the details of the Russian exchange student program because it wasn't under student affairs. That was under the "big league," but I learned fast. It was Charles [G.] Jelavich, who was a professor in Slavic languages who was in charge of the Russian exchange program. He was out of the country. I found his wife. She was an ingenious, great person and we called the [U.S.] State Department and asked for the desk that would be responsible for this and we found somebody and told them what we just learned, and was this of concern to them and did they have any suggestions? They said, "It's very much of concern. Russia wants out of this much more than we do. All we can ask is that you see that it doesn't put them in a position to have an excuse to get out of here."

Rowland: Out of the student exchange program?

Sherriffs: Right, take their students back. He said, "I promise you, if Russian students become involved in newspapers and in American politics, they'll be out of here." So Mrs. Jelavich and I worked all night trying to think of how within civil liberties, civil rights, and the university ideal, one could cope with this situation.

Sherriffs: I guess it was four in the morning before we finally found the solution. She had gotten the names of the Russian students from the State Department and from the dean of students (who knew what we were doing). Mrs. Jelavich (which was perfectly logical, her husband was in charge of the program) phoned the Russian students at six in the morning--the SLATE press conference was supposed to be at ten--woke them all up, and said that there was a tour today for them to see San Francisco and the station wagon would be there for them at seven. Well, they didn't know from beans. So at seven o'clock she was there with the station wagon and took the Russian students to San Francisco and drove them all over the place for hours while SLATE met in International House with no Russian students. They gathered some other foreign students as substitutes, but it wasn't as sensitive, and it wasn't going to destroy the program.

Those give you an idea of continuing tough times, and the games were pretty cute. So SLATE wasn't just a pushover. I think the answer to the specific problem turns out to have been pretty obvious, but I must say it took a lot of thinking before we were able to deal with it.

But whether it was that, or another conscious violation of the rules which led to Clark Kerr's statement in the student press offering to give them back their old rules, whatever there was, there was an element of harrassment from SLATE going on all the time. Kerr wasn't any more fond of that harrassment than I was and that began long before I was a vice chancellor.

The "Spock" Generation: A Factor behind the Student Rebellion

Rowland: What was your opinion on the rise of student awareness that occurred with the beginnings of SLATE in 1958? What would you attribute that to?

Sherriffs: You've got to remember I'm a psychologist and my explanation is going to be psychological. Again, for any researcher he can look to the full record. I've given many speeches and written on why I thought the 1964 episode happened.

One of the main elements (and I won't give you the speech now, you don't have that much tape here), is that this was the first generation--generation is a loose word--but the first of college age anyhow--who had been raised by parents in any society where the parents didn't have confidence that their

Sherriffs: feelings and their instincts or their reflex responses to their kid's behavior were appropriate. It was the era of Spock, the era of looking it up in a book. It was the mental health movement which said that you can break babies if you drop them, psychologically.

What you had symbolically was, when a kid was taking a hammer to the coffee table, instead of taking your hand to the kid's bottom and saying, "Knock it off, I'm taking the hammer away" the parent would look for Spock's child rearing text to see what it said about jealousy. Well, that doesn't convince a kid that his parent will stand up for very much.

This was the time of the Genovese tragedy in New York where quite a few people were sitting in their windows watching a woman stabbed to death. (There were three separate incidents and stabbings before she died and nobody called the police. When interviewed later they said they didn't want to get "involved.")

It was the time of the "silent generation," the "silent majority," which, in part, itself resulted from the fact that one's role models, one's parents, didn't stand up for what they believed in (because they were immobilized by my field, psychology).

Swings have been going on since, as you are very well aware. The pendulum has swung, as far as I'm concerned, even too far, in some cases, in "doing your own thing" to a fault. But when people have role models that are afraid to stand up for what they believe in, then they themselves say, "Who am I to stand up for what I believe?"

We had instances, such as in San Mateo County at a high school, where some eighty youngsters stood and watched one that they all acknowledged was a bully, a big kid, knock to the ground a little kid with thick glasses (whose only way to prestige was through books)--and kick out his eye. Not one of those kids said, "Stop." No two of them said, "Let's separate them." Nobody went for a teacher. Later, when they were interviewed they all said, "It wasn't my fight, and I didn't want to get involved." This was all in the same period.

Rowland: Was this a philosophy or perspective that you adopted after or during the free speech--

Sherriffs: Before, long before.

Rowland: Was this something that you were talking about in your classes?

Sherriffs: I was talking about it in my classes working in student government on it, and trying to involve everybody.

The basic point is that it was not a period when students were politically alive, oriented and active. That's bull. You look at the record. It's the period of the lowest votes, not only by students but by adults; regarding students, you had student body votes of seven, eight and ten per cent. It's the period when honor codes broke down because nobody would enforce them. Nobody would stand up for what they believed. They were embarrassed.

When you have that, what you have is the rank and file of a democratic society having left the stage to whomever--the nuts, or the extremists, or those that are organized, even if they're good guys. They're not moderated by having to work with the others, because the others aren't functioning. So you get strange kinds of candidates determined by very small percentages of people and society is in a very risky state.

So it is in that context, as far as I'm concerned, that these things happened. The photographs on the cover of the UC alumni magazine, and the photographs in the newspapers and so forth, of 10,000 people in front of Sproul Hall in that plaza communicated to citizens and parents, "My God, 10,000 people are involved!" Baloney!

When that police car was captured, and there is a count on this, there is a count by professionals. There was an observer's room for the Berkeley police, the Oakland police, the Alameda County Sheriff's Office--people whose job it was to know accurately what was going on. They were watching those around the police car. They were sitting there while Kerr was negotiating with Mario Savio [an FSM leader] and allies. Berkeley Chancellor Strong was unaware that that's what Kerr was doing.

While we were waiting for Kerr to finish meeting with the FSM people down there in Kerr's office, the announcement came--not through the president to the chancellor to the campus--but [strikes table for emphasis] through the president to Savio, to the crowd outside Sproul Hall. A quite different Kerr was apparent than I thought I knew in the speeches of May on idealism about what universities are, what they can give away, and what they don't.

There were 400 people in front of Sproul Hall who stood up when the announcement of capitulation was made, cheered and left. The rest of the "10,000" watching (who wouldn't watch when, in

Sherriffs: the first time since the civil war, a human being and a symbol of law--a police car--had been held for thirty-six hours, and nothing had happened except that the symbol of authority remained hostage), and society was made equal to whatever you want to call it, a mob. So the 10,000 were the silent majority observing 400, and there were 400 all right, a majority of them were not students.

Disillusionment with Clark Kerr

Rowland: So this was the beginning of your disillusionment with Dr. Kerr.

Sherriffs: Sure. On September 18, I have a record of a conversation with Clark Kerr and Katherine Towle. [see following page]

Rowland: This is when he returned from Tokyo and was informed about the--

Sherriffs: Right, in which we went over with Kerr, at University House, why we were where we were and so forth, and in which he outlined for us what we did next. He didn't say no, he didn't say stop it, he didn't say find a way out of that. He gave no hint of a change in principle. He was still, as far as I knew at that moment the Kerr of May. He said, "Of course, we cannot allow people to take the law into their own hands," and so forth. Later, we were in the strange position of having to have meetings with Kerr as to what we do next, and then Kerr would blame Strong for what we did. Do you want to turn that off for a second?

[tape interruption]

Rowland: Do you feel then that Kerr was turning against his own personal principles regarding the university and its policies?

Sherriffs: For whatever reasons and almost before we knew it was happening, student demonstrations were going on. The university president had taken a position that you cannot compromise under duress, while you're being held a hostage. That was his expressed value system. Also that the university cannot itself let its facilities be used for these particular kinds of purposes, and so forth. But he became like a labor arbitrator and mediator who didn't have an investment in the value of either side but wanted a solution.

Rowland: You did know that Dr. Kerr had a background as a labor arbitrator?

Meeting with Kerr
(Sherriffs, Towle and Hafner present
for all or part of the discussion)

The President said there is to be no distribution of action literature on campus anywhere.

This means no supporting one candidate or another, one issue or another, no literature on such things as a call for a meeting to organize a picket or stage a demonstration.

Speakers can advocate causes and take stands on issues but cannot distribute literature such as bumper strips.

There is to be no fund raising or receiving of donations for causes (except, of course, for those approved by the Chancellor).

The area on Bancroft and Telegraph between the posts and the plaques is University property and there are to be no speakers there - no literature distributed which can be claimed is propoganda - no tables except that the Dean of Students will permit a limited number of ~~takee-w~~ tables which are to be manned at all times. A poster maybe affixed to the tables. Otherwise no posters.

On an experimental basis we will extend Hyde Park area on the steps of Sproul Hall as long as the crowd does not interfere with the flow of traffic. Speakers must be students or members of the faculty - not the public

Kerr wants Cunningham to see the paper which Towle will hand to the students at her meeting with the group on Monday morning - to check for freedom of speech and assembly points.?

Cunningham and CK do not agree on the place of the University. Cunningham sees it as public property and Kerr does not.

Kerr understands that we are in an awkward position since we didn't crackdown on the area before when we knew that it was University property. Therefore it is essential that the explanation be given very carefully to the students and to the faculty. Namely, that no rule has been modified - that the boundary between city and University property was thought to be at the posts and this is not the case, it is the plaques. Students got their permits from the City believing it was City property - now that it is clear that it is not City property, we must follow the University regulations

Sherriffs - ES wants the statement made just like the above. KCM

Sherriffs: I didn't say that by accident; it's the nicest explanation I can give. I can give some less nice ones, but it's the nicest one I can give; I'm not sure it's even the right one. If it was just a habit of the negotiator to find a solution then why didn't he at least inform the chancellor? Why should it be hidden negotiations? That takes yet an extra step of understanding.

Rowland: This leads into the larger context of why we are doing these interviews. To begin with, we're working on the Goodwin Knight-Pat Brown series. One of the questions we're asking Pat Brown, Clark Kerr and various other people is why Governor Brown personally got involved on December 3rd to bring the police on campus.

Sherriffs: I know why Brown got involved. I don't know what he said. What did he say?

Rowland: I don't think Pat Brown has actually been asked that question. We're working chronologically with him to that period and I don't think we're actually in that period yet, but we will be asking him that question.

But the larger context of why we're talking about this and what I'd like to know from you is perhaps you can help us in an analysis of why the governor's office got personally involved in the incident on the Berkeley campus.

Sherriffs: I think what's mystifying is why it took so long for the governor's office to get involved; Governor Brown's experience was long before the terrorists of today. Now we're used to hostages. But the first hostages in the United States were held during this episode (that I know of). The FSM activists tried to hold the dean of students captive in her own office, and they held a police officer captive in his own car, while the governor sat fat and sassy; didn't even make a statement of moral outrage, acted politically instead. I think that's fascinating. I think it's just as fascinating as it is bizarre that holding hostages should occur.

What I know is only a part, but what I do know is that a photographer-reporter, free lance, his name is Peter Whitney, was in Sproul Hall functioning as a photographer-reporter. A phone call came to the chancellor's office from this person saying, "I have just been roughed up and they did bodily damage to me and my equipment in this building and what are you going to do about it?"

[Page 36 of the manuscript is under seal until August, 1989]

[Page 36 of the manuscript is under seal until August, 1989]

Sherriffs: I had been told by the governor's equivalent to an education secretary at the time, "Don't bother us until somebody gets hurt." (That was a wrong position to take--"Let us know if there's any danger to people," would have been a fairer position for Brown to have taken.)

Sherriffs: There was a phone call then to Sacramento saying, "This is all we know."

Rowland: To Governor Brown?

Sherriffs: No, he was at a banquet in southern California. It was a phone call to his aide saying, "This is all we know. A photographer-reporter called and said that he has been roughed up and he demands protection in some way, and who's going to do something for him?" I said, "I don't know whether he was roughed up or whether his pride was hurt. There were no police in there with him because you guys [the governor's staff] and Kerr had an agreement on how to handle all this and that's the way it is. You want to know if anybody was hurt and I'm just telling you this."

The aide found Brown at the banquet. Brown took the call and made the decision on that phone call from his aide.

Rowland: You called Sacramento and talked to the education aide?

Sherriffs: I did. I did not ask for anything. I merely reported the incident.

Rowland: Then the aide called Governor Brown and Governor Brown acted upon the information the aide provided?

Sherriffs: The aide told me he did, and somebody at the banquet told me that Brown received the call and came back to the banquet group and said he'd called on the [Alameda County] Sheriff to act. So it's fairly certain.

Rowland: When did you personally get disillusioned with Kerr?

Sherriffs: It wasn't sudden. In the first place, there had been a long history of loyalty, respect, admiration for Clark Kerr. I had lost friends for being on Clark Kerr's side. You don't go from that attitude to disillusionment in one easy lesson. I had seen a couple of things Kerr handled, like the panty raids, that I thought were less than well done. I didn't think he was perfect. I just thought he was remarkable. He had a scapegoat in the panty raid incident.

[Page 38 of the manuscript is under seal until August, 1989]

Sherriffs: I think the university administration scapegoated the Berkeley police, and some of the campus police, to escape blame for a situation known as panty raiding, which didn't need all that heavy artillery. (It was a normal disease like smallpox.) The public would learn to live with it. There were a couple of thousands dollars of property damage, no worse than a usual football game.

Rowland: Basically then, up until that speech he gave in May of '64, you were still very loyal.

Sherriffs: I was loyal to Kerr on September 30, 1964, too. It wasn't until I began to realize that he was telling us [Sherriffs and Strong] one thing and telling the regents something else (and it took me a while to believe that, even). But after all, when it becomes dozens of instances instead of one or two, you begin to realize that something is wrong.

When you're called by one person representing the president at four in the morning--and told to let the FSM activists speak on the steps and you're called by another at seven in the morning, also representing the president, and told not to let them speak, you're hung, whichever you do. You're countermanding one order, and you don't have a witness to the other call, and you're good old Alex. You really began to wonder about this game.

So you sooner or later decide that all you can do is what you think is right. I knew Ed Strong was trying with the best of decent, liberal, human motives to do what was right. He wasn't fast on his political feet. He wasn't a politician. He was a philosopher. But he was loyal to his staff, he was loyal to principle. He believed in the same things that we did. He believed in Kerr at the beginning, as we did, and he was the fall guy himself much more than anybody else. He was the one who put his name on things that others of us suggested. He was the one who went to the regents and said how he saw it, and lost his job for doing so--after they had encouraged him to come.

But, to be kind, in retrospect, most of these people are nice people. Most of these people are decent people. Most of these people are fallible human beings. Most of these people were caught up in something that they didn't understand. That goes for me, too. This was a "first" in a society, this episode.

Rowland: In this crisis situation that was taking on national proportions by December of '64, the state legislature was alerted and not

[Page 38 of the manuscript is under seal until August, 1989]

Sherriffs: He scapegoated the Berkeley police and he knew what he was doing. I'm not that kind of politician. I think if you believe in our kind of society, what you've got to give the people is all of the information and let the chips fall where they may; but be damn sure they get it all. I think the open forum policy should be the policy in life as well as on the campus.

Rowland: only the governor's office but several investigating agencies, including the Burns committee, was trying to get information from the campus, regarding what was going on on the campus itself. The 1965 report of the un-american activities committee mentions that there was some highly placed university or campus administrator who was feeding information to the committee. I was wondering if you could shed some light on that.

Sherriffs: I think I know who they're referring to and he's dead, and I'd just as soon not name him. I don't think his motives were bad. Each person in this chaos, in terms of what he understood society to be and decency to be and how you bring about change and keep democracy and so forth, behaved in what they felt were the best terms.

Rowland: Just as a side note here, in my research I had been trying to track down William Wadman, university state-wide security officer.

Sherriffs: Willian Wadman was somebody I met maybe twice. That wasn't who I was thinking of, but that certainly would be the one (he was the campus security officer), a likely one. I don't know if Wadman's dead or alive. But one of Kerr's first desires was to get Wadman out. I do not remember much. Wadman was never very important in my activities. When he was on Kerr's mind, I was working on things like "the new spirit," and trying to get faculty to advise students, and the like. By the time we got around to the FSM incident, Wadman was gone. Whether Wadman was indiscreet or a bumbler, or otherwise, I don't know. I don't challenge why Kerr got rid of Wadman. I have no idea. I wouldn't have been challenging Kerr then anyway, and it wouldn't have been my business at that time.

Rowland: What did you see then as the role? Do you feel it was proper for the legislature to step in, such as the Burns committee to do a full scale investigation of FSM? Jesse Unruh and Hugh Burns both wanted to start an investigating committee on higher education to study the question of continuing university autonomy as it existed in the constitution.

Sherriffs: The tragedy is that the legislature now, without an FSM, is doing all those things. The legislature now has taken on, in budget language, the job of regents and trustees, and jobs that are none of their damn business or shouldn't be. You have eight, ten, twelve, and sixteen pages worth single spaced of do's and don't's.

Rowland: I do think that the sixties made those people possible. The Burns committee--I'm trying to remember the membership. There

Rowland: were three--[Hugh M.] Burns, [Stephen P.] Teale,-- and Aaron [W.] Quick who came from the Imperial Valley.

Sherriffs: Quick I never met. The other two I know well.

Rowland: There was Richard E. Combs who was really the working person on that committee.

Sherriffs: But he wasn't a legislator was he?

Rowland: No, he wasn't a legislator but he was essentially the committee head as counsel.

Sherriffs: That committee got supported year after year by the state legislature which also financed the University of California to one-third of its financing. You ask me if I were a legislator, would I have said there was a need for such a committee--that's one kind of question. If you say there is such a committee by the legislature, and somebody from that committee comes to the dean of students office, the dean of students calls me and said (I forget the name but it's also in there somewhere, So and So Brydon, I think)--

Rowland: Charles Brydon.

Sherriffs: --"Is over here and asking questions. What do I do?" I said, "You tell him the truth, but you don't go any further than you have to." That's the way I deal with him too. What am I going to do with the legislature? Tell them to shove it? Not until they start doing things that are destructive.

The Bellquist Committee

[Interview II: September 21, 1978]##

Sherriffs: Should I refer back to the last interview?

Rowland: If you want to hold back before you start, I want to clarify some things from that last interview. First, I believe I sent you some material before this interview and one of the papers was something I think we talked about.

Sherriffs: I don't think we did.

Rowland: The Bellquist committee in 1960, not the formal Bellquist committee which came out of the Free Speech Movement, was a 1960 committee chaired by Eric Bellquist in which you had deliberated.

Sherriffs: Along with the dean of students.

Rowland: I don't think we got a full response from you in the last interview on your role on that committee. It was quite a few years ago, but you might be able to recall the committee and why it got together.

Sherriffs: What I was going to say was that if I were an historian looking back, I would want to check my sources for a number of things: One of those things has to do with a very thoughtful effort which involved a number of people, one of the prime movers of which was Clark Kerr (both as chancellor and later as president) to try to find the right balance to maximize freedom on the campus, and to protect the campus as an institution itself. Now as you know, laws and court interpretations have changed a lot since 1958 and a person has to put himself back to where it all was then. The rules under which the game was played when Kerr became chancellor were rules in which people could hear free speech, standing on the campus, but the speech had to come from off campus.

Rowland: Kerr recalled that Adlai [E.] Stevenson and Estes Kefauver had to speak off campus.

Sherriffs: Kefauver, Stevenson--right. I think we mentioned last time that Pat Brown was provoked because even he had to speak off campus.

One of the preoccupations that Kerr had, and that the rest of us around him had, was how could we make it so that you could have maximum free speech and still not get the university involved in politics which could bring the university to its knees, distort it, or give the legislature the right to tell it how to behave. It was in this light that we got regulation changes and many such changes went to the regents.

We had the so-called "Kerr Directives." The Kerr Directives actually were a tremendous liberalization. What they really said in terms of political speech was that as long as the other side could be heard too, over time, (not even at the same time) anything could be said. That's essentially what they were, and a number of us functioned on committees involving students and others to see to it that, over time, people representing a variety of points of view were heard. As long as you did that, then nobody could say you were aiding the left, the right, the middle, the Democrats, the Republicans or whatever. It wouldn't be a propaganda indoctrination machine but rather a part of education. There were various efforts, little niceties, along the way that were either incorporated or thrown out: Such things as a moderator, and a provision for security if the crowd

Sherriffs: was over a certain size and it was a provocative topic.

Rowland: Now you're talking about the regents' speaker's policy?

Sherriffs: I'm talking about the series of changes in policy which culminated in the Kerr Directives in which [Eric C.] Bellquist, [Ronald N.] Walpole, [Raymond G.] Bressler, [Jr.] (all friends of mine at the time), Dean [William F.] Shepherd, and I consulted for Kerr. It was consultation, that's what it was. It had to do with what ways university facilities could be used, in what format could you have speech so it could be maximally free, and who could use the facilities and in what ways. There were a lot of things that had to be built upon the past. In the past, for example, for a variety of reasons, there had been strict rules against collection of money. (Except that the chief campus officer could okay two fund raisings a year.)

The arguments were many. On the pro side, they were that you couldn't raise money for the Democrats, or for the Republicans, or for the Communists, or for the Ku Klux Klan. The public wouldn't understand it and politically they would then come in to control you. It wasn't public relations that was the concern. It wasn't that you wanted the public to love you. It was that if somebody came in to control you, you're that much less a university because you're that much less free to pursue the truth. And this was always the problem. It became the problem in 1964, 1965, up through 1971; all of that became telescoped, that those issues were the issues.

You enclosed another document from Tom [Thomas J.] Cunningham to the campus which said in 1964 that what was being suggested as the rules of the game on the campus had no backing in terms of law; in short, Cunningham thought they were too restrictive. This brings a rather fundamental set of points to the fore. One, Thomas Cunningham was ahead of his time. If you take any one individual, as far as I am concerned, and study his behavior through the sixties and into 1971, I think Tom Cunningham and Clark Kerr were at sword points and they were at sword points on the issue of whether the university was public property or not. [see page 26a-b-c]

Rowland: What was Kerr's stand on it?

Sherriffs: That it was not public property, that we could have quite different rules to protect this institution.

Rowland: Because the university had a different governing body such as the regents?

Sherriffs: It had a state constitutional status. Now, the thing that is hard for those who were around to remember, and will be baffling to those who are looking at something like this for the first time, is this: the president of the university, whose office was on the seventh floor of a building across not too wide a street along the Berkeley campus and opposite the main campus gate, had been chancellor of that campus. He knew what the frontiers were, the things that had to be accomplished that he had had in mind. He knew who the people were. He knew what the buildings were. Even when a fire engine came on that campus, often before the chancellor's office, which was well inside the gate, became aware that there was a fire engine on the campus, there would be a call from the state-wide administration building saying, "What was that for?" It was really that close.

Questions of Policy: Controlling Activism on Campus

Sherriffs: All right. From the president's office, Thomas Cunningham sent the Berkeley administration, as you point out by having sent it back to me, a memorandum dated September 21 suggesting that we could go further in allowing freedom than we were doing [see following page]. That was September 21. On September 18, in a meeting with Clark Kerr, Alex Sherriffs (me), Dean Towle, Dick Hafner [public information officer], a memorandum by Kitty Malloy, who was Chancellor [Edward W.] Strong's confidential secretary, stated [see page 34a]: "The president said there is to be no distribution of action literature on campus anywhere. This means no supporting one candidate or another, one issue or another, no literature on things such as a call for a meeting to organize a picket or stage a demonstration. Speakers can advocate causes or take stands on issues, but they cannot distribute literature such as bumper strips."

[Quoting Kerr now] "There is to be no fund raising or receiving of donations for causes (except, of course, for those approved by the chancellor). The area of Bancroft and Telegraph between the posts and plaques is university property and there will be no speakers there, no literature distributed which can be claimed to be propaganda, no tables except that the dean of students will permit a limited number of tables which will be manned at all times. A poster may be affixed to the table; otherwise, no posters." This is not the campus administration; this is the president of the university. That is the point.

Sherriffs: [quoting Kerr again] "On an experimental basis, we will extend the Hyde Park area on the steps of Sproul Hall as long as the crowd does not interfere with the flow of traffic." That turned out to have been a fatal tactical mistake! But it was done with good will. "Speakers must be students or members of the faculty, not the public." (Most speakers were not students or faculty from that date on, incidentally.) "Kerr wants Cunningham to see the papers which Towle will hand to the students at the meeting with the group on Monday to check for freedom of speech and assembly points." The memorandum continues: "Kerr said, Cunningham and Kerr do not agree on the place of the university. Cunningham sees it as public property and Kerr does not."

Rowland: This is an amendment of the September 14th edict that--

Sherriffs: Oh, every time we met there were amendments.

Rowland: Right, but the September 14th edict was the first one in which Dean Towle told the student groups who were organized that they could not establish recruiting tables at the south entrance of the campus.

Sherriffs: Right.

Rowland: I would imagine that most of those student groups were primarily Republican student organizing groups for the Republican candidates?

Sherriffs: There was SNCC [Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee], and there was SLATE; the Republican groups were not the ones that took up the cudgel. They got in it when it was convenient for others to have them there for appearances--to make the full spectrum.

[continues reading] "Kerr understands that we're in an awkward position since we didn't crack down on the area before we knew it was university property. Therefore, it's essential an explanation be given very carefully to the students and the faculty, namely that no rule has been modified, that the boundary between the city and university property was thought to be the post and this is not the case, it's the plaques. Students got their permits from the city, believing it was city property." (That was true.) "Now it is clear that it is not city property and we must follow university regulations."

(Now, be my guest.) The pattern that emerged was the president (Clark Kerr) made the campus decisions. The president and

Sherriffs: the legal counsel (and it you don't interview the legal counsel you're missing a most important human being in this picture) then gave their own reports to the regents and quite often gave contrary advice to the campus administration. For a while Cunningham was ignorant of the facts, and innocent of the fact that Kerr was having meetings such as the one that we've just discussed, and thought that the campus was simply out of its mind. He learned what was really going on from some of his staff who were working on the various subcommittees, committees, and ad hoc groups that were trying to settle all of this.

Rowland: For further clarification, this was the first meeting with Kerr after he returned from the Tokyo trip?

Sherriffs: Yes, it was.

Rowland: He was being briefed on what happened while he was away in Tokyo?

Sherriffs: He had been briefed by written materials that had gone to him. He was also being briefed orally by us at that time, and he was quick, right, and took charge.

Now, on September 30 we had another meeting. This time with Chancellor Strong, Dean Towle, Kitty Malloy, meeting at Alumni House on September 30. [quote] "After a discussion, Kerr summarized the agreements arrived at as follows: --The students sit-in tonight, we don't remove them, but no one re-enters after they have left Sproul Hall." There is to be a statement by Strong (which says such and such). [see following page] Such a statement by Strong was made and your office can have that, too. The point I'm making is the quarterback for the Berkeley campus administration was the president.

Rowland: Not the chancellor.

Sherriffs: Nor the vice chancellor. We got into a greater and greater difference of opinion as--it's a very strange thing--as the man who could most beautifully state the importance of protecting the truth went into one compromise after another. Kerr could inspire. He taught me to inspire students, too, because I believed it, felt it, and understood it. He taught me to see how significant a university was to a free society, to a democracy, and that its significance was gone if it became the vehicle for one partisan point of view. Then the university becomes an agent. It no longer protects democracy itself by letting the people hear all the points of view. Yet it was Kerr who gave point after point away to Savio and the others.

Meeting with Kerr - Strong, Sherriffs, Williams, Towley Malloy
 Alumni House - 6-7 p.m. September 30, 1964

After discussion, Kerr summarized the agreements arrived at as follows:

1. The students sit in tonight (we do not remove them - noone enters after having left Sproul Hall.)
2. There is to be a statement by Strong - including the point that a revolution was indicated in the Slate Supplement and now it is happening.
3. We have clear cases on the eight - but call it indefinite suspension in all news stories as well as letters to the students.
4. Wires or special deliveries should go to the parents of those indefinitely suspended - saying "We regret to inform you,....."
5. Strong is to meet with Sue and Charley Powell wish, say, two representatives of the groups - the point being that we are on record with the faculty etc, - ~~at~~ that every effort was made by the Administration to meet with the ~~disagreeers~~ ^{John} revolvers.
6. Pick off one at a time.
7. Hold out on throwing the organizations out at this time. This means we will have action every day - do not do everything at once.
8. Strong to call Tom Parkinson - saying that he understands that Parkinson's name is being used by the revolvers as urging them on - and to explain the seriousness of the situation.
9. Important to get the opposition to a minimum as we build up the friends ~~in~~ from students and faculty.
10. Avoid police action - except non-students. Right now have police remove non-students.
11. If they talk about rights being taken away from them - say we would be pleased to return to any previous set of rules we have had before.

KCM

Sherriffs: I was summarizing the way it went as I was coming up here on the plane. It started with free speech as the so-called "issue." I think that's what Kerr would say, what everybody will say that you interview, that free speech was not the issue, but that it started with that statement. Then it was freedom to use facilities to advocate politics. I'm talking about shifts within days now, not months. Then it was the use of the facilities to advocate politics and the right to convert, signing them up and so forth. These were the demands. Then it was all of those things plus adding collection of dollars for these purposes. Then it was all of those things plus being able to mount illegal activities off campus.

Katherine Towle even went so far as to say, "Why not (in the letter you forwarded to me) [see following page] Let's have peace." (I won't say she meant "at any price.") She was saying let the legality or the illegality be determined by the police out there. The regents, even, wouldn't go along with that one, but to knowingly allow starting an illegal campaign on a campus certainly was going to allow whoever was the party in power or the party that wanted to get into power to use the university as their means to an end.

Rowland: Their whipping boy.

Sherriffs: Yes, their whipping boy. After they got in they got control. And I hear what I'm saying; I know full well what I'm saying. But by May of 1965 we'd had all of those positions demanded by the dissident "students;" as a matter of fact we had all of those positions by October of 1964 enunciated, and new points of demand after points had been given in to.

By May of 1965 we heard of a new point of demand for the first time and that was that Vietnam was an issue. When the president was appraised of that one he said, "It will never fly." That's all right, I'm not sure I thought it would fly either. I'm not blaming him for that but I'm just saying it was interesting that Vietnam didn't come on as the thing or issue during the FSM. There is no doubt that people came to this situation that had nationwide press, cover stories in Time, Newsweek, and so on--that people came to make a forum out of the situation in Vietnam. Once there's excitement, though, everybody gets in the picture for their own purpose.

Following Vietnam we had People's Park, as you may recall. We had "reconstitution of courses" and a third of the students left campus by April. They were tired of almost every course being politicized to the point it wasn't education at all.

Note: This was not sent to FWS at ACS's request. Wanted to wait & see what Pres.

December 5, 1964

Kerr's statement would cover at the forthcoming meeting in the Greek Theatre on Dec 7.

KAT gave ACS his copy of this memo for the Chancellor's office files, so that she at least would be on record in Chancellor's office. KAT 12/6

Chancellor Edward W. Strong
Office of the Chancellor
3335 Dwinelle Hall
Campus

Dear Chancellor Strong:

Those of us in the Dean of Students' office believe that much of the present unrest and mistrust on the part of students and faculty alike would be alleviated if a clear and immediate interpretation could be enunciated of the statement adopted by The Regents at their November 20 meeting concerning the use of University facilities for "... lawful campus action, not unlawful campus action."

Understandably there is legitimate concern as to the meaning of the latter clause. Doubts are expressed openly that this policy can be implemented without arbitrary and unconstitutional infringements on freedom of speech.

Members of the staff of this office are particularly sensitive to its interpretation because of the numbers of students (not just those of the FSM) who are deeply concerned about the matter and are seeking our advice and assistance in obtaining clarification. The Dean of Students' staff has studied possible interpretations carefully. We are convinced that the new liberalized regulation need not be in conflict with the already stated policy outlined by President Kerr in his 1964 Davis campus Charter Day address, and if we are interpreting correctly his remarks on Thursday, December 3, as reported in the San Francisco Chronicle, his reiteration of that policy:

"This (FSM) protest has never been over 'free speech.' There has been and is freedom of speech at the University of California. The protest has been over organizing political action on campus. This is now allowed with the one qualification that unlawful action cannot be mounted on campus. And it has been made abundantly clear that there is no 'double jeopardy' involved since students would be liable for University discipline for misuse of University facilities and would not be punished for the actual off-campus violations of law." (Italics supplied.)

It would seem abundantly clear then that this application of policy will violate neither freedom nor reason, ~~nor common sense~~. Lawful forms of protest against the community can now be mounted from or advocated on the campus itself with responsibility for unlawful or illegal acts which subsequently may occur solely a matter between the student-citizen and the courts. In short, the University should not and will not attempt

- 2 -

to determine the constitutionality of advocacy: this is a matter for the courts. Further, there will be no witch-hunts and no "star chamber" proceedings; there never have been. And the customary handling of conduct cases would continue to prevail.


The debate over these and related questions has engulfed the campus for nearly three months. The Regents at their November meeting liberalized the rules concerning advocacy of political and social action on campus. A concise statement with respect to the meaning of "unlawful action" would, we firmly believe, clear that air and give us all opportunity to return again to the continuing business of the University. In view of the Academic Senate's meeting on Tuesday, December 8, where this crucial matter is sure to engage much of the discussions, I urge most strongly that such a statement from the Chancellor and/or the President be issued either at that meeting or prior to it.

We also recommend most earnestly that the University drop pending charges against the four students: Mr. Savio, Mr. Goldberg, Miss Goldberg, and Mr. Turner since they have now subjected themselves to legal action by civil authority. For the University to continue to press charges would seem to serve no useful or helpful purpose in the current campus crisis. I, for one, wish to be on record as opposed to further action against these students for their alleged acts of October 1 and 2. Further, I urge immediate public announcement of the dropping of the charges, if this recommendation receives favorable consideration.

These steps would go a long way toward dispelling current mistrust and frustration and would make easier the next task before us--that of implementing locally as soon as possible those sections of the so-called "Cheit Report" which you have already accepted.

You are aware, I am sure, that the Dean of Students' staff is ready always to offer whatever assistance it can to you personally and to your staff to help get the campus back on the road to reason and mutual trust.

Sincerely yours,


KATHERINE A. TOWLE
Dean of Students

KAT:mh

cc: President Kerr
Vice-Chancellor Sherriffs ,

Rowland: This was once you had left the Berkeley administration and were working for the Reagan administration?

Sherriffs: I'm taking this from its beginning to its end. The beginning of an episode which itself had a history, it was the beginning of an episode starting September of 1964 and which expired as dramatically in the summer of 1971. It expired I might add, two years before the Vietnam War ended. So those who like to explain history of the 1960's in terms of Vietnam have got to explain why did it start with no Vietnam issue and why did it stop when Vietnam was still an issue? They're going to have some trouble doing it if they're honest.

Rowland: Turning back again, in that December, 1964 episode in which the students took over Sproul Hall and you had communicated with Pat Brown's office regarding the incident surrounding a reporter named Whitney--

Sherriffs: I had done as I had been requested to do.

Rowland: You said his name was Whitney, but you could not recall the first name.

Sherriffs: I did recall; Peter Whitney.

Rowland: He was a reporter?

Sherriffs: He was a free lance reporter. He lived in Berkeley, probably still does. You probably can still find him.

Rowland: So he was just free lancing to write an article.

Sherriffs: Everybody was--look, we're used to hostages and people being killed on high school campuses and like things in 1978. We were not used to any of these kinds of things in 1964. When you have 400 people, most of them non-students, running an administration around and around the block, dividing the faculty and administration, dividing some faculty from other faculty, having 10,000 students coming out and watching a police car being held by 400 people, why the hell wouldn't free lance reporters be there?

Rowland: He called up your office and told you that he had been physically assaulted?

Sherriffs: He said, "I have been roughed up."

Rowland: Then you called Pat Brown's office. Who did you talk to there, do you recall?

[Page 49 of the manuscript is under seal until August, 1989]

[Page 49 of the manuscript is under seal until August, 1989]

Sherriffs: I certainly do and I'm not about to say.

Rowland: Even though you have the possibility of putting it on seal.

Sherriffs: All right, I'll put it under seal. Ron Moskowitz. He was serving as the education aide to Governor Pat Brown. Ron Moskowitz sat in on meetings in the dean of student's office as, for example, when we looked down on the police car being held. He represented Pat Brown day after day after day as observer.

Rowland: What was his title?

Sherriffs: Educational assistant or something like that; I've got it some place.

Rowland: Then Ron Moskowitz told you that he was going to call Pat Brown.

Sherriffs: He said, "I will call." He called back later and said, "Pat will take care of it."

The Towle Memorandum and the Greek Theatre Meeting

Rowland: We have, as you recall, the Towle memorandum [see page 47a] I sent to you in which there was a penciled remark up in the upper right hand corner written by Katherine Towle. You allegedly told her that this should not be issued or sent to Chancellor Strong because (I believe you said): "We should wait until we learn what Kerr says at the Greek Theatre December 7."

Sherriffs: It's a very interesting situation to be in. I had been the chief assistant for Kerr for a long time in the area of student affairs, and Kerr still considered me almost a staff member. He was as quick to give me an order or a request as anybody in his own building. Kerr had indicated that he was going to solve everything at this Greek Theatre meeting and yet we did not know what he was going to say. We were in a position of having to have some of us in other places because of rumors that this group was going to break up the Greek Theatre meeting. It was incredible. [laughs] It was incredible. But I wasn't in the Greek Theatre. I drew a detail that was in the administration building.

But the point was that we couldn't be coming out with a policy statement like the Towle memorandum. We certainly couldn't give away the store, namely to tell people to come on in and set up their campaigns on campus to raid the community or do whatever illegal thing they had in mind. Everything would have leaked right out if this became a formal, accepted memo. This would have been before committees that were ad hoc had been formed.

IV IN THE VORTEX OF THE CONTROVERSY

Campus Administrators versus Clark Kerr: A Conflict of Values

Sherriffs: It was a long time before some campus administrators (including myself) realized that nobody had a master strategy, that everybody was going on a day to day basis and everybody was going on a basis of "informed sources." Seymour [M. "Marty"] Lipset had his ideas and some would turn to Marty Lipset. Paul Seabury had his ideas and Kerr would turn to Paul, and somebody else would have his ideas and so on and so on. Some of them took the position that "they'll break up, they'll splinter apart, providing you give them enough so that they can fight amongst themselves," and I think that's part of the strategy that Kerr followed. There's the other position that you can't negotiate with people that are involved with criminal behavior or you have accepted the criminal behavior, and that was my and other administrators position on the campus--"Let the police car go and we'll talk. While you're around that police car, to hell with you."

Rowland: From your perspective why did Kerr turn against Kerr's own values?

Sherriffs: I would give a lot to be sure about that. There are a number of hypotheses. (Don't think a number of us didn't wonder during those days.) [laughs] There was the notion that he could turn around and put the university back together again once he got the problem solved. In short, in a kind of panic he was living for the moment to get the thing solved, but in the back of his mind thought, "Well, I'm not really violating my values. I'll get these guys out of here in the long run." (Or something else.) He never said that to anybody I know, however. [pause]

Sherriffs: How much did he believe in the values that he was enunciating? That's pretty hard to decide, but at times it was so hard to believe anything else. I've listened to Clark. He later invited me to come to talk to the Carnegie commission at Perino's Restaurant in Los Angeles when I was at the governor's office. I know Kerr had a close staff: Virginia [M.] Norris, Gloria [L.] Copeland, Virginia [B.] Smith, and Eugene Lee. I like all those people as a matter of fact, but for the life of me I do not understand why Kerr did what he did. [pause] I just do not understand--I'd like to know what made him do it and make it all fit into place, because I don't know.

Rowland: So it's still a puzzle for you.

Sherriffs: It really is. With everything off the record and sealed for forty years, it would still be a guess; it would be a very rough guess. Certain things happened to me and my feelings; but they're not answering the question about "why".

[Pages 53-54 of the manuscript are under seal until August, 1989]

Sherriffs: But as this thing developed, the regents themselves got different hypotheses in their minds as to what was going on, on the basis of the information that they had. There were regents who would call Ed Strong (who was chancellor) and would talk with him and encourage him to bring a statement (of what Kerr really was doing) to the Board of Regents meeting.

Rowland: Let me inject something. The Burns Committee [California Senate Un-American Activities Subcommittee] in their 1965 Report stated that when Kerr became president, he established a policy of off-the-record regents meetings, informal meetings usually at his house or his office where a selected group of regents and he got together and worked over an agenda which was presented publicly at public regents' meetings. The Burns committee said that this made the board essentially a rubber stamping mechanism for Kerr and his policies and prevented the regents from getting other opinions on what was happening on the campus.

Sherriffs: Yes, there's a very bitter memo from Ed Strong* after he had been relieved of his duties (but before he had been either formally resigned or been fired, but was acting--I mean was given nothing to do) in which he said, "I have never had an opportunity to speak to the regents." He had an opportunity to speak to several individual regents because they took it on themselves to see that he did, but he was prevented from speaking to the entire board.

For example, at one regents meeting, Berkeley was the one on fire with protests. (This is before Santa Barbara's computer was involved and all that stuff.) It was a round table session that one of the regents had set up to have input from all the chancellors. As a matter of fact, it was set up in part so Ed Strong would have a chance to speak at last to the board. Kerr managed the business so that every other chancellor spoke. Strong was called on last, and it was Berkeley that was the place where demonstrations were held. By then they had gotten the mood of the meeting to change, a few people had left, and Strong just felt absolutely defeated in the context of all this.**

[Pages 56-59 of the manuscript are under seal until August, 1989]

*For copy of memo, see supplementary materials in Bancroft Library.

**For copy of report given to regents by Chancellor Strong, see supplementary materials in The Bancroft Library.

[Pages 53-54 of the manuscript are under seal until August, 1989]

Sherriffs: [pause] I don't like the administrative style that always blames others and I wasn't aware that that was his style and yet that's how he managed the university in 1964, 1965, 1966, and 1967. Always it was, "I've been betrayed by Pat Brown, I've been betrayed by--" You can find those quotes all over the place. "They did this to me, the silly rule at the Gate," and yet he said, "Don't let them pass out the stuff."

He smeared Ed Strong and got him fired. Ed Strong never said a bad word about him even though he disagreed with him all the way; Kerr actually collected the papers that Ed Strong gave the regents in response to their invitation for him to give his picture of the problem; it was the greatest statement of what was going on during the FSM period and I hope you people have it. It was handed out to the regents and Kerr had them collected--bizarre. Most of the regents gave them back, a couple of them didn't.

It's strange, the magnetism the man had to be able to manage so much. He had so many good qualities and yet when he got off on whatever this was, it immobilized many.

I was called to meetings by the regents in secrecy from Kerr (as were several other people) at Regent [Donald H.] McLaughlin's home and several other places.

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Sherriffs: So the regents themselves were very much confused. They didn't call us in to meetings to be hostile to us. They were polite and thanked us for the time we'd spent. They didn't call us in as their agents either. But they obviously no longer believed they were getting all of the information they needed from their own top staff.

It's interesting that when Chancellor Strong was fired it was individual regents who asked me to stay on and not walk out with Strong, even when the next chancellor didn't want me.

Rowland: Which regents? A majority of the regents, unanimous?

Sherriffs: I don't know if I even want to put them on the record; a number of regents, seven or eight regents.

Rowland: The regents who were friends to Kerr--

Sherriffs: --wanted me to stay. That's correct. I'll name them off the record (for the time being off the record): Don McLaughlin; Ted [Theodore R.] Meyer, [Laurence J.] Kennedy [Jr.], [Edwin W.] Pauley (who was not friendly), [Catherine C.] Hearst (who became unfriendly to him). Ellie [Elinor R.] Heller was in on a couple of those meetings but I wouldn't say she was one who asked me to stay. But these were regents who represented themselves. They didn't come to me in a bloc and say, "Hey, we need another window."

Rowland: Do you mean Pat Brown appointees?

Sherriffs: Well, they almost all were Pat Brown's appointees. Except for Goodie Knight's.

Rowland: Most of them were Goodie Knight's but there was [William K.] Coblentz, [Frederick G.] Dutton--

Sherriffs: Coblentz and Dutton were certainly not in on this. The other regents didn't accept them very much at the beginning anyway. The regents are a strange group of knighthood types and Ed [Edward W.] Carter played his usual game which he plays with everybody and will sacrifice anybody--put a few more on boards and commissions and hire a couple of others as lawyers and control the board.

Rowland: This is Ed Carter's strategy?

Sherriffs: Yes, off the record and really to stay off.

Rowland: I think Ed Carter was a Goodwin Knight--no, Ed Carter was a Pat Brown appointee.

Sherriffs: I think he was re-appointed by Pat Brown.

Kerr's Relationship with University Regents

Rowland: Right, re-appointed by Pat Brown in 1966. Turning to the regents then, we didn't really get into that in the last tape and I think that's an important area to explore, the role of the regents during this whole controversy. What was Kerr's working relationship with the regents?

Sherriffs: Kerr worked primarily through Ed Carter. He and Ed Carter were on the phone, I would guess, daily. He had his other regents and he touched base with as many regents as he could; he, as most chief officers, knew how to get along with the board.

[Pages 56-59 of the manuscript are under seal until August, 1989]

Sherriffs: So it was strange, but members of the board tried to learn.

(In 1971, Catherine Hearst, for example, used her audit committee to get the university's auditors to examine the reconstitution of courses and what ever else was going on, and whether courses were even being taught.)

Rowland: This was during the free speech period?

Sherriffs: Whatever you want to call it.

Rowland: Around 1964.

Sherriffs: No, no. This was 1971.

But there were many members of that board who did not believe they were getting facts. Well, that had to be true for the board to come to the conclusion that it finally did. [pause] But I don't know why Kerr did what he did. It's as though [pauses further] I don't know, it was as though he was immobilized by the wide variety of advisors he had and he had advisors from soup to nuts. Many of them set themselves up as big pros. Well, you can't be a pro on something that's never happened before. There was a belief, I am sure on the part of the president and it was a belief on the part of many people that there was-- after the thing really got going--that the Communist party found it as a useful vehicle to push their disruptive ends.

Rowland: Who on the board took that philosophy?

Sherriffs: I think everybody believed it to some extent. After all, Dorothy Healey took an apartment, and she was a southern California Communist party chairman, at the corner of Telegraph and Bancroft for the duration so you can't--

Rowland: Was this an influence of the Burns committee on the board?

Sherriffs: I don't think the Burns committee had much influence on the board. I really don't. I think that--

Rowland: Lawrence Kennedy, Jr., for instance--

Sherriffs: He's another person who was aware earlier than--

Rowland: Ed Pauley, Lawrence Kennedy--

Sherriffs: Pauley might have.

Rowland: Also Corley's influence too?

Sherriffs: Corley wasn't a member of the board.

Rowland: No, he wasn't.

Sherriffs: I knew more people who saw the Burns committee as a possible way to get the truth out than getting the truth in. People were absolutely frustrated by Kerr being the single spokesman and presenting a story which was not what we saw.

Regent Pauley versus Clark Kerr: 1963 and 1965 Special Regents Meetings

Rowland: Do you recall a 1965 special session of the regents, after the 1965 report of the Burns committee was issued in which Ed Pauley tried to have Kerr fired? That was a meeting in which Pat (Edmund G.) Brown attended and Pat Brown and the majority of the board defeated Pauley's motion.

Sherriffs: I was not watching that meeting.

I know about another regents meeting in 1963. I was sent to Washington by the president to get a character reference for him.

Rowland: From the CIA?

Sherriffs: Yes. [pause] That was a strange one also, but I don't think that's relevant to our topic. But it was strange.

Rowland: No, it isn't, But that goes back to an interview I had with Kerr in which he told me about that incident that I believe you're talking about; the one in which there was an allegation that Kerr was speaking in Latin America on behalf of the Communist party.

Sherriffs: Well, but there were a lot of people that could have gone to Washington that had been there before. I had never been to Washington before. I was sent and I kept wondering if I was being sent because I was dumb or sent because I was trusted.

Sherriffs: I went to the CIA and I had never been there before. I'm telling you, that's a spooky experience.

Rowland: That's in Langley, Virginia?

Sherriffs: Lord! You sit in room after room and you know damn well you are being observed. I finally got in there and my request was simple, "Can I have a character reference for this [Clark Kerr] guy?" The man I addressed was very friendly and he said, "You'll hear from me." I wait overnight and finally I'm allowed about twenty minutes leeway to go to the airplane after I'm told to come by to get the letter. That letter could have been written anytime in five minutes. Well, I really felt that I was part of a charade. I really don't know what was going on. Maybe the CIA does everything that way, but I always wondered what that entire episode was really about.

Rowland: You're not aware of that story then? You just were sent--

Sherriffs: Oh, no, I'm aware of a story. I don't know if we know the same story. Maybe your story I don't know. I was aware of the fact that Pauley was out to get Kerr and it was on leftist business. I was to get from the guy who planned the Bay of Pigs incident, whatever his name was, a letter stating that they themselves wanted to use Kerr for a CIA venture in South America. From what I've heard of the CIA since, I don't know if that says much one way or another. But I'm just saying why was it me instead of Gene [Eugene L.] Burdick, the author of The Ninth Wave, who died, who was much more aware of political things than I was then. I've been to Washington a few times since, but I was a babe in the woods then.

Rowland: What was Gene Burdick's position?

Sherriffs: Trusted advisor and friend of Kerr, a member of the faculty at Berkeley in the political science department, author, great fame, entree to socially prominent people. He was just the logical person to go, but they sent me. Maybe it was just so that it was absolutely clear that it was clean. [chuckles] I didn't have the sense to see myself as playing anybody's game. (But I don't think that's related to 1964.)

Rowland: No, but it's important for perspective on Kerr himself and the involvement with the regents. As you could see it, after the FSM incident in which you were still on the campus (you were asked to remain by the seven regents whom you mentioned), was there a mood on the regents board turning against Kerr?

Sherriffs: Oh, sure.

Rowland: We know Pauley and probably [John E.] Canaday, too, from what Clark Kerr told me.

Sherriffs: I would say Pauley, Canaday, Kennedy, Hearst were certainly on the "no" side. In sad disbelief, but I always would forgive, would be people like McLaughlin--(I'd have to have the names of that board in front of me right now.)

Rowland: In support of Kerr would be, of course, Jesse Unruh and Governor Brown.

Sherriffs: Brown wrote some letters supporting Kerr like I've never seen when things were pretty much shades of grey. I'm suprised at how totally he--his letters that he sent in support of Kerr.

Rowland: This was during the free speech controversy?

Sherriffs: Oh, 1965. His form letter that went out was a glowing character reference. I'm surprised that he was willing to go that far because he could have written something like "I can see how you feel, but--"

Rowland: Was this again in defense of Kerr against the Pauley move in the 1965 special meeting?

Sherriffs: That wasn't my impression, but I don't know. I don't know what went on. I guess the mail just was running heavy but I don't know if it was coincidental with other things or not.

Rowland: I'm not quite sure of your perspective on Kerr. From the last meeting you said that after the December incident in Sproul Hall you became disillusioned with Kerr and his policies.

Sherriffs: I guess the moment of my real disillusionment was when he made the deal with the people who had captured the police car. It began when he left the chancellor of the Berkeley campus outside the room in which a meeting took place between Kerr and the dissidents leaving Strong unaware that a meeting was taking place inside that room, and when Kerr communicated not through any institutional channel, but through a person who was engaged in, the first time in the history of the United States, holding a police car, (a symbol of law, and rule by law) to announce to the world the capitulation of the university. He and Earl [C.] Bolton (I'm trying to remember if it was Earl Bolton or if it was--I think it was--who was with him at the time) later on in the evening came over to Sproul Hall and were walking through the halls. Kerr had a gaiety about him which I felt was forced, but he said to me as he walked by me, "This is a great day in the life of the university." I said, "You can't mean that. The university will never be itself again." That exchange was an exchange that neither of us could ever forget.

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Rowland: Getting back to 1965 to chronicle your disillusionment with Kerr, you were disillusioned then after the police car incident in which Kerr had negotiated with the students privately.

Sherriffs: But it wasn't just that incident. That incident was the straw which put into focus Kerr's duplicity. He was telling us to do these things and blaming us for doing them and all the other things and I finally said, "Well, what the hell is he doing?" I mean it takes a while to have your hero become a bad guy. I still don't think of him as a bad guy. I have a very confused feeling about him.

Returning to Teaching: An Orchestrated Resignation

Rowland: So you stayed on in the administration as vice chancellor of student affairs?

Sherriffs: That's right.

Rowland: Up until when?

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Rowland: Yet Kerr still trusted you?

Sherriffs: I was usable, I guess.

Rowland: He sent you to Washington to pick up the character reference in 1963 to defend allegations presented against him by the Burns committee in which they had documents from the American ambassador to Mexico that he was speaking in Latin America on behalf of the Communist party. This was presented in the 1963 (or 1962) meeting to [Committee Chairman Hugh M.] Burns and Counsel [Richard E.] Combs at the Bohemian Club.

Sherriffs: Oh, that kind of detail at the time I didn't know. What I was told was there was going to be a meeting, (whether it was special or regular--if I had to guess, betting money, I'd say a special meeting) that Pauley was responsible for having happen and he needed this character reference by a given minute and therefore I had to leave that day. I had to leave that night for Washington D.C. and I came back to my "white charger," arriving at 6:00, and I went to Kerr's house and handed him the envelope in time for the meeting the next morning. I guess it was 1962 or 1963.

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Sherriffs: Through the chancellorship of Martin Meyerson, through the fake resignation of Kerr and Martin Meyerson, and through the meeting of the university deans and administrators to try to get a unanimous statement to ask Kerr and Meyerson not to resign. They had stayed after saying they were going to resign.

I and Bill [William B.] Fretter were the only two that had the guts to stand up at the deans' meeting and say, "This is the third time Kerr's said he's going to resign. Does he mean it this time? Shouldn't you phone him and ask whether he really wants us to tell him not to?"--which made me persona non grata; Bill and I left the meeting. Bill is now vice president of the university so it didn't hurt him too much to have done so.

Sherriffs: So I went out when Roger [W.] Heyns was coming in as chancellor and Earl [F.] Cheit was setting up the palace guard and so on and--

Rowland: Did you resign?

Sherriffs: Well, Cheit came to me and he said, "This afternoon we're having a staff meeting and I'm going to announce that you're resigning." [pause] I said, "Is this your idea? Is it Roger Heyns' or is it Clark Kerr's?" And he wouldn't answer me. I said, "Well, that's enough of an answer. I'm tired of empty in-baskets. I think I can do something better for the cause than sit here anyway, so go ahead. Announce it."

Then Cheit said, "Let's have lunch." So we had lunch and he said, "You should have six months to get caught up so you can go back to teaching with a fresh start, and so forth." I didn't feel hostile. He was doing what he was supposed to do. Actually, I didn't want to be somebody's vice chancellor who didn't want me. I had been somebody's vice chancellor who didn't want me because there was a war going on and nobody seemed to know who was on what side: I refer to the Meyerson episode.

Rowland: Where did you go after that?

Sherriffs: I became vice chairman of the department of psychology or chairman of one of three divisions in the department of psychology and I went back to teaching on the Berkeley campus.

Rowland: When did you begin to get involved with the Reagan 1966 campaign?

Sherriffs: Oh, hell, I was a dyed-in-the-wool Democrat and it didn't occur to me to be a Republican. As a matter of fact, I was for [George] Christopher during the Republican primary against Reagan in 1966 and I can remember myself saying that Reagan was too far out.

Rowland: Did you actively work for Christopher?

Sherriffs: I was a Democrat. I didn't work for either of them, but I was against Reagan. (But just because of what I read in the newspapers and the philosophy they imputed to him.)

I remember going down to Pasadena for a party with some friends with whom we spent every summer, a few weeks on the beach, and they were red hot for Reagan down there. I said, "That's crazy. In the first place, he's a right-wing kook and in the second place he can't get elected. No actor can be elected in the State of California." [chuckles] I can remember it now. So there was nothing automatic about this at all.

Sherriffs: Some people I respected began working for Reagan and I began to look beyond the stereotype.

Rowland: Were you working for Brown?

Sherriffs: I liked Pat. I gave a little contribution at campaign time, did a little precinct work.

Rowland: You gave in Berkeley?

Sherriffs: But not in the name of the university or on the campus.

I guess, speaking for myself on my transition to the Republican party, I watched an institution that I did love [pause] being beat to death.

Rowland: In the political campaign?

Leftist Politics and the Faculty: Changes in the University

Sherriffs: No, not at all; on the campus. When I saw course after course taught with a political slant where ten years before one's colleagues would have ridden one out on a rail (it wouldn't have taken an administration to do so). Even if one's bias was to Freud one told the students, for God's sake, to read Jung and Adler in those days.

I saw psychologists being hired in psychology because they had a political point of view and others not being hired because they didn't have that political point of view. I saw that multiplied by department after department and I couldn't convince my own colleagues to leave politics out of their goddamn considerations, and just to get the best psychologists. How long can a university be a university? Should it get away with being seen as pursuit of the truth when in fact it's in pursuit of something different? So as far as I was concerned, I had a responsible feeling to the university enough to sit under a chancellor that didn't want me and one who I didn't admire (Martin Meyerson). (That's kind of an indignity for a cause!) Well, I didn't stop caring when I left the office of vice chancellor of student affairs.

A number of people talked to me that maybe there were worse things than putting public heat on an institution to correct itself than to do nothing about it and have it going the way it was going.

Rowland: Even though this probably brought up questions of violation of university state constitutional autonomy.

Sherriffs: Oh, the university was no longer autonomous. I didn't know who it was in the hands of, but it wasn't autonomous.

Rowland: It became a political puppet?

Sherriffs: [excited] Hell, some great people would come to the department of sociology, for example, and the graduate students were told not to work with them or these graduate students wouldn't pass their orals. You've got to realize that it was crazy times. It was such crazy times that you didn't talk about it to many people. Nowadays, a few people think you're making it all up.

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Rowland: How did it come to a stop?

Sherriffs: I think it took the average faculty member only a few months to become shocked at what he had done or what he had smiled at being done under the name of "reconstitution of courses." I mean, after all, these were old enough people, even the young ones, to have heard about how universities were used in Germany to promote the Aryan myth and so on. I think that the killing of an anonymous teaching assistant in a University of Wisconsin building (working far into the night, working toward his Ph.D.) was something that every faculty member who ever got a Ph.D. could empathize with.

My personal belief is that it all didn't stop because Vietnam had stopped, because Vietnam didn't stop. It didn't stop because Art [Jack] Goldberg [FSM activist] got tired; he didn't get tired, he's still working. It didn't stop for any reason that you can point to: any governor, any administrator, any hero. It stopped because it went too far. Finally, it went too far too fast and then too many people became sane again!

Rowland: So you became disillusioned because leftist politics was becoming infused in university course material and course offerings.

Sherriffs: Not all leftist politics; partisan politics.

V AS AN EDUCATION ADVISOR TO GOVERNOR REAGAN

A Meeting with the New Governor

- Rowland: But then you began to see Ronald Reagan as a viable candidate?
- Sherriffs: No, I did not. That was the hardest part. I was doing a great deal of speaking during this period when I was no longer in the chancellor's office. I was speaking about what I thought were the basic problems of our society. I was not speaking about Berkeley as such, but I was speaking to what I thought made the whole thing possible. The very people I was talking to were the cause, really--the body politic. That was my opinion. And it's still my opinion.
- Rowland: These were lectures or speaking engagements?
- Sherriffs: Anything from a Rotary Club to the League of Women Voters to whatever, and I was speaking three times a week at least.
- Rowland: Primarily in Berkeley or all over?
- Sherriffs: All over this state and other states because what I was saying people liked to hear.

What I was saying was essentially that when something happens so that individuals don't stand up for what they believe in--really the text of my speech was "all that is necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing." The quote was from Edmund Burke, and I hadn't even realized he was a great conservative. (I couldn't have known whether the quote was a conservative or liberal statement.)

As a liberal I would go along with the view that everybody should function. We had five to eleven per cent of the student

Sherriffs: body voting for campus officers on the campuses in the State of California. When you have five to eleven per cent votes, political organizations can rig any election; so you don't get the usual kind of candidates. When you have five to ten per cent votes, the political stage is manned by people who don't represent a large constituency.

You had the phenomenon of the Genovese case in New York which I think I mentioned last time. It was a shocker. All the newspapers carried the fact that thirty-eight known people watched somebody stabbed to death in over three individual episodes before she died. Not one of them walked to the phone even to anonymously call the police--the man on the street was worried! In a democracy you need few policemen because each individual, in place of a policeman on every corner, is carrying the values of society; that's pretty serious stuff.

There were just lots of incidents: in San Mateo, in Berkeley, and a lot of places. I would catch my audience's attention describing situations like the Genovese case and I would say, "It would be hard to find a time in America's past where it was the same--and what's different?"

My belief as a psychologist was that this was the first time in the history of our society (or anybody's society) that parents had lost confidence in themselves as parents and had to look up the answer in a book as to how to deal with their own children and their own values, whatever their values were. They had to look it up in a child rearing book and the bestseller became [Dr. Benjamin M.] Spock's. I wasn't then against Spock as a politician. He didn't start out as one as far as I knew. He became one later. It was the dependence of the American people on a field I was associated with, psychology. Parents became ineffective as role models for constructive adulthood to their own children.

It was also a time when the cult of youth in the United States was at its peak. When I was in my teens what was cute was seeing a little girl come down the front steps in her mother's shoes; people would smile. What was true in the 50's and 60's was that a kid learned the twist thinking this would be a little too sexy for his parents and probably shock them; but the parents took twist lessons instead.

A kid said "cool" and did other things to develop his own "slanguage": because you have to be apart from your parents before you can get close again. But the parents said "cool" and the kids went further and further out, even to drugs. They

Sherriffs: keep looking over their shoulders and here came their parents right behind them. It's kind of terrifying when you're far from ready to be parent to your own parents. I really believe that it is that kind of setting that made it so that the majority--individually operating--didn't take care of itself.

I've written that speech, by the way, and given it. It's in the [United States] Congressional Record and other places if you ever want to read it. It's dated now. The title, "The Silent Generation," was the fifties, and the sixties followed the fifties. I reread it myself last week to see how embarrassed I would be by it. A couple of things in it embarrassed me, but not much. I still think it's a pretty good picture of what was going on.

A lot of people heard my speech who hadn't heard anything that made sense to them: they had heard, "You've got to understand that youth is different these days and we have to go along with it" or "it's got to be healthy because it's change" or some such. There are all kinds of apologists for the behavior I am speaking of. Then there were the nuts who said, "Shoot the student radicals down. Close the institution." That didn't satisfy the public either. Whether I was right or wrong, I was taking a position that was a rational one from my audiences' point of view and I wasn't making scapegoats. All it was saying was that each person in terms of his own beliefs should be functioning on his beliefs. A lot of people who heard me were also people who were for Reagan and they introduced us.

Rowland: So Reagan sought you out?

Sherriffs: Yes, and I was called to come up--

Rowland: Some of Reagan's supporters sought you out or Reagan himself?

Sherriffs: Oh, not Reagan. No, he had never heard me. Apparently my name kept coming in as a nominee for some thing in the new state government after he was elected.

Rowland: Did you work for him during the campaign?

Sherriffs: Hell, no. I was against him.

Rowland: When he was running against Pat Brown?

Sherriffs: Yes.

Rowland: But did you work for Pat Brown?

Sherriffs: In the sense of money and precinct work. I didn't have time. I was trying to save my academic life on the Berkeley campus. I didn't do very much. But I was invited to come to Sacramento to speak (I forget what it was called) to the governor's council or something. Anyway, it was made up of ninety or so people--the head of agriculture, head of fish and game, head of forestry, head of welfare, head of all those governmental agencies. I said, "Sure." I was flattered. I talked to a lot of audiences and I wouldn't mind that one either.

Rowland: There was an article in the Oakland Tribune that said you had worked with Reagan's campaign and had suggested to Reagan a tuition for the University of California.

Sherriffs: False. Was that Carl Irving's article or whose?

Rowland: I don't recall, but the article said you had suggested a tuition for the university.

Sherriffs: No, as a matter of fact, the story of me and tuition is a lengthy one, but the article isn't true. I didn't do anything for anybody in the Reagan campaign--period. After he was elected, then people began to seek me out. I was invited to come up to Sacramento.

Oh, when I got there my speech was a thirty-minute one; you could almost call it "the speech," the whistle stop speech, because I had given it so many times. To keep myself from going to sleep I'd give it starting from different ends. [Rowland laughs] I'd give the conclusion and build up to the beginning or go from the middle and go out--all kinds of things. Certain things obviously got the point across better than others; why change them?

Rowland: This was while Ronald Reagan was governor-elect and Brown was still in office?

Sherriffs: To you--I understand your context. To me--it was after I was out of the chancellor's office and now free. As long as I was in the chancellor's office with the title "vice chancellor" if I gave a speech, I was saying something about the university even if I didn't want to. As soon as I was just a faculty member, and since what I was doing wasn't partisan I felt free to say the things I wanted to say, and it is true that most every speech I gave led to at least five to ten invitations to give another one. I spoke to everything from soup to nuts--labor unions, police academy in Los Angeles, you name it.

Sherriffs: But then I was invited to Sacramento. I got up there and they told me, "Now it's a big agenda so you have ten minutes." I said, "I can't do it in ten minutes. I can't give you my name in ten minutes. That's the point of the whole thing--this is a complex, complicated issue. There aren't ten minute answers. There aren't just good guys and bad guys." So I was told I could have fifteen. So it took forty. But I got before the microphone with an understanding of fifteen minutes. I had gotten through my first three minutes and the door opened and in came Reagan. That's unnerving because your first, introductory, remarks are there for a reason and he hadn't heard them. So I worried about it all the way through [chuckles] and he stood there for the entire speech.

Afterwards, I was invited to come down to his office and meet him and he asked me if I'd work for him. I said, "In what role and for what purpose and what do you believe?" And I was astounded at the things he believed. They weren't the things I had been taught by my local press. His ideas were sound and fair. Seven out of Reagan's sixteen staff members had been Democrats within the last five years, including himself.

Rowland: Such as? Philip [M.] Battaglia?

Sherriffs: No, he was gone before I came. This was the second year. I missed the whole first year. It was the second year.

Rowland: You didn't get into Reagan's camp until the second year of his first term?

Sherriffs: That's right. I wasn't that impulsive.

Rowland: [laughs] I thought you took office with him when he entered.

Sherriffs: I wouldn't have dreamed of it then. Of course, he wouldn't have dreamed of it either.

Rowland: So this was about 1972, 1973?

Sherriffs: I think I was being actively thought about probably in late October and early November of 1967. Reagan took office in January of 1967, I came aboard on the first of January or the second of January in 1968. So I was there, without being there for the first year or the last year. I was in from the second year through the seventh year.

Rowland: So this was the second year of his first term, but prior to that you were still a faculty member at Berkeley?

Sherriffs: And vice chairman of the department of psychology.

Rowland: And you were still doing speaking engagements?

Sherriffs: Yes, on what I thought was society's sickness. I thought the university was just an example and I still believe that.

But I think there has been a swing. Partly the youngsters who were the little brothers and sisters of the people who were on drugs and got that far out came in as a quite different breed of cat. They didn't come in imitating their brothers and sisters.

Rowland: What position did you take in the Reagan administration?

Sherriffs: Educational advisor to the governor.

Rowland: I will explain why I'm doing this prodding of the Reagan administration because we have to dig up as much as we can on Reagan because we hope to have an interview with Governor Reagan in October on his 1966 campaign.

Sherriffs: I can't help you much with 1966.

Rowland: You mentioned the Democrats who came over and worked for Reagan and became part of his staff.

Sherriffs: Well, [Edwin] Ed Meese [III] can tell you. Reagan was one himself; Bill Clark, Paul Beck, me and any number of secretaries.

Rowland: Who was the legislative secretary?

Sherriffs: I don't know. Yes. I'd have to look at the--I didn't prepare for thinking about this--I'd have to look at the names to remember who was whom, but there was seven of us who had been Democrats (Reagan was one) and I've always felt it's--I didn't care which way you end up. I don't know how I'll end up either. But I think it's very important, if you don't want to become too convinced of your own position on things, to have been in both political parties to see how fervently they can actually believe what they say, either of them.

Rowland: That's true in politics--

Sherriffs: Well, it's people, it's people. People like simple answers.

Sherriffs: They like to believe they're a hundred per cent right and they don't like to see there are shades of grey. That's one reason why the two parties work, strangely enough.

[Pages 74-76 of the manuscript are under seal until August, 1989]

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The Dismissal of Clark Kerr

Rowland: Turning back to the very first month in which Ronald Reagan took office, there was a very controversial thing that happened and that was the firing of Clark Kerr. Do you recall when you went in the office, what talk there was of who engineered the firing?

Sherriffs: Oh, I was fascinated by that question and then finally one day when I was waiting for an airplane at an airport I said, "Ron, would you mind telling me the story, the real story?", and he did. It happens that later I got possession, by a fluke (somebody just showed me something and I wasn't even in the Reagan administration) a copy of the Board of Regents Executive Committee notes which I think you ought to get because that will tell you the story of Clark Kerr's firing. I know Ron will tell you, Ronald Reagan will tell you, when you ask him, so that's the best way to find out.

But I've also asked several people questions about it since, so I'm not--the one thing I can't reveal to you is what's in the executive committee minutes of the Board of Regents. But I can say from all the things I know that the decision that Clark was to go was made before Reagan was even elected.

There were certain surprising regents--perhaps it wouldn't be surprising to a number of people who read about it as history--waited on the new governor and then said, paraphrasing, "This man has got to go. We're going to wait, however, because it would not be politically right to do this to you in your first regent's meeting since taking office." Reagan said, in essence, "Politics shouldn't influence you either way. You should not fail to do what's right because a governor is new on your board. You shouldn't have either errors of omission or commission. Don't pay any attention to me. Whatever you do, do."

Now, that's one part of the story. Another part of the story, if they'll show it to you and if you'll go to the right places (it's all documented) is that Kerr was begged not to force the issue by regents who knew he wouldn't make it. He damn well forced the issue and he thought--I almost know what he thought because I didn't work with him the number of years

Sherriffs: I did without learning how he thinks--he thought, and under ordinary circumstances it would be true, that if he could get a vote of confidence he would be safe for two years; the regents wouldn't bring it up again. Those that still wanted him out would have to get new material. The safest time was when you've got a new governor just coming in who would be appointing two new regents every so often from now on; get a vote of confidence right this minute, that was his strategy. He pushed it, but the die was already cast.

Rowland: Reagan made quite a few ex officio appointments to the board, that is not necessarily to the Board of Regents but made appointments who by their appointed position became ex officio Board of Regents' members.

Sherriffs: When you find out who voted to remove Clark Kerr, you will realize that Reagan's appointments, beliefs and speeches had nothing to do with it because his own best friends had given up.

Rowland: Kerr's best friends?

Sherriffs: Yes.

Rowland: There are many different angles on that, but some day maybe we will get access to those executive committee minutes. I think we'll probably wait until we launch in to the Ronald Reagan era project.

Sherriffs: Yes, I can understand well, in the lifetime of people, how who voted is nobody's business, since the regents really believed in the confidentiality of an executive session. (It was executive session.) Unfortunately, how who voted determines on whether a myth continues; that is, the myth that a governor moves in, never having had the experience of governing before, and fires the president of a university before he does anything else. Anybody who knows the Board of Regents knows that couldn't happen.

Rowland: Even though Reagan made a campaign against Clark Kerr--

Sherriffs: Almost especially because. The Board of Regents are "superior" in their minds to governors, believe me. They have sixteen-year terms; governors have four. Their average wealth is probably three or four times that of the average governor. They've been in the Bohemian Club probably fourteen years longer than the average governor! Some of those regents think they can make and break governors. Some of them aren't bad at it. Just go

Sherriffs: through the minutes of the meetings and find how many motions Reagan made ever got passed by that Board of Regents. Some were rather simple little things. But because he made them they were against them. Why would regents go against Clark Kerr if Reagan didn't like him. Nonsense.

Rowland: One argument posed by the Los Angeles Times is that Reagan had slashed the university budget. Rumor had it that a portion of the budget would be restored if Reagan's friends on the board voted to fire Kerr.

Sherriffs: Well, if there was a hypocrisy that ever existed it would be if the Los Angeles Times was the paper that put that forth, if you read me. [Sherriffs and Rowland laugh] I'm not going to say why, but that is absolute hypocrisy.

Rowland: You mentioned supporters of Reagan who came to you--

Sherriffs: Incidentally, you two won't get along well if you say REEgan. Only unfriendly Democrats say REEgan. [laughter]

Rowland: No one else says it except me. [laughs]

Sherriffs: Unruh always did it on purpose.

Rowland: Incidentally, that was another point that the Los Angeles Times made, that Jesse Unruh came out as kind of a front runner for the 1970 Democratic governorship nomination as a result of the firing of Clark Kerr. Unruh came out in defense of Clark Kerr after the vote was taken and said he thought that was a shameful incident.

He was now in stated opposition to Ronald Reagan because of Reagan's move to fire Kerr. Of course, Unruh was trying to get control of the university administration too.

Rowland: Do you remember any battles with Jesse Unruh?

Sherriffs: Oh, yes.

Rowland: During the Free Speech Movement?

Sherriffs: No.

Rowland: Unruh came out against the FSM. He came out in a public statement jointly with Hugh Burns. They wanted to create a joint higher education investigating committee to investigate the possibility of restricting university autonomy. This was in late 1964 after that incident at Sproul Hall.

Sherriffs: Most of my contacts with Jess were where he was trying to develop resources for the legislature from the campuses, and whether that was an appeal to the intellectuals or partisan politics for himself or not, I don't know. It was a good idea. There were those on the campuses who knew a fair amount about juvenile delinquency. Why not have them as resource people to committees that are working on legislation relating to correctional schools and so on? There were those who knew a lot about taxation. Why not have them conduct seminars for legislators who vote on taxes every year? It was very appealing and most of my personal contacts with Unruh when I was with the University of California were favorable.

[pause] I always have trouble understanding people of presumed stature who turn against you if you are on the other side of an issue. It's true of a lot of people but I still don't understand it, presuming in a free society you and I can have different points of view and respect each other and are not just mouthing it when we say--

Rowland: Two opponents should be able to go out and have a beer together, if nothing else.

Sherriffs: Well, hell yes! But Jess isn't one of those. You have a different position on something than Jess and Jess feels you've crossed him.

Now, Kerr was one of those who felt that if you had a different position you crossed him too. Kerr made a public statement that Brown double-crossed him. It takes a certain kind of narcissism that seems to be true of politicians generally, and of more academicians than I'd like to admit to, to feel there's something personal about somebody having a point of view that's the opposite to one's own.

Sherriffs: I guess partly it's true in the academic because people become so specialized that they're not really well educated, and I'm afraid that's true of my colleagues. The generalists are hard to find. As a matter of fact, most universities don't agree (can't get a faculty consensus) on what a general education is, and what an educated person is and what the baccalaureate should be. There's a considerable amount of narcissism in all that. [pause] But Sacramento is not better, believe me. [laughs]

Rowland: You found Jesse Unruh hard to work with then when you turned against his policy or disagreed--

Sherriffs: Oh, it didn't turn him against--he discovered I worked for Reagan, and when we met on an airplane he wouldn't speak to me.

##

While we are looking into the personalities of those involved in the '60's, I would like to state for the record that Chancellor Strong had the most integrity of anybody in the whole show. He never deviated from integrity. He's a good, decent, liberal human being.

Rowland: What about George Steffes?

Sherriffs: He's the last place I want you to start. You ought to start with Ed Meese who's got the big picture.

Rowland: Was Ed Meese involved in the campaign in 1966?

Sherriffs: He probably was. Ed Meese was also involved as a deputy district attorney in the affairs of the Free Speech Movement and other things on the Berkeley campus for Alameda County, so Ed Meese has insight into the sixties that will surprise you.

Ed is a totally delightful guy and has--well, he's my candidate for anybody's governor in any state from any party.

Rowland: He actively worked for Reagan in the 1966 campaign against Brown?

Sherriffs: I assume so. He became his executive secretary, his third executive secretary and longest lasting executive secretary.

Rowland: We have that name that I mentioned flagging me down again and that's Phil Battaglia.

Sherriffs: He was part of the disaster of the first year.

Rowland: But he worked on the campaign?

Sherriffs: Probably. I never met him.

Rowland: You don't recall his role?

Sherriffs: No, I really knew nothing of the campaign.

Rowland: Or Bob Haldeman?

[Page 80 of the manuscript is under seal until August, 1980]

- Rowland: But you do recall Haldeman working on the campaign?
- Sherriffs: I wouldn't have any idea about the campaign. It's true, I just don't have any idea about the campaign.
- Rowland: We're trying to find people who have just the slightest tidbit of information.
- Sherriffs: The trouble with campaign people--campaign people and staff people are quite different kinds of cat. Campaign people for anybody's campaign tend to be people who want excitement, and to do things right away. The kind of personalities that go into a campaign are usually the kind of people that you don't want to have on your regular staff if you don't want people to be patient, quiet, consult--you don't want activists on your staff as a rule.
- Rowland: But are campaigners also looking for staff positions?
- Sherriffs: Often, and they often get them because they earn them in a sense, in the name-of-the-game sense, and they often don't stay. But that's just politics generally--[lowers voice, chuckles] from little insight into it from a "wee peek".
- Rowland: Getting back to the speaking engagements you were doing--
- Sherriffs: State Supreme Court Justice [William] Bill [P.] Clark, [Jr.], Ed Meese (Clark was also an executive secretary of Reagan's), Jim [G.] Stearns--Director of Conservation--I'll get you the staff list and send it to you.
- Rowland: Fine.
- Sherriffs: Incidentally, there is a Molly Sturges at the Hoover Institution who is the archivist for Reagan's papers. They try to be helpful, and if you phone and ask who was on the Reagan campaign staff she could tell you, and if she could, she would.
- Rowland: Getting back to your first brushings with the Reagan camp, when you were on speaking tours all over the state, who was it that personally approached you and suggested that Reagan might be interested?
- Sherriffs: My first brushes would not have been with the people who had heard me at this organization or that, thought this was an important thing to hear, or thought--"he ought to be working for Reagan." So there were people that were for Reagan, by and large or at least were for Reagan as governor by then, because this was after the fact. I'm only told this story. Some of these people can tell you. There may be things I don't know about how I got there.

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Sherriffs: No. (H.R.) Bob Haldeman was in Nixon's campaign. Bob Haldeman was the biggest disappointment as a regent I've ever seen, he and Bob [H.] Finch. They would take a walk, go up to the men's room, if a vote would come up that they felt would hurt them politically because they were hoping to be in [President Richard M.] Nixon's administration, quite obviously. It got so bad that I can remember once when Catherine Hearst had introduced a motion, when Haldeman had slipped out to make a phone call, because he didn't want to be in on some vote on People's Park or whatever it was, Catherine said, "Let's wait until he comes back to the board." Everybody was thinking the same thing, so she didn't have to say anymore. The chairman had everybody discuss something else and when Haldeman came back in ten minutes the chairman said, "You're just in time!" Oh, God, it was poetic justice!

Rowland: Any names that you recall?

Sherriffs: Oh, yes, several. One was Jim (I said his name a minute ago) Gibson, who was a professor for awhile (I don't know where he is now) at Pepperdine University. Then the appointments secretary during that period was a regular politician whose name is Paul [R.] Haerle. He's in the machinery now of the Republican party in California so he won't be hard to find. Every governor has an appointments secretary who collects suggestions that come in. When a judgeship comes up for example, they look, and they have thousands of names for judges. They set up a screening committee and so on. But those were the two--well, actually three--Supreme Court Justice Bill Clark. He was the executive secretary at the time I was appointed. He's the one who made the offer and I said, "At that price I couldn't do it." I did say at that price I couldn't do it because it was literally three thousand less than I was getting at the University of California and the University of California charged me an extra \$3,000 to leave. I had to give \$3,000 back which I don't think they ever did to anybody else.

Rowland: What was Jim Gibson's role again in these years?

Sherriffs: In the first year they didn't have an educational secretary. (Jerry Brown has never had one.) But when things would come in on education, Jim Gibson would do what he could with them, but Jim recognized that he was a little out of his depth in a lot of it. But because he would function in that role--he was sort of the scout; he went out and interviewed the people who other people were suggesting. So the people that really, to my knowledge, would be the ones that had to do with my appointment would be Bill Clark, Jim Gibson, and Ronald Reagan.

Rowland: Ronald Reagan?

Sherriffs: Nobody appointed somebody in my position without his approval.

VI LOOKING BACK AT THE FREE SPEECH EPISODE

Schism in the Faculty

Rowland: Why don't we get those things that you wanted to get on tape. One of them was the faculty's role during FSM.

Sherriffs: Yes, let me make a concluding comment here that may not turn out to really be concluding.

In preparing myself to come today, in thinking about it on the airplane, I thought it was important to get across and I hope I have, that there is always a continuing dynamic process of working for the protection of a university while allowing freedom for the people that are students and faculty within it. There are changes going on in that particular area right now. There always will be. Times change and so on.

There has been an intense period of change, of thinking about change and then change. Clark Kerr went from restrictive rules in favor of protection of the institution to rules allowing much more freedom. During the sixties the push, as it looked from the institution's point of view, was to remove rules altogether and make it, "do your own thing," or "the end justifies the means." (The issue is important.) What happened functionally was, time after time, a small change was made in the direction of taking away any restriction and each time that was done the activists, mostly off-campus people, young faculty members, and with a minority, as far as I'm concerned, of the leadership being students at all, would take a new position that was just a little further out. So when you gave it away, you just started all over again.

For it to be able to happen, you needed the student troops. You could get the student troops. After all, a few young faculty members and off-campus people couldn't go romping through,

Sherriffs: trashing buildings, burning Wheeler Auditorium, and capturing Sproul Hall. You had to have troops. It took Joan Baez to come in and sing some folk songs to get some of those troops to go into the building, and so it went. But they were able to get a number of students involved, a very small percentage of the campus, the "movement people," whatever they were.

But the particular faculty members were constant. The particular off-campus people were constant. They would go back to Columbia from here and then they'd go over to Cornell and come back here again and so on.

Rowland: Such as Bettina Aptheker?

Sherriffs: That would be one. There were lots.

Rowland: Savio?

Sherriffs: Savio was a different cat; Savio is unique. He was used more than--even though he was out in front, he was "used" much more than others. Savio was a fascinating person.

[Page 85 of the manuscript is under seal until August, 1989]

Sherriffs: The loudspeakers for the rallies to make possible the illegal use of steps in front of Sproul Hall and all that, were kept in the history department.

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Sherriffs: What I mean by the faculty was involved I mean it was involved;
I mean Savio would come in to see a philosopher, John [R.] Searle,
and he would say, "What do I say now, John?"

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Sherriffs: I was asked by the president of the university by phone one night to go in and steal the loudspeakers. That was the quickest way to lose my credibility that I could think of.

Rowland: Do you recall the time?

Sherriffs: It had to be before December; it had to be somewhere around December.

Rowland: Before December of 1964?

Sherriffs: I would think because that's when the use of those steps of Sproul Hall was pretty delicate.

Rowland: Clark Kerr told you to go into the history department?

Sherriffs: Yes. It wasn't like, "I'm giving you an order." He was talking about what was going on on the phone and he said, "Go take the thing," and I said, "I don't think that's going to work." He'll probably say he was being facetious. I don't think he was. But it was no solution. You can buy loudspeakers. It was an unreasonable thing to do. If he really meant it, he was asking me to put my neck out for no purpose. But my point was not anything about Clark Kerr.

Sherriffs: My point was that the faculty was involved. You don't keep loudspeakers in the history department secretly.

That the faculty was involved was not surprising when you realize that from 1960 for the next four or five years, the student body was growing in size at a tremendous pace and to keep up with it we were hiring faculty members, increasing the number of faculty if I recall figures (and they can easily be checked)--as I recall it we added a third to the faculty each year for four years. This was at a time when potential faculty were in short supply and the demand was strong. You not only hired faculty members, but you promised them lighter teaching loads (which seems to be the most important coin of the realm) more time for research, research assistants and all those things.

It was students who had just gotten their Ph.D.'s, found themselves being recruited as Tom Seaver is as a baseball pitcher, and it didn't make them humble; they weren't a humble group. They weren't a group of even normal humility. They were not a group prone to speak in shades of grey. They spoke with dogmatism. They were not a group with a love of the particular institution because other institutions were offering them jobs all the time.

Rowland: Such as Searle in the philosophy department?

Sherriffs: Many of them.

Rowland: Who in the history department?

Sherriffs: Who specifically?

Rowland: Yes.

Sherriffs: Why do I want to pick on any one person? I'm talking about a characteristic of a generation of faculty and this generation of faculty changed the academic senate which had been a body with a tremendous value for hearing the other person out, even to the point of missing dinner. Senate meetings would go on and on. It changed almost overnight--from 1962 to 1964. Often if an elder statesman was making a speech to a point he believed in, there was great impatience. There'd even be stamping of feet on the floor by these new cats. Don't ask me which ones; I don't know which ones. In embarrassment the elder statesman would finally sink back into his seat, sometimes in tears.

This to me was symbolic of something rather tragic in an institution established for nonpolitical purpose. Certainly the

Sherriffs: taxpayers--which is a dirty word to a liberal; certainly the citizens of the state, which is an "all right" word for liberals, didn't intend that a university in a free society should be one that stifled speech of those that they didn't want to hear.

The real free speech issue was the one that wasn't talked about. It was that [Edward] Teller, for example, couldn't speak in his class because he was one who wanted better behavior on the campus. (And, of course, because of atomic research.) People made a point of threatening his life, and of making a shambles out of his class--and did so to quite a number of others on that campus. A number of them have by now written articles in Harper's and Atlantic as to why they left, not because of Ronald Reagan, but because there was no place for people with their ideas on that campus.

Rowland: Some of the older respected faculty members who had identified with the purpose of the university?

Sherriffs: Right, and they were liberals. That wasn't the issue. They just didn't believe in the lack of civility and the violence.

Evaluating the Free Speech Movement

Sherriffs: So I guess what I'm trying to say is that, as I see it, the problem would have probably happened no matter what, because parents had not had roles that were respected by their own children, and that immobilized the children in growing up. There was no adolescent rebellion because there was nothing to rebel against; your parents did what you did and so on. You have to read up on that aspect of the era to understand how real it was. People were seeking anonymity. Going steady was a way not to take a chance on being turned down. If one interviewed the kids themselves, one learned it was a very real psychological, social psychological, situation that was meant to remove competition.

If somebody was aggressive and knew what he was about wanted to take over student government, take over the faculty senate or anything else, it would be easier under these circumstances, than at any time I could imagine. The minute you could put a "good cause" notion to it, you could get a fair number of followers and lots of observers. So there's that.

Sherriffs: It probably would have happened if there hadn't been Clark Kerr, it it had been John Doe that was president. If there hadn't been an Alex Sherriffs there would have been Jane Doe or somebody else. It happened as easily as it did though because we had a president who functioned as though he were the chancellor, but he didn't do so openly. He functioned with the chancellor and chancellor's staff and a regents board that didn't know where the president left off in reporting the facts.

And not all of the facts were reported, but strange information was coming in to the regents from those that did know the chancellor or did know Alex Sherriffs or did know other people, information that didn't tally exactly with what they were hearing. So I don't know whether you would say it was exacerbated by--

Rowland: Did the governor also fit that equation? Was he involved in that formula too?

Sherriffs: I think Pat [pause]--I'd like to hear Pat on the subject. I think Pat was one who was willing to accept foibles in friends, and I don't mean that in a negative sense. He would be willing to forgive lots of things if a person was overall a good person.

Rowland: He trusted Clark Kerr--

Sherriffs: I think in a confusing situation he had to go one way or another and he threw his weight with Clark Kerr. Even so it became hard because he was getting hooked--in some of those materials I'm leaving with you here, Kerr says, "Arrest nonstudents"--but at the same time, he's publicly asking the governor to keep the police out. The governor gets a report that somebody's roughed up and brings the police in and Kerr says, "I've been double-crossed." What the hell? You end up with a puzzle. As far as I'm concerned, you end up with more of a puzzle than a clear picture the more you know. [chuckles]

Anyway, the more I know! I'm not even mad anymore so I can't end up with just believing what I want to believe!

Anyway, I think the scariest thing about the whole thing is that it can happen in this country, because it did, and secondly, is that there is no way we've learned from that one experience to stop it. Standing resolute against them didn't stop it. Making speeches didn't stop it. The one thing that was never tried was throwing your weight with the normal students. SLATE, FSM could use any mimeograph, any xerox machine in the institution.

Rowland: By "normal students" you mean students who were not involved in the Free Speech Movement or were not involved politically?

Sherriffs: For instance, there were a couple of groups, I can't remember what they called themselves even, they were rather small-- Students for a Responsible University or something like that.

The orders were out to the faculty: don't let them use your stuff because it will antagonize those other guys.

Rowland: The other guys?

Sherriffs: Yes, FSM. You can't let them use your things. I think I told you last time that there was report that this FSM person was taking a piece of furniture from the student union to his home and the police stopped him. The chancellor's office--this wasn't under Ed Strong, it was under the new chancellor--called the police and told them not to create any problems. There's a note that I can show you from one staff member to that chancellor saying, "Don't worry, the police know that they aren't supposed to follow up on it."

Well, this is trying to buy or pander your way out of trouble. Yielding to blackmail never works. It's odd to me that people thought it would.

Rowland: Unfortunately, we've reached the end of our interview. I most sincerely appreciate the time you've given to our project and I hope we can continue more interviews with you on the Reagan era at a later date.

Transcriber: Michelle Stafford
Final Typist: Matthew Schneider

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
Holds B.A. from Western Connecticut State College and M.A. from San Francisco State University, with additional studies at Hunter College and Columbia University in New York, and the University of California, Berkeley.

Teacher and administrator in public and private schools for five years. Developed specialization in California legislative history through master's studies on higher education and legislative affairs.

Interviewer/Editor for Regional Oral History Office, 1978 to present.

Author of articles in professional journals.

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